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ARISTOTLE

ON THE SOUL
PARVA NATURALIA
ON BREATH

WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY
W. 5. Hier, M.A.

SOMBTIME SCHOLAT OF WSDMAM COLLEGH OXFORD

LONDON
WILLIAM HEINEMANN LTD

CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS
HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS
MOMXXXV

Printed ἐπὶ Great Britain

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION .

ON THE SOUL:
INTRODUCTION .
Book I :
Boox 11
Boox III

PARVA NATURALIA:

On Sense ann Sensrsue Opsecrs—
Introduction
Text and Tr ΠΕΣ

On Memory anp RecoLLecrion—
Introduction
Text and Translation

On Sueep anp Waxina—
Introduction
Text and Tr: aadlagion

Ow Drtans—

Introduction ‘
Text and Translation

CONTENTS

On Propuecy In SLEEP—
Introduction
Text and Tr itor

On Lenern anp Srorryrss ov Lire—
Introduction
Text and Ῥωιηβϊαϊίοι

On Yourn anp Ομ Aer, On Lure anp
Deatu—
Introduction ‘
Text and Translation

On RespiraTion—

Introduction
Text and Tr ealatten

ON BREATH :

Introduction
Text and T eanelnun

InpExEes—
1. Index Nominum
2. Index Rerum

PAGE

483
181

517
518

INTRODUCTION

Antsrorte, the man, we know; the works of
Aristotle, the philosopher, present almost insuperable
problems. We know as much of the life of Aristotle
as of most of Hellas’ great men, but we find it diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to regard his work as his con-
temporaries regarded it. His writing was considered a
model of Greek prose style at its best, but no one who
reads his works as they have come down to us could
subscribe to this view. In the treatises comprised in
this volume, the philosopher is sometimes lucid and
bald, sometimes involved and obscure, and sometimes
even unintelligible, but very rarely brilliant in style.
Yet we need not necessarily blame Aristotle for
this. In days when there was no copyright corrup-
tion of the text was fatally easy, and if we are to
believe Strabo, the works of Aristotle were peculiarly
unfortunate in this respect. According to that
author, Aristotle left his library to Theophrastus,
who handed it on to others. It passed through a
good many hands, including those of one Apellicon,
who is delightfully described by Strabo as “ἃ book-
worm, rather than a philosopher,” by whom the gaps
in the manuscript caused by damp and moth were
filled in “ not well.” Later on still, when Sulla cap:
tured Athens, they were transferred to Rome, and
edited by inferior clerks under the direction of
vii

INTRODUCTION

booksellers who made no attempt to collate the
different copies. Small wonder if we find them often
obsenre and lacking in style. There is, however,
another view of the works which have come down
to us bearing the name of Aristotle. Cicero refers to
them as commentarit, and it is quite possible that
the present volume contains nothing but leclure
notes compiled cither by Aristotle himself or his
pupils. This would account for the unevenness of
exposition. Some points are argued in full, some
are only bricfly outlined. It might also account for
the numerous cross-references to other treatises, some
of which cannot be traced.

Yet, in spite of obscurity and baldness of style, it
would be quite wrong to suppose that these treatises
ave valueless. An attempt has been made in the
introductions to the separate treatises to show where
this value lies for us to-day.

The modern reader studying Greek philosophy is
confronted at the outset by a difficulty which must
be boldly faced. Aristotle received his training in
the school of Plato, and from him inherited many of
his fundamental beliefs. Plato had come to regard
the world of sense as unreal, and only the world as
apprehended by the mind, detached as far as possible
from sense impressions, as real. Aristotle repeatedly
shows this Platonic influence in his handling of philo-
sophical questions. He pursues an argument in the
direction in which Logic leads him, quite unmoved by
any apparent absurdity in the conclusions at which
he arrives. Thus in this volume Aristotle will often
be found to reach conclusions, which at first sight
seem only fantastic; but such are always worth
careful and unbiased consideration.

viii

INTRODUCTION

This collection of treatises belongs to subjects on
the borderline between bodily and mental. Aris-
totle was the son of a doctor, and himself a biologist,
who believed in experiment and dissection as a means
of collecting evidence. Thus his views on the soul
are influenced by his physiology. Yet he never falls
into the meshes of materialism, and appears quite
certain that the body cannot possibly explain the
mind, His method is analytical, his logic, within
the limitations imposed by his age and personal
character, is ruthless, and his knowledge is ency-
clopaedic. His arguments and conclusions should
assuredly serve to stimulate, even where they fail
to satisfy.

Finally, without’ any monotheistic conception of
God, Aristotle believes implicitly in design and pur-
pose in the universe, and lays it down as axiomatic
that no account of any part of the body or function
of the mind can be considered adequate, unless it
shows the purpose which it serves in the scheme of
creation.

Tur Texr

The present text is that of Bekker. It is based in
the main upon two mss. known as Codex Parisiensis
and Codex Vaticanus. Bekker also collated six other
mss., which seem to have come from one original.
Since the publication of Bekker’s recension a con-
siderable amount of research has been devoted to
themss. This has suggested a number of alterations,’
some of which have cleared up doubtful points or

INTRODUCTION

havemade unintelligible passages comparatively clear.
Where such an alteration has seemed important it
has been incorporated in the text, and the original
“ Bekker ” reading printed as a footnote followed by
the letter B. In most eases it hus not seemed worth
while to print other mss. variations.

I have found it impossible to express in detail my
indebtedness to those many scholars who have edited
or revised the text of Aristotle’s De Anima and
Parva Naturalia, but all who have worked in this
field must. be conscious how great that debt inevitably
is. In the translation it has been my aim to make
Aristotle’s meaning as clear as possible, even if this
has involved contraction or (more commonly) ex-
pansion of the Greek. I have one other debt to
acknowledge : my thanks are due to Messrs. R. & R.
Clark’s reader, who has dealt so ably with the
German text (in spite of the comparative poorness
of the type and the irritating contractions) that my
own task of proof correction has been reduced to a
minimum.

It may assist the gencral reader to add an ex-
planation of some of the technical terms used by
Aristotle in this work.

‘

δυνάμει (“ potential’), A man is “ potentially ”
(e.g.) a thinking being, but he is not always
thinking. When this capacity is actually
operating, Aristotle calls him ἐνεργείᾳ (“ actu-
ally ’’) a thinking being.

ἐντελεχεία (“ actuality ” or “ actualization”’). This
term frequently overlaps ἐνέργεια, but in its

INTRODUCTION

most exact sensc it means more. It is the
perfect realization of all that any creature or
power is capable of becoming.

εἶδος (‘form ἢ), often contrasted with ὕλη
(‘matter’), Matter in itself is formless ;
e.g. the marble from which a statue is carved.
When it has received εἶδος, it becomes τόδε Tt
(“ particular thing ”).

κατὰ συμβεβηκός (‘ accidentally”), τὰ συμβεβηκότα
C‘ contingent attributes’). A table may be
green, but its greenness is only “ accidental ” ;
that is to say, if it were (¢.g.) brown, it would
be just as much a table as before. But there
are Some qualities which belong to its οὐσία
(“ essence,” “ essential quality .). We assume
this to be true of all objects of sense, and
although it is always difficult and usually im-
possible to determine exactly what these
qualities are their sum total constitutes the
τὸ τί ἣν εἶναι (“that which makes it what it
is”

νοῦς (‘mind "); the most general word, including
frequently both the percipient and the in-
tellectual faculties. It is sometimes sub-
divided by Aristotle into vots πρακτικός (the
mind as applied to producing results) and the
νοῦς θεωρητικός (the mind regarded as purely
contemplative).

πάσχω (“be acted upon”? or “ affected’). Both in
the physical and intellectual worlds influences
of different kinds are at work. If such an
influence operates the object of it is said
πάσχειν. The noun πάθος (“ affection ’’) is Lo
be interpreted in this sense.

INTRODUCTION

φαντασία (“imagination”). ‘The word is used by
Aristotle in two senses: (1) sometimes it
operates in the presence of the sensible object
and thus ‘‘interprets ‘the object to the mind ;
(2) sometimes it operates in the absence of
the sensible object, and then is either a form
of memory or what we call‘ pare imagination.”

ON THE SOUL

INTRODUCTION

It seems impossible to avoid the word “soul”? as a
translation of the Greck ψυχήν indeed it would ‘be
entirely suitable were it not for the religious con-
notation with which the word is invariably associated
in the language of to-day, ᾿

This treatise has more interest for us as the founda-
tion of the modern science of psychology than for its
actual conclusions. It is not to be supposed that
Aristotle was the first to inquire into the nature of
the soul; far from it. Indeed he builds on the
foundations laid by his predecessors, particularly
Plato. But he was the first to grasp the importance
of the application of scientific method to the inquiry.
The present treatise was not Aristotle’s only work
on the subject ; but we have only fragments of his
dialogue—the Eudemus—and these for the most part
only repeat the arguments of the De Anima.

A precise definition of the soul is hard to come by,
though we shall find one in this work, which Aristotle
ultimately accepts, but we may premise that the
author means by the word that in virtue of which
the term living is applied to plants, animals, and above
all to men; but weare not to understand from this
that each of these three classes has a soul of the same’
kind.

ΟΝ THE SOUL

ARGUMENT

Book I

A reader who wishes to know nothing beyond what
Aristotle himself can contribute to psychology could
afford to omit nearly the whole of Book I.; for the
author has devoted it in the main to clearing the
ground for a statement of his own views in Books FH.
amd IIT. Yet this first book has a value of its own,
in that it shows that Aristotle did not consider him-
self a pioneer in this field, though he clearly regards
his predecessors’ conclusions as always inadequate,
and often quite erroneous.

The first chapter raises some preliminary questions
as to the right method of approach to this important
subject, and as to the category to which the soul
properly belongs. ‘The philosopher then passes on
to consider how body and soul are related. We
ourselves are quite familiar with this problem. We
find ourselves continually baffled in an attempt to
draw an accurate line of demarcation between the
“ physical ’’ (as we call it) and the “‘mental.”’ Aris-
totle’s conclusion (which is further developed later
in the treatise) is that the soul itself is without ques-
tion incorporeal, but that it has no possibility of
action apart from the body to which it belongs. In
his own language it is only separable from the body
in thought, in just the way that a geometrical truth
is only separable in thought from the figure to which
it relates. .

The rest of the book is mainly devoted to those
characteristics of the soul which are acknowledged by
earlier thinkers. It is the cause of movement, and
it is composed of the elements. To neither of these

ARISTOTLE.

propositions does Aristotle give unqualified assent, nor
on the other hand does he explicitly deny them. Ie,
however, points out with a good deal] of closely reasoned
argument, that many difficulties arise if these two
characteristics are accepted without. qualification,

He denies the doctrine Lhat the soul moves itself.
This erroneous theory was based on the belief that
the soul is the cause of movement and that nothing
can produce movement, which does not itself moye!
At the same time he admits that there must be some
connexion between mavement and the soul, but he
leaves its precise nature undetermined. He sug-
gests in chapter 4. that the soul may only move “ in-
directly,” that is, that it may be in something which
moves (the body), and only moves in this sense,

The second supposed characteristic of the soul—
that it is composed of the elements—scems to Aris-
totle equally unconvincing as it stands. If the soul
is composed of the elements it cannot escape from
being corporeal ; and, even if this conclusion were not
inevitable, it would be impossible on this hypothesis
to account for many of the admitted functions of the
soul.

The rest of Book I. is occupied with other earlier
theories, particularly with the question whether the
soul has parls, or is one and indivisible, Aristotle
seems to conclude that the soul has parts, but that
these parts are not qualitatively different.

Book II

This book begins with a tentative definition of the
soul ; it is found to be “ the first actuality of a natural
body possessing life.” These difficult words will

ON THE SOUL

repay careful consideration. A block of marble is
the “ matter’ out of which the statue of Hermes is
made. ‘The marble may then be said to be potentially
a statue of Hermes. But when it receives “ form”
—given to it by the sculptor—it becomes “ actually ”’
a statue of Hermes. Similarly the body being the
“ matter ” the soul gives it form, and the living being
is now actualized. So the soul is the actuality of the
body. It is called the first actuality as opposed to
the second, which is the soul when performing its
functions.

Chapter 2 begins with an explanation of true
definition. Aristotle decides that his present de-
finition is foo abstract, and that a much closer in-
vestigation of the functions of the soul is essential
to a true understanding of it. They are found to be
nutrition, sensation, thinking and movement. After
some argument these functions are found 1o con-
stitute a series, the later terms of the series implying
the earlier ones, so that as we ascend from the lower
to the higher forms of life we find more and higher
functions.

The most elementary and essential faculty of the
soulis the nutritive, In this is included both feeding,
which preserves the life of the individual, and repro-
duction, which preserves the life of the species.

The remainder of Book ITI. (chs. 5-12) is concerned
with sensation. Avistotle deals first with sensation
in general and then with the senses in particular.
Vision and the objects of vision first come under
review. It is found that light is an essential con-
dition of vision, and Aristotle offers us a physical
explanation of light, which is largely inaccurate.
He then outlines a theory, which he discusses later

ARISTOTLE

on, that in between the sensible object and the sense
organ which perccives it there must exist a medium,
without which no sensation will be felt.

Chapter 8 deals with sound on similar lines, chapter
9 with smell, chapter 10 with taste, chapter 11 with
touch, while the last chapter attempts a definition
of seusation in general.

Book L1I

This book begins with a complicated and somewhat
unnecessary argument to prove that there are only
five senses, and that therefore anything which is
perceived, and yet appears not to be the object of
any one of ihe five, must be pereeived by a combina-
tion of two or nore senses. After the discussion of
some further difficulties in the operation of the
sensitive faculties Aristotle proceeds (ch. 8) to con-
sider the relation between sensation and thinking.
He finds (ch. 4) that though they have obyious super-
ficial analogies they are not really analogous, From
this point up to the end of chapter 8 he deals with
the mind, its method of operation, and how far tis
a of abstract thinking is illusory. In chapter 8
16 attempts to summarize his views on the relations
between the sensitive and thinking facullics of the
soul, and decides that although they can be con-
ceived as separate they are really interdependent and
inseparable. In chapter 9 Aristotle reaches the
question how movement is associated with the soul.
On the commonly accepted view that there are
definite and separate parts of the soul he cannot
account for movement as due to any one of these,
though he thinks (ch. 10) that it may be due to

ΟΝ THE SOUL

“appetence and mind.” In chapter 11 mind is
dismissed as being a real cause of movement, and
appetence seems to be left to account for it. The last
two chapters attempt to explain why the various
forms of life occur in an ascending scale, gradualed
by the possession of more and more faculties of the
soul. ‘Touch is the one indispensable faculty, with-
out which the living creature must die; the other
(and presumably higher) faculties exist in the higher
‘animals, not that they may live but that they may
“live well.”

ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΔΟΥΣ
ΠΕΡῚ ΨΥΧΗΣ

405). 1. Τῶν καλῶν καὶ τιμίων τὴν εἴδησιν ὑπολαμ-
βάνοντες, μᾶλλον δ᾽ ἑτέραν ἑτέρας ἢ κατ᾽ ἀκρίβειαν
ἢ τῷ βελτιόνων τε καὶ θαυμασιωτέρων εἶναι, δι᾽
ἀμφότερα ταῦτα τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἱστορίαν εὐλόγως
ἂν ἐν πρώτοις τιθείημεν. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ πρὸς
ἀλήθειαν ἅπασαν ἡ γνῶσις αὐτῆς μεγάλα συμβάλ-
λεσθαι, μάλιστα δὲ πρὸς τὴν φύσιν: ἔστι γὰρ οἷον
ἀρχὴ τῶν ζῴων. ἐπιζητοῦμεν δὲ θεωρῆσαι καὶ
γνῶναι τήν τε φύσιν αὐτῆς καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν, εἶθ᾽
ὅσα συμβέβηκε περὶ αὐτήν- ὧν τὰ μὲν ἴδια πάθη
τῆς ψυχῆς εἶναι δοκεῖ, τὰ δὲ δι᾿ ἐκείνην καὶ τοῖς
ζῴοις ὑπάρχειν. πάντῃ δὲ πάντως ἐστὶ τῶν χαλε-
πωτάτων λαβεῖν τινὰ πίστιν περὶ αὐτῆς. καὶ γὰρ
ὄντος κοινοῦ τοῦ ζητήματος πολλοῖς ἑτέροις, λέγω
δὲ τοῦ περὶ τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τοῦ τί ἐστι, τάχ᾽ ἄν
τῳ δόξειε μία τις εἶναι μέθοδος κατὰ πάντων περὶ
ὧν βουλόμεθα γνῶναι τὴν οὐσίαν, ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν
κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἰδίων ἀπόδειξις, ὥστε ζητητέον

1 ἀπόδειξιν B.
8

ARISTOTLE: ON THE SOUL

BOOK I

I. We regard all knowledge as beautiful and valu-
able, but one kind more so than another, either in
virtue of its accuracy, or because it relates to higher
and more wonderful things. On both these counts
it is reasonable to put an inquiry into the soul among
subjects of the foremost rank. Moreover this in-
vestigation seems likely to make a substantial con-
tribution to the whole body of truth, and particularly
to the study of nature ; for the soul is in a sense the
basis of animal life. So we seek to examine and
investigate first the nature and essential quality of
the soul, and then its contingent attributes. Of the
latter some seem to be affections peculiar to the soul,
-and others seem to belong to all living things by
virtue of the soul, But to attain any sure belief on
the subject is hedged with difficulties on every side.
This inquiry has the same characteristics as many
others, such as that concerned with essential quality
and real existence, and one might suppose that there
was one method applicable to all the things whose
real nature we wish to understand; just as syl-
logistic demonstration applies to all their contingent
attributes. If so, this method must be discovered ;

Tho object:
and method
ot the
inquiry.

402 a

τῷ
aa

402 b

ARISTOTLE

ἂν εἴη τὴν μέθοδον ταύτην. εἰ δὲ μή ἐστι μία
τις καὶ κοινὴ μέθοδος περὶ τὸ τί ἐστιν, ἔτι χαλε-
πώτερον γίνεται τὸ πραγματευθῆναι- δεήσει γὰρ
λαβεῖν περὶ ἕκαστον τίς ὁ ,Τρόπος, ἐὰν δὲ φανερὸν
ἢ, πότερον ἀπόδειξίς τίς ἐστιν ἢ διαίρεσις ἢ καί
τις ἄλλη μέθοδος, ἔτι' πολλὰς ἀπορίας ἔχει καὶ
πλάνας, ἐκ τίνων δεῖ ζητεῖν" ἄλλαι γὰρ ἄλλων
ἀρχαί, καθάπερ ἀριθμῶν καὶ ἐπιπέδων.

Πρῶτον δ᾽ ἴσως ἀναγκαῖον διελεῖν ἐν τίνι τῶγ
γενῶν καὶ τί ἐστι, λέγω δὲ πότερον τόδε τι καὶ
οὐσία ἢ ποιὸν ἢ ποσὸν ἢ καί τις ἄλλη τῶν διαιρε-
θεισῶν “κατηγοριῶν, ἔτι δὲ πότερον τῶν ἐν δυνάμει
ὄντων ἣ μᾶλλον ἐντελέχειά τις" διαφέρει γὰρ ov σι
σμικρόν. σκεπτέον δὲ καὶ εἰ μεριστὴ ἢ ἀμερής,
καὶ πότερον “ὁμοειδὴς ἅπασα ψυχὴ 7) οὔ! εἰ δὲ μὴ
ὁμοειδής, πότερον εἴδει διαφέρουσιν ἢ γένει. νῦν
μὲν γὰρ οἱ λέγοντες καὶ ζητοῦντες περὶ ψυχῆς
περὶ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης μόνης ἐοίκασιν. ἐπισκοπεῖν.
οὐαι δ᾽ ὅπως μὴ λανθάνῃ “πότερον εἷς ὁ
λόγος αὐτῆς ἐστί, καθάπερ ζῴου, ἢ καθ᾿ ἕκαστον
ἕτερος, οἷον ἵππου, κυνός, ἀνθρώπου, θεοῦ' τὸ δὲ
ξῷον τὸ καθόλου ἤτοι οὐθέν ἐστιν ἣ ὕστερον.
ὁμοίως δὲ κἂν εἴ τι κοινὸν ἄλλο κατηγοροῖτο. ἔτι
δ᾽ εἰ μὴ πολλαὶ ψυχαὶ ἀλλὰ μόρια, πότερον Set

1 μέθοδος. ἔτι δὲ 1).

Τα Pivision, Plato used and perhaps invented this method
of forming a concept. If, for instance, you divide the term
“living Saoaa ties into “ footed’? and “ footless,”” and
“footed *? again into “ biped” and “ quadruped,” and so
on, you il after many such divisions and subdivisions
form a clear concept of the meaning of “ living creature.”

A. objects (Post. dn. 11, c. 7, 92 b 5) to the method on several

grounds, one being that such division presupposes the
existence of the concept.

ON THE SOUL, I. 1.

but if there is no one common method of inquiry
into real existence, our handling of the subject be-
comes still more difficult. Tor we shall be obliged
to establish the proper method in each individual
case ; and, even if this is patent, whether syllogistic
demonstration, or division,® or some other method is
the right one, there is still room for confusion and
error as to the premisses from which we must start
the inquiry ; for the premisses of all subjects are
mot the same; for instance those of arithmetic and
those of plane geometry are different.

Perhaps our first business is to determine to what To what
genus the soul belongs, and what it is; I mean ae
whether it is some particular thing and has real soul belong?
existence or whether it is a qualiiy, or quantity, or
belongs to any other of our pre-established cate-
gories, and furthermore, whether it has potential or
actualeyistence. For this makes no small difference.
In the second place we must inquire whether it has
parts or ποῖ, and whether every soul is of the same
kind or not; and if not, whether the difference is
one of species or of genus. For speakers and in-
quirers about the soul seem to-day to confine their
inquiries to the soul of man. But one must be care-
ful not to evade the question whether one definition
of “soul” is enough, as we can give one definition
of “living creature,” or whether there must be a
different one for each soul; that is, one of the horse,
one of the dog, one of man, and one of God, and
whether the words “ living creature ” as a common
term have no meaning, or logically come later. This
question can of course be raised about any common
term. Further, supposing that there are not many
-kinds of soul, but only parts, are we to inquire first

402 b
10

408 a

ARISTOTLE

- ͵ Ἂς; ia ἧι. al 4 é
ζητεῖν πρότερον τὴν ὅλην ψυχὴν ἢ τὰ μόρια.
A δ᾽ " ta ὃ iy “a ,ὔ
χαλεπὸν δὲ καὶ τούτων διορίσαι ποῖα πέφυκεν
Lid > 7 a rs \ ? \ 4 aA
ἕτερα ἀλλήλων, καὶ πότερον τὰ μόρια χρὴ ζητεῖν

᾿ Ὁ Φ ἢ ἐξ,
πρότερον ἢ τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν, οἷον τὸ νοεῖν ἢ τὸν
“ δ \ ? 4 bd \ > J ¢ Ls
νοῦν Kat τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ τὸ αἰσθητικόν" ὁμοίως
δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. εἰ δὲ τὰ ἔργα πρότερον,
-
πάλιν ἄν τις ἀπορήσειεν εἰ τὰ ἀντικείμενα πρότερον
᾿ a ww
τούτων ζητητέον, οἷον τὸ αἰσθητὸν τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ
~ ~ , >
Kal τὸ νοητὸν τοῦ νοητικοῦ. ἔοικε δ᾽ οὐ μόνον
τὸ τί ἐστι γνῶναι χρήσιμον εἶναι πρὸς τὸ θεωρῆσαι
~ cal f tA
τὰς αἰτίας τῶν συμβεβηκότων ταῖς οὐσίαις, ὥσπερ
3 a la rd A > \ v 4 Ν ,
ἐν τοῖς μαθήμασι τί τὸ εὐθὺ καὶ καμπύλον ἢ τί
\ \ a. Ψ ‘ ‘ a /
γραμμὴ καὶ ἐπίπεδον πρὸς τὸ κατιδεῖν πόσαις
> nn ς “-“ tA / w 3 A A
ὀρθαῖς αἱ τοῦ τριγώνου γωνίαι ἴσαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ
ἀνάπαλιν τὰ συμβεβηκότα συμβάλλεται μέγα μέρος
AY \ Ὁ Δ ft > ᾿
πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι τὸ τί ἐστιν’ ἐπειδὰν γὰρ ἔχωμεν
ἀποδιδόναι κατὰ τὴν φαντασίαν περὶ τῶν συμ-
βεβηκότων, ἢ πάντων ἢ τῶν πλείστων, τότε καὶ
Ἅ a 2 / id , / ,΄
περὶ τῆς οὐσίας ἕξομεν λέγειν κάλλιστα: πάσης
‘ > ᾿ς > A A * 3 a >
yap ἀποδείξεως ἀρχὴ τὸ τί ἐστιν, ὥστε καθ᾽ ὅσους
- - i
τῶν δρισμῶν μὴ συμβαίνει τὰ συμβεβηκότα γνωρί-
3 \ 3 ? δ, " > ~ 2 / os
few, ἀλλὰ μηδ᾽ εἰκάσαι περὶ αὐτῶν εὐμαρές, δῆλον
a ~ i A ~
ὅτι διαλεικτικῶς εἴρηνται καὶ κενῶς ἅπαντες.
? , > " A 7 - Δι , ,
Απορίαν δ᾽ ἔχει καὶ τὰ πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς, πότερόν
2 a
ἐστι πάντα κοινὰ καὶ τοῦ ἔχοντος ἢ ἐστί τι καὶ

12°

ON THE SOUL, I. 1.

into the soul as a whole or the several parts? Here and how
again it is difficult to determine the nature of the nae
differences, one from the other, and whether we theunalysia?
should inquire first into the parts of the soul, or their
functions ; for example, into the thinking or into
that which thinks, into sensation or into that which
feels; and a similar difficulty arises with all the
other parts. If we are to take the functions first, a
further problem may arise ; whether we should con-
sider the objects corresponding to them before the
parts themselves—I mean, the thing felt before the
part of the goul which feels it, and the thing thought
before the mind which thinks it. A knowledge of
what ἃ thing is is of course:a valuable assistance
towards the examination of the causes of the attri-
butes contingent upon its essence ; for instance, in
mathematics, to know the meaning of “ straight,’
“eurved,’”’ “line,” and “ plane figure” helps to
determine the number of right-angles to which the
angles of a triangle are equal. But the converse
is also true; the accidental properties contribute
materially to the knowledge of what a thing is. For
when we are in a position to expound all or most of
the accidental properties as presented to us, we shall
also be best qualified to speak about the essence.
Por the essential quality of a thing is the starting-
point for a demonstration, and definitions which do
not enable us to know the accidental properties, nor
even to make a tolerable guess about them, are
clearly laid down merely for argument’s sake and are
utterly valueless.

The affections of the soul present a further diffi- Relations
culty—Are they all associated with that which con- δι ἀραὶ ἀρὰ
tains the soul, or is any of them peculiar to the soul

ARISTOTLE
408 κα
τῆς ψυχῆς ἴδιον αὐτῆς" τοῦτο γὰρ λαβεῖν μὲν

, - Py £45 δέ δι δὲ α λ ,
ἀναγκαῖον, οὐ ῥάδιον δέ. φαίνεται δὲ τῶν πλείστων
οὐθὲν ἄνευ σώματος πάσχειν οὐδὲ ποιεῖν, οἷον
ὀργίζεσθαι, θαρρεῖν, ἐπιθυμεῖν, ὅλως αἰσθάνεσθαι.
4λ δ᾽ ΜΝ 18 A we >» δ᾽ ? 1 \
μάλιστα δ᾽ ἔοιικεν ἴδιον τὸ νοεῖν" εἰ δ᾽ ἐστὶ καὶ
τοῦτο φαντασία τις ἢ μὴ ἄνευ φαντασίας, οὐκ
10 ἐνδέχοιτ᾽ ἂν οὐδὲ τοῦτ᾽ ἄνευ σώματος εἶναι, εἰ
μὲν οὖν ἐστί τι τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἔργων ἣ παθημάτων

my Σ Ψ > n > \ ‘ > \
ἴδιον, evddyorr ἄν αὐτὴν χωρίζεσθαι' εἰ δὲ μη-
/ >? wu >A ΕἾ bh a / 3 A
θέν ἐστιν ἴδιον αὐτῆς, οὐκ ἂν εἴη χωρφστή, ἀλλὰ
καθάπερ τῷ εὐθεῖ, ἢ εὐθύ, πολλὰ συμβαίνει, οἷον
ἅπτεσθαι τῆς χαλιςῆς σφαίρας κατὰ στιγμήν, οὐ
μέντοι γ᾽ ἅψεται τούτου χωρισθὲν τὸ εὐθύ" ἀ-
χώριστον γάρ, εἴπερ ἀεὶ μετὰ σώματός τινός ἐστιν.
ἔοικε δὲ καὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς πάθη πάντα εἶναι μετὰ

, , / , y f
σώματος, θυμός, πραότης, φόβος, ἔλεος, θάρσος,
ἔτι χαρὰ καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν τε καὶ μισεῖν: ἅμα γὰρ
τούτοις πάσχει τι τὸ σῶμα. μηνύει δὲ τὸ ποτὲ
20 μὲν ἰσχυρῶν καὶ ἐναργῶν παθημάτων συμβαινόντων
μηδὲν παροξύνεσθαι ἢ φοβεῖσθαι, ἐνίοτε δ᾽ ὑπὸ
μικρῶν καὶ ἀμαυρῶν κινεῖσθαι, ὅταν ὀργᾷ τὸ σῶμα

\ εἰ
καὶ οὕτως ἔχῃ ὥσπερ ὅταν ὀργίζηται. ἔτι δὲ
τοῦτο μᾶλλον φανερόν: μηθενὸς γὰρ φοβεροῦ συμ-
᾿ - “ a
Batvovros ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι γίνονται τοῖς τοῦ φοβου-
f a
2% μένου. εἰ δ᾽ οὕτως ἔχει, δῆλον ὅτι τὰ πάθη λόγοι
, a
ἔνυλοί εἰσιν. ὥστε οἱ ὅροι τοιοῦτοι. οἷον τὸ dpyt-
΄, “-

ζεσθαι κίνησίς τις τοῦ τοιουδὶ σώματος ἢ μέρους

1ῦ

ΟΝ THE SOUL, I. 1.

itself? This question must be faced, but its solution
is not easy. In most cases it seems that none of
the affections, whether active or passive, can exist
apart from the body. This applies to anger, en-
thusiasm, desire and sensation generally, though
possibly thinking is an exception. But if this is also
some form of activity stimulated by sense impression,
or at least cannot exist without “πὶ activity, it cannot
exist apart from the body. If then any function or
affection of the soul is peculiar to it, it can be separ-
ated from the body ; but if there is nothing peculiar
to the soul it cannot be separated. In the same way
there are many accidental properties belonging to
straight, ia straight, as, for instance, that a straight
line touches a bronze sphere at a point, yet if
separated, the straight line will not so touch. Itisin
fact inseparable, if it is always associated with some
body. Probably all the affections of the soul are
associated with the body—anger, gentleness, fear,
pity, courage and joy, as well as loving and hating ;
for when they appear the body is also affected.
There is good evidence for this. Sometimes no
irritation or fear is expressed, though the provoca-
tions are strong and obvious ; and conversely, small
and obscure causes produce movement, when the
body is disposed to anger, and when it is in an angry
mood, And here is a still more obvious proof.
There are times when men show all the symptoms of
fear without any cause of fear being present. If this
is the case, then clearly the affections of the soul are
ideas expressed in matter. Their definitions there-
fore must be in harmony with this; for instance,
anger must be defined as a movement made by a body
in a particular state, or by a part, or by a capacity of

408 ἃ

408 ἢ

τι

ARISTOTLE

nn f t A 35 4 55 \ ὃ \ -
ἢ δυνάμεως ὑπὸ τοῦδε ἕνεκα τοῦδε. καὶ διὰ ταῦτα
Ud na A - \ an an é a
ἤδη φυσικοῦ τὸ θεωρῆσαι περὶ ψυχῆς, ἢ πάσης ἢ
~ , ἔς 5» e f a
τῆς τοιαύτης. διαφερόντως δ᾽ ἂν ὁρίσαιντο dvoucds
\ \ “ toa ry , \ ,
τε καὶ διαλεκτικὸς ἕκαστον αὐτῶν, οἷον ὀργὴ τί
> ὔ ε A ‘ ΕΣ > δ uy na
ἐστίν' ὃ μὲν yap ὄρεξιν ἀντιλυπήσεως ἢ τι τοιοῦτον,
iy ἌΣ κα fo) " / “ \ ~
ὁ δὲ ζέσιν τοῦ περὶ καρδίαν αἵματος καὶ θερμοῦ.
͵ \ £ 4 A a > a [- \, \
τούτων δὲ ὁ μὲν τὴν ὕλην ἀποδίδωσιν, ὁ δὲ "τὸ
εἶδος καὶ τὸν λόγον. ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγος εἶδος τοῦ
ta 3 4 δ᾽ ἧ ~ > DAN δὲ
πράγματος, ἀνάγκη δ᾽ εἶναι τοῦτον ἐν ὕλῃ τοιᾳδί,
εἰ ἔσται, ὥσπερ οἰκίας ὁ μὲν λόγος τοιοῦτος, ὅτι
δῇ \ ~ ς 3 3 / \
σκέπασμα κωλυτικὸν φθορᾶς tm ἀνέμων καὶ
ὄμβρων καὶ καυμάτων, 6 δὲ φήσει λίθους καὶ
πλίνθους καὶ ξύλα, ἕτερος δ᾽ ἐν τούτοις τὸ εἶδος,
o é ͵ Fd © A ‘ /
ἕνεκα τωνδί. τίς οὖν ὁ φυσικὸς τούτων; πότερον
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ὁ περὶ τὴν ὕλην, τὸν δὲ λόγον ἀγνοῶν, ἢ ὁ περὶ
τὸν λόγον μόνον; ἢ μᾶλλον ὁ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν; ἐκείνων
\ 4 a ε ᾿ ay Ἅ μ᾿ ¢ * A
δὲ δὴ τίς ἑκάτερος; ἢ οὐκ ἔστι τις ὁ περὶ τὰ
, “᾽ isd 4 A Ἴ a’ τ f
πάθη τῆς ὕλης τὰ μὴ χωριστά, μηδ᾽ ἣ χωριστά,
3 3 ε A 4 av ΕΣ ae ~ ‘
GAN ὁ φυσικὸς περὶ ἅπανθ᾽ ὅσο, τοῦ τοιουδὶ
é \ “a ta a " \ /
σώματος Kal τῆς τοιαύτης ὕλης ἔργα Kal πάθη"
doa’ δὲ μὴ ἢ τοιαῦτα, ἄλλος, καὶ περὶ τινῶν
μὲν τεχνίτης, ἐὰν τύχῃ, οἷον τέκτων ἢ ἰατρός,
- A x a , 4 \ γᾷ
τῶν δὲ μὴ χωριστῶν μέν, ἦ δὲ μὴ τοιούτου
1 ὁπόσα Β,

16,

ON THE SOUL, I. τ.

such a body roused by such a cause, with such an end
in view. For this reason it immediately becomes the
business of the philosopher to inquire into the soul,
either every soul, or at least a soul from this point of
view. But the natural philosopher and the logician
will offer different definitions in answer to the ques-
tion what is anger. The latter will call it a craving
for retaliation, or something of the sort, while the
former will describe it as a surging of the blood round
the-heart and a form of heat. The one is describing
the matter, the other the form, that is the idea
implied. For this implied idea is the form of the
thing, and if it is to exist, it must appear in matter
of such a kind. To illustrate this: the idea of a
house is a covering to protect from dainaye by wind,
rain and heat. But another will mean by a house
stones, bricks and timber; and another again will
mean the form expressed in these materials to achieve
these objects. Now which of these is really the
natural philosopher? The man who ignores the
form and is only concerned with the matter, or the
man who is only concerned with the idea implied ?
Probably the man who bases his concept on both.
What then are we to say of the other two? Perhaps
there is no one who treats of the affections of the
soul which are inseparable, or in so far as they are
inseparable *; but the natural philosopher’s concern
is with all the functions and affections of the body, and
of matter in such a state ; whatever is not in such a
state is the business of another ; in some subjects it
is the business of the craftsman, the carpenter, it
may be, or the physician ; but inseparables in so far
as they are not affections of the body in such a state,

4 4a, from the body.
c 17

ARISTOTLE

408 b , , ae) 3 , « ῃ
1 σώματος πάθη καὶ ἐξ ἀφαιρέσεως, ὁ μαθηματικός,

h δὲ κεχωρισμένα, ὁ πρῶτος φιλόσοφος.
᾿Αλλ᾽ ἐπανιτέον ὅθεν 6 λόγος. ἐλέγομεν δ᾽ ὅτι
τὰ πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς ἀχώριστα τῆς φυσικῆς ὕλης
τῶν ζῴων, 4 δὴ τοιαῦθ᾽ ὑπάρχει, θυμὸς καὶ φόβ
+ 27 ἢ PX ? μος opos,
καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ γραμμὴ καὶ ἐπίπεδον.
2 ol A \ inl 3 - ω
20 1|. ᾿πισκοποῦντας δὲ περὶ ψυχῆς ἀναγκαῖον ἅμα
διαποροῦντας περὶ ὧν εὐπορεῖν δεῖ, προελθόντας
τὰς τῶν προτέρων δόξας συμπαραλαμβάνειν ὅσοι
τι περὶ αὐτῆς ἀπεφήναντο, ὅπως τὰ μὲν καλῶς
? ta / 5 τι , i - no? ἣν
εἰρημένα λάβωμεν, ef δέ τι μὴ καλῶς, τοῦτ᾽ ed-
86 λαβηθῶμεν. ἀρχὴ δὲ τῆς ζητήσεως προθέσθαι τὰ
/ “- > ¢ 4 2A ‘ , A
μάλιστα δοκοῦνθ᾽ ὑπάρχειν αὐτῇ κατὰ φύσιν. τὸ
ἔμψυχον δὴ τοῦ ἀψύχου δυοῖν μάλιστα διαφέρειν
δοκεῖ, κινήσει τε καὶ τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι. παρειλή-
φαμεν δὲ καὶ παρὰ τῶν προγενεστέρων σχεδὸν
δύο ταῦτα περὶ ψυχῆς" φασὶ γὰρ ἔνιοι καὶ μάλιστα
καὶ πρώτως ψυχὴν εἶναι τὸ κινοῦν. οἰηθέντες δὲ
80 τὸ μὴ κινούμενον αὐτὸ μὴ ἐνδέχεσθαι κινεῖν ἕτερον,
τῶν κινουμένων τι τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπέλαβον εἶναι.
4040 ὅθεν Δημόκριτος μὲν πῦρ τι καὶ θερμόν φησιν
αὐτὴν εἶναι" ἀπείρων γὰρ ὄντων σχημάτων καὶ
3 i Ἂς hand ~ \ \ i
ἀτόμων τὰ σφαιροειδῆ πῦρ καὶ ψυχὴν λέγει, οἷον
ἐν τῷ ἀέρι τὰ καλούμενα ξύσματα, ἃ φαίνεται ἐν
Ὁ ἀέρ μι ματα,
ταῖς διὰ τῶν θυρίδων ἀκτῖσιν, ὧν τὴν πανσπερμίαν

9 i.e. the Melaphysician.
18

ON THE SOUL, I. 1—11.

that is, in the abstract, are the province of the mathe-
matician, and in so far as they are separable are the
sphere of the First Philosopher.¢

But we must now retum to the point from which
our digression started. We were saying that the
affections of the soul, such as anger and feay, are in-
separable from the matter of living things in which
their nature is manifested, and are not separable like
a line and a plane figure.

ΤΙ. In our inquiry about the soul we shall have to Previons
raise problems for which we must find a solution, and fhagries as
in our progress we must take with us for comparison nee of
the theories’expounded by our predecessors, in order" *"
that we may adopt those which are well stated, and
be on our guard against any which are unsatisfactory.

But our inquiry must begin by laying down in ad-
vance those things which seem most certainly to
belong to the soul by nature. There are two qualities
in which that which has a soul seems to differ radically
from that which has not; these are movement and
sensibility. We have practically accepted these two
distinguishing characteristics of the soul from our
predecessors. Some say that capacity to produce
movement is first and foremost the characteristic of
the soul, But because they believe that nothing can
produce movement which does not itself move, they
have supposed that. the soul is one of the things which
move. On this supposition Democritus argues that
the soul is fire in some sense and heat. For forms
and atoms being countless, he calls the spherical
ones fire and soul, like what are called particles in
the air, which can be seen when the sunbeams pass
through our windows ; the whole collection of which
he calls the elements of which all nature is composed.

404 ἃ
δ

ARISTOTLE

tal λέ ~ ὅλ 14 ¢ ΄. δὲ 4
στοιχεῖα λέγει τῆς ὅλης φύσεως. ὁμοίως δὲ Kal
Λεύκιππος. τούτων δὲ τὰ σφαιροειδῆ ψυχήν, διὰ

‘ rf LY ι 7 a \
τὸ μάλιστα διὰ παντὸς δύνασθαι διαδύνειν τοὺς
τοιούτους ῥυσμούς, καὶ κινεῖν τὰ λοιπὰ κινούμενα
καὶ αὐτά, ὑπολαμβάνοντες τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι τὸ
παρέχον τοῖς ζῴοις τὴν κίνησιν». διὸ καὶ τοῦ ζῆν
ὅρον εἶναι τὴν ἀναπνοήν: συνάγοντος γὰρ τοῦ
περιέχοντος τὰ σώματα, καὶ ἐκθλίβοντος τῶν
σχημάτων τὰ παρέχοντα τοῖς ζῴοις τὴν κίνησιν
ὃ AY ὁ ὃ᾽ " \ > a. ὃ / 40

td τὸ μηδ᾽’ αὐτὰ ἠρεμεῖν μηδέποτε, βοήθειαν

, θ θ 2 2 / tn rf 1
γίγνεσθαι θύραθεν ἐπεισιόντων ἄλλων τοιούτων ἐν
τῷ ἀναπνεῖν: κωλύειν γὰρ αὐτὰ καὶ τὰ ἐνυπάρ-
χοντα ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις ἐκκρίνεσθαι, συνανείργοντα τὸ
συνάγον καὶ πηγνύον' καὶ ζῆν δὲ ἕως ἂν δύνωνται
τοῦτο ποιεῖν. ἔοικε δὲ καὶ τὸ παρὰ τῶν ΠΠυθ-

,
ayopetwy λεγόμενον τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχειν διάνοιαν'
ἔφασαν γάρ τινες αὐτῶν ψυχὴν εἶναι τὰ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι
ξύσματα, οἱ δὲ τὸ ταῦτα κινοῦν. περὶ δὲ τούτων
εἴρηται, διότι συνεχῶς φαίνεται κινούμενα, κἂν ἢ
νηνεμία παντελής. ἐπὶ ταὐτὸ δὲ φέρονται καὶ ὅσοι
λέγουσι τὴν ψυχὴν τὸ αὑτὸ κινοῦν" ἐοίκασι yap
οὗτοι πάντες ὑπειληφέναι τὴν κίνησιν οἰκειότατον

a " Α ‘ A y / a
εἶναι τῇ ψυχῇ, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πάντα κινεῖσθαι

4 fay 4
διὰ τὴν ψυχήν, ταύτην δ᾽ ὑφ᾽ ἑαυτῆς, διὰ τὸ μηθὲν

τὰ “- iJ ΄-
ὁρᾶν κινοῦν ὃ μὴ καὶ αὐτὸ κινεῖται,
‘Opoiws δὲ καὶ ᾿Αναξαγόρας ψυχὴν εἶναι λέγει

a 4 a Nv wo e ΕἾ a
τὴν κινοῦσαν, Kal εἴ τις ἄλλος εἴρηκεν ws τὸ πᾶν

ON THE SOUL, I. 1.

And Leucippus adopts a similar position. It is the
spherical atoms which they call the soul, because
such shapes can most readily pass through anything,
and can move other things by virtue of their own
motion, supposing, as they do, that the soul is that
which imparts motion to living things. They con-
sider that this is why respiration is the essential con-
dition of life ; for the surrounding atmosphere exerts
pressure upon bodies and thus forces out the atoms
which produce movement in living things, because
they themselves are never at rest. The resulting
shortage is reinforced from outside, when other
similar atoms enter in the act of breathing ; for they
prevent the atoms which are in the bodies at the time
from escaping by checking the compression and the
hardening (caused by the surrounding atmosphere) ;
and animals can live just so long as they are competent
todo this. The theory handed down from the Pyth~-
agoreans seems to mean the same thing ; for some of
them have declared that the soul is identical with
the particles in the air, and others with what makes
these particles move. The identity of these particles
with the soul has been alleged because they can be
seen perpetually in motion even when the air is com-
pletely calm. Those who say that the soul is that
which moves itself tend towards the same view.
For they all seem to assume that movement is the
distinguishing characteristic of the soul, and that
everything else owes its movement to the soul, which
they suppose to be self-moved, because they see
nothing producing movement which does not. itself
move,
In the same way Anaxagoras says that the soul is Anaxagoras,

the producer of movement, and any other who has

ARISTOTLE

4044 δος ἢ Ἣν A < to > « A ,
ἐκίνησε νοῦς, οὐ μὴν παντελῶς γ᾽ ὥσπερ Δημό-
κριτος. ἐκεῖνος μὲν γὰρ ἁπλῶς ταὐτὸν ψυχὴν
καὶ νοῦν' τὸ γὰρ ἀληθὲς εἶναι τὸ φαινόμενον" διὸ
- a Lace a e ἐσ at
80 καλῶς ποιῆσαι τὸν “Ὅμηρον ὡς “"Kxrewp κεῖτ᾽ ἀλλο-
φρονέων." οὐ δὴ χρῆται τῷ νῷ ὡς δυνάμει τινὶ περὶ
τὴν ἀλήθειαν», ἀλλὰ ταὐτὸ λέγει ψυχὴν καὶ νοῦν.
stn ᾿ΑΔναξαγόρας δ᾽ ἧττον διασαφεῖ περὶ αὐτῶν"
πολλαχοῦ μὲν γὰρ τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ καλῶς καὶ ὀρθῶς
τὸν νοῦν λέγει, ἑτέρωθι δὲ τοῦτον εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν'
ἐν ἅπασι γὰρ ὑπάρχειν αὐτὸν τοῖς ζῴοις, καὶ
o "
5 μεγάλοις καὶ μικροῖς, καὶ τιμίοις καὶ ἀτιμοτέροις.
οὐ φαίνεται δ᾽ ὅ γε κατὰ φρόνησιν λεγόμενος νοῦς
Fol cal > a
πᾶσιν ὁμοίως ὑπάρχειν τοῖς ζῴοις, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ τοῖς
ἀνθρώποις πᾶσιν.
@ \ x 2} ‘ “- \ oo 3
ὥσοι μὲν οὖν ἐπὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι τὸ ἔμψυχον ἀπ-
/ we ‘ A ¢ 7 \
ἔβλεψαν, οὗτοι τὸ κινητικώτατον ὑπέλαβον τὴν
3 \ \ ,
ψυχήν" ὅσοι δ᾽ ἐπὶ τὸ γινώσκειν καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι
~ - \ >
10 τῶν ὄντων, οὗτοι δὲ λέγουσι τὴν ψυχὴν τὰς ἀρχάς,
οἱ μὲν πλείους ποιοῦντες, οὗ δὲ μίαν ταύτην, ὥσπερ
᾿Ἐμπεδοκλῆς μὲν ex τῶν στοιχείων πάντων, εἶναι
δὲ καὶ ἕκαστον ψυχὴν τούτων, λέγων οὕτω

f \ ‘ a > Ψ. τ) 2. ᾿᾿
γαίῃ μὲν γὰρ γαῖαν ὁπώπαμεν, ὕδατι δ᾽ ὕδωρ,
αἰθέρι δ᾽ αἰθέρα δῖαν, ἀτὰρ πυρὶ πῦρ ἀΐδηλον,

16 στοργῇ δὲ στοργήν, νεῖκος δέ τε νείκεϊ λυγρῷ.

τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ Ἰ]λάτων ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ
τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων ποιεῖ" γινώσκεσθαι
γὰρ τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον, τὰ δὲ πράγματα ἐκ τῶν
ἀρχῶν εἶναι. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς περὶ φιλοσοφίας

* Because on D.’s theory the dying Hector’s delusions are
true.

ON THE SOUL, I. τι.

Jaid it down that the mind is responsible for all
movement, though not in every case, as Democritus
said; for he actually identified the soul and the
mind; for he believes that what appears to one is
the truth. Hence he regards Homer’s description
of Hector in his swooning as “ lying thinking other
thoughts ’ as accurate. He does not then employ
the term mind as a faculty concerned with the truth,
but identifies the soul and the mind.

Anaxagoras is less precise in his dealing with the
subject ; for on many occasions he speaks of the
mind as responsible for what is right and correct, but
at others he says that this is the soul: for the mind
he regards as existing in all living things, great and
small, noble and base ; but the mind in the sense of
intelligence does not appear to belong to all living
things alike, and not even to all men.

Those then who have interpreted the soul in terms
of motion have regarded the soul as most capable of
producing movement. But those who have referred
it to cognition and perception regard the soul as the
first beginning of all things—some regarding this
first beginning as plural and some as singular,
Empedocles, for instance, thought that the soul was Empedocles.
composed of all the elements, and yet considered
each of these to be asoul. He says:

By Earth we see Earth, by Water Water,
By Air the divine Air, by Fire destroying Fire,
Love by Love, and Strife by bitter Strife.

In the same way, in the Timaeus, Plato constructs
the soul out of the elements. For he maintains that
“like ’’ ean only be known by “ like,” and that from
these first beginnings grow the things which we
perceive. <A similar definition is laid down in his

404 b
20

“ὃ

ARISTOTLE

λεγομένοις διωρίσθη, αὐτὸ μὲν τὸ ζῷον ἐξ αὐτῆς
τῆς τοῦ ἑνὸς ἰδέας καὶ τοῦ πρώτου μήκους καὶ
πλάτους καὶ βάθους, τὰ δ᾽ ἄλλα ὁμοιοτρόπως.
ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἄλλως, νοῦν μὲν τὸ ἔν, ἐπιστήμην δὲ
τὰ δύο" μοναχῶς γὰρ ἐφ᾽ ἕν' τὸν δὲ τοῦ ἐπιπέδου
ἀριθμὸν δόξαν, αἴσθησιν δὲ τὸν τοῦ στερεοῦ" οἱ
μὲν γὰρ ἀριθμοὶ τὰ εἴδη αὐτὰ καὶ αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἐλέγοντο,
εἰσὶ δ᾽ ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων. κρίνεται δὲ τὰ πράγματα
τὰ μὲν νῷ, τὰ δ᾽ ἐπιστήμῃ, τὰ δὲ δόξῃ, τὰ δ᾽
αἰσθήσει" εἴδη δ᾽ of ἀριθμοὶ οὗτοι τῶν πραγμάτων.

"Eel δὲ καὶ κινητικὸν ἐδόκει ἡ ψυχὴ εἶναι καὶ
γνωριστικόν, οὕτως ἔνιοε συνέπλεξαν. ἐξ ἀμφοῖν,

np? ,
su ἀποφηνάμενοι τὴν ψυχὴν ἀριθμὸν κινοῦνθ᾽ ἑαυτόν.

405 ἃ

διαφέρονται δὲ περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν, τίνες καὶ πόσαι,
μάλιστα μὲν of σωματικὰς ποιοῦντες τοῖς ἀσω-
μάτους,' τούτοις δ᾽ οἱ μίξαντες καὶ ἀπ᾽ ἀμφοῖν τὰς
ἀρχὰς ἀποφηνάμενοι. διαφέρονται δὲ καὶ περὶ τὸ
πλῆθος" οἱ μὲν γὰρ μίαν οἱ δὲ πλείους λέγουσιν.
ἑπομένως δὲ τούτοις καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀποδιδόασιν'

ἃ ἀσωμάτοις B.

«γ} diffenlt passage gives Aristotle’s interpretation of
Plato’s theory of Ideas, as applied to the origin of the uni-
verse. We know of no treatise of Plato bout Philosophy,
but tradition ascribes the reference to some lecture notes of
Plato to which Aristotle had access. According to this
theory Pure Knowledge has some object corresponding to it;
this object is not the world of Sense, but the world of Ideas.
All the sensible world is thus but an imperfect capy of this
world of Ideas. ‘Uhere is, for instance, in the world of Ideas
an Idea Beauty, Objects in the world of Sense are beautiful
only in so far as they are copies of this. But the world of
Ideas includes the Ideas of numbers and, according to the
theory Aristotle is discussing, from these are derived some
24

ON THE SOUL, 1. τι.

comments About Philosophy, where he maintains
that the living universe is derived from the idea of
the One, primary length from the ideal number Two,
primary breadth from the ideal number Three, and
primary depth from the ideal number Four, and all
the rest in the same way. But there is a further
explanation that mind is One and knowledge Two.
For there is only one straight line from one point
to another. So the number of the plane figure
(Three) is opinion, and the number of the cube (four)
is perception. Tor numbers are alleged to be their
forms and ultimate principles, but they are composed
of the elements. The sensible world is apprehended
in some cases by mind, in others by knowledge, in
others again by opinion, and in others by perception ;
but these numbers are the forms of things.

But since the soul appears to contain an element
which produces movement and one which produces
knowledge, so some thinkers have constructed it
from both, explaining the soul as a number moving
itself. But men differ about the first beginnings of
things, both as to their nature and quantity, especially
those who make them corporeal from those who make
them incorporeal, and from both these differ those
who combine the two and explain the ultimate prin-
ciples as compounded of both. They differ again
about the number, some alleging that there is one,
and others more than one. The account they give
of the soul in each ease follows their conclusions ;
of our concepts. One was not considered by the Greeks as
a number, but only as the fountain of all numbers. So the
three dimensions are derived from the numbers 2, 3, and 4
respectively. As “like” is known by “‘like,” there are
similarly in the soul faculties corresponding to these. So
mnind corresponds to One, Knowledge to Two, and so on.

ARISTOTLE
405 a / 4 3 x‘ ca ~ ,ὔ δ
δ τό TE γὰρ κινητικὸν τὴν φύσιν τῶν πρώτων br-
εἰλήφασιν, οὐκ ἀλόγως. ὅθεν ἔδοξέ τισι πῦρ εἶναι"
καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο λεπτομερέστατόν τε καὶ μάλιστα
τῶν στοιχείων ἀσώματον, ἔτι δὲ κινεῖταί τε καὶ
κινεῖ τὰ ἄλλα πρώτως. Δημόκριτος δὲ καὶ γλα-
φυρωτέρως εἴρηκεν ἀποφηνάμενος διὰ τί τούτων
ἑκάτερον. ψυχὴν μὲν γὰρ εἶναι ταὐτὸ καὶ νοῦν,
το τοῦτο δ᾽ εἶναι τῶν πρώτων καὶ ἀδιαιρέτων σω-
μάτων, κινητικὸν δὲ διὰ μικρομέρειαν καὶ «τὸ
σχῆμα: τῶν δὲ σχημάτων εὐκινητότατον τὸ σφαιρο-
ειἰδὲς λέγει" τοιοῦτον δ᾽ εἶναι τόν τε νοῦν καὶ τὸ
πῦρ.
᾿Αναξαγόρας δ᾽ ἔοικε μὲν ἕτερον λέγειν ψυχήν
τε καὶ νοῦν, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν καὶ πρότερον, χρῆται
15 δ᾽ ἀμφοῖν ὡς μιᾷ φύσει, πλὴν ἀρχήν γε τὸν νοῦν
τίθεται μάλιστα πάντων: μόνον γοῦν φησὶν αὐτὸν
τῶν ὄντων ἁπλοῦν εἶναι καὶ ἀμιγῆ τε καὶ καθαρόν.
ἀποδίδωσι δ᾽ ἄμφω τῇ αὐτῇ ἀρχῇ, τό τε γινώσκειν
καὶ τὸ κινεῖν, λέγων νοῦν κινῆσαι τὸ πᾶν. ἔοικε
20 δὲ καὶ Θαλῆς ἐξ ὧν ἀπομνημονεύουσι κινητιιςόν τι
τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπολαβεῖν, εἴπερ τὸν λίθον ἔφη ψυχὴν
ἔχειν, ὅτι τὸν σίδηρον κινεῖ. Διογένης δ᾽ ὥσπερ
καὶ ἕτεροί τινες, ἀέρα τοῦτον οἰηθεὶς πάντων
λεπτομερέστατον εἶναι καὶ ἀρχήν: καὶ διὰ τοῦτο
γινώσικειν τε καὶ κινεῖν τὴν ψυχήν, ἢ μὲν πρῶτόν
ἐστι, καὶ ἐκ τοῦτου τὰ λοιπά, γινώσκειν, F δὲ
45 λεπτότατον, κινητικὸν εἶναι. καὶ “Ἡράκλειτος δὲ

τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναί φησι ψυχήν, εἴπερ τὴν ἀναθυμίασιν,

« i.e.‘ the Magnesian stone,” or, as we call it, the magnet.
26

ON THE SOUL, I. 1.

for they consider the soul to be that first cause, which

by its own nature produces movement ; and this is

not unreasonable. And so some have thought the

soul to be fire ; for this is composed of the lightest

constituents, and of all the elements is the nearest to

incorporeal, but it also moves and is a primary cause

of movement in other things. Democritus has ex~ Democritus.

plained with greater precision why each of these

two things is so; for he identifies the soul and the

mind, This, he says, consists of primary and indivis-

ible bodies, and its power of producing movement,

is due to the smallness of its parts and its shape; for he

calls the spherical the most easily moved of all shapes ;

and this characteristic is shared by mind and fire.
Anaxagoras indeed seems to regard soul and mind Anaxagoras.

as different, as we have said before, but he treats

them both as of one nature, except that he regards

mind as above all things the ultimate principle ; at

any rate, he speaks of it as the only existing thing

which is simple, unmixed, and pure. But he assigns

both the power of knowing and of moving ἰο the same

principle when he says that the mind moves every-

thing. Thales too, judging from what men recall Thales.

of his work, seems to suppose that the soul is in a

sense the cause of movement, since he says that a

stone® has a soul because it causes movement to

iron. Diogenes and some others think that the soul piogenos.

is air, regarding this as having the lightest parts of

all things, and as an ultimate principle; for this

yeason he believes that the soul both knows and

causes movement ; it knows because it is primary and

from it all else comes ; it causes movement because

of its extreme lightness. Heracleitus also calls the deracleitus,

soul the first beginning, as the emanation from which

405 ἃ

80 Καὶ

405 b

ARISTOTLE

ἐξ ἧς τἄλλα συνίστησιν: Kal ἀσωματώτατον δὴ
καὶ ῥέον ἀεί' τὸ δὲ κινούμενον κινουμένῳ γινώ-
σκεσθαι. ἐν κινήσει δ᾽ εἶναι τὰ ὄντα κἀκεῖνος
oe καὶ οἱ πολλοί. παραπλησίως δὲ τούτοις
ἡ ᾿Αλκμαίων ἔ ἔοικεν ὑπολαβεῖν περὶ Ψυχῆς" φησὶ
wep αὐτὴν ἀθάνατον εἶναι διὰ τὸ ἐοικέναι τοῖς
ἀθανάτοις, τοῦτο δ᾽ ὑπάρχειν αὐτῇ ὡς ἀεὶ κινου-
μένῃ" κινεῖσθαι γὰρ καὶ τὰ θεῖα πάντα συνεχῶς
ἀεί, σελήνην, ἥλιον, τοὺς ἀστέρας καὶ τὸν οὐρανὸν
ὅλον. τῶν δὲ φορτικωτέρων καὶ ὕδωρ τινὲς ἀπ-
εφήναντο, καθάπερ Ἵππων. πεισθῆναι δ᾽ ἐοίκασιν
ἐκ τῆς γονῆς, ὅτι πάντων ὑγρά: καὶ γὰρ ἐλέγχει
τοὺς αἷμα φάσκοντας τὴν ψυχήν, ὅτι ἡ γονὴ οὐχ
αἷμα. ταύτην δ᾽ εἶναι τὴν πρώτην ψυχήν. ἕτεροι
δ᾽ αἷμα, καθάπερ Κριτίας, τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ψυχῆς
οἰκειότατον ὑπολαμβάνοντες, τοῦτο δ᾽ ὑπάρχειν
διὰ τὴν τοῦ αἵματος φύσιν. πάντα γὰρ τὰ στοιχεῖα
κριτὴν εἴληφε, πλὴν τῆς γῆς" ταύτην δ᾽ οὐθεὶς
ἀποπέφανται, πλὴν εἴ τις αὐτὴν εἴρηκεν ex πάντων
εἶναι τῶν στοιχείων 7 πάντα.
ἱΟρίζονται: δὲ πάντες τὴν ψυχὴν τρισὶν ὡς εἰπεῖν,
κινήσει, αἰσθήσει, τῷ ἀσωμάτῳ' τούτων δ᾽ ἕκαστον
ἀνάγεται πρὸς τὰς ἀρχάς. διὸ καὶ οἱ τῷ γινώσκειν
ὁριξόμενοι αὐτὴν ἢ στοιχεῖον ἢ ex τῶν στοιχείων
ποιοῦσι, λέγοντες παραπλησίως. ἀλλήλοις, πλὴν
ἑνός" φασὶ γὰρ γινώσκεσθαι τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ'
ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἡ ψυχὴ πάντα γιγνώσκει, συνιστᾶσιν
αὐτὴν ἐκ πασῶν τῶν ἀρχῶν. ὅσοι μὲν οὖν μίαν
τινὰ λέγουσιν αἰτίαν καὶ στοιχεῖον ἕν, καὶ τὴν

4 Empedocles. δ Anaxagoras,

ON THE SOUL, I. τι.

he constructs all other things: it is incorporeal and
always in a state of flux: he and many others sup-
posed that a thing moving can only be known by
something which moves, and all that exists is in
motion. Alemacon’s suppositions about the soul are
somewhat similar to these ; for he says it is immortal,
because it resembles the immortals, and that this
characteristic is due to iis perpetual motion; for
things divine are in a state of perpetual motion, the
moon, the sun, the stars, and the whole heavens.
Some of the less exact thinkers like Hippon have
declared the soul to be water. This belief seems
to arise from the fact that the seed of all things is
moist, For he rebuts those who say that the soul is
blood, on the ground that the seed is not blood 5 but
he says that the first soul is seed. Others like Critias
have imagined the soul to be blood, because they
have supposed perceptiveness to be the peculiar
characteristic of the soul, and that this is due to the
nature of blood. In fact each of the elements in turn
has found a supporter, except earth ; but this no one
has suggested except in so far as one“ has said that
the soul is composed of, or is identical with, all
the elements.

But all, or almost all, distinguish the soul by three
of its attributes, movement, perception, and incor-
poreality ; and each of these leads to the first be-
ginnings. So those who define it by the power of
knowing describe it as an element, or as derived from
the elements, all arguing with one® exception on
similar lines ; for they say that ‘ like” is known by
‘like’; for since everything is known by the soul,
they construct it of all the elements. Those, then,
who allege that there is only one cause, and but one

Alemacon,

Hippon.

Critias,

ARISTOTLE

406 b 4 a ta - ων 5 3 4, ,ὔ
ψυχὴν ἕν τιθέασιν, οἷον πῦρ ἢ ἀέρα" οἱ δὲ πλείους

λέγοντες τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν πλείω ποιοῦσιν.
2» ᾿Αναξαγόρας δὲ μόνος ἀπαθῆ φησὶν εἶναι τὸν νοῦν,
καὶ κοινὸν οὐθὲν οὐθενὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔχειν. τοιοῦτος
δ᾽ ὧν πῶς γνωριεῖ καὶ διὰ τίν᾽ αἰτίαν, οὔτ᾽ ἐκεῖνος
εἴρηκεν οὔτ᾽ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων συμφανές ἐστιν.
ὅσοι δ᾽ ἐναντιώσεις ποιοῦσιν ἐν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς, καὶ
τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων συνιστᾶσιν: οἱ δὲ
25 θάτερον τῶν ἐναντίων, οἷον θερμὸν ἢ ψυχρὸν ἢ τι
τοιοῦτον ἄλλο, καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ὁμοίως ἕν τι τούτων
τιθέασιν. διὸ καὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασιν ἀκολουθοῦσιν, οὗ
μὲν τὸ θερμὸν λέγοντες, ὅτι διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ ζῆν
ὠνόμασται, οἱ δὲ τὸ ψυχρὸν διὰ τὴν ἀναπνοὴν καὶ
τὴν κατάψυξιν καλεῖσθαι ψυχήν. τὰ μὲν οὖν παρα-
80 δεδομένα περὶ ψυχῆς, καὶ δι’ ἃς αἰτίας λέγουσιν
οὕτω, ταῦτ᾽ ἐστίν.
III. ᾿Επισκεπτέον δὲ πρῶτον μὲν περὶ κινήσεως"
ἴσως γὰρ οὐ μόνον ψεῦδός ἐστι τὸ τὴν οὐσίαν
408 5 αὐτῆς τοιαύτην εἶναι οἵαν φασὲν of λέγοντες ψυχὴν
εἶναι τὸ κινοῦν ἑαυτὸ ἣ δυνάμενον κινεῖν, ἀλλ᾽ ἕν
τι τῶν ἀδυνάτων τὸ ὑπάρχειν αὐτῇ κίνησιν. ὅτι
μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον τὸ κινοῦν καὶ αὐτὸ κινεῖσθαι,
πρότερον εἴρηται. διχῶς δὲ κινουμένου παντός (ἢ
syap καθ᾽ ἕτερον ἢ καθ᾽ αὑτό" καθ᾽ ἕτερον δὲ
λέγομεν, ὅσα κινεῖται τῷ ἐν κινουμένῳ εἶναι, οἷον
πλωτῆρες" οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως κινοῦνται τῷ πλοίῳ" τὸ
μὲν γὰρ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ κινεῖται, οὗ δὲ τῷ ἐν κινουμένῳ

ΟΝ THE SOUL, I. 1.11.

element, also make the soul one element, such as
fire or air ; but those who believe in more than one
first beginning make the soul also plural. Anax-
agoras is alone in his belief that the mind cannot be
acted upon, and that it has nothing in common with
anything else. But how the mind being thus con-
structed can ever recognize anything, and by what
agency, he does not explain, nor is it clear from his
expressed views. But those who assume pairs of
opposites to exist in the first beginnings also con-
struct the soul from opposites. Those who suppose
the first beginning to be one of a pair of opposites
such as hot and cold or the like, similarly also suppose
the soul to be one of these. They have an ety-
mological argument also; those who say it is heat
connect (jv (to live) with (ety (to boil), but those
who call it cold think that it is due to breathing and
chilling or κατάψυξις (connecting this with ψυχή).
These, then, are the traditional views about the soul
and the causes to which it is attributed.

III. In the first place we must investigate the Doss tho
question of movement. T'or perhaps it is not merely °°"! move?
untrue that the nature of the soul is of such a kind
as those deseribe it to be who say that the soul moves
itself or can do so, but it may be quite impossible that
movement should be characteristic of the soul at all.
We have said before that it is not necessary that that
which produces movement should itself move. But
everything may be moved in two senses (directly and
indirectly. We call movement indirect, when a thing
moves because it is in something which moves; for
instance the passengers in a ship. Tor they do not
move in the same sense as the ship moves; for the
ship moves directly, but they move only by being in

ARISTOTLE

406 a a ? +4 ~ i 7 , κ᾿ 4
εἶναι. δῆλον δ᾽ ἐπὶ τῶν μορίων' οἰκεία μὲν γάρ

> i ~ ul a \ 4 > ͵ὔ
ἐστι κίνησις ποδῶν βάδισις, αὕτη δὲ καὶ ἀνθρώπων:
10 οὐχ ὑπάρχει δὲ τοῖς πλωτῆρσι τότε), διχῶς δὲ
λεγομένου τοῦ κινεῖσθαι, νῦν ἐπισκοποῦμεν περὶ
τῆς ψυχῆς εἰ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν κινεῖται καὶ μετέχει
κινήσεως.
Τεσσάρων δὲ κινήσεων οὐσῶν, φορᾶς ἀλλοιώσεως
, > f ἍἌ ᾿ 7, ΚΝ a nv
φθίσεως αὐξήσεως, ἢ μίαν τούτων κινοῖτ᾽ ἂν ἢ
͵ nn / ? A a \ A
πλείους ἢ πάσας. εἰ δὲ κινεῖται μὴ κατὰ συμ-
7 4 vn ς ta , > ~ vd A
1 βεβηκός, φύσει ἂν ὑπάρχοι κίνησις αὐτῇ" εἰ δὲ
τοῦτο, καὶ τόπος" πᾶσαι γὰρ αἱ λεχθεῖσαι κινήσεις
2 / > δ᾽ 3 εἶ e , ,ὔ lol a \ ων
ἐν τόπῳ. εἰ δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἡ οὐσία τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ κινεῖν
ς tA ? x A » ~ \ a
ἑαυτήν, οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αὐτῇ τὸ κινεῖσθαι
a nt nw n δι
ὑπάρξει, ὥσπερ τῷ λευκῷ ἢ τῷ τρυπήχει" κινεῖται
40 γὰρ καὶ ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός: ᾧ γὰρ
ὑπάρχουσιν, ἐκεῖνο κινεῖται, τὸ σῶμα. διὸ καὶ οὐκ
Mv i 2 ~ ~ A Gal Mu a 4
ἔστι τόπος αὐτῶν’ τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς ἔσται, εἴπερ φύσει
κινήσεως μετέχει.
"Ere δ᾽ εἰ φύσει κινεῖται, κἂν βίᾳ κινηθείη" κἂν
εἰ βίᾳ, καὶ φύσει. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον ἔχει καὶ
\ ,ὔ ~ ~
περὶ ἠρεμίας" εἰς ὃ γὰρ κινεῖται φύσει, Kal ἠρεμεῖ
ἢ , a
25 ἐν τούτῳ φύσει" ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ εἰς ὃ κινεῖται βίᾳ,
4 3 a a a
Kat ἠρεμεῖ ἐν τούτῳ Bia. ποῖαι δὲ βίαιοι τῆς
“-“ ᾿
ψυχῆς κινήσεις ἔσονται καὶ ἠρεμίαι, οὐδὲ πλάττειν
32

ON THE SOUL, I. πὶ.

something which moves. And this becomes obvious
if we consider the parts of the body. For the move-
ment proper to the feet is walking, that is the mave-
ment natural to human beings ; and at the moment
the passengers are not exhibiting this kind of motion),
Movement then having two different senses, we are
at present inquiring whether the soul moves and has
a share in direct movement.

Now there are four kinds of movement: (1) Fonr kmds
change of position, (2) change of state, (3) decay and οὐ move
(4) growth ; ifthen the soul moves, it has one of these
kinds of movement, or more than one of them, or all
of them. But if the movement of the soul is not
accidental, then movement must belong to it by
nature ; if this is so, its movement is in space, for all
the kinds of movement mentioned are in space. But
if it is the essence of the soul to move itself, then
movement will not belong to it by accident, as it does
for instance to the quality of whiteness, or to a length
of three cubits ; these are liable to be moved, but
only accidentally, and merely because the body to
which they belong is moved. For this reason they
have no position in space. But the soul must have a
position in space, if it shares in movement by its own
nature.

Again, if it moves by its own nature, it must be Dimeulties
moved by some force; and conversely if by force, cereal
sthen its movement is natural to it. And the same mene to the
thing is true about its rest; for it comes to rest by sues
nature at the point to which it is moved by nature ;
and similarly it rests by force in the place to which it
is moved by force. But how these enforced move-
ments of the soul and enforced rests occur is not
easy to explain, even if we are prepared to allow our

D 88

ARISTOTLE

408 a
- ᾿» > Η ,
βουλομένοις ῥάδιον ἀποδοῦναι. ἔτι δ᾽ εἰ μὲν ἄνω

n x - 2
κινήσεται, πῦρ ἔσται, εἰ δὲ κάτω, γῆ" τούτων γὰρ
- >
τῶν σωμάτων αἱ κινήσεις αὗται. ὁ δ᾽ αὐτὸς λόγος
wy Καὶ περὶ τῶν μεταξύ.
᾿ + 2 \ rs a \ ~ ts
Ere δ᾽ ἐπεὶ φαίνεται κινοῦσα τὸ σῶμα, ταύτας
εὔλογον κινεῖν τὰς κινήσεις ἃς καὶ αὐτὴ κιρεῖται.
> \ ln \ 3 ,ὔ > lal > Α ω
εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, καὶ ἀντιστρέψασιν εἰπεῖν ἀληθὲς ὅτι
406 υ ἣν τὸ σῶμα κινεῖται, ταύτην καὶ αὐτή. τὸ δὲ
΄- “ ~ a Ἁ, [2 Α a
σῶμα κινεῖται dopa: ὥστε καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ μεταβάλλοι"
ἂν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα 7} ὅλη ἢ κατὰ μόρια μεθισταμένη.
᾿ \ a? 2 rd \ 3 lol ’ 7
εἰ δὲ τοῦτ᾽ ἐνδέχεται, καὶ ἐξελθοῦσαν εἰσιέναι
/ 2 / 3 La tA ἢ a 3 a” A 3
πάλιν ἐνδέχοιτ᾽ dv: τούτῳ δ᾽ ἕποιτ᾽ ἂν τὸ ἀν-
, - ~
ὃ ίστασθαι τὰ τεθνεῶτα τῶν ζῴων.
aml \ \ \ A n eyo toe
Τὴν δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς κίνησιν κἂν ὑφ᾽ ἑτέρου
“ 3 ᾽ὔ ‘ BD Yi \ ~ > - \ *
κιψοῖτο' ὠσθείη γὰρ dv Bia τὸ ζῷον. οὐ δεῖ δὲ ᾧ

Φ a “

\ 3 ς - a > a“ ? τ e 5
τὸ ὑφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ κινεῖσθαι ἐν τῇ οὐσίᾳ, τοῦθ᾽ ὑπ
a ~ A > A ‘ /
ἄλλου κινεῖσθαι, πλὴν εἰ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός,
Ὁ 3 \ \ > = \ > ‘ “ . 1 , \
ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ δι᾿ αὑτό, τὸ

A 3 ν» ‘ > ς , a A ‘

10 μὲν δι᾿ ἄλλο εἶναι, τὸ δ᾽ ἑτέρου ἕνεικεν. τὴν δὲ
ψυχὴν μάλιστα φαΐη τις ἂν ὑπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν
κινεῖσθαι, εἴπερ κινεῦται.

᾿Αλλὰ A \ ? cal 7 τ i 4 Lg ‘ ? Δ

ὰ μὴν καὶ εἰ κινεῖ γε αὐτὴ αὑτήν, καὶ αὐτὴ
κινοῖτ᾽ ἄν, ὥστ᾽ εἰ πᾶσα κίνησις ἔκστασίς ἐστι
τοῦ κινουμένου ἣ κινεῖται, καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ἐξίσταιτ᾽
ἂν ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας, εἰ μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αὑτὴν

“Μδην of the things we want we want for the sake of
something else; e.g. we may want money for the sake of
health, health for the sake of our work in the world, and so
on. But ultimately we must reach a‘ good ” which we want

ON THE SOUL, I. m.

fancies free play. If the soul moves upwards it will
be fire, and if downwards earth ; for these two move-
ments belong respectively to these two bodies ; and
the same argument will apply to movements inter-
mediaie between “up ’’ and © down.”

Moreover, since Lhe soul seems to move the body,
it is reasonable Lo suppose that it imparts to it the
same movements that it, hag itself; and if this is 50,
we are entitled to declare the converse proposition
true—nainely, that the soul has the same move-
ments as the body. But the body moves by change
of position ; so that the soul must change position in
the same way as the body, either as a complete whole
or in parts. But, if this is possible, it would also be
possible for the soul to go out of the body and enter
in again; and upon this would follow the possibility
of resurrection for those living beings which are dead.

But if the soul’s movement is accidental, it must be
moved by something else ; the living creature might
be pushed by force. But that which has the capacity
for self-caused movement cannot be moved by any-
thing else except accidentally : in the same way that
which is good in itself is not good for anything else,
and that which is good for its own sake is not good
for the sake of anything else.t But one would be
inclined to assert that the soul, if it is moved at all,
is moved by sensible objects.

Moreover, even if the soul moves itself, it still
moves, so that, if every kind of movement is a dis-
placement of that which moves in so far as it moves,
then the soul is moved out of its essential nature, if

for its own sake, one, that is, which is not a subordinate end
but the summum bonum, for which the Greek philusophers
were always seeking,

ARISTOTLE.
406 b - > > € tA = > ,ὔ roa 2
τὸ κινεῖ. ἀλλ᾽ ἔστιν ἡ κίνησις τῆς οὐσίας αὐτῆς καθ
¢ ,
αὑτήν.
Ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ κινεῖν φασὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τὸ σῶμα ἐν
ᾧ ἐστίν, ὡς αὐτὴ κινεῖται, οἷον Δημόκριτος, παρα-
πλησίως λέγων Φιλίππῳ τῷ κωμῳδοδιδασκάλῳ.
φησὶ γὰρ τὸν Δαίδαλον κινουμένην ποιῆσαι τὴν
ξυλίνην ᾿Αφροδίτην, ἐγχέαντ᾽ ἄργυρον. χυτόι.
20 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ Δημόκριτος λέγει" κιυουμένας γάρ
φησι τὰς ἀδιαιρέτους σφαίρας διὰ τὸ πεφυκέναι
μηδέποτε μένειν, συνεφέλιειν καὶ Kurety τὸ σῶμα
πᾶν. ἡμεῖς δ᾽ ἐρωτήσομεν εἰ καὶ ἠρέμησιν ποιεῖ
ταὐτὰ ταῦτα. πῶς δὲ ποιήσει, χαλεπὸν ἢ καὶ
ἀδύνατον εἰπεῖν. ὅλως δ᾽ οὐχ οὕτω φαίνεται
45 κινεῖν ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ ζῷον, ἀλλὰ διὰ προαιρέσεώς τινος
καὶ νοήσεως.

Τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ὁ Τίμαιος φυσιολογεῖ
τὴν ψυχὴν. κινεῖν τὸ σῶμα' τῷ γὰρ κινεῖσθαι αὐτὴν
καὶ τὸ σῶμα κινεῖν διὰ τὸ συμπεπλέχθαι πρὸς
αὐτό. συνεστηκυῖαν γὰρ ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων, καὶ
μεμερισμένην κατὰ τοὺς ἁρμονικοὺς ἀριθμούς,

80 ὅπως αἴσθησίν τε σύμφυτον ἁρμονίας ἔχῃ καὶ τὸ
πᾶν φέρηται συμφώνους φοράς, TH εὐθυωρίαν εἰς
κύκλον κατέκαμψεν" καὶ διελὼν ἐκ τοῦ ἑνὸς δύο

4011 κύκλους δισσαχῇ συνημμένους πάλι τὸν ἕνα
διεῖλεν εἰς ἑπτὰ κύκλους, ὡς οὔσας τὰς τοῦ οὐρανοῦ
φορὰς τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς κινήσεις.

Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν οὐ καλῶς τὸ λέγειν τὴν ψυχὴν
μέγεθος εἶναι: τὴν γὰρ τοῦ παντὸς δῆλον ὅτι
τοιαύτην εἶναι βούλεται οἷόν ποτ᾽ ἐστὶν ὁ καλού-

ἃ The point of the comparison is that both offer a purely
external and mechanical explanation of movement,

ΟΝ THE SOUL, I. τα.

it does not move itself accidentally, but movement is
part of ils essential nature.

Some say that the soul moves the body in which it
resides, just as it moves itself. Such is the view of
Democritus, arguing in the vein of Philip, the master
of comedy ; for he tells us that Daedalus made the
wooden Aphrodite move by pouring in quicksilver.?
Democritus speaks in a similar strain; for he says
that the indivisible spheres (atoms), because it is
their nature never to remain still, draw the whole
body with them and move it. But we want to ask
whether these same atoms also produce rest. How
they can do so, it is difficull, if not impossible, to say.

In general the living creature does not seem to
be moved by the soul in this way, but by exerting
preference and by thought.

In the same way Timaeus ὃ in Plato’s dialogue also Plato's view
argues by physical science that the soul moves the {ot BM...
body ; he thinks that the soul moves the body by its movemeut
own movement, owing io its being intimately inter- vi
woven with it. For first the Creator fashioned the
soul owt of all the elements, and divided it according
to harmonic ratios, in order that it might have per-
ception of harmony and might move entirely by
harmonic moventents ; then he bent the straight line
into the form of a circle, and, having divided the one
circle into two, meeting at two points, he again
divided one of these into seven, so that the move-
ments of the heavenly bodies are the movements of
the soul.

(1) Now in the first place, to say that the soul is Objections
amagnitude is unsound ; for “ the soul of the world” {,4)208

must clearly be some such thing as what is called

ὃ Plato, Zimacus, pp. 83 syq.
37

ARISTOTLE

407 a ~ ? bi \ , > ἐ > 7 29?
μενος vous: οὐ yap δὴ οἷόν γ᾽ ἡ αἰσθητική, odd

e @ 0° , ? 4 ¢ , ᾽
οἷον ἡ ἐπιθυμητική" τούτων γὰρ ἡ κίνησις οὐ
᾽ « \ “ Φ' \ ,ὕ ao
κυκλοφορία. ὁ δὲ νοῦς εἷς καὶ συνεχής, ὥσπερ
καὶ ἡ νόησις" ἡ δὲ νόησις τὰ νοήματα: ταῦτα δὲ
τῷ ἐφεξῆς ἕν, ὡς ἀριθμός, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὡς τὸ μέγεθος.
διόπερ οὐδ᾽ ὁ νοῦς οὕτω συνεχής, ἀλλ᾽ ἤτοι ἀμερὴς
nn ΕῚ ς , , / ~ \ \ \
107) ody ὡς μέγεθός τι συνεχής: πῶς γὰρ δὴ Kal
νοήσει μέγεθος ὧν ὁτῳοῦν τῶν μορίων τῶν αὑτοῦ;
μορίων δ᾽ ἤτοι κατὰ μέγεθος ἢ κατὰ στιγμήν, εἰ
δεῖ καὶ τοῦτο μόριον εἰπεῖν. εἰ μὲν οὖν κατὰ
τὰ a 3 a a δ > é
στιγμήν, αὗται δ᾽ ἄπειροι, δῆλον ws οὐδέποτε
,ὔ
διέξεισιν, εἰ δὲ κατὰ μέγεθος, πολλάκις ἢ ἀπειράκις
a ‘ > / a A oo 3 f
τὸ νοήσει τὸ αὐτό. φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ἅπαξ ἐνδεχόμενον.
2 3 La 4 ~ ς “- “ , δ, nm
εἰ δ᾽ ἱκανὸν θιγεῖν ὁτῳοῦν τῶν μορίων, τί δεῖ
κύκλῳ κινεῖσθαι ἢ καὶ ὅλως μέγεθος ἔχειν; εἰ 8
9 - - a / / ig >
ἀναγκαῖον νοῆσαι τῷ ὅλῳ κύκλῳ θιγόντα, τίς ἐστιν
ες ~ t θί at δὲ “ δ 7
ἡ τοῖς μορίοις θίξις; ἔτι δὲ πῶς νοήσει TO μεριστὸν
ἀμερεῖ καὶ τὸ ἀμερὲς μεριστῷ; ἀναγκαῖον δὲ τὸν
40 νοῦν εἶναι τὸν κύκλον τοῦτον. νοῦ μὲν γὰρ κίνησις
, ὰ ᾿ , > κ,κ᾿᾽ῷ ες ,
νόησις, κύκλου δὲ περιφορά. εἰ οὖν ἡ νόησις περι-
φορά, καὶ νοῦς ἂν εἴη ὁ κύκλος, οὗ ἡ τοιαύτη περι-
Ἂ Pg Ἂν Ἢ A ὔ ᾿ -“ / w
φορὰ νόησις. ἀεὶ δὲ δή τι νοήσει" δεῖ γάρ, εἴπερ
᾿ ε “ a
ἀΐδιος ἡ περιφορά" τῶν μὲν γὰρ πρακτικῶν νοήσεων
50 ἔστι πέρατα (πᾶσαι γὰρ ἑτέρου χάριν), αἱ δὲ θεωρη-
A ~ Φ' ~
τικαὶ τοῖς λόγοις ὁμοίως ὁρίζονται, λόγος δὲ πᾶς
38

ON THE SOUL, I. τὴ.

mind; it is nothing like either the perceptive or
appetitive faculty; for their movements are not
circular. But the mind is one, and continuous like
the process of thinking ; and the process of thinking
implics thoughts. But these are continuous in the
same sense as numbers and not as magnitudes. So
also the mind is not continuous in this sense, but it
is cither indivisible, or at any raie is not continuous
as a magnitude. Τὸν, if it is a magnitude, how will
it think with any one of its parts? With a part then
considered as a magnitude, or as a point, if one can
call a point a part. If then with a point, seeing that
these are infinite, the mind can obviously never
reach any end, If as a magnitude, it will think the
same thoughts very many or an infinite number of
times. But it is clear that it is capable of thinking
a thought once only. (2) But if it is sufficient for it
to touch with any one of the parts, why should it
move in a circle, or generally have magnitude? But
if it can only think when in contact with the whole
cirele, what is its contact with the parts? (3) Again,
how will the divisible part think the indivisible
thought. or the indivisible the divisible? The mind
must therefore be identical with this circle ; for the
movement of the mind is the act of thinking, and the
movement of a circle is circular. If then the act of
thinking travels in a cirele, then that cirele would be
sthe mind, of which the act of thinking is the cireum-
ference. Then there is some one thing which it will
always think. It must behave in this way, for the
circumference of a circle has no end. But all prac-
tical thinking has an end (for all thoughts have an
object in view), and theoretical speculations are
defined by their terms ; every term is a definition or

ARISTOTLE

407 a * 4 »ἱ > ͵ ig > > ὃ , ᾿" A] >
ὁρισμὸς ἢ ἀπόδειξις. at δ᾽ ἀπο εἰξεις καὶ ἀπ

> ~ " yw Ul ͵ \ ᾿ ως
ἀρχῆς, καὶ ἔχουσί πως τέλος τὸν συλλογισμὸν ἢ
τὸ συμπέρασμα" εἰ δὲ μὴ περατοῦνται, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ
ἀνακάμπτουσί γε πάλιν ἐπ᾽ ἀρχήν, προσλαμβά-
νουσαι δ᾽ ἀεὶ μέσον καὶ ἄκρον εὐθυποροῦσιι"" ἡ
\ Ἂν 7 oS: 2 \ 3 ΄ =
30 δὲ περιφορὰ πάλιν ἐπ᾽ ἀρχὴν ἀνακάμπτει. of ὃ
ὁρισμοὶ πάντες πεπερασμένοι. ἔτι εἰ ἡ αὐτὴ περι-
4 , , , Ἃ , > 7
φορὰ πολλάκις, δεήσει πολλάκις νοεῖ!" τὸ αὐτό.
ἔτι δ᾽ ἡ νόησις ἔοικεν ἠρεμήσει τινὶ καὶ ἐπιστάσει
μᾶλλον ἢ κινήσει: τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ὁ
/ 3 Ἂ, ἈΝ Ε \ ͵ é A \
συλλογισμός. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ μακάριόν ye τὸ μὴ
ἘΠῚ > \ , 2 2% \ ς ᾿ , αὶ 4
407 b ῥάδιον ἀλλὰ βίαιον" εἰ δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἡ κίνησις αὐτῆς μὴ
~ , \ \ \
οὐσία, mapa φύσιν ἂν κινοῦτο. ἐπίπονον δὲ καὶ τὸ
- - δ \
μεμῖχθαι τῷ σώματι μὴ δυνάμενον ἀπολυθῆναι, καὶ
ral a A
προσέτι φευκτόν, εἴπερ βέλτιον TH νῷ μὴ μετὰ
ὃ σώματος εἶναι, καθάπερ εἴωθέ τε λέγεσθαι καὶ
a a \ a
πολλοῖς συνδοκεῖ. ἄδηλος δὲ καὶ τοῦ κύκλῳ
φέρεσθαι τὸν οὐρανὸν ἡ αἰτία: οὔτε γὰρ τῆς ψυχῆς
c 2 t > ~ la / > ‘ AY
ἡ οὐσία αἰτία τοῦ κύκλῳ φέρεσθαι, ἀλλὰ κατὰ
συμβεβηκὸς οὕτω κινεῖται, οὔτε τὸ σῶμα αἴτιον,
ἀλλ᾽ ἡ ψυχὴ μᾶλλον ἐκείνῳ. ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ᾽ ὅτι
4 ,ὔ , 3 ? = ‘ o~ ΕἾ
10 βέλτιον λέγεται: καίτοι γ᾽ ἐχρῆν διὰ τοῦτο τὸν
θεὸν κύκλῳ ποιεῖν φέρεσθαι τὴν ψυχήν, ὅτι βέλτιον
~ - nn a >
αὐτῇ τὸ κινεῖσθαι τοῦ μένειν, κινεῖσθαι δ᾽ οὕτως"
ay » 3 " > > A ς 4 ΓΑ Ξε /
ἢ ἄλλως. ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἡ τοιαύτη σκέψις ἑτέρων
λόγων οἰκειοτέρα, ταύτην μὲν ἀφῶμεν τὸ νῦν.
> - ιν , ‘ 4 - 7
Ἐκεῖνο δὲ ἄτοπον συμβαίνει καὶ τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ
16 καὶ τοῖς πλείστοις τῶν περὲ ψυχῆς" συνάπτουσι
γὰρ καὶ τιθέασιν εἰς σῶμα τὴν ψυχήν, οὐθὲν mpoo-
40

ON THE SOUL, I. im.

a demonstration. A demonstration must start from
some beginning, and has an cud in a sense in an
inference or conclusion. Hiven if they do not arrive
at a conclusion, they do not at any rate return again
to the beginning, but they advance in a straight line
by means of the middle and extreme terms. But
the circle is for ever returning to its starting-point,
whereas all definitions are fmite. Again, if the same
cirele recurs frequently, the mind will frequently
think the same thing. (4) Again, the mind seems
more like a state of rest or a halting than a move-
meut ; and the same thing is true of the syllogism.
(5) Furthermore, that which moves not easily but
only by force cannot be happy. If its movement is
not an essential quality, it will be contrary to nature.
(6) Again, the idea of the soul being involved with the
body without the possibility of escape is painful, and
must be avoided, if it is true that it is better for the
mind to be without the body, as is usually said and as
most men believe. (7) Again, the reason why the
heavenly bodies move in a circle is obscure. For the
essence of the soul sugyests no reason for its circular
movement, but it only moves in this way by accident,
nor is the body responsible for the soul but rather the
converse. Nor is there any suggestion that this
circular movement is better, and yet God must surely
have made the soul move in a circle for this very
reason, that movement ig a better condition for it
than rest, and this movement better than any other.
But since this inquiry belongs more properly to
another subject let us leave it now.

But there is one absurd feature both in this argu-
ment, and in most of those about the soul. Men
associate the soul with and place it in the body, with-

41]

Relation ot
soul and
body.

ARISTOTLE
407 b

διορίσαντες διὰ τίν᾽ αἰτίαν καὶ πῶς ἔχοντος τοῦ
σώματος. καίτοι δόξειεν ἃ ἂν τοῦτ᾽ ἀν αγκαῖον εἶναι"
διὰ γὰρ τὴν κοινωνίαν. τὸ μὲν ποιεῖ τὸ δὲ πάσχει
καὶ τὸ μὲν κινεῖται τὸ δὲ κινεῖ, τούτων δ᾽ οὐθὲν

20 ὑπάρχει πρὸς ἄλληλα τοῖς τυχοῦσιν. οἱ δὲ μόνον
ἐπιχειροῦσι λέγειν ποῖόν τι ἡ ψυχή, περὶ δὲ τοῦ
δεξομένου σώματος οὐθὲν ἔτι προσδιορίζουσιν,
ὥσπερ ἐνδεχόμενον κατὰ τοὺς ]Τ]|υθαγορικοὺς
μύθους τὴν τυχοῦσαν ψυχὴν εἰς τὸ τυχὸν ἐνδύεσθαι
σῶμα: δοκεῖ γὰρ ἕκαστον ἴδιον ἔχειν εἶδος καὶ
μορφήν. παραπλήσιον. δὲ λέγουσιν ὥσπερ εἴ τις
ὃ5 φαίη τὴν τεκτονικὴν εἰς αὐλοὺς ἐνδύεσθαι: δεῖ γὰρ
τὴν μὲν τέχνην χρῆσθαι τοῖς ὀργάνοις, τὴν δὲ
ψυχὴν τῷ σώματι.

IV, Καὶ ἄλλη δέ τις δόξα παραδέδοται περὶ ψυχῆς,
πιθανὴ μὲν πολλοῖς οὐδεμιᾶς ἧττον τῶν λεγομένων,
λόγους δ᾽ ὥσπερ εὐθύνας δεδωκυῖα καὶ τοῖς ἐν

30 κοινῷ γινομένοις λόγοις" ἁρμονίαν γάρ τῦῦα αὐτὴν
λέγουσι" καὶ γὰρ τὴν ἁρμονίαν κρᾶσιν καὶ σύνθεσιν
ἐναντίων εἶναι, καὶ τὸ σῶμα συγκεῖσθαι ἐξ ἐ ἐναντίων.

Ἰζαίτοι γε ἡ μὲν ἁρμονία λόγος τίς ἐστι τῶν
μιχθέντων ἢ ἢ σύνθεσις, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν οὐδέτερον οἷόν
τ᾽ εἶναι τούτων. ἔτι δὲ τὸ κινεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἀρ-

408 a μονίας, ψυχῇ δὲ πάντες ἀπονέμουσι τοῦτο μάλισθ᾽
ὡς εἰπεῖν. ἁρμόζει δὲ μᾶλλον καθ᾽ ὑγιείας λέγειν
ἁρμονίαν, καὶ ὅλως τῶν σωματικῶν ἀρετῶν, ἢ
κατὰ ψυχῆς. φανερώτατον δ᾽ εἴ τις ἀποδιδόναι
5 πειραθείη τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰ ἔργα τῆς ψυχῆς ἁρμονίᾳ
τινί" “Δαλεπὸν γὰρ ἐφαρμόζειν. ἔτι δ᾽ εἰ λέγομεν"
τὴν ἁρμονίαν εἰς δύο ἀποβλέποντες, κυριώτατα μὲν

1 λέγοιμεν B,
42

ON THE SOUL, I. πι|.--τῖν.

out laying down why this is so, and in what condition
the body is ; and yet this would seem to be essential.
For it is by this association that the soul acts and is
acted upon, that it moves and causes movement, and
none of these qualities belong to each other by
chance. But they only undertake to explain what
is the nature of the soul, without postulating any-
thing about the body which is to receive it, as
though it were possible, as the Pythagorean stories
suggest, that any soul can find its way into any
body : but each body seems to have its own peculiar
shape and form.. But they talk as if one could sup-
pose that carpentry can find its way into flute-playing;
each craft must employ its own tools, and each soul
its own body.

IV. There is another traditional theory about the Is tho soul
soul, which many find the most credible of all current §.rmony
theories, although it has, as it were, been called to ton?
account in general discussions. It is said that the
soul is a harmony of some kind; for, they argue, a
harmony is a mixture or composition of opposites,
and the body is composed of opposites.

But (1) a harmony is cither a proportion or a com- Objections

eye A ἢ A ¢ to this
position of the ingredients mixed, and the soul cannot theory.
be either of these things. (2) Again, movement is
not a characteristic of harmony, and yet almost
everyone ascribes this to the soul as an essential.
(3) It seems more in accord with the facts to ascribe
harmony to bodily health and to bodily qualities
generally than to the soul. This will become quite
obvious if one tries to ascribe the soul’s experiences
and actions to some sort of harmony ; for it is diffi-
cult to make a harmony of them. (4) Again, we use
the word harmony in two different senses : primarily

408 ἃ

ARISTOTLE:

τῶν μεγεθῶν ἐν τοῖς ἔχουσι κίνησιν καὶ θέσιν τὴν
σύνθεσιν αὐτῶν, ἐπειδὰν οὕτω συναρμόζωσιι' ὥστε
μηδὲν συγγενὲς παραδέχεσθαι, ἐντεῦθεν, δὲ καὶ τὸν
τῶν μεμιγμένων λόγον.

Οὐδετέρως perv οὖν εὔλογον, ἡ δὲ σύνθεσις τῶν
τοῦ σώματος μερῶν λίαν" εὐεξέταστος" πολλαί τε
γὰρ αἱ συνθέσεις τῶν μερῶν καὶ πολλαχῶς" τίνος
οὖν ἢ πῶς ὑπολαβεῖν τὸν vodr χρὴ σύνθεσιν εἶναι,
ἢ καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν ἢ ὀρεκτιικόν; ὁμοίως δὲ
ἄτοπον καὶ τὸν λόγον τῆς μίξεως εἶναι τὴν ψυχήν"
οὐ γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχει λόγοι ἡ μίξις τῶν στοιχείων
καθ᾽ ἣν σὰρξ καὶ καθ᾽ ἣν ὀστοῦν. συμβήσεται ob
πολλάς τε ψυχὰς ἔχειν καὶ κατὰ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα,
εἴπερ πάντα μὲν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων μεμιγμένων, ὁ
δὲ τῆς μίξεως λόγος ἁρμονία καὶ ψυχή. ἀπαιτή-
σειε δ᾽ ἄν τις τοῦτό γε καὶ παρ᾽ ᾿Εμπεδοκλέους"
ἕκαστον γὰρ αὐτῶν λόγῳ τινί φησιν εἶναι' πότερον
οὖν 6 λόγος ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχή, ἢ μᾶλλον ἕτερόν τι
οὖσα ἐγγίνεται τοῖς μέλεσιν; ἔτι δὲ πότερον ἡ
φιλία τῆς τυχούσης αἰτία μίξεως ἢ τῆς κατὰ τὸν
λόγον; καὶ αὕτη πότερον ὁ λόγος ἐστὶν ἢ παρὰ
τὸν λόγον ἕτερόν τι; ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἔχει τοιαύτας
ἀπορίας" εἰ δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἕτερον ἡ ψυχὴ τῆς μίξεως, τί
δή ποτε ἅμα τῷ σαρκὶ εἶναι ἀναιρεῖται καὶ τῷ
τοῖς ἄλλοις μορίοις τοῦ ζῴου; πρὸς δὲ τούτοις

@ Love is Empedocles’ personification of the force of
attraction which accounts for the combination of elements
into a whole, as its opposite repulsion (Strife) accounts for
the separation of things into separate wholes.

44,

ON THE SOUL, Lr

of magnitude, to mean putting together in the case
of those things. which have moyement and position,
when they fit in such a way that there is no room
for anything of the same kind between them ; but
in another sense we use the word harmony to mean
the proportion in which the components are mixed.
Neither of these meanings offers a reasonable ex-
planation of the soul, but, in the sense of composition
of parts of the body, the theory is casily refuted.
For the compositions of parts are many, and take
placeinmany ways. Of which of the parts, then, are
we to suppose that the mind or the perceptive or
appetitive faéulty is a composition, and how is such
a composition effected? But the view that the soul
is a harmony in the sense of a proportion of com-
ponents is equally absurd. Tor the mixing of the
clements which go to make the flesh has not the same
proportions as that which makes the bone. It will
follow, then, that there are many souls distributed all
over the body, if all is made up of elements in different
combinations, and the proportion of the mixture is
ἃ harmony which is the soul. One would like to
question Empedocles ; for he says that cach of these
parts is determined by a certain proportion. Now
is this proportion the soul, or is the soul something
distinct, which develops in the Hmbs? Again, is
his principle of Love “ responsible for a chance mix-
‘ture, or for a mixture in a fixed proportion? And is
the soul this proportion, or is it some other thing dis-
tinct from the proportion ? Such are the difficulties
which these theories present. Ifthe soul is a different
thing from the mixture in proportion, why does it die
at the same time as the flesh and the other parts of
the living animal? Besides this, unless cach of the

408 ἃ

408 ἢ

ARISTOTLE

” X

a ΕἾ a Ἵ ͵
εἴπερ μὴ ἕκαστον τῶν μορίων ψυχὴν ἔχει, εἰ μή
- ,ὔ > A
ἐστιν ἡ ψυχὴ ὁ λόγος τῆς μίξεως, τί ἐστιν ὃ
~ lal 4
φθείρεται THs ψυχῆς ἀπολειπούσης;
8 : \
Ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὔθ᾽ ἁρμονίαν οἷόν τ᾽ εἶναι τὴν
Ε - > ~
ψυχὴν οὔτε κύκλῳ περιφέρεσθαι, δῆλοι; ex τῶν
εἰρημένων. κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ κινεῖσθαι, καθ-
ἄπερ εἴπομεν, ἔστι καὶ κινεῖν ἑαυτήν, οἷον κινεῖσθαι
μὲν ἐν ᾧ ἐστί, τοῦτο δὲ κινεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς"
» > > ri ~ \ # Ἵ ,ὔ
ἄλλως δ᾽ οὐχ οἷόν τε κινεῖσθαι κατὰ τόπον αὐτήν".
᾿ \ ~
Ἑλογώτερον δ᾽ ἀπορήσειεν dv τις περὶ αὐτῆς ὡς
- Ν
κινουμένης, εἰς τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀποβλέψας: φαμὲν γὰρ
τὴν ψυχὴν λυπεῖσθαι χαίρειν θαρρεῖν φοβεῖσθαι,
ΝΜ ἌΝ 3 a , x 3 / ᾿ a
ἔτι δὲ ὀργίζεσθαί τε καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ διανοεῖ-
σθαι' ταῦτα δὲ πάντα κινήσεις εἶναι δοκοῦσιν.
568 J θ , μ᾿ \ - ἢ ’ > μὲ
ὅθεν οἰηθείη τις ἂν αὐτὴν κινεῖσθαι" τὸ δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν
ἀναγκαῖον" εἰ γὰρ καὶ ὅτι μάλιστα τὸ λυπεῖσθαι ἢ
᾽ a NI a
χαίρειν ἢ διανοεῖσθαι κινήσεις εἰσί, καὶ ἕκαστον
κινεῖσθαι τούτων, τὸ δὲ κινεῖσθαί ἐστιν ὑπὸ τῆς
- \ > 7 ΩΣ “ lal ἥν
ψυχῆς, οἷον τὸ ὀργίζεσθαι ἢ φοβεῖσθαι τῷ τὴν
ἣν φ A a A A a AS -
καρδίαν wd. κινεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ διανοεῖσθαι ἢ τοιοῦτον
iq
ἴσως ἢ ἕτερόν τι (τούτων δὲ συμβαίνει τὰ μὲν
\ ‘ “~
κατὰ φορὰν τινῶν κινουμένων, τὰ δὲ κατ᾽ ἀλ-
ft “ ~
λοίωσιν. ποῖα δὲ καὶ πῶς, ἕτερός ἐστι λόγος).
ῃ \ , “δ
τὸ δὲ λέγειν ὀργίζεσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν ὅμοιον κἂν εἴ
é εἶ 4 t a.
ris λέγοι τὴν ψυχὴν ὑφαίνειν ἢ οἰκοδομεῖν' βέλτιον
A ᾿ 4 f ‘ val
yap ἴσως μὴ λέγειν τὴν ψυχὴν ἐλεεῖν ἢ μανθάνειν ἢ
ΟΝ BS - a “~
διανδεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ τὸν ἄνθρωπον τῇ ψυχῇ. τοῦτο
, \ e 3 2 , “
δὲ μὴ ὡς ἐν ἐκείνῃ τῆς κινήσεως οὔσης, ἀλλ᾽ ὁτὲ
\ 4 3 f LY >
μὲν μέχρι ἐκείνης, ὁτὲ δ᾽ ἀπ᾽ ἐκείνης, οἷον ἡ μὲν
46

ON THE SOUL, I. τν.

parts has a separate soul of its own, and if in conse-
quence the soul is not the proportion of the mixture,
what is it which is destroyed when the soul leaves it ?

It is clear from what has been said that the soul
cannot be a harmony, nor can it move in a circle. It
is, however, possible, as we have said, that it has move-
ment as an accidental quality, and that it can move
itself in the sense of moving within that in which it
resides, and that this is moved by the soul; but in
no other sense can it move in space.

The following considerations suggest cven more
reasonable difficulties in the theory that the soul
moves. We-say that the soul grieves, is courageous,
or afraid, and also grows angry, perceives and thinks ;
all these seem to be movements; from which one
might suppose that the soul is moved ; but this is not
a necessary consequence, Let us grant that grief,
joy and thinking are all movements, and that each of
these may be called a movement ; Jet us further admit
that movement is caused by the soul—for instance
that anger and fear are particular movements of the
heart, and that thinking is the movement of the heart
or of something else (recognizing of course that some
of these movements are in position, and some quali-
tative : of what kind and in what way is another
question). Jiven if we admit both these propositions,
to say that the soul gets angry is as if one were to
‘say that the soul weaves or builds a house. Probably
it ig wiser not to say that the soul pities, or learns, or
thinks, but to say rather that the soul is the instru-
ment whereby man does these things; that is to
say, that the movement does not take place in the
soul, but sometimes penetrates to it, and sometimes
starts from it. Jor instance perception starts from

Surnmary.

Further
difhenlties
about the
soul’s moye-
ment,

408 b

409 a

ARISTOTLE

" 2 A iM Ψ' ? > 2 2 > 7 é
αἴσθησις ἀπὸ τωνδί, ἡ δ᾽ ἀνάμνησις ἀπ᾽ ἐκείνης
ἐπὶ τὰς ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις κυήσεις ἢ μονάς.

« A a wn > f Ἵ , 4

O δὲ νοῦς ἔοικεν ἐγγίνεσθαι οὐσία τις οὖσα,
καὶ οὐ φθείρεσθαι. μάλιστα γὰρ ἐφθείρετ᾽ ἂν ὑπὸ
τῆς ἐν τῷ γήρᾳ ἀμαυρώσεως, νῦν δ᾽ ἴσως ὅπερ
pees ~ > ͵7 ᾿ + % ͵ ἐν
ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων συμβαίνει" εἰ γὰρ λάβοι ὁ

va a é f ἊΝ ῳ \ x
πρεσβύτης ὄμμα τοιονδί, βλέποι ἃν ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ
νέος. ὥστε τὸ γῆρας οὐ τῷ τὴν ψυχήν τι πέπον-

͵ 3 > > k / > / Ν ,
θέναι, ἀλλ εν ῳ, καθάπερ εν μέθαις Kat νοσοίς.

- - ,
καὶ τὸ νοεῖν δὴ καὶ τὸ θεωρεῖν μαραίνεται ἄλλου
4 vw ἢ ἐς Ἄ, \ ba i > \
τινὸς ἔσω φθειρομένου, αὐτὸ δὲ ἀπαθές ἐστιν. τὸ

ἐς - \ - " > » ? ἅ
δὲ διανοεῖσθαι καὶ φιλεῖν ἢ μισεῖν οὐκ ἔστων" ἐκείνου

, 3 ‘ gr nan μ > a Ὁ ᾽ -
πάθη, ἀλλὰ τουδὶ τοῦ ἔχοντος ἐκεῖνο, ἦ ἐκεῖνο
ἔχει. διὸ καὶ τούτου φθειρομένου οὔτε μνημονεύει

ua n Ἴ Ν > ,ὔ > 2 \ ~ ~ Δ
οὔτε φιλεῖ' οὐ γὰρ ἐκείνου ἦν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ κοινοῦ, ὃ
> 4A λ ἦ ς δὲ - uw " θ td / V9 θέ
ἀπόλωλεν" ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἴσως θειότερόν τι καὶ ἀπαθές

Ν a“
ἐστιν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐχ οἷόν τε κινεῖσθαι τὴν
> ~
ψυχήν, φανερὸν ἐκ rovTwy: εἰ δ᾽ ὅλως μὴ κινεῖται,

~ ¢ γ05 ε 3 ¢ a
δῆλον ὡς οὐδ᾽ ὑφ᾽ ἑαυτῆς.

Πολὺ δὲ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀλογώτατον τὸ λέγειν
ἀριθμὸν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν κινοῦνθ᾽ ἑαυτόν: ὑπάρχει
γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἀδύνατα: πρῶτα μὲν τὰ ἐκ τοῦ κινεῖσθαι

, 2. 5 2 fot i 2 4 = ,
συμβαίνοντα, ἰδίᾳ δ᾽ ee τοῦ λέγειν αὐτὴν ἀριθμόν"
πῶς γὰρ χρὴ νοῆσαι μονάδα κινουμένην, καὶ ὑπὸ

n ~ ‘3 > an
τίνος, καὶ πῶς, ἀμερῆ Kal ἀδιάφορον οὖσαν; εἰ
γάρ ἐστι κινητικὴ καὶ κινητή, διαφέρειν δεῖ. ἔτι

4 This is the theory of Nenocrates, a contemporary of
Aristotle, who succeeded Speusippus as head of the
* Academy.”

ON THE SOUL, 1. τν.

particular objects and reaches the soul; recollection
starts from the soul and rcaches to movements in the
sense organs, or to remains of such movements.

But the mind seems Lo have an independent exist-
ence and not to suffer decay. fit could be destroyed
the most probable cause would be the feebleness of
old age, but, as it caamot, probably the same thing
occurs as in the sense organs ; for if. an old man could
acquire the eye of a young man, he would sec as a
young man sees. So that old age is not due to any
affection of the soul. but only of that in which the
soul resides, as is the case in drunkenness and disease,
Thus the power of thought and speculation decays
because something else within decays, but the power
of thought is not itself affected. Thinking, loving
and hating are not then qualities of the mind, but
rather of the individual man who possesses the mind,
in so far as he does so. Memory and love then fail
because he fails; for they were never part of the
mind, but of the whole entity which has perished.
Possibly the mind is too divine, and is therefore un-
affected. It is then obvious from these considera-
tions that the soul cannot move; and, if it is
generally incapable of movement, it is obviously not
moved by itself.

But of all the unreasonable theories about the soul
the most unreasonable is that which calls the soul a
umber which moves itself.¢ In this theory there are
inherent inspossibilities, first those which arise from
the idea of movement and in particular from calling
the soul a number. For how can one conceive (1) ἃ
unit moving, and by what is it moved, and in what
way, being as it is without parts and indivisible ?
For if it is movable and moved it must have divisions.

Ἐ 40

Does the
soul dovay ?

The soul aga
selfanoving
number.

ARISTOTLE

408 8 5 3 é a \ δ σὰν a
δ᾽ ἐπεί φασι κινηθεῖσαν γραμμὴν ἐπίπεδον ποιεῖν,

ὅ στιγμὴν δὲ γραμμήν, καὶ αἱ τῶν μονάδων κινήσεις
γραμμαὶ ἔσονται: ἡ γὰρ στιγμὴ μονάς ἐστι θέσιν
~ = \
ἔχουσα: 6 δ᾽ ἀριθμὸς τῆς ψυχῆς ἤδη πού ἐστι καὶ
/ μ wt > > a δ ἢ ὙΝ 2 a
θέσιν ἔχει. ἔτι δ᾽ ἀριθμοῦ μὲν ἐὰν ἀφέλῃ τις
> 4 at / i » 2 / A δὲ
ἀριθμὸν ἢ μονάδα, λείπεται ἄλλος ἀριθμός: τὰ δὲ
φυτὰ καὶ τῶν ζῴων πολλὰ διαιρούμενα ζῇ, καὶ
a i Ἵ \ X wv - ΕΣ / 2
10 δοκεῖ τὴν αὐτὴν ψυχὴν ἔχειν τῷ cider. δόξειε ὃ
nn ’ 4 ,ὔ 4 A ΩΣ rg
av οὐθὲν διαφέρειν μονάδας λέγειν ἢ σωμάτια
μικρά' καὶ γὰρ ἐκ τῶν Δημοκρίτου σφαιρίων ἐὰν
γένωνται στιγμαί, μόνον δὲ μένῃ τὸ “ποσόν, ἔσται
τι ἐν αὐτῷ τὸ μὲν κινοῦν τὸ δὲ κινούμενον, ὥσπερ
? al cal ‘ ‘ ͵ Ν
ἐν τῷ συνεχεῖ" οὐ γὰρ διὰ τὸ μεγέθει διαφέρειν 7)
/ , \ i > 3 a ,
1 μικρότητι συμβαίνει τὸ λεχθέν, ἀλλ’ ὅτι ποσόν.
\
διὸ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναί τι τὸ κινῆσον τὰς μονάδας.
> ~ A. \ > ns
εἰ δ᾽ ἐν τῷ ζῴῳ τὸ κινοῦν ἡ ψυχή, καὶ ἐν τῷ
3 - “A "ἢ
ἀριθμῷ, ὥστε οὐ τὸ κινοῦν καὶ τὸ κινούμενον ἡ
, 2 A \ ~. f ? i \ 1 \
ψυχή, ἀλλὰ τὸ κινοῦν μόνον. ἐνδέχεται δὲ ᾿δὴ
πῶς μονάδα ταύτην εἶναι;" δεῖ γὰρ ὑπάρχειν τινὰ
40 αὐτῇ διαφορὰν πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας' στιγμῆς δὲ μονα-
-“ f Bly ” 4 \ ͵ > \ μεν
δικῆς τίς ἂν εἴη διαφορὰ πλὴν θέσις; εἰ μὲν οὖν
oN a
εἰσὶν ἕτεραι ai ἐν τῷ σώματι μονάδες καὶ at
στιγμαί, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἔσονται αἱ μονάδες" καθέξει
- 4 a“
yap χώραν στιγμῆς. καίτοι τί κωλύει ἐν τῷ
αὐτῷ εἶναι, εἰ δύο, καὶ ἀπείρους; ὧν γὰρ ὁ τόπος
> 7 mn
ag ἀδιαίρετος, Kal αὐτά. εἰ δ᾽ al ἐν τῷ σώματι
στιγμαὶ ὃ ἀριθμὸς ὁ τῆς ψυχῆς, ἢ εἰ ὁ ἐκ τῶν ἐν
τῷ σώματι στιγμῶν ἀριθμὸς ἡ ψυχή, διὰ τί οὐ
1 B. δή πὼς and no question mark.
50

ΟΝ THE SOUL, I. w.

(2) Again, since they say that a straight line in motion
describes a plane figure, and a moving point a line,
the movement of units will be straight lines. For a
point is a unit having position; but the number of
the soul is already somewhere, and has position.
(3) Now, if one subtracts a number or unit from a
number, another number is left. But plants and
many animals continue to live even when divided,
and seem to have the same soul in these fragments as
in their original form. It would seem to make no
difference whether we speak of unils or of minute
bodies, Vor if points are dev eloped from Demo-
eritus’s spheres, and if magnitude is their only per-
manent quality, there will be something which moves
and something which is moved, as in a continuous
succession. For what we have mentioned does not
occur through any difference of size (either great or
small), but because it is a quantity. There must, then,
be something which will give movement to the units.
But if that which produces movement in the animal
is the soul, then it is also so in the number, so that
the soul is not both that which produces movement
and that which is moved, but only that which pro-
duccs movement. But how can this possibly be a
unit? Tor it must have differences from other units.
But what difference can there be between one point
jand another except in position ἢ If then the bodily
“unils and points are different, the units will be in the
“game place, for each will occupy the place of a point.
And yet what prevents them, if there are two or an
infinite number, from coinciding in the same place ?
For where space is indivisible so are they. But ifthe
bodily points are identical with the soul number, or
if the number of bodily points is the soul, why do not

ARISTOTLE
400 8
πάντα ψυχὴν ἔχουσι τὰ σώματα; στιγμαὶ γὰρ ér
ἅπασι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι καὶ ἄπειροι. ἔτι δὲ πῶς οἷόν
τε χωρίζεσθαι τὰς στιγμὰς; καὶ ἀπολύεσθαι. τῶν
80 σωμάτων, εἴ γε μὴ διαιροῦνται αἱ γραμμαὶ εἰς
στιγμάς;
Ν. Συμβαίνει δέ, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, τῇ μὲν ταὐτὸ
λέγει" τοῖς σῶμά τι λεπτομερὲς αὐτὴν τιθεῖσι, τῇ
409} δ᾽, ὥσπερ Δημόκριτος κινεῖσθαί φησιν ὑπὸ τῆς
ψυχῆς, ἴδιον τὸ ἀτοπον' εἴπερ γάρ ἐστιν" ἡ ψυχὴ
ἐν παντὶ τῷ αἰσθανομένῳ σώματι, ἀναγκαῖον ev
τῷ αὐτῷ δύο εἶναι σώματα, εἰ σῶμά τι ἡ ψυχή"
τοῖς δ᾽ ἀριθμὸν λέγουσιν, ἐν τῇ μιᾷ στιγμῇ πολ-
υ λὰς στιγμὰς ἢ πᾶν σῶμα ψυχὴν ἔχειν, εἰ μὴ
διαφέρων τις ἀριθμὸς ἐγγίνεται καὶ ἄλλος τις τῶν
ὑπαρχουσῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι στιγμῶν. συμβαίνει
τε κινεῖσθαι τὸ ζῷον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ, καθάπερ
καὶ Δημόκριτον ἔφαμεν αὐτὸ κινεῖν: τί γὰρ
διαφέρει σφαίρας λέγειν σμικρὰς ἢ μονάδας μεγά-
Aas, ἢ ὅλως μονάδας φερομένας; ἀμφοτέρως γὰρ
ἀναγκαῖον κινεῖν τὸ ζῷον τῷ κινεῖσθαι ταύτας.
Τοῖς δὴ συμπλέξασιν εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ κίνησιν καὶ
ἀριθμὸν ταῦτά τε συμβαίνει καὶ πολλὰ ἕτερα
τοιαῦτα' οὐ γὰρ μόνον ὁρισμὸν ψυχῆς ἀδύνατον
τοιοῦτον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ “συμβεβηκός. δῆλον δ᾽
15 εἴ τις ἐπιχειρήσειεν ἐκ τοῦ λόγου τούτου τὰ πάθη,
καὶ τὰ ἔργα τῆς ψυχῆς ἀποδιδόναι, οἷον λογισμούς,
αἰσθήσεις, ἡδονάς, λύπας, ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα"
ὥσπερ γὰρ εἴπομεν πρότερον, οὐδὲ μαντεύσασθαι
ῥάδιον ἐξ αὐτῶν.

1 ψυχὰς Β.
52

ON THI SOUL, 1. τν.---ν.

all bodics have a soul? Lor there appear to be an
infinite number of points in all of them. And again
how is it possible to separate the points and free them
from the bodies, unless the lines are divided into
points ?

V. As we have said, this theory in one direction
says the same thing as Lhose who suppose the soul to
be a body of light parts, and in another direction, just
as when Democritus states that the body is moved by
the soul, ib has an absurdity of its own. Vor if the
soul exists in every part of the sentient body then
there must be two bodies in the same place. if the soul
isabody. But those who say that the soul is a number
must believe that there are many points in one point,
or else that every body has a soul, unless the number
existing in the soul is a different thing from the points
which reside in bodies. And it follows that the living
creature is moved by the number, just as we have
already said that Democritus accounted for its move-
ment; for what. difference does it make whether we
call them small spheres, or large units, or generally
moving units? Loy in either case they can only move
the living creature by moving themselves.

These are the difficulties in the way of those who
combine movement and number together, and there
are many other problems of a like nature ; for not
only is this unable to serve as a definition of the soul ;
it is not even one of its accidental attributes. And
this will became clear to anyone, if he tries to give
an explanation based on this theory of the affections
and functions of the soul, such as calenlations, sensa-
tions, pleasures, sorrows, and so on; for, as we have
said before, on these lines it is not easy even to con-
jecture an explanation.

Xonoerates!
theory
farther
eviticized.

Conclusion,

409 b

4108

ARISTOTLE

~ > Ἢ
Τριῶν δὲ τρόπων παραδεδομένων καθ᾽ ods
ὁρίζονται τὴν ψυχήν, of μὲν τὸ κιητικώτατον
ἀπεφήναντο τῷ κινεῖν ἑαυτό, οἱ δὲ σῶμα τὸ λε-
πτομερέστατον ἢ τὸ ἀσωματώτατοι τῶν ἄλλων.
ταῦτα δὲ τίνας ἀπορίας τε καὶ ὑπεναντιώσεις ἔχει,
>
διεληλύθαμεν σχεδόν. λείπεται δ᾽ ἐπισκέψασθαι
πῶς λέγεται τὸ ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων αὐτὴν εἶμαι.
λέγουσι μὲν γάρ, ἵν᾽ αἰσθάνηταί τε τῶν ὄντων
καὶ ἕκαστον γνωρίζῃ, ἀναγκαῖον δὲ συμβαίνειν
‘ 1 ee ͵ “ 4 ’ x ,
πολλὰ καὶ ἀδύνατα τῷ λόγῳ' τίθενται γὰρ γνωρίζειν
τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ τὴν ψυχὴν τὰ
πράγματα τιθέντες. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ μόνα ταῦτα,
πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἕτερα, μᾶλλον δ᾽ ἴσως ἄπειρα τὸν
Ὄ > ‘
ἀριθμόν, τὰ ἐκ τούτων. ἐξ ὧν μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν
% \
ἕκαστον τούτων, ἔστω γινώσκειν τὴν ψυχὴν Kal
> / > AY Ἂ. 4 , Cal Ὁ
αἰσθάνεσθαι: ἀλλὰ τὸ σύνολον τίνι γνωριεῖ ἢ
> , rd θ A nv a “δ \ Ἢ
αἰσθήσεται, οἷον τί θεὸς ἢ ἄνθρωπος ἢ σὰρξ ἢ
~ \ ~ ~
ὀστοῦν; ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν τῶν συνθέτων"
ec a A a
od yap ὁπωσοῦν ἔχοντα τὰ στοιχεῖα τούτων ἕκα-
3 ‘ / χ Ἁ / id A
στον, ἀλλὰ λόγῳ τινὶ καὶ συνθέσει, καθάπερ φησὶ
- > ~
᾿Ἐμπεδοκλῆς τὸ ὀστοῦν'

δὲ χθὼν ἐπίηρος ἐν εὐστέρνοις χοάνοισιν
Sh δύ πο 3 4 ͵ dé s 5 tad
τὼ" δύο τῶν ὀκτὼ μερέων λάχε νήστιδος αἴγλης,
Ψ 3 ε ,ὔ ‘ > > ; 4...
τέσσαρα δ᾽ “Ἡφαίστοιο: τὰ δ᾽ ὀστέα devi’.
ἐγένοντο.
οὐδὲν οὖν ὄφελος elvar τὰ στοιχεῖα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, εἰ
μὴ καὶ οἱ λόγοι ἐνέσονται καὶ ἡ σύνθεσις" γνωριεῖ
γὰρ ἕκαστον τὸ ὅμοιον, τὸ δ᾽ ὀστοῦν ἢ τὸν ἄνθρω-
1 τὰ Β,

ON THE SOUL, I. v.

Three methods of defining the soul have come down
to us; some have regarded it as the greatest cause
of movement, because it moves itself; others again
have explained the soul as composed of very light
parts, or as corporeal but less so than any other body.
We have pretty well exhausted the difficulties and
contradictions which these two definitions involve.
But it remains to examine the third definition, and
see what is meant by saying that the sonl is composed
of the elements. ‘This theory is intended to explain
how the soul apprehends and recognizes each existing
thing, but the theory involves many impossibilities ;
its supporters assume that like is recognized by like,
and thus they identify the soul with the things it
knows. But these clements are not the only things
existing ; there are many other things compounded
of the elements, in fact these arc almost infinite.
Granted that the soul might know and. perceive the
elements from which each of these things is com-
pounded ; yet by what part willit perceive and know
a composite whole such as god, man, flesh, or bone ?
And similarly any other compound whole? For such
wholes do not consist of the elements arranged at
random, but in a certain proportion and with some
principle of composition, as Empedocles says in his
description of bone :

“The pleasant earth in full-breasted crucibles took

etwo of the eight parts from the gleam of moisture,
and four from Hephaestus; and bones came into
being all white.”

It is then no use for the elements to exist in the soul,
unless the proportion and principle of composition
also exist in it; for each thing will fecognize the like,
but there will be nothing in the soul to recognize

The soul ag
a compound
of the
elements,

410 ἃ
10

30
410 b

ARISTOTLE

mov οὐθέν, εἰ μὴ καὶ ταῦτ᾽ ἐνέσται. τοῦτο δ᾽ ὅτι
ἀδύνατον, οὐθὲν δεῖ λέγειν: τίς γὰρ ἂν ἀπορήσειεν
εἰ ἔνεστιν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ λίθος ἢ ἄνθρωπος; ὁμοίως
δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ μὴ ἀγαθόν». τὸν αὐτὸν
δὲ τρόπον καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων.

Ἔτι δὲ πολλαχῶς λεγομένου τοῦ ὄντος (σημαίνει
γὰρ τὸ μὲν τόδε τι, τὸ δὲ ποσὸν ἢ ποιὸν ἣ καί
τινα ἄλλην τῶν διαιρεθεισῶν κατηγοριῶι) πότερον
ἐξ ἁπάντων ἔσται ἡ ψυχὴ ἢ οὖ; ἀλλ᾽ οὐ δοκεῖ
κοινὰ πάντων εἶναι στοιχεῖα. ἄρ᾽ οὖν ὅσα τῶν
οὐσιῶν ἐκ τούτων μόνον; πῶς οὖν γινώσκει καὶ
τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον; ἢ φήσουσιν ἑκάστου γένους
εἶναι στοιχεῖα. καὶ ἀρχὰς ἰδίας, ἐξ ὧν τὴν ψυχὴν
συνεστάναι; ἔσται ἄρα ποσὸν καὶ ποιὸν καὶ οὐσία.
ἀλλ᾽ ἀδύνατον ἐκ τῶν τοῦ ποσοῦ στοιχείων οὐσίαν
εἶναι καὶ μὴ ποσόν. τοῖς δὴ λέ ουσιν ἐκ πάντων
ταῦτά τε καὶ τοιαῦθ᾽ ἕτερα συμ aiver, ἄτοπον δὲ
καὶ τὸ φάναι μὲν ἀπαθὲς εἶναι τὸ ὅμοιον ὑπὸ τοῦ
ὁμοίου, αἰσθάνεσθαι δὲ τὸ ὅμοιον τοῦ ὁμοίου καὶ
γινώσκειν τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον. τὸ δ᾽ αἰσθάνεσθαι
πάσχειν τι καὶ κινεῖσθαι τιθέασιν" ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ

Δ - ΓΑ
τὸ νοεῖν τε καὶ γινώσκειν.

Πολλὰς δ᾽ ἀπορίας καὶ δυσχερείας ἔχοντος τοῦ
λέγειν, καθάπερ ᾿Εμπεδοκλῆς, ὡς τοῖς σωματικοῖς
στοιχείοις ἕκαστα γνωρίζεται καὶ πρὸς τὸ ὅμοιον,
μαρτυρεῖ τὸ νῦν λεχθέν: ὅσα γὰρ ἔνεστιν ἐν τοῖς
τῶν ζῴων σώμασιν ἁπλῶς γῆς, οἷον ὀστᾶ νεῦρα
τρίχες, οὐθενὸς αἰσθάνεσθαι δοκεῖ, ὥστ᾽ οὐδὲ τῶν
ὁμοίων. καίτοι προσῆκεν. ἔτι δ᾽ ἑκάστῃ τῶν

α So that the soril can know other categories besides that of
substance.

ON THE SOUL, I. ν.

bone, for instance, or man, unless they exist in it.
But it is unnecessary to prove that this is impossible.
For who could speculate as to whether there is a
stone or a man in the soul? The same argument
applics to good and not-good; and so wilh many
other things.

Again, the word “ existing” is used in many piffculttes
senses (il means substance, quantity, quality, or any ὌΝ
other of the different categories). 1s the soul then
composed of all these or not ? The elements cannot
surely be common to all the categories. Is the soul
composed only of those which belong to the category
of substance’? How then is it to know each of the
others? Will they maintain that the elements have
each their own genus and special principles, and
that the soul is composed of each of these ?” In that
case it will be quantity, quality, and substance. But
nothing can be derived from the elements of quantity
without its being quantity. ‘Those who say that the
soul is composed of all the clements are confronted
with these and similar difficulties. It is unreasonable
to say on the one hand that like is not acted on by
like, and on the other that like has perception of like,
and that one recognizes like by like; but they de-
scribe perception as a form of being acted upon and
as movement. And similarly with thinking and
knowing.

There arc many obscurities and difficulties in say- Problems
ing, as Empedocles docs, that each thing is known by δ τ
corporeal elements, as what has been already said theory.
shows. For all the elements in living creatures which
are composed simply of earth, such as bone, sinews,
and hair, seem to have no perception at all, even of
like things ; and yet on this theory they should have.

410 b

ARISTOTLE

ἀρχῶν ἄγνοια πλείων ἢ σύνεσις ὑπάρξει" γνώσεται
μὲν γὰρ ἕν ἕκαστον, πολλὰ δ᾽ ἀγνοήσει' πάντα
γὰρ τἄλλα. συμβαίνει δ᾽ ᾿μπεδοκλεῖ ye καὶ
ἀφρονέστατον εἶναι τὸν θεόν" μόνος γὰρ τῶν στοι-
χείων ἕν οὐ γνωριεῖ, τὸ νεῖκος, τὰ δὲ θνητὰ πάντα"
ἐκ πάντων γὰρ ἕκαστον. ὅλως τε διὰ τίν᾽ αἰτίαν
οὐχ ἅπαντα ψυχὴν ἔχει τὰ ὄντα, ἐπειδὴ πᾶν ἢ
στοιχεῖον ἢ ἐκ στοιχείου ἑνὸς ἢ πλειόνων ἢ πάντων;
ἀναγκαῖον γάρ ἐστιν ἕν τι γινώσκειν ἢ τινὰ 7
πάντα. ἀπορήσειε δ᾽ ἄν τις καὶ τί ποτ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ
ἑνυποιοῦν αὐτά; ὕλῃ γὰρ ἔοικε τά γε στοιχεῖα"
κυριώτατον γὰρ ἐκεῖνο τὸ συνέχον ὅ τί ποτ᾽ ἐστίν"
τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς εἶναί τι κρεῖττον καὶ ἄρχον ἀδύνατον"
ἀδυνατώτερον δ᾽ ἔτι τοῦ νοῦ" εὔλογον γὰρ τοῦτον
εἶναι προγενέστατον καὶ κύριον κατὰ φύσιν, τὰ δὲ
στοιχεῖά φασι πρῶτα τῶν ὄντων εἶναι.

Πάντες δὲ καὶ οἱ διὰ τὸ γνωρίζειν καὶ αἰσθάνε-
σθαι τὰ ὄντα τὴν ψυχὴν ex τῶν στοιχείων λέγοντες
αὐτήν, καὶ οἱ τὸ κινητικώτατον, οὐ περὶ πάσης
λέγουσι ψυχῆς" οὔτε γὰρ τὰ αἰσθανόμενα πάντα
κινητικά" φαίνεται γὰρ εἶναΐ τινα μόνιμα τῶν ζῴων
κατὰ τόπον. καΐτοι δοκεῖ γε ταύτην μόνην τῶν"
κινήσεων κινεῖν ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ ζῷον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
ὅσοι τὸν νοῦν καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων
ποιοῦσιν: φαίνεται yap τά τε φυτὰ ζῆν οὐ μετ-
ἔχοντα φορᾶς οὐδ᾽ αἰσθήσεως, καὶ τῶν ζῴων πολλὰ

ON THE SOUL, I. v.

Again, in each of these first principles there will be
more ignorance than understanding ; for each will
know one thing, but will be ignorant of many, in
fact of everything else. Thus Empedocles’ god must
be most unintelligent ; for he alone will be ignorant
of one of these elements, namely strife, whereas man
will know them all; for each individual is composed
of them all; in general also why have not all existing
things a soul, since everything is an element, or com-
posed of an element, or of more than one, or of all ?
Tor they must all know one thing, or some things, or
all things. There would be a further difficulty in
deciding what is the combining principle, for the
elements correspond to matter ; and the combining
foree, whatever it is, is complete master; but it is
impossible that anything should be superior to and
muster of the soul, and still more impossible that it
should be superior to the mind ; for it is reasonable
to suppose that the mind is by nature priorand master,
but they say that the elements are the first of all
existing things.

Those who say that the soul is composed of the The defni-
elements, because it knows and perceives existing dae all
things, and equally those who call it the chief cause the frets.
of motion, do not offer an explanation which will cover
every soul. For not everything which has percep-
tion has movement also; for instance some living
things seem to be stationary in space ; and yet this
seems the only kind of movement which the soul
imparts to the living creature. The same difficulty
arises for those who construct the mind and the per-
ceptive faculty out of the elements ; for plants seem
to live without sharing in movement in space, nor
in perception, and many living animals have no power

410
26

=
on

ARISTOTLE:

διάνοιαν οὐκ ἔχειν. εἰ δέ τις καὶ ταῦτα παρα-
χωρήσειε, καὶ θείη τὸν νοῦν μέρος τι τῆς ψυχῆς,
ς ᾿ \ ‘ ‘ 2 ὔ ΟΣ WA a if.
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικόν, οὐδ᾽ ἂν οὕτω λέγοιεν
, A ͵ = 2 A \ Lia > \
καθόλου περὶ πάσης ψυχῆς οὐδὲ περὶ ὅλης οὐδὲ
μιᾶς. τοῦτο δὲ πέπονθε καὶ ὁ ἐν τοῖς ’Opduxois
ἔπεσι καλουμένοις λόγος" φησὶ γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν ere
τοῦ ὅλου εἰσιέναι ἀναπνεόντων, φερομένην ὑπὸ τῶν
ἀνέμων. οὐχ οἷόν τε δὴ τοῖς φυτοῖς τοῦτο συμβαί-
νειν οὐδὲ τῶν ζῴων ἐνίοις, εἴπερ μὴ πάντα ἀνα-
/ ~ A / \ τ ς 4
πνέουσιν. τοῦτο δὲ λέληθε τοὺς οὕτως ὑπειληφό-
τας. εἴ τε δεῖ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐϊς τῶν στοιχείων ποιεῖν,
οὐθὲν δεῖ ἐξ ἁπάντων" ἱκανὸν yap θάτεροι; μέρος
τῆς ἐναντιώσεως ἑαυτό τε κρίνειν κκαὶ τὸ ἀντικεί-
\ a a \ ‘
μενον. καὶ yap τῷ εὐθεῖ καὶ αὐτὸ καὶ τὸ καμπύλον
γινώσκομεν" κριτὴς γὰρ ἀμφοῖν ὁ κανών, τὸ δὲ
καμπύλον οὔθ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ οὔτε τοῦ εὐθέος. καὶ ἐν τῷ
a , ΕἸ 4 ral Ig “ ᾿" λ
ὅλῳ δέ τινες αὐτὴν μεμῖχθαί φασιν, ὅθεν ἴσως καὶ
an Lr 4 ͵ / ~ - >
Θαλῆς ὠήθη πάντα πλήρη θεῶν εἶναι. τοῦτο ὃ
ἔχει τινὰς ἀπορίας" διὰ τίνα γὰρ αἰτίαν ἐν μὲν τῷ
ἀέρι ἢ τῷ πυρὶ οὖσα ἡ ψυχὴ οὐ ποιεῖ ζῷον, ἐν δὲ
τοῖς μικτοῖς, καὶ ταῦτα βελτίων ἐν τούτοις εἶναι
δοκοῦσα; ἐπιζητήσειε γὰρ dv τις καὶ διὰ τίν᾽
αἰτίαν ἡ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι ψυχὴ τῆς ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις
a 3 " A > é tA
βελτίων ἐστὶ καὶ ἀθανατωτέρα. συμβαίνει δ᾽
14
ἀμφοτέρως ἄτοπον καὶ παράλογον: καὶ yap τὸ
Ent 1} ~ nn 4 2. --
λέγειν ζῷον τὸ πῦρ ἢἣ τὸν ἀέρα τῶν παραλογω-
, 4 - -
τέρων ἐστί, καὶ τὸ μὴ λέγειν ζῷα ψυχῆς ἐνούσης
” ς - 2 ΟΡ ἢ μν Ν A
ἄτοπον. ὑπολαβεῖν δ᾽ ἐοίκασιν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν

ON THE SOUL, I. ν.

of thinking. But supposing one were to let this
question pass, and to admit that the mind is part of
the soul, and similarly the perceptive faculty, yet one
could not speak generally in this way about every
soul, nor about the whole of any one soul. The
theory in the so-called poems of Orpheus presents
the same difficulty ; for this theory alleges that the
soul enters froin the universe into animals when they
breathe, borne by the winds. But this cannot happen
to plants, nor to some animals, since they do uot all
breathe ; a point which has escaped those who sup-
port this theory. And if we are to construct the
soul out of the elements, it is quite unnecessary that
it should be composed of all the clements ; for only
one of a pair of opposiles is needed to understand
both it and its opposite. For instance, by knowing
the meaning of “ straight” we also know the meaning
of “crooked”; for the carpenter's rule is the test
of both, but the crooked tests neither itself nor the
straight. Some think that the soul pervades the
whole universe, whence perhaps came ‘Thales’ view
that everything is full of gods. But this theory con-
tains certain difficulties ; for why does not the soul,
when it is in the air and in fire, make an animal, but
only when the elements are mixed, and that too
though it seems to be in a purer form in the first case ?
Vor one might ask why the soul in the air is better
and less liable to death than the soul in living
creatures. But in any case the conclusion is extra-
ordinary and unreasonable ; for to describe fire or
air as living crcatures is too improbable, and yet to
refuse to call them living creatures, if there is a soul
in them, is illogical. ‘They appear to suppose that
the soul resides in these elements, because the whole

ARISTOTLE

‘iia 2 , v νι ὦ a , ς , e >
εν TOUTOLS, OTL TO ὅλον τοις μοριοις ὁμοειδές. WOT

3 - , ζω ,ὔ ν \ X © cal
ἀναγκαῖον αὐτοῖς λέγειν καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ὁμοειδῆ
τοῖς μορίοις εἶναι, εἰ τῷ ἀπολαμβάνεσθαί τι τοῦ

20 περιέχοντος ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις ἔμψυχα τὰ ζῷα γίνεται.
εἰ δ᾽ ὃ μὲν ἀὴρ διασπώμενος ὁμοειδής, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ
ἀνομοιομερής, τὸ μέν τι αὐτῆς ὑπάρξει δῆλον ὅτι,
τὸ δ᾽ οὐχ ὑπάρξει. ἀναγκαῖον οὖν αὐτὴν ἢ ὁμοιο-
μερῆ εἶναι ἢ μὴ ἐνυπάρχειν ἐν ὁτῳοῦν μορίῳ τοῦ
παντός.

‘ * > a > t ¢ a \

Φανερὸν οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὡς οὔτε τὸ
96 γινώσκειν ὑπάρχει τῇ ψυχῇ διὰ τὸ ἐκ τῶν στοι-
, a ~ >
χείων εἶναι, οὔτε τὸ κινεῖσθαι αὐτὴν καλῶς odd

3 al / > A ~ ~
ἀληθῶς λέγεται. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ γινώσκειν τῆς ψυχῆς

’ \ \ 5 > / ,ὔ \ \ , » \
ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαί τε καὶ τὸ δοξάζειν, ἔτι δὲ

4 3 a Ν ΄ , ov ¢ oa 7
τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν καὶ βούλεσθαι καὶ ὅλως ai ὀρέξεις,
\ \ ¢ \ , ~ -
γίνεται δὲ Kal ἡ κατὰ τόπον κίνησις τοῖς ζῴοις
a a ? 2 3 x.
80 ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς, ἔτι δ᾽ αὔξη τε Kal ἀκμὴ καὶ
Ψ, / ¢ - ~ ͵ ῳ
att φθίσις, πότερον ὅλῃ τῇ ψυχῇ τούτων ἕκαστον
ὑπάρχει, καὶ πάσῃ νοοῦμέν τε καὶ αἰσθανόμεθα
καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον ποιοῦμέν τε καὶ πάσχο-
μεν, ἢ μορίοις ἑτέροις ἕτερα; καὶ τὸ ζῆν δὴ
πότερον ἔν τινι τούτων ἐστὶν ἑνὶ ἢ καὶ ἐν πλείοσιν
mn” ~ A \ uv wv , ,

5 ἢ πᾶσιν, ἢ καὶ ἄλλο τι αἴτιον; λέγουσι δή τινες
μεριστὴν αὐτήν, καὶ ἄλλῳ μὲν νοεῖν ἄλλῳ δὲ
ἐπιθυμεῖν. τί οὖν δή πότε συνέχει τὴν ψυχήν, εἶ
μεριστὴ πέφυκεν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ τό γε σῶμα' δοκεῖ

\ “-
γὰρ τοὐναντίον μᾶλλον ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ σῶμα συνέχειν.
ἐξελθούσης γοῦν διαπνεῖται καὶ σήπεται. εἰ οὖν
μὴ } ? a - » \

10 ἕτερόν τι μίαν αὐτὴν ποιεῖ, ἐκεῖνο μάλιστ᾽ ἂν εἴη

\ a
ψυχή. δεήσει δὲ καὶ πάλιν κἀικεῖνο ζητεῖν, πότερον

ON THE SOUL, I. v.

is homogeneous with its parts; so they are com-

pelled to say that the soul is homogeneous with its

parts, if living creatures become possessed of soul by

some part of the surrounding air being cut off and
enclosed inthem. But if the air detached is homo-
geneous, while the soul has parts of different kinds,

then evidently one part of the soul exists in the air,

while another does not. So that either the soul must

be of similar parts, or else it does not exist in any

part of the universe taken at random.

¥rom what has been said it is obvious that the Can the soul

faculty of knowing does not belong to the soul be- ae
cause it is composed of the elements, nor is it well according
and truly said that it moves. But since knowing, fiends?
perceiving, and the forming of opinions are operations

of the soul, besides desiring, wishing, and the appe-

tites in general, and again since movement in space
belongs to living creatures by reason of the soul,
besides growth, the prime of life, and decay, does

each of these things belong to the soul as a
whole? Do we think, perceive, and do and suffer
everything else with the whole soul, or do some
functions belong to one part and others to another ἢ

Does living depend upon one of these, or upon more,

or upon all, or is something else the cause ? Some

say that the soul has parts, and thinks with one part,

and desires with another, In this case what is it

‘which combines the soul into a whole, if it naturally
consists of parts ? Certainly not the body : on the
contrary the soul seems rather to combine the body

into a whole ; for when the soul is gone the body dis-

solves into air and decays. If then some other thing

gives the soul unity, this would really be the soul.

But we shall have to inquire again, whether this is a

4118

ARISTOTLE

ἕν ἢ πολυμερές. εἰ μὲν yap ἕν, διὰ τί οὐκ εὐθέως
καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ἕν; εἰ δὲ μεριστόν, πάλιν 6 λόγος
ζητήσει τί τὸ συνέχον ἐκεῖνο, κκαὶ οὕτω δὴ πρόεισιν
ἐπὶ τὸ ἄπειρον. ἀπορήσειε δ᾽ ἄν τις καὶ περὶ τῶν
μορίων αὐτῆς, τῶν ἔχει δύναμιν ἕκαστον ἐν τῷ
σώματι. εἰ γὰρ ἡ ὅλη “ψυχὴ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα συνέχει,
προσήκει καὶ τῶν μορίων ἕκωστον συνέχειν τι τοῦ
σώματος. τοῦτο δ᾽ ἔοικεν ἀδυνάτῳ" ποῖον γὰρ
μόριον ἢ πῶς ὁ νοῦς συνέξει, χαλεπὸν καὶ πλά-
σαι. φαίνεται δὲ καὶ τὰ φυτὰ διαιρούμενα ᾿ζῆν
καὶ τῶν ζῴων ἔνια τῶν ἐντόμων, ὡς τὴν αὐτὴν
ἔχοντα ψυχὴν τῷ εἴδει, εἰ καὶ μὴ ἀριθμῷ ἑκάτεροι'
γοῦν τῶν μορίων αἴσθησιν ἔχει καὶ κινεῖται κατὰ
τόπον ἐπί τινα χρόνον. εἰ δὲ μὴ διατελοῦσιν, οὐθὲν
ἄτοπον’ ὄργανα γὰρ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ὥστε σώζειν τὴν
φύσιν. ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲν ἧττον ἐν ἑκατέρῳ τῶν μορίων
ἅπαντ᾽ ἐνυπάρχει τὰ ie τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ ὁμοειδῆ
εἰσιν ἀλλήλοις καὶ τῇ ὅλῃ, ἀλλήλων μ ἐν ὡς οὐ
χωριστὰ ὄντα, τῆς δ᾽ ὅλης ψυχῆς ὡς διαιρετῆς
οὔσης. ἔοιικε δὲ καὶ ἡ ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς ἀρχὴ ψυχή
τις εἶναι" μόνης γὰρ ταύτης κοινωνεῖ καὶ ζῷα καὶ
φυτά. καὶ αὕτη μὲν χωρίζεται τῆς αἰσθητιιςῆς
ἀρχῆς, αἴσθησιν δ᾽ οὐθὲν ἄνευ ταύτης ἔχει.

¢ 'The os, reading is doubtful. With the present text A>
must mean that supposing an animal to be divided and to
continue to live there must be a soul in each segment. The

ΟΝ THE SOUL, I. v.

unit or has many parts. For if itis a unit, why should
not the soul be straightway described as a unit?
And if it has parts, the progress of the argument will
again demand to know what is its combining prin-
ciple, and thus we shall proceed ad infizitum. There
may also be some doubt about the parts of the soul,
as to what is the function of each in the body. For
if the soul as a whole combines the whole body, it is
natural that each of the parts should combine some
part of the body. But this seems impossible ; for it
is hard even to imagine what part the mind will com-
bine, or how it will do it. Moreover plants seem to
live even when divided, and some of the insects also,
and the parts have a soul the same in kind if not in
number ; for each of the parts has perception and
moves in space at any rate for a short time. It is not
at all surprising that they do not continue to do so ;
for they have not the organs necessary to maintain
life. But none the less all the parts of the soul exist
in each of the divided portions, and these are homo-
geneous ® both with each other and with the whole,
not in the sense that they are separated from each
other, but because the whole soul is divided. The
first principle in plants, then, seems to be a kind of
soul ; for this alone is shared by animals and plants ;
and this is separate from the perceptive first. prin-
ciple, but no being has perception without it.

‘different parts of the soul in one segment will be of the same
kind as the corresponding parts in another segment, e.g.
each sepment will contain an appctitive part, and so on.

4128. 1. Τὰ μὲν δὴ ὑπὸ τῶν πρότερον παραδεδομένα περὶ
ψυχῆς εἰρήσθω: πάλιν δ᾽ ὥσπερ ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς ἐπ-
Ὁ ανίωμεν, πειρώμενοι διορίσαι τί ἐστι ψυχὴ καὶ τίς
ἂν εἴη κοινότατος λόγος αὐτῆς. λέγομεν δὴ γένος
ἕν τι τῶν ὄντων τὴν οὐσίαν, ταύτης δὲ τὸ μὲν ὡς
ὕλην, ὃ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ μὲν οὐκ ἔστι τόδε τι, ἕτερον δὲ
μορφὴν καὶ εἶδος, καθ᾽ ἣν ἤδη λέγεται τόδε τι,
καὶ τρίτον τὸ ἐκ τούτων. ἔστι δ᾽ ἡ μὲν ὕλη
10 δύναμις, τὸ δ᾽ εἶδος ἐντελέχεια, καὶ τοῦτο διχῶς,
τὸ μὲν ὡς ἐπιστήμη, τὸ δ᾽ ὡς τὸ θεωρεῖν. οὐσίαι
δὲ μάλιστ᾽ εἶναι δοκοῦσι τὰ σώματα, καὶ τούτων
τὰ φυσικά' ταῦτα γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρχαί. τῶν δὲ
φυσικῶν τὰ μὲν ἔχει ζωήν, τὰ δ᾽ οὐκ ἔχει" ζωὴν
δὲ λέγομεν τὴν δι’ αὐτοῦ τροφήν τε καὶ αὔξησιν
τ καὶ φθίσιν. ὥστε πᾶν σῶμα φυσικὸν μετέχον
ζωῆς οὐσία ἂν εἴη, οὐσία 8 οὕτως ὡς συνθέτη.
ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἐστὶ σῶμα τοιόνδε, ζωὴν γὰρ ἔχον, οὐκ
ἂν εἴη τὸ σῶμα ψυχή' οὐ γάρ ἐστι τῶν καθ᾽
ὑποκειμένου τὸ σῶμα, μᾶλλον δ᾽ ὡς ὑποκείμενον

5 If you have the capacity to acquire knowledge of a
subject, you may be said to have potential knowledge of it,
which will become actual by study. In another sense, if

BOOK II

I, The theories of the soul handed down by our Doinitionof
predecessors have been sufficiently discussed ; now °°"
we must return to our starting-point, and try to
define what the soul is, and what account of it can be
given which will be the most comprehensive. We
describe one class of existing things as substance ;
and this we subdivide into three: (1) matter, which
is in itself not any particular thing ; (2) shape or form,
in virtue of which it is called some particular thing,
and (3) a compound of the two. Matter is then
potentiality, while form is realization or actuality,
but the word actualily is used in two senses, as is
illustrated by the possession of knowledge and the
exercise of it. Bodies seem to be pre-eminently
substances, and most particularly those which are of
natural origin; for these are the sources from which
the rest are derived. But of natura) bodies some
have life and some have not; by life we mean the
capacity for self-sustenance, growth, and decay.
‘very natural body, then, which possesses life must be
substance, and substance of the class which is a com-
pound. Since this—having life—is predicated of a
body, the body cannot be the soul, for the body is not
predicated of anything else, but rather has things
you possess knowledge which you are not using, it may be
elle potential, actual only when you are using it.

ARISTOTLE

412 a \ cal > a " Von ‘ 2 4 ny
20 καὶ ὕλη. ἀναγκαῖον dpa ti" ψυχὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι

ε ey , ~ , \ ”
ὡς εἶδος σώματος φυσικοῦ δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχοντος.
e 9 ͵ , 3 i 4 » a
ἡ δ᾽ οὐσία ἐντελέχεια. τοιούτου dpa σώματος
> ? o nN , “a ς " ©
ἐντελέχεια. αὕτη δὲ λέγεται διχῶς, ἡ μὲν ὡς
> , € > ¢ ‘ A 1 ᾿ ῳ
ἐπιστήμη, ἡ δ᾽ ὡς τὸ θεωρεῖν. φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι
ὡς ἐπιστήμη: ἐν γὰρ τῷ ὑπάρχειν τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ
yf 4 2 / é ’ 3 é 7 ¢ \
2% ὕπνος καὶ ἐγρήγοροίς ἐστιν, ἀνάλογον δ᾽ ἡ μὲν
ἐγρήγορσις τῷ θεωρεῖν, ὁ δ᾽ ὕπνος τῷ ἔχειι' καὶ
μὴ ἐνεργεῖν. προτέρα δὲ τῇ γενέσει ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ
ξ > ΄ \ 4 2 > / ¢ -
ἡ ἐπιστήμη. διὸ ψυχή ἐστιν ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη
σώματος φυσικοῦ δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχοντος. τοιοῦτο
/ “ Κ᾿ bd > / " \ Ά. ‘ ~
aiap δέ, ὃ ἂν 7 ὀργανικόν. (ὄργανα δὲ καὶ τὰ τῶν
φυτῶν μέρη, ἀλλὰ παντελῶς ἁπλᾶ, οἷον τὸ φύλλον
περικαρπίου σκέπασμα, τὸ δὲ περικκάρπιον καρποῦ.
ἐ : ee ~ / > 4 » , .“
αἱ δὲ ῥίζαι τῷ στόματι ἀνάλογον: ἄμφω γὰρ ἕλκει
‘ rd kd la \ aS , ~
τὴν τροφήν.) εἰ δή τι κοινὸν ἐπὶ πάσης ψυχῆς
- iy ” bo 2 / ¢ , ,ὔ
6 δεῖ λέγειν, εἴη ἂν ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη σώματος
a Ἰὰ a \ ‘ 1 a“ a > 4 ς
φυσικοῦ ὀργανικοῦ. διὸ καὶ οὐ δεῖ ζητεῖν εἰ ἐν ἡ
ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ σῶμα, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸν κηρὸν καὶ τὸ
a 202 ὦ \ coe “ ᾿ \ *
σχῆμα, οὐδ᾽ ὅλως THY ἑκάστου ὕλην καὶ τὸ οὗ
@ \ 4 a A 4 3 ‘1 n
ὕλη: τὸ γὰρ ἕν καὶ τὸ εἷναι ἐπεὲ πλεοναχῶς
λέγεται, τὸ κυρίως ἡ ἐντελέχειά ἐστιν.
4 4 x ᾿ .» ς é > te
10 [Ιζαθόλου μὲν οὖν εἴρηται τί ἐστιν ἡ ψυχή" οὐσία

1 τὰν Β,

4 Every ‘“‘ substance ” is composed of two factors—matter
68

ON THE SOUL, II. τ.

predicated of it, and is therefore mattcr.* So the
soul must be substance in the sense of being the form
of a natural body, which potentially has life. And
substance in the sense of form is actuality, The soul,
then, is the actuality of the kind of body we have
described. But actuality has two senses, analogous
to the possession of knowledge and the exercise of it.
Clearly actuality in our present sense is analogous to
the possession of knowledge ; for, where there is a
soul, there is both sleep and wakefulness, and wake-
fulness is analogous to the exercise of knowledge,
sleep to its possession but not its exercise. Now in
any one person the possession of knowledge precedes
its use. The soul may therefore be defined as the
first actuality of a natural body potentially possessing
life, and the body must be of a kind which possegses
organs. (In plants also the parts are their organs,
very simple ones, such as the leaf which covers the
pod, and the pod which covers the seed; but the
roots are analogous to the mouth, for both these
absorb food.) If then one is to find a comprehensive
definition which will apply to every soul, it is the first
actuality of a natural body possessed of organs. So
one can no more ask if the body and the soul are one
than if the wax and the impression it receives are one,
or speaking generally the matter of each thing and
the form of which it is the matter; for admitting
shat the terms unity and existence are used in many
senses, the paramount sense is that of actuality.

We have, then, given a general definition of what
and form: e.g. a billiard ball. Its matter ts ivory, its form
spherical. An animate body, then, as it is a substance,
consists of matter and form. ‘The body must be matter, for

it is not itself an attribute, but has attributes. Therefore
the soul is form.
69

The soul
as form,

ARISTOTLE

412 b 7
γὰρ ἡ κατὰ τὸν λόγον. τοῦτο δὲ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι

τῷ τοιῳδὶ σώματι, καθάπερ εἴ τι τῶν ὀργάνων
φυσικὸν ἦν σῶμα, οἷον πέλεκυς" ἦν γὰρ ἂν τὸ
πελέκει εἶναι ἡ οὐσία αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦτο'
χωρισθείσης γὰρ ταύτης οὐκ ἂν ἔτι πέλεκυς ἦν,
15 ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ὁμωνύμως. νῦν δ᾽ ἐστὶ πέλεκυς" οὐ γὰρ
τοιούτου σώματος τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι καὶ ὁ λόγος ἡ
ψυχή, ἀλλὰ φυσικοῦ τοιουδὶ ἔχοντος ἀρχὴν κινή-
σεως καὶ στάσεως ἐν ἑαυτῷ. θεωρεῖν δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ
τῶν μερῶν δεῖ τὸ λεχθέν. εἰ γὰρ ἦν ὁ ὀφθαλμὸς
ζῷον, ψυχὴ ἂν ἣν αὐτοῦ ἡ ὄψις" αὕτη γὰρ οὐσία
Σ “ ς \
ὀφθαλμοῦ ἡ κατὰ τὸν λόγον. ὁ δ᾽ ὀφθαλμὸς ὕλη
ὄψεως, ἧς ἀπολειπούσης οὐκ ἔστιν ὀφθαλμός, πλὴν
ὁμωνύμως, καθάπερ ὁ λίθινος καὶ ὁ γεγραμμένος.
δεῖ δὴ λαβεῖν τὸ ἐπὶ μέρους ἐφ᾽ ὅλου τοῦ ζῶντος
σώματος" ἀνάλογον γὰρ ἔχει ὡς τὸ μέρος πρὸς τὸ
25 μέρος, οὕτως ἡ ὅλη αἴσθησις πρὸς τὸ ὅλον σῶμα
τὸ αἰσθητικόν, ἦ τοιοῦτο. ἔστι δὲ οὐ τὸ ἀπο-
βεβληκὸς τὴν ψυχὴν τὸ δυνάμει ὃν ὥστε ζῆν,
ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔχον. τὸ δὲ σπέρμα καὶ ὁ καρπὸς τὸ
δυνάμει τοιονδὲ σῶμα. ὡς μὲν οὖν ἡ τμῆσις καὶ
4188 ἡ ὅρασις, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ἐγρήγορσις ἐντελέχεια, ὡς
δ᾽ ἡ ὄψις καὶ ἡ δύναμις τοῦ ὀργάνου, ἡ ψυχή" τὸ
δὲ σῶμα τὸ δυνάμει ὄν: GAN ὥσπερ 6 ὀφθαλμὸς ἡ

* A.’s argument in the rest of this chapter is not quite
easy to follow. The introduction of the axe seems at first
irrelevant, because, as A. afterwards explains, being inani-
mate, it is not really parallel to the living creature. But
his point is clear, the axe consists of the matter (wood and
metal) of which it is composed, and its form (i.e. what makes
it an axe—cutting edge, weight, and so forth). If you take
away (¢.g.) its edge, what remains? Still an axe, although
one that will not cut. But this is not true of the living
creature. IL has a body which is its matter, and a soul

ON THE SOUL, II. τ.

the soul is: it is substance expressed as form.? It
is this which makes a body what it is ; supposing that
instruments had a natural body, for instance an axe ;
the substance of the axe would be that which makes
il an axe, and this would be its soul; suppose this
removed, and it would no Jonger be an axe in the
ordinary sense of the term, As it is, Jt remains an
axe, because the soul is not the form of a body of this
kind, but only of a natural body, which has in itself
the power of movement and rest. We must therefore
investigate the application of our definition to the
parts of the body. If the eye were a living creature,
its soul would be its power of sceing ; for this is the
substance of the eye expressed as form. But the eye
is the matter of seeing, and if secing were absent,
there would be no eye, except in an equivocal sense,
as for instance a stone or painted eye. Now we must
apply what we have found true of the part to the
whole living body. Vor the same relationship must
hold good of the part to the part, and the whole of
sensation to the whole body which feels, in so fay as
it does so, But it is not the body which has lost its
soul, which has the capacity to live, but that which
possesses its soul; so the seed and the fruit are
potentially bodies of sucha kind. Just as the cutting
of the axe or the seeing of the eye is an actuality, so
also is the waking state, and the soul is actuality in
the same sense as the capacity of the eye for seeing,
or of the instrument for doing its work. But the
body is that which has a capacity for life ; but just as
the pupil and the power of seeing make an eye, so

which is its form. Take away the latter and the hody
perishes, so that the whole is no longer a living creature 5 by
removing the form of a living creature we destroy its identity.

τὶ

418 ἃ

ὄ

τὸ

ARISTOTLE

ὕ \ € av > ~ £ 4 \ \ ~ εἴ
κόρη καὶ ἡ ὄψις, κἀκεῖ ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ σῶμα τὸ
nm” ¢ A > > vw ¢€ 4 4 on
ζῷον. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ ψυχὴ χωριστὴ τοῦ

δ) > a
σώματος, ἢ μέρη τινὰ αὐτῆς, εἰ μεριστὴ πέφυκεν,
ob ἄδηλον: ἐνίων γὰρ ἡ ἐντελέχεια τῶν μερῶν
> ‘ ᾿ ~ > \ > > » 2 > XY ΄
ἐστὶν αὐτῶν. οὐ μὴν ἀλλ᾽ ἔνιά γε οὐθὲν κωλύει,
διὰ τὸ μηθενὸς εἶναι σώματος ἐντελεχείας. ἔτι
δὲ ἄδηλον εἰ οὕτως ἐντελέχεια τοῦ σώματος ἡ
4.

ψυχὴ ὥσπερ πλωτὴρ πλοίου. τύπῳ μὲν οὖν ταύτῃ
διωρίσθω καὶ ὑπογεγράφθω περὶ ψυχῆς.

11. ᾿Επεὶ δ᾽ ἐκ τῶν ἀσαφῶν μὲν φανερωτέρων δὲ

bb
ἧς Ν Ἃς A | Bis’
γίγνεται τὸ σαφὲς καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον γνωριμώ-
τερον, πειρατέον πάλιν οὕτως ἐπελθεῖν περὶ αὐτῆς"
a ‘ »-
οὐ γὰρ μόνον τὸ ὅτι δεῖ τὸν ὁριστικὸν λόγον δηλοῦν,
A c A ~ ῳ a ε Ν Ἧ
ὥσπερ οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν ὅρων λέγουσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ
i a.
τὴν αἰτίαν ἐνυπάρχειν καὶ ἐμφαίνεσθαι. νῦν δ᾽
ε ~

ὥσπερ συμπεράσμαθ᾽ of λόγοι τῶν ὅρων εἰσίν"
οἷον τί ἐστι τετραγωνισμός; τὸ ἴσον ἑτερομήκει
ὀρθογώνιον εἶναι ἰσόπλευρον. ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ὅρος
λόγος τοῦ συμπεράσματος. ὁ δὲ λέγων ὅτι ἐστὶν
ὁ τετραγωνισμὸς μέσης εὕρεσις, τοῦ πράγματος
λέγει τὸ αἴτιον.

2 oe Bk, 1, ch. iii.
> Norse.—The reference is to the figure opposite.

AB is a straight line divided into two parts at C. On AB
a semicircle ADB is described. CD is drawn at right angles
to AB to meet the circumference in D. Two conclusions
can be proved. (1) The square on CD is equal to the
rectangle AC.CB. (2) CD is the mean proportional between
AC and CB, or in other words AC:CD::CD:CB. For the
proofs of these two propositions ef. Euclid ii. 14 and vi. 18,

ON THE SOUL, IL 1—n.

in the other case the soul and body make a living
creature. ΤῸ is quite clear, then, that neither the soul
nor any parts of it, if it has parts, can be separated
from the body, for the actuality of some animals
belongs lo the parts themselves. Not but what there
is nothing to prevent some parts being separated,
because they are not actualities of any body. It is
also uncertain whether the soul as an actuality bears
the same relation to the body as the sailor to the
ship.? This then in outline is a sufficient definition
and sketch of the soul.

II, But since the clear and theoretically better
known conception arises from the obscure but more
obvious data of sense, we must bry to revise our views
on the soul in this way ; for the words of a definition
ought not merely to show the fact, as most definitions
do, but to present the underlying cause, But so far
the words of our definitions are only conclusions ; for
instance, what is the definition of squaring a rectangle?
It is the construction of a square equal in area to a
rectangle. Such a definition is merely a conclusion.
But if a man says that squaring a rectangle is the
finding of a mean proportional, he is giving the under-
lying cause of the fact.?

True
dafinition,

ARISTOTLE

1188 eg > 3 4 / ~ ‘A
éyopey οὖν ἀρχὴν λαβόντες τῆς σκέψεως,

διωρίσθαι τὸ ἔμψυχον τοῦ ἀψύχου τῷ ζῆν. πλεο-
ναχῶς δὲ τοῦ ζῆν λεγομένου, κἂν ἕν τι τούτων
ἐνυπάρχῃ μόνον, ζῆν αὐτό φαμεν, οἷον νοῦς,
αἴσθησις, κίνησις καὶ στάσις ἡ κατὰ τόπον, ἔτι
96 κίνησις ἡ κατὰ τροφὴν καὶ φθίσις τε καὶ αὔξησις.
διὸ καὶ τὰ φυόμενα πάντα δοκεῖ ζῆν: φαίνεται γὰρ
ἐν αὑτοῖς ἔχοντα δύναμιν καὶ ἀρχὴν τοιαύτην, δι᾽
= » tf + ,ὔ a \ \
ἧς αὔξησίν τε καὶ φθίσιν λαμβάνουσι κατὰ τοὺς
ἐναντίους τόπους: οὐ γὰρ ἄνω μὲν αὔξεται, κάτω
δ᾽ οὔ, ἀλλ᾽ ὁμοίως ἐπ᾽ ἄμφω καὶ πάντοσε καὶ
so τρέφεται καὶ ζῇ διὰ τέλους, ἕως ἂν δύνηται λαμ-
, 4 ᾿ \ a A, fal
βάνειν τροφήν. χωρίζεσθαι δὲ τοῦτο μὲν τῶν
ἄλλων δυνατόν, τὰ δ᾽ ἄλλα τούτου ἀδύνατον ἐν
τοῖς θνητοῖς. φανερὸν δ᾽ ἐπὶ τῶν φνομένων'
38 , A 3 tal ς 4 ὃ ra ἀλλ “a
418b οὐδεμία γὰρ αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχει δύναμις ἄλλη ψυχῆς.
Τὸ μὲν οὖν ζῆν διὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν ταύτην ὑπάρχει
τοῖς ζῶσι, τὸ δὲ ζῷον διὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν πρώτως"
καὶ γὰρ τὰ μὴ κινούμενα μηδ᾽ ἀλλάττοντα τόπον,
ἔχοντα δ᾽ αἴσθησιν ζῷα λέγομεν καὶ οὐ ζῆν μόνον.
5 αἰσθήσεως δὲ πρῶτον ὑπάρχει πᾶσιν apy. ὥσπερ
δὲ τὸ θρεπτικὸν δύναται χωρίζεσθαι τῆς ἁφῆς καὶ
, > 4 oe € ¢ \ ~ vy
πάσης αἰσθήσεως, οὕτως ἡ ἁφὴ τῶν ἄλλων
αἰσθήσεων. θρεπτικὸν δὲ λέγομεν τὸ τοιοῦτον"
μόριον τῆς ψυχῆς οὗ καὶ τὰ φυτὰ μετέχει τὰ δὲ
ζῷα πάντα φαίνεται τὴν ἁπτικὴν αἴσθησιν ἔχοντα'
2 a 3 2 fF € ὦ ͵ ᾿ς
το δι’ ἣν δ᾽ αἰτίαν ἑκάτερον τούτων συμβέβηκεν,
ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν.
~ 3 Φ οἷ a x tA ; a > ΝΥ ε
Νῦν δ᾽ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω μόνον, ὅτι ἐστὶν ἡ
74

ΟΝ 'THE SOUL, IL. 1.

We say then, reverting to the starting-point of our
inquiry, that that which has soul is distinguished from
that which has not by living. But the word living is
used in many senses, and if any one of the following
is present we say that the creature lives—mind,
sensation, movement or position in space, besides
the movement implied in getting food, decay, and
growth, Consequently all plants are consicered
to live, for they evidently have in themselves a
capacity and first principle of such a kind that they
show both growth and decay, and these in opposite
directions ; for they do not grow up and not down,
but equally in both directions, and in every direction,
and they are nourished and continue to live, as long
as they are able to absorb food. This capacity to
absorb food may exist apart trom all other powers,
but the others cannot exist apart from this, as we see
in human beings. This is evident, too, in the case of
plants ; for they have no other capacity of the soul.

Because of this fundamental power all living things
have life, but the living animal first and foremost
lives because it can feel ; for even those which do not
move or change their place, but have sensation, we
call living creatures, and do not merely say that they
live. The first essential factor of sensation, which we
al] share, is a sense of touch. Just as the merely
nutritive faculty may exist apart from touch and
-from all sensation, so touch may exist apart from all
other senses. We call the nutritive faculty that part
of the soul which even the plants share, But all living
animals seem to possess the sense of touch. Why
each of these things has happened so, we shall explain
later on.

But for the moment let us be satisfied with saying

Sensation
a first
espential
of life.

ARISTOTLE
418}

ψυχὴ τῶν εἰρημένων τούτων ἀρχὴ καὶ τούτοις
ὥρισται, θρεπτικῷ, αἰσθητικῷ, διανοητικῷ, κινήσει.
πότερον δὲ τούτων ἕκαστόν ἐστι Ψυχὴ ἣ μόριον
ψυχῆς, καὶ εἰ μόριον, πότερον οὕτως ὥστ᾽ εἶναι
1 χωριστὸν λόγῳ μόνον ἢ καὶ τόπῳ, περὶ μὲν τινῶν
τούτων οὐ χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν, ἔνια δὲ ἀπορίαν ἔχει.
ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν φυτῶν ἔνια “διαιρούμενα φαί-
νεται ζῶντα καὶ χωριζόμενα ἀπ᾽ ἀλλήλων, ὡς
οὔσης τῆς ἐν τούτοις ψυχῆς ἐντελεχείᾳ μὲν μιᾶς
ἐν ἑκάστῳ φυτῷ, δυνάμει δὲ πλειόνων, οὕτως
20 ὁρῶμεν καὶ περὶ ἑτέρας διαφορὰς τῆς ψυχῆς συμ-
βαῖνον. ἐπὶ τῶν ἐντόμων ἐν τοῖς διατεμνομένοις"
καὶ γὰρ αἴσθησιν ἑκάτερον τῶν μερῶν ἔχει καὶ
Kivnow τὴν κατὰ τόπον, εἰ δ᾽ αἴσθησιν, καὶ φαν-
τασίαν καὶ ὄρεξιν: ὅπου μὲν γὰρ αἴσθησις, καὶ
λύπη τε καὶ ἡδονή, ὅπου δὲ ταῦτα, ἐξ ἀνάγκης
95 καὶ ἐπιθυμία. περὶ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τῆς θεωρητικῆς
δυνάμεως οὐδέν πω φανερόν, ἀλλ᾽ ἔοικε ψυχῆς
γένος ἕτερον εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἐνδέχεται
χωρίζεσθαι, καθάπερ τὸ ἀΐδιον τοῦ φθαρ τοῦ. τὰ
δὲ λοιπὰ μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων ὅτι
οὐκ ἔστι χωριστά, καθάπερ τινές φασιν' τῷ δὲ
80 λόγῳ ὅτι ἕτερα, φανερόν' αἰσθητικῷ γὰρ εἶναι καὶ
δοξαστικῷ ἕτερον, εἴπερ καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι τοῦ
δοξάζειν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον τῶν
εἰρημένων. ἔτι δ᾽ ἐνίοις μὲν τῶν ζῴων ἅπανθ᾽.
ὑπάρχει ταῦτα, τισὶ δέ τινα τούτων, ἑτέροις δὲ ἕν
4i4a μόνον, τοῦτο δὲ ποιεῖ διαφορὰν τῶν ζῴων" διὰ
τίνα δ᾽ αἰτίαν, ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον. παραπλήσιον

δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις συμβέβηκεν" τὰ μὲν γὰρ

« Cf. Introduction,
76

ON THE SOUL, Π, τι.

that the soul is the origin of the characteristics we
have mentioned, and is defined by them, that is by
the faculties of nutrition, sensation, thought and
movement. The further questions, whether each of
these faculties is a soul, or part of a soul, and, if a
part, whether a part in the sense that it is only separ-
able in thought or also in fact, are in some cases easy
of solution, but in some they involve difficulty. For
just as in the case of plants some paris clearly live
when divided and separated from each other, so that
the soul in them appears to be one in actuality in each
whole plant, but potentially more than one, 50 we can
sec that in other characteristics of the soul the same
thing happens among insects in the divided pieces ;
for each of the parts has sensation and movement in
space ; and, if it has sensation, it must also have
imagination * and appetite ; for, where sensation is,
there is also pain and pleasure, and where these are
there must also be desire. But in the case of the
mind and the thinking faculty nothing is yet clear,
but it seems to be a distinct species of soul, and it
alone admits of being separated, as the immortal
from the perishable. But it is quite clear froin what
we have said that the other parts of the soul are not
separable, as some say ; though it is obvious that they
are theoretically different ; for there is a difference
between the faculties of sensation and thought, just
ras feeling is different from thinking. And the same
thing is true of all the other faculties we have men-
tioned. Again, some animals have all these capacities,
some only some of them, and others again only one.
It is this which will constitute the differences in
animals. The reason for this must be considered
later. But a similar thing is true about sensations ;

ΤΠ

4148

£5

τὸ

ARISTOTLE

μὲ / Ν Xx , A ἧς ͵ “ 3
ἔχει πάσας, τὰ δὲ τινάς, τὰ δὲ μίαν τὴν ἀναγ-
καιοτάτην, ἁφήν.

᾿Επεὶ δὲ ᾧ ζῶμεν καὶ αἰσθανόμεθα διχῶς λέγεται,

͵ e ? τὰ / x \ \ τῇ

καθάπερ ᾧ ἐπιστάμεθα (λέγομεν δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐπι-
στήμην τὸ δὲ ψυχήν: ἑκατέρῳ γὰρ τούτων φαμὲν
ἐπίστασθαι)" ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ᾧ ὑγιαίνομεν, τὸ μὲν
ὑγίεια, τὸ δὲ μορίῳ τινὶ τοῦ σώματος ἢ καὶ ὅλῳ...
τούτων δ᾽ ἡ μὲν ἐπιστήμη τε καὶ ὑγίεια μορφὴ
καὶ εἶδός τι καὶ λόγος καὶ οἷον ἐνέργεια τοῦ δε-
κτικοῦ, ἡ μὲν τοῦ ἐπιστημονικοῦ, ἡ δὲ τοῦ ὑγια-
στικοῦ (δοκεῖ γὰρ ἐν τῷ πάσχοντι καὶ διατιθεμένῳ
ἡ τῶν ποιητικῶν ὑπάρχειν ἐνέργεια), ἡ ψυχὴ δὲ
τοῦτο ᾧ ζῶμεν καὶ αἰσθανόμεθα καὶ διανοούμεθα

font ω , nn yw " 4 3 3
πρῶτως, ὥστε λόγος τις ἂν εἴη καὶ εἶδος, ἀλλ
οὐχ ὕλη καὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον. τριχῶς γὰρ λεγο-
μένης τῆς οὐσίας, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, ὧν τὸ μὲν
εἶδος, τὸ δὲ ὕλη, τὸ δὲ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν: τούτων δ᾽ ἡ
μὲν ὕλη δύναμις, τὸ δὲ εἶδος ἐντελέχεια" ἐπεὶ δὲ

λ > 3 ~ ᾿᾿ ᾿ \ “~ 4? > /
τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἔμψυχον, οὐ τὸ σῶμά ἐστιν ἐντελέχεια
ψυχῆς, GAN αὕτη σώματός τινος. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο

~ ς / εν = 49 ay ,

καλῶς ὑπολαμβάνουσιν οἷς δοκεῖ μήτ᾽ ἄνευ σώ-
ματος εἶναι μήτε σῶμά τι ἡ ψυχή' σῶμα μὲν γὰρ
οὐκ ἔστι, σώματος δέ τι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐν σώματι
ὑπάρχει, καὶ ἐν σώματι τοιούτῳ, καὶ οὐχ ὥσπερ
of πρότερον εἰς σῶμα ἐνήρμοζον αὐτήν, οὐθὲν
προσδιορίζοντες ἐν τίνι καὶ ποίῳ, καίπερ οὐδὲ
φαινομένου τοῦ τυχόντος δέχεσθαι τὸ τυχόν. οὕτω

5 412 ἃ θ,
78

ΟΝ THE SOUL, IL. 1.

for some animals have all, some only some, and some
again one only—the most indispensable—touch.

The phrase ‘‘ whereby we live and fecl ” is used in
tivo senses, just as the phrase “ whereby we know ἡ
(in the one sense we mean knowledge and in the other
the soul; for we can say that we know by each of
these); similarly the phrase ‘whereby we are
healthy ’ may mean health, or it may mean some
part or the whole of the hody. Now of these, know-
ledge in the one case and health in the other are the
shape and in a sense the form or notion, and the
actuality of the recipient of knowledge in the one
case, and health in the other. (For if is upon that
which is affected and in a given condition that the
activity of what is producing an effect scems to
operate,) but the soul is that whereby we live and fecl
and think in the most fundamental sense, so that the
soul would be the notion or form, and not the matter
and underlying material. As we have already said,”
substance is used in three senses, form, matter, and
a compound of the two. Of these matter is poten-
tiality, and form actuality ; and since what has soul
is a compound of the two, the body cannot be the
actuality of a soul, but the soul is the actuality of
some body. For this reason those are right in their
view who maintain that the soul cannot exist without
the body, but the soul is not in any sense a body. It
is not a body, but it is something connected with a
body, and exists in a body, and in a body of a par-
ticular kind, not at all as our predecessors supposed,
who fitted it to any body, without adding any limita-
tions as to what body or what kind of body, although
it must be evident that no chance thing can admit
any other chance thing. But it happens in this way

ARISTOTLE

414
δὲ γίνεται καὶ κατὰ λόγον' ἑκάστου γὰρ ἡ ἐντελέ-
χεια ἐν τῷ δυνάμει ὑπάρχοντι καὶ τῇ οἰκείᾳ ὕλῃ
πέφυκεν ἐγγίνεσθαι. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐντελέχειά τίς
ἐστι καὶ λόγος τοῦ δύναμιν ἔχοντος εἶναι τοιούτου,
φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων.
IIT. Τῶν δὲ δυνάμεων τῆς ψυχῆς αἱ λεχθεῖσαι τοῖς
80 μὲν ὑπάρχουσι πᾶσαι, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, τοῖς δὲ
τινὲς αὐτῶν, ἐνίοις δὲ μία μόνη. δυνάμεις δ᾽
εἴπομεν θρεπτικόν, ὀρεκτικόν, αἰσθητικόν, κινη-
τικὸν κατὰ τόπον, διανοητικόν. ὑπάρχει δὲ τοῖς
44h μὲν φυτοῖς τὸ θρεπτιιςὸν μόνον, ἑτέροις δὲ τοῦτό
τε καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικόν. εἰ δὲ τὸ αἰσθητικόν, καὶ
τὸ ὁρεκτικόν' ὄρεξις μὲν γὰρ ἐπιθυμία καὶ θυμὸς
καὶ βούλησις, τὰ δὲ ζῷα πάντ᾽ ἔχουσι μίαν γε
τῶν αἰσθήσεων, τὴν ἁφήν: ᾧ δ᾽ αἴσθησις ὑπάρχει,
δ τούτῳ ἡδονή τε καὶ λύπη καὶ τὸ ἡδύ τε καὶ
λυπηρόν, οἷς δὲ ταῦτα, καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία’ τοῦ γὰρ
ἡδέος ὄρεξις αὕτη. ἔτι δὲ τῆς τροφῆς αἴσθησιν
ἔχουσιν: ἡ γὰρ ἁφὴ τῆς τροφῆς αἴσθησις" ξηροῖς
γὰρ καὶ ὑγροῖς καὶ θερμοῖς καὶ ψυχροῖς τρέφεται
τὰ ζῷα πάντα, τούτων δ᾽ αἴσθησις ἁφή" τῶν δ᾽
10 ἄλλων αἰσθητῶν κατὰ συμβεβηκός" οὐθὲν γὰρ εἰς
τροφὴν συμβάλλεται ψόφος οὐδὲ χρῶμα οὐδὲ
ὀσμή. ὁ δὲ χυμὸς ἕν τι τῶν ἁπτῶν ἐστίν. πεῖνα
δὲ καὶ δίψα ἐπιθυμία, καὶ ἡ μὲν πεῖνα ξηροῦ καὶ
θερμοῦ, ἡ δὲ δίψα ψυχροῦ καὶ ὑγροῦ' ὁ δὲ χυμὸς
οἷον ἧδυσμά τι τούτων ἐστίν. διασαφητέον δὲ
18 περὶ αὐτῶν ὕστερον, νῦν δ᾽ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω,
ὅτι τῶν ξῴων τοῖς ἔχουσιν ἁφὴν καὶ ὄρεξις ὑπ-
ἄρχει. περὶ δὲ φαντασίας ἄδηλον, ὕστερον δ᾽ ἐπι-

* i.e. on general grounds we should expect a particular
soul to belong to a particular body.

ON THE SOUL, II. τι.---αττ.

quite reason: bly ©; for the actuality of each thing
ig naturally inherent in its potentiality, that is in its
own proper matter. [vom all this it is clear that the
soul is the actuality and form of that which has the
capacity of having a soul.

III. But of the faculties of the soul which we have
mentioned, some living things have all, others only
some, and others again only one. Those we have
mentioned are the faculty for nourishment, for
appetite,” for sensation, for movement in space, and
for thought. Plants have the nutritive faculty only,
but other living things have this and the faculty for
sensation. But if for sensation then also for appetite ;
for appetite consists of desire, anger, and wish, and all
animals have one of the senses, “that of touch ; but
that which has sensation knows pleasure and pain,
the pleasant and the painful, and that which knows
these has also desire ; for desire is an appctite for
what is pleasant. They have also a sensation in
feeding ; for touch is the sense which apprehends
food. ΑἸ] animals, again, are nourished by food.
which is dry or wet, hot or cold, and touch is the
sense which apprehends these ; the other objects of
sense are only indirectly apprehended by touch ;
for neither sound, nor colour, nor smell contribute
anything to nourishment. But flavour is one of the
things apprehended by touch, Hunger and thirst
are desire, the former for what is dry and hot, the
latter for what is cold and wet ; and flavour is a kind
of sweetening of these things. We must be precise
about these subjects later, but for the moment it is
enough to say, that those animals which have a sense
of touch have also appetite. As for imagination it is

® Appetite is not included in the list in 418 b 13,
G 81

All Hving
creatures
have not all
faculties,

414b

418 8

ARISTOTLE

σκεπτέον. ἐνίοις δὲ πρὸς τούτοις ὑπάρχει καὶ TO
κατὰ τόπον κινητικόν, ἑτέροις δὲ καὶ τὸ διανοη-
τιιςόν τε καὶ νοῦς, οἷον ἀνθρώποις καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον
ἕτερόν ἐστιν ἢ καὶ τιμιώτερον.

Δῆλον οὖν ὅτι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον εἷς ἂν εἴη λόγος
ψυχῆς. τε καὶ σχήματος" οὔτε γὰρ ἐκεῖ σχῆμα παρὰ
τὸ τρίγωνόν ἐστι καὶ τὰ ἐφεξῆς, οὔτ᾽ ἐνταῦθα
ψυχὴ παρὰ τὰς εἰρημένας. γένοιτο δ᾽ ἂν καὶ ἐπὶ
τῶν σχημάτων λόγος κοινός, ὃς ἐφαρμόσει μὲν
πᾶσιν, ἴδιος δ᾽ οὐδενὸς, ἔσται σχήματος. ὁμοίως
δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ ταῖς εἰρημέναις ψυχαῖς. διὸ γελοῖον
ξητεῖν τὸν κοινὸν λόγον καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων καὶ ἐφ᾽
ἑτέρων, ὃς οὐδενὸς ἔσται. τῶν ὄντων ἴδιος λόγος,
οὐδὲ κατὰ τὸ οἰκεῖον καὶ ἄτομον εἶδος, ἀφέντας τὸν
τοιοῦτον.

Παραπλησίως δ᾽ ἔχει τῷ περὶ τῶν σχημάτων
καὶ τὰ κατὰ ψυχήν. ἀεὶ γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἐφεξῆς
ὑπάρχει δυνάμει τὸ πρότερον ἐπί τε τῶν σχημά-
των καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐμψύχων, οἷον ἐν τετραγώνῳ μὲν
τρίγωνον, ἐν αἰσθητικῷ δὲ τὸ θρεπτικόν. ὥστε
καθ᾽ ἕκαστον. ζητητέον, τίς ἑκάστου ψυχή, οἷον
τίς φυτοῦ καὶ τίς ἀνθρώπου ἢ θηρίου. διὰ τίνα
δ᾽ αἰτίαν τῷ ἐφεξῆς οὕτως ἔχουσι, σκεπτέον.
ἄνευ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν οὐκ
ἔστιν" τοῦ δ᾽ αἰσθητικοῦ “χωρίζεται τὸ θρεπτικὸν
ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς. πάλιν δ᾽ ἄνευ μὲν τοῦ eee
τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων οὐδεμία ὑπάρχει, ἁφὴ ὃ

4 The argument of this paragruph is as follows: Just as
figure has a definition aptleable to all varieties of figures,
so soul has a similar ‘“‘ common’? definition; but this can
only be discovered by a patient study of individual souls,
8.9. of man, animal, and plant.

ON THE SOUL, I. τη.

a matter of doubt, aud must be considered later. In
addition to these senses some also possess the power
of movement in space, and others again the power of
thinking and mind, namely, man, and any other being
which inay be superior to him. ᾿

So it is clear that in the same way there should be
one definition of soul as there is of rectilinear figure ;
for in the latter case there is no figure besides the
triangle and those that follow from it (1.6. quadri-
lateral, pentagon, etc.), nor is there any soul besides
those we have mentioned, It would be possible in
the case of figures also to frame a common definition,
which would fit them all, but would be descriptive of
no particular figure. And similarly in the case of the
kinds of soul we have mentioned. So that it would
be ridiculous Lo look for the common definition in this
case as in others, which is the particular definition
of no existing thing, and has no reference to any par-
ticular or individual species, while we neglect such a
particular definition.*

The facts regarding the soul are in the same posi-
tion as those concerned with figures ; for in any series
the first term has always a potential existence, both
in the case of figures and of what possesses soul ; for
instance the triangle is implied by the quadrilateral,
and the nutritive faculty by the sensitive. We must
then inquire in each several case, what is the soul
of each individual, for instance of the plant, the
man, and the beast. But we must also consider why
they are thus arranged in a series. For without the
nutritive faculty the sensitive does not exist, and in
plants the nutritive is divorced from the sensitive
faculty. Again, without the sense of touch none of
the other senses exist, but touch may exist without

Definition
of nonl

simitar to
mathemati-
eal deflui-
tion.

4185 ἃ
δ

ARISTOTLE

ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων ὑπάρχει: πολλὰ yap τῶν ζῴων
οὔτ᾽ ὄψιν οὔτ᾽ ἀκοὴν ἔχουσιν οὔτ᾽ ὀσμῆς ὅλως
αἴσθησιν. καὶ τῶν αἰσθητιικκῶν δὲ τὰ μὲν ἔχει τὸ
κατὰ τόπον κινητικόν, τὰ δ᾽ οὐκ ἔχει. τελευταῖον
δὲ καὶ ἐλάχιστα λογισμὸν καὶ διάνοιαν" οἷς μὲν
γὰρ ὑπάρχει λογισμὸς τῶν φθαρτῶν, τούτοις καὶ
τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα, οἷς δ᾽ ἐκείνων ἕκαστον, οὐ πᾶσι
λογισμός, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν οὐδὲ φαντασία, τὰ δὲ
ταύτῃ μόνῃ ζῶσιν. “περὶ δὲ τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ νοῦ
ἕτερος λόγος. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ὁ περὲ τούτων ἑκάστου
λόγος οὗτος οἰκειότατος καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς, δῆλον.
IV. ᾿Αναγκαῖον δὲ τὸν μέλλοντα. περὶ τούτων
σκέψιν ποιεῖσθαι λαβεῖν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν τί ἐστιν,
εἶθ᾽ οὕτως περὶ τῶν ἐχομένων ἣ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀλ-
λων ἐπιζητεῖν. εἰ δὲ χρὴ λέγειν τί ἕκαστον αὐτῶν,
οἷον τί τὸ νοητικὸν ἢ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν ἢ τὸ θρεπτι-
κόν, πρότερον ἔτι λεκτέον τί τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τί τὸ
αἰσθάνεσθαι: πρότερον γάρ εἰσι τῶν δυνάμεων αἱ
ἐνέργειαι καὶ αἱ πράξεις, κατὰ τὸν λόγον. εἰ δ᾽
οὕτως, τούτων δ᾽ ἔτι πρότερα τὰ ἀντικείμενα δεῖ
τεθεωρηκέναι, περὶ ἐκείνων πρῶτον ἂν δέοι δι-
ορίσαι διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν, οἷον περὶ τροφῆς καὶ
αἰσθητοῦ καὶ νοητοῦ. ὥστε πρῶτον περὶ τροφῆς
καὶ γεννήσεως λεκτέον" ἡ γὰρ θρεπτικὴ ψυχὴ καὶ
τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπάρχει, καὶ πρώτη καὶ κοινοτάτη
δύναμίς ἐστι ψυχῆς, καθ᾽ ἣν ὑπάρχει τὸ ζῆν
ἅπασιν. ἧς ἐστὶν ἔργα γεννῆσαι καὶ τροφῇ
χρῆσθαι" φυσικώτατον γὰρ τῶν ἔργων τοῖς ζῶσι,

« We proceed from the exercise of the functions, which we
know and sce, to assume the existence of the faculty; nature
proceeds in the opposite order.

» A, identities the origin of growth and reproduction,

ON TIE SOUL, ΓΙῸ τῆι, ταν,

any others; for many of the animals have neithe:
vision nor hearing nor, οἷ nerally spe aking, any sense
of smell. Again, af alusie possessing fecling, some
have mouvement in space, and some have not. And
lastly, and most rarely, living creatures have power
of reasoning and thought. For those perishable
creatures which have reasoning power have all the
other powers as well, but those who have any one of
them have not all reasoning power, but some have not
even imagination, while ΟΝ can be called living in
virtue of this alone. The consideration of the specu-
lative faculty is another question. But it is clear
that the account of each of these faculties is also the
most relevant account that can be given of the soul.
IY. If one intends to investigate these faculties,
one must first inquire what each of them is, and then
proceed to inquire about the next and other questions,
But if one is to ask what cach of them ts, such as the
thinking, sensitive, or nutritive faculty, one must first
examine the meaning of acts of thinking or feeling ;
for in our reasoning ® the exercise of their functions
comes before the ἔπουϊεῖος themselves. And if this
is so, and if one should first of all examine the objects
upon which the faculties are exercised, then for the
same reason one must first of all lay down definitions
of food, the thing felt, or the thing thought. First,
then, we must speak of food and ‘yeproduction ; for
the nutritive soul belongs to all other living creatures
besides man, and is the first and most widely shared
faculty of the soul, in virtue of which they all have
life. The functions of the nutritive faculty are to
reproduce and to use food.’ lor this is the most

because food is needed both for the survival of the individual
and for the reproduction of the species.

The method
of inquiry,

445 a

415 Ὁ

τι

ARISTOTLE

ὅσα τέλεια καὶ μὴ πηρώματα, ἣ τὴν γένεσιν αὐτο-
μάτην ἔχει, τὸ ποιῆσαι ἕτερον οἷον αὐτό, ζῷον

A ~ \ A ‘ Ὁ - ΗΒ " ~
μὲν ζῷον, φυτὸν δὲ φυτόν, ἵνα τοῦ det καὶ τοῦ

t f
θείου peréywow ἡ δύνανται: πάντα γὰρ ἐκείνου
ὀρέγεται, κἀκείνου ἕνεκα πράττει ὅσα πράττει κατὰ

, ‘ ry aoe , ἡ \ 2 4 \
φύσιν. τὸ δ᾽ οὗ ἕνεκα, διττόν, τὸ μὲν οὗ, TO δὲ
ᾧ. ἐπεὶ οὖν κοινωνεῖν ἀδυνατεῖ τοῦ ἀεὶ καὶ τοῦ
θείου τῇ συνεχείᾳ, διὰ τὸ μηδὲν ἐνδέχεσθαι τῶν
φθαρτῶν ταὐτὸ καὶ ἕν ἀριθμῷ διαμένειν», F δύναται
μετέχειν ἕκαστον, κοινωνεῖ ταύτῃ, τὸ μὲν μᾶλλον

‘ 2 a / 2 4 ‘ 3 3 2 ᾿
τὸ δ᾽ ἧττον' καὶ διαμένει οὐκ αὐτὸ ἀλλ᾽ οἷον αὐτό,
3 nm \ . a uw > oF
ἀριθμῷ μὲν οὐχ ἕν, εἴδει δ᾽ ἕν,

Ἔστι δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦ ζῶντος σώματος αἰτία καὶ
> , - \ a Z ¢ , > ¢
ἀρχή. ταῦτα δὲ πολλαχῶς λέγεται. ὁμοίως δ᾽ ἡ

\ : ”
ψυχὴ κατὰ τοὺς διωρισμένους τρόπους τρεῖς αἰτία"
\
καὶ yap ὅθεν ἡ κίνησις αὐτή, καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα, Kal ὡς
~ \ 5
ἡ οὐσία τῶν ἐμψύχων σωμάτων ἡ ψυχὴ αἰτία.
ὅτι μὲν οὖν ὡς οὐσία, δῆλον: τὸ γὰρ αἴτιον τοῦ
εἶναι πᾶσιν ἡ οὐσία, τὸ δὲ ζῆν τοῖς ζῶσι τὸ εἶναί
ἐστιν, αἰτία δὲ καὶ ἀρχὴ τούτων ἡ ψυχή. ἔτι τοῦ
᾿ ” ? ¢ 2 t \ 2. ς
δυνάμει ὄντος λόγος ἡ ἐντελέχεια. φανερὸν δ᾽ ὡς
καὶ οὗ ἕνεκεν ἡ ψυχὴ αἰτία: ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ νοῦς

«ΟἹ, Metaph. 983 a 26 “the word cause is used...
(1) as the essential nature, (2) as the source of movement,

8) as the final cause.”

» The word form here can best be understood by reference
to A.’s own analogy. The wax is the ‘‘ matter” of the seal,
but it is only potentially a seal, When the die is impressed on
the wax, the matter receives “ form *’ and becomes ‘‘ actual-
ized ’’ as a seal.

ON THE SOUL, U. τν.

natural of all functions among living creatures, pro-
vided that. they are perfect and not maimed, and do
not have spontancous generation, Fach produces
another creature like itself; an animal produces an
animal, and a plant a plant, in order that they may
have a share in the immortal and divine in the only
way they can; for every creature strives for this, and
this is the final cause of all its natural functions. But
final cause has two meanings, the person for whose
sake and the object for the sake of which an action is
done, Since, then, they cannot share in the immortal
and divine by continuity of existence, because no
perishable thing can remain numerically one and the
same, they share in these in the only way they can,
some to a greater and some to a less extent ; what
persists is not the individual ilself, but something in
its image, not identical as a unit, but identical in
form.

But the soul is the cause and first principle of the
living body. The words cause and first principle are
used in several separate senses. But the soul is
equally the cause in each of the three senses to which
we have referred *; for it is the cause in the sense of
being that from which motion is derived, in the sense
of the purpose or final cause, and as being the sub-
stance of all bodies that have souls. (1) That the
soul is the cause in the sense of substance is obvious ;

-for substance is the cause of existence in all things,
and in living creatures life is their existence, and of
these the soul is the cause and first principle. Also
actuality is the form of that which exists potentially.?
(2) And it is clear that the soul is the cause in the
sense of the final cause. For just as the mind acts

Tha nature
of the soul.

ARISTOTLE

415 b
a t
ἕνεκά Tov ποιεῖ, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ἡ φύσις,

" nd ot ; ν᾿ 4 ~ a 5] n
καὶ τοῦτ᾽ ἔστιν αὐτῇ τέλος. τοιοῦτον δ᾽ ἐν τοῖς
ζῴοις ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ κατὰ φύσιν’ πάντα γὰρ τὰ
φυσικὰ σώματα τῆς ψυχῆς ὄργανα, καὶ καθάπερ

20 τὰ τῶν ζῴων, οὕτω καὶ τὰ τῶν φυτῶν, ὡς ἕνεκα
τῆς ψυχῆς ὄντα. διττῶς δὲ τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα, τό τε
ἊΝ \ νι Φ 2 N XV ν ὦ A ¢ \
οὗ καὶ τὸ ᾧ. ἀλλὰ μὴν Kal ὅθεν πρῶτον ἡ κατὰ
τόπον κίνησις, ψυχή’ οὐ πᾶσι δ᾽ ὑπάρχει τοῖς
~ ς , 4 μὲ \ \ > , \
ζῶσιν ἡ δύναμις αὕτη. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἀλλοίωσις καὶ

» \ / € x % vy 3 é iy
αὔξησις κατὰ ψυχήν' ἡ μὲν yap αἴσθησις ἀλλοίωσίς

~ 3
οὔ τις εἶναι δοκεῖ, αἰσθάνεται δ᾽ οὐθὲν ὃ μὴ ἔχει
ψυχήν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ αὐξήσεώς τε καὶ
ἢ

φθίσεως ἔχει: οὐδὲν γὰρ φθίνει οὐδ᾽ αὔξεται
~ \ , , 3 cap! a x
φυσικῶς μὴ τρεφόμενον, τρέφεται δ᾽ οὐθὲν ὃ μὴ

κοινωνεῖ ζωῆς.

3 ~ nw
᾿Ἐμπεδοκλῆς δ᾽ οὐ καλῶς εἴρηκε τοῦτο, προσ-
τιθεὶς τὴν αὔξησιν συμβαίνειν τοῖς φυτοῖς κάτω.
\ foal

48a μὲν συρριζουμένοις διὰ τὸ τὴν γῆν οὕτω φέρεσθαι
κατὰ φύσιν, ἄνω δὲ διὰ τὸ πῦρ ὡσαύτως. οὔτε
γὰρ τὸ ἄνω καὶ κάτω καλῶς λαμβάνει: od yap
ταὐτὸ πᾶσι τὸ ἄνω καὶ κάτω καὶ τῷ παντί, ἀλλ᾽

e ¢ \ a , ” eer “ἡ =

ὡς ἡ κεφαλὴ τῶν ζῴων, οὕτως at ῥίζαι τῶν φυτῶν,
δ εἰ χρὴ τὰ ὄργανα λέγειν ἕτερα καὶ ταὐτὰ τοῖς
ἔργοις. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τί τὸ συνέχον εἰς τἀναντία"
φερόμενα τὸ πῦρ καὶ τὴν γῆν; διασπασθήσεται
γάρ, εἰ μή τι ἔσται τὸ κωλῦσον' εἰ δ᾽ ἔσται, τοῦτ᾽
> \ € 4 ay ‘ " ~ 2 ΄ \
ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχὴ Kal τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ αὐξάνεσθαι καὶ
τρέφεσθαι.

ON THE SOUL, I. w.

with some end in view, so in the same way does
nature, and this is its end. This, then, is the nature of
the soul among living creatures, and this 15 in accord-
ance with nature ; for all natural bodies are the in-
struments of the soul, and just as is the case with the
bodies of aninials, so with those of plants, in the sense
that they exist for the sake of the soul. But the
phrase ‘‘ for the sake of” has two meanings—"' for
whom?” and“ for what?” (3) Lastly, the soul is
the cause whence movement is derived in the first
place ; but this capacity does nol belong to all living
creatures, Change of state and growth are also due
to the soul; ‘for sensation is in a sense change of
state, and nothing feels which has not a soul. The
same is true about growth and decay ; for nothing
dies nor grows in nature, unless it is fed, and nothing
is fed which does not share in life.

Empedocles is mistaken in his account of this,
when he adds that the growth in plants, when their
roots spread downwards, is due to the fact that earth
naturally tends in this direction, and that when they
grow upwards, it is duc to the natural movement of
fire. Nor is his theory of “ upwards ”’ and “ down-
wards ’’ correct ; for upwards and downwards are not
the same for every thing in every case, but the
function performed by the head in animals is per-
formed by the roots in plants, if we are to identify
and distinguish organs by their functions. But in
addition to this, what is it which connects the fire
and the earth tending in opposite directions? For
they will be violently separated, unless there is some-
thing to prevent this ; but if there is anything of the
sort this will be the soul, and therefore the cause of
growth and nourishment.

ARISTOTLE
4168 ~ Fd ¢ - A ,ὔ & ~ >.
10 Δοκεῖ δέ τισιν ἡ τοῦ πυρὸς φύσις ἁπλῶς αἰτία
τῆς τροφῆς καὶ τῆς αὐξήσεως εἶναι: καὶ γὰρ
αὐτὸ φαίνεται μόνον τῶν σωμάτων ἢ τῶν στοι-
χείων τρεφόμενον καὶ αὐξόμενον. διὸ καὶ ἐν τοῖς
φυτοῖς καὶ ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις ὑπολάβοι τις ἂν τοῦτο
εἷναι τὸ ἐργαζόμενον. τὸ δὲ συναίτιον μέν πώς
2 3 A 7 ~ we 3 A a ¢
ws ἐστιν, οὐ μὴν ἁπλῶς γε αἴτιον, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἡ
ψυχή" ἡ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ πυρὸς αὔξησις εἰς ἄπειρον,
ἕως ἂν q 70 καυστόν, τῶν δὲ φύσει συνισταμένων
πάντων ἐστὶ πέρας καὶ λόγος μεγέθους τε καὶ αὐξή-
σεως" ταῦτα δὲ ψυχῆς, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ πυρός, καὶ λόγου
μᾶλλον ἣ ὕλης.
᾿Επεὶ 1p ἡ αὐτὴ δύναμις τῆς ψυχῆς θρεπτικὴ
"0 καὶ γεννητική, περὶ τροφῆς ἀναγκαῖον διωρίσθαι
πρῶτον' ἀφορίζεται γὰρ πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας δυνάμεις
τῷ ἔργῳ τούτῳ. δοκεῖ δ᾽ εἶναι ἡ τροφὴ τὸ
ἐναντίον τῷ ἐναντίῳ, οὐ πᾶν δὲ παντί, ἀλλ᾽ ὅσα
“ 2. ἐν A / i ? 2 ὔ ue
τῶν ἐναντίων μὴ μόνον γένεσιν ἐξ ἀλλήλων ἔχουσιν
ἀλλὰ καὶ αὔξησιν' γίνεται γὰρ πολλὰ ἐξ ἀλλήλων,
4 ἀλλ᾽ οὐ πάντα ποσά, οἷον ὑγιὲς ἐκ κάμνοντος.
} > 2D? ? “- \ 2 \ } > ta
φαίνεται δ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἐκεῖνα τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἀλλήλοις
Z > \ 1 A V4 a ‘ ἃ \
εἶναι τροφή, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ὕδωρ τῷ πυρὶ τροφή, τὸ
δὲ πῦρ οὐ τρέφει τὸ ὕδωρ. ἐν μὲν οὖν τοῖς ἁπλοῖς
σώμασι ταῦτ᾽ εἶναι δοκεῖ μάλιστα τὸ μὲν τροφὴ
A 4 / > tf > Ψ \ ‘\ =.
τὸ δὲ τρεφόμενον. ἀπορίαν δ᾽ ἔχει: φασὶ yap οἱ
a μὲν τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ τρέφεσθαι, καθάπερ καὶ
αὐξάνεσθαι, τοῖς δ᾽ ὥσπερ εἴπομεν τοὔμπαλιν δοκεῖ,
τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ ἐναντίῳ, ὡς ἀπαθοῦς ὄντος τοῦ
ε i δ A ὅπ δ i 4 A \ /
ὁμοίου ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου, τὴν δὲ τροφὴν μεταβάλλειν
καὶ πέττεσθαι' ἡ δὲ μεταβολὴ πᾶσιν εἰς τὸ ἀντι-

ON THE SOUL, IT. 1.

To some the nature of fire seems by itself to be the Fire in

cause of nutrition and growth; for it alone of ΠΝ
bodies and elements seems to be nourished and grow
of itself. So that one might suppose that it was the
operating principle in plants and animals. ΠῚ may
perhaps be a contributory cause, but it is not the
primary cause, which is much more properly the soul 5
for the growth of fire is without limit, so long as there
is something to be burned, but of all things existing
in nature there is a limit and a principle of size and
growth ; this is due to the soul, not to fire, and to
form rather than to matter.

elition to
TOWLh,

But since hutrition and generation are the same the mture

faculty of the soul, we must first define nutriment °

carefully ; the nutritive faculty is separated from the
other faculties by ils function of feeding. There is
a general opinion that opposites are nutriment toe
opposites ; not of course in every case, but among
such opposites as have not merely their birth from
each other, but their growth as well; for many
things arise from each other, but they are not all
quantities ; for instance, health from illness, But not
even the things mentioned seem to be food for each
other in the same way; water feeds fire,* but fire
does not feed water. It is true that in simple bodies
the food and what is fed do seem opposite, But this
presents a difficulty ; for some say that like is fed by
like, just as like grows by like, but others, as we have
said, hold the opposite view, that opposites are fed
by their opposites, on the ground that like is un-
affected by like, but that food changes and is
digested. But all change is to an opposite, or to an

# Tt was cn aay that wood, when perfectly dry, would not
keep a fire alight,
gl

f food,

ARISTOTLE

416 a f Oy \ 4‘ wu ΄, 9 Yoe y
36 KELLLEVOV Ἢ TO μεταξύ. ετὶ πασχέι TL q τροφὴ ὕπο

- ψ' > 3 + ~ ¢ εἶ a ~
416700 τρεφομένου, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τοῦτο ὑπὸ τῆς τροφῆς,
[2 +O? ¢< ) Ἔ A ~ [4 > > ¢€ > ? ὔ
ὥσπερ οὐδ᾽ ὁ τέκτων ὑπὸ τῆς ὕλης, ἀλλ᾽ ὑπ᾽ ἐκεί-
Ua φ A ᾽ὔ / 7 >
νου αὕτη: 6 δὲ τέκτων μεταβάλλει μόνον eis
ἐνέργειαν ἐξ ἀργίας.

Πότερον δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἡ τροφὴ τὸ τελευταῖον προσ-
γινόμενον ἢ τὸ πρῶτον, ἔχει διαφοράν. εἶ &
Mv IAN’ ¥ ‘ » τ δὲ 7

ἄμφω, a ἡ μὲν ἄπεπτος ἡ δὲ πεπεμμένη,
> rd nw ἢ i. \ \ / = 4
ἀμφοτέρως ἂν ἐνδέχοιτο τὴν τροφὴν λέγειν: H μὲν
γὰρ ἄπεπτος, τὸ ἐναντίον τῷ ἐναντίῳ τρέφεται,
ἢ δὲ πεπεμμένη, τὸ ὅμοιον τῷ ὁμοίῳ. ὥστε
φανερὸν ὅτι λέγουσί τινα τρόπον ἀμφότεροι καὶ
? θῶ " 3 ’ ~ + i. δ᾽ ΕΣ A 7
ὀρθῶς καὶ οὐκ ὀρθῶς. ἐπεὶ οὐθὲν τρέφεται

μὴ μετέχον ζωῆς, τὸ ἔμψυχον ἂν εἴη σῶμα

x / Μ A 4 τ ‘
τὸ τρεφόμενον, ἦ ἔμψυχον, ὥστε Kal ἡ τροφὴ
πρὸς ἔμψυχόν ἐστι καὶ οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός.
a > ω nd A 3 a“ \
ἔστι δ᾽ ἕτερον τροφῇ καὶ αὐξητικῷ εἶναι: ἢ μὲν

A u ‘4 μὴ Ἂν , \ a
yap ποσὸν τι τὸ ἔμψυχον, αὐξητικόν, ἧ δὲ τόδε τι
καὶ οὐσία, τροφή' σώζει γὰρ τὴν οὐσίαν, καὶ

16 μέχρι τούτου ἐστὶν ἕως ἂν καὶ τρέφηται' καὶ
γενέσεως ποιητικὸν οὐ τοῦ τρεφομένου, ἀλλ᾽ οἷον
τὸ τρεφόμενον: ἤδη γάρ ἐστιν αὐτὴ ἡ οὐσία, γεννᾷ

" ει \ Ἵ 4 “δ ta 3 LS a @ > ς A
δ᾽ οὐθὲν αὐτὸ ἑαυτό, ἀλλὰ σώζει. ὥσθ᾽ ἡ μὲν
τοιαύτη τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρχὴ δύναμίς ἐστιν οἵα σώζειν
τὸ ἔχον αὐτὴν ἧ τοιοῦτον, ἡ δὲ τροφὴ παρασκευάζει

20 ἐνεργεῖν. διὸ στερηϑὲν τροφῆς οὐ δύναται εἶναι.
3 A 3 + a" a 4 i τ κι τ 7
ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἐστὶ τρία, τὸ τρεφόμενον καὶ ᾧ τρέφεται
καὶ τὸ τρέφον, τὸ μὲν τρέφον ἐστὶν ἡ πρώτη

ON THE SOUL, IL. iv.

intermediate state. Again, the food is affected by the
fed, and not wee versa, just as the carpenter is not
affected by his material, but the material by the car-
penter ; the carpenter merely changes from idleness
to work.

Now it makes a difference whether the food is
referred to in its last state or in its first. Ifin both
states, that is both undigested and digested, it
would be possible to speak of fond in both the ways
referred to above ; for when it is undigested, oppusite
feeds on opposite, but when digested like fecds on
like. So that it is clear that both sides argue cor-
rectly in one-sense and incorrectly in another. But
since nothing is nourished which does not share in
life, that which has a soul would be the nourished
body, in virtue of its having a soul, so that food
belongs to that which has a soul and is not an acei-
dental property of il. But nutrition and growth are
two different things ; for in so far as that which lives
is a quantity, it is a matter of growth, but in so far
as it is a particular thing and substance, it is a matter
of nourishment; for that which lives preserves its
substance and continues to exist, so long as it is
nourished, and it produces the birth not of that which
is nourished, but of another like it ; for it is already
itself substance, and it does not produce itself in any
way, but only preserves itself. So that the first
principle of the soul in this respect is its power of
preserving what possesses it as an individual, while
food prepares it for work. For this reason it cannot
continue to exist when deprived of food. But there
are three factors in the problem, that which is
nourished, that whereby it is nourished, and that
which nourishes it. The primary soul is that which

Solution of
the difll-
culty,

ARISTOTLE
16b , 4 1 2 +o” δ τὰ A .
ψυχή, τὸ δὲ τρεφόμενον τὸ ἔχον αὐτὴν σῶμα, ᾧ
\ / ξ , 2 ay A > \ ~ /
δὲ τρέφεται, ἡ τροφή. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ τέλους
ἅπαντα προσαγορεύειν δίκαιον, τέλος δὲ τὰ γεννῆσαι
"6 οἷον αὐτό, εἴη ἂν ἡ πρώτη ψυχὴ γεννητωςὴ οἷον

> + "» \ 7 / “ . τ
αὐτό. ἔστι δὲ ᾧ τρέφεται διττόν, ὥσπερ καὶ ᾧ
κυβερνᾷ, ἡ χεὶρ καὶ τὸ πηδάλιον, τὸ μὲν κινοῦν
καὶ κινούμενον, τὸ δὲ κινοῦν μόνον. πᾶσαν δ᾽
3 aA Ai , ᾿ς td ,ὔ
ἀναγκαῖον τροφὴν δύνασθαι πέττεσθαι, ἐργάζεται
\ \ / ‘ of \ a. ” uv
δὲ τὴν πέψιν τὸ θερμόν" διὸ πᾶν ἔμψυχον ἔχει θερ-
go μότητα. τύπῳ μὲν οὖν ἡ τροφὴ τί ἐστιν εἴρηται"
διασαφητέον δ᾽ ἐστὶν ὕστερον περὶ αὐτῆς ἐν τοῖς
οἰκείοις λόγοις.
V. Διωρισμένων δὲ τούτων λέγωμεν κοινῇ περὶ
, > / eg ᾿ ἐπ a ,
πάσης αἰσθήσεως. ἡ δ᾽ αἴσθησις ἐν τῷ κινεῖσθαί
tq ~
τε Kal πάσχειν συμβαίνει, καθάπερ εἴρηται" δοκεῖ
\ > , \ , \ A
a γὰρ ἀλλοίωσίς τις εἶναι. φασὶ δέ τινες καὶ τὸ
ταδμοιον ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου πάσχειν. τοῦτο δὲ πῶς
2 “
δυνατὸν ἢ ἀδύνατον, εἰρήκαμεν ἐν τοῖς καθόλου
λόγοις περὶ τοῦ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν. ἔχει δ᾽
ἀπορίαν διὰ τί καὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων αὐτῶν οὐ
if wv \ 4A ti » - μὴ >
γίνεται αἴσθησις, καὶ διὰ τί ἄνευ τῶν ἔξω οὐ
5 ποιοῦσιν αἴσθησιν, ἐνόντος πυρὸς καὶ γῆς καὶ τῶν
ἄλλων στοιχείων, ὧν ἐστὶν ἡ αἴσθησις καθ᾽ αὑτὰ
aa 3) , i” =~ S ν 4
ἢ τὰ συμβεβηκότα τούτοις. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι τὸ
? A 3 Ψ > 7 > A } id
αἰσθητικὸν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐνεργείᾳ, ἀλλὰ δυνάμει μόνον.
διὸ καθάπερ τὸ καυστὸν οὐ καίεται αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ
~ ~ ,
ἄνευ τοῦ καυστικοῦ" ἔκαιε γὰρ ἂν ἑαυτό, καὶ οὐθὲν
3 ~ ἊΣ ͵ 4 μὲ > Ν + A
10 ἐδεῖτο τοῦ ἐντελεχείᾳ πυρὸς ὄντος. ἐπειδὴ δὲ τὸ

“ΝΟ such treatise has come down to us.

94.

ON THE SOUL. LL. tv.

nourishes, that which is nourished is the body which
contains {πο soul, and that whereby it is nourished
is the food, But since it is right to name everything
in view of its end, and its end is the reproduction of
the species, the primary soul would be that which
reproduces another like itself. But the words “ by
which it is nourished ” are used in two senses, just
like the phrase “ by which the helinsman steers,”
meaning cither his hand or the rudder, the latter
both moving and being inoved, and the former only
moving. But all add. must he digested, and it is
heat which produces digestion ; consequently every-
thing possessing a soul has heat, ‘The meaning of
food has thus been described in outline ; ; later on we
must be more precise about ilina treatise of its own."
V. Having completed these definilions let us dis-
cuss sensation in general, Sensation cunsists, as has
been said, of being moved and acted upon ; for it
scems to be some sort of change of state. Naw some
say that like is only affected by like. But the sense
in which this is possible or impossible we have already
stated in our general account. of acting and being
acted upon.? But a difficulty arises as to why there
is no sensation of the senses themselves ; that is, why
they give no sensation apart from external objects,
seeing that fire and earth and the other elements
enter into their composition, of which things there is
sensation either in themselves, or in their accidental
properties. It is clear from this that the faculty of
sensation has no actual but only potential existence.
So fuel does not bum by itself without something
to set fire to it; for otherwise it would burn of itself,
and would not Need any fire actually at work. But

> De Gen. et Corr. i. 1. 328 b 18 sq.
Q5

Sengation
In general.

417 a

ARISTOTLE

αἰσθάνεσθαι λέγομεν διχῶς (τό Te γὰρ δυνάμει
ἀκοῦον καὶ δρῶν ἀκούειν καὶ ὁρᾶν λέγομεν, κἂν
τύχῃ καθεῦδον, καὶ τὸ ἤδη ἐνεργοῦν), διχῶς ἂν
λέγοιτο καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις, ἡ μὲν ὡς δυνάμει, ἡ δὲ
ὡς ἐνεργείᾳ. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, τό
τε δυνάμει ὃν καὶ τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ.

Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ὡς τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὄντος τοῦ πάσχειν
καὶ τοῦ κινεῖσθαι καὶ τοῦ ἐνεργεῖν λέγωμεν: καὶ
γὰρ ἔστιν ἡ κίνησις ἐνέργειά τις, ἀτελὴς μέντοι,
καθάπερ ἐν ἑτέροις εἴρηται. πάντα δὲ πάσχει καὶ
κινεῖται ὑπὸ τοῦ ποιητικοῦ καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ ὄντος.
διὸ ἔστι μὲν ὡς ὑπὸ τοῦ ὁμοίου πάσχει, ἔστι δὲ
ὡς ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀνομοίου, καθάπερ εἴπομεν: πάσχει
μὲν γὰρ τὸ ἀνόμοιον, πεπονθὸς δ᾽ ὅμοιόν ἐστιν.

Διαιρετέον δὲ καὶ περὶ δυνάμεως καὶ ἐντελε-
χείας' νῦν γὰρ ἁπλῶς λέγομεν περὲ αὐτῶν. ἔστι
μὲν γὰρ οὕτως ἐπιστῆμόν τι ὡς ἂν εἴποιμεν
ἄνθρωπον ἐπιστήμονα, ὅτι ὁ ἄνθρωπος τῶν ἐπι-
στημόνων καὶ ἐχόντων ἐπιστήμην" ἔστι δ᾽ ὡς ἤδη
λέγομεν ἐπιστήμονα τὸν ἔχοντα τὴν γραμματικήν.
ἑκάτερος δὲ τούτων οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον δυνατός
ἐστιν, ἀλλ᾽ ὁ μὲν ὅτι τὸ γένος τοιοῦτον καὶ ἡ
ὕλη, ὁ δ᾽ ὅτι βουληθεὶς δυνατὸς θεωρεῖν, ἂν μή
Te κωλύσῃ τῶν ἔξωθεν" ὁ δ᾽ ἤδη θεωρῶν ἐντελεχείᾳ

Ἂ ἢ ΄ 2 , ᾽ Η 3 /
80 ὧν Καὶ κυριῶς ἐπιστάμενος τόδε το Α. ἀμφότεροι

\ S Ξε A 4 2 2 ‘ 24) 2
μὲν οὖν of πρῶτοι κατὰ δύναμιν ἐπιστήμονες, ἀλλ
¢ A A fa > = " 4 4.
ὁ μὲν διὰ μαθήσεως ἀλλοιωθεὶς καὶ πολλάκις ἐξ
ἐναντίας μεταβαλὼν ἕξεως, ὁ δ᾽ ἐκ τοῦ ἔχειν τὴν

@ eg. Phys. iii. 2, 201} 81.
96

ON THE SOUL, II. v.

since we use the term fecling in two senses (for we
say that that which has the power of hearing and
seeing hears and sees, even if it happens to be asleep,
as well as when the faculty is actually operative), so
the term sensation inust be used in two senses, as
potential and as actual. And so feeling means both
the faculty and the exercise of it.

To begin with, let us assume that being acted upon
and moving is the same thing as exercising the
function ; for moyement is a form of exercise, though
incomplete, as has been said in other treatises." But
everything is acted upon and moved by something
which produces an effect and actually exists. ‘There-
fore, as we have said, a thing is acted upon both by
like and by unlike ; for while it is being acted upon
it is unlike, but when the action is complete, it is like.

But we must draw a distinction between potential
and actual; for at present we are speaking of both
without discrimination. For knowledge is used in
two senses: we might call a man wise because man
belongs to the class of those who are wise and have
knowledge ; but we may also call the man wise who
has a knowledge, say, of grammar. Now each of
these two has capacity, but in a different sense : the
former, because it is characteristic of his class, and
the matter of which he is made ; the latter, because
he is capable of thinking whenever he likes, provided
that external causes do not prevent him; but the
man who is now thinking is not potential ‘but actual,
and really knows something —for instance the letter
A. The first two men are both wise only potentially ;
the former becomes actually wise only after a change
due to instruction, and often from the opposite con-
dition, the latter undergoing change in another sense,

H 97

Potential
and uctual.

417 b

τι

ARISTOTLE

αἴσθησιν ἣ τὴν γραμματικήν, μὴ ἐνεργεῖν δ᾽

τὸ ἐνεργεῖν ἄλλον τρόπον. οὐις ἔστι δ᾽ ἁπλοῦν
οὐδὲ τὸ πάσχειν, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν φθορά τις ὑπὸ τοῦ
ἐναντίου, τὸ δὲ σωτηρία μᾶλλον τοῦ δυνάμει 6 ὄντος
ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐντελεχείᾳ ὄντος καὶ ὁμοίου, οὕτως ὡς
δύναμις ἔχει πρὸς ἐντελέχειαν: θεωροῦν “γὰρ
γίγνεται τὸ ἔχον τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ὅπερ ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν
ἀλλοιοῦσθαι (εἰς αὐτὸ γὰρ ἐπίδοσις καὶ εἰς
ἐντελέχειαν) ἢ ἕτερον γένος ἀ) λοιώσεως. διὸ οὐ
καλῶς ἔ ἔχει λέγειν τὸ φρονοῦν, ὅ ὅταν φρονῇ, ἀλλοιοῦ-
σθαι, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὸν οἰκοδόμον ὅταν οἰκοδομῇ.
τὸ μὲν οὖν εἰς ἐντελέχειαν ἄγον ἐκ δυνάμει ὄντος
κατὰ τὸ νοῦν καὶ φρονοῦν οὐ διδασκαλίαν ἀλλ᾽
ἑτέραν ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχειν δίκαιον" τὸ δ᾽ ἐκ δυνάμει
ὄντος μανθάνον καὶ λαμβάνον ἐπιστήμην ὑπὸ τοῦ
ἐντελεχείᾳ ὄντος καὶ διδασκαλικοῦ ἤτοι οὐδὲ
πάσχειν φατέον, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ἢ δύο τρόπους
εἶναι ἀλλοιώσεως, τήν τε ἐπὶ τὰς στερητικὰς
διαθέσεις μεταβολὴν καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ τὰς ἕξεις καὶ τὴν
φύσιν. τοῦ δ᾽ αἰσθητικοῦ ἡ μὲν πρώτη μεταβολὴ
γίνεται ὑπὸ τοῦ γεννῶντος, ὅταν δὲ γεννηθῇ, € ἔχει
ἤδη ὥσπερ ἐπιστήμην. καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι. καὶ
τὸ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν δὲ ὁμοίως λέγεται τῷ "θεωρεῖν"
διαφέρει δέ, ὁ ὅτι τοῦ μὲν τὰ ποιητικὰ τῆς ἐνεργείας
ἔξωθεν, τὸ ὁρατὸν καὶ τὸ ἀκουστόν, ὁμοίως δὲ
καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν αἰσθητῶν. αἴτιον δ᾽ ὅτι τῶν
Kal? ἕκαστον ἡ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν αἴσθησις, ἡ δ᾽

* When we see the colour red we see a particular object,
which is red, at a particular time. But knowledge of “ rec
is not knowledge of any red object at any one time but of the
colour red detached from stich objects, ze. in A.’s phrase-
ology as “ universal.” ‘

ΟΝ THE SOUL, IT. v.

that is, from possessing sensation, or the art of
grammar, but not using them, to the exercise of
these faculties. But even the term “ being acted
upon ”’ is not used in a single sense, but sometimes it
means a form of decay caused by an opposite, and
sometimes rather a preservation of that, which is only
potential by that which is actual and like itself, in the
sense that the potential is related to the actual ; for
that which has the knowledge becomes a thinking
being, which either is not a change of state (for it is
only a growth into its real self, that is to actuality),
or else is a different kind of change of state. 80 it is
not sound to describe that which thinks as changing
its state when it thinks, any more than it is true to
say that the builder changes his state when he builds.
That which produces development. from potential to
actual in the matter of understanding and thought
ought not to be described as teaching, but needs some
other name ; and that which in a state of potentiality
learns, and acquires knowledge from what is actual
and educative, either ought not to be called “ being
acted upon,” as has been said, or else there are two
kinds of change of state, one a change to a negative
condition, and the other a change to a positive con-
dition, that is, a realization of its nature. But in
sense~perception the first change is caused by the
parent, and when birth is complete the subject has
already in a sense knowledge and feeling. We speak
just in the same way of actual exercise in the case of
thinking ; with this difference, that the things which
produce the exercise of sensation are objects from
outside, the visible and andible, and similarly with
all the other objects of sense.* This is because active
feeling is for particular objects, whereas knowledge

ARISTOTLE

a7 b
“A 3 4 om
ἐπιστήμη τῶν xabddov: ταῦτα δ᾽ ev αὐτῇ πώς

Ε - - A ~ εἶ 3. +. ΕἾ mn ig ,
ἐστι τῇ ψυχῇ. διὸ νοῆσαι μὲν ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ, ὁπόταν

rt 4 ? ͵ > 7 > 3 ᾿. mn, > ΩΝ

23 βούληται, αἰσθάνεσθαι δ᾽ οὐκ ἐπ᾽ αὐτῷ" ἀναγκαῖον
γὰρ ὑπάρχειν τὸ αἰσθητόν. ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτ᾽ ἔχει
κἀν ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις ταῖς τῶν αἰσθητῶν, καὶ διὰ
τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν, ὅτι τὰ αἰσθητὰ τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστα
καὶ τῶν ἔξωθεν.

᾿Αλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων διασαφῆσαι καιρὸς γένοιτ᾽
at \ Ἵ - ~. 7 , ~ id
ἂν καὶ εἰσαῦθις. viv δὲ διωρίσθω τοσοῦτον, ὅτι

3 ε an ΜΝ γὰ ͵ , > \ oe

80 ody ἁπλοῦ ὄντος τοῦ δυνάμει λεγομένου, ἀλλὰ τοῦ
μὲν ὥσπερ ἂν εἴποιμεν τὸν παῖδα δύνασθαι στρατη-
γεῖν, τοῦ δὲ ὡς τὸν ἐν ἡλικίᾳ ὄντα, οὕτως ἔχει τὸ

‘Ba αἰσθητικόν. ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἀνώνυμος αὐτῶν ἡ διαφορά,
διώρισται δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ὅτι ἕτερα καὶ πῶς ἕτερα,

a ral ~ > “~
χρῆσθαι ἀναγκαῖον τῷ πάσχειν καὶ ἀλλοιοῦσθαι

3 A > . ᾿
ὡς κυρίοις ὀνόμασιν: τὸ δ᾽ αἰσθητικὸν δυνάμει
Η ‘ g \ > ‘ " 2 , ᾿
ἐστὶν οἷον τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἤδη ἐντελεχείᾳ, καθάπερ

ὃ εἴρηται. πάσχει μὲν οὖν οὐχ ὅμοιον ὄν, πεπονθὸς
δ᾽ ὡμοίωται καὶ ἔστιν οἷον ἐκεῖνο.

VI. Λεκτέον δὲ καθ᾽ ἑκάστην αἴσθησιν περὶ τῶν
αἰσθητῶν πρῶτον. λέγεται δὲ τὸ αἰσθητὸν τριχῶς,
ὧν δύο μὲν καθ᾽ αὑτά φαμεν αἰσθάνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ

- A

10 ἕν κατὰ συμβεβηκός. τῶν δὲ δύο τὸ μὲν ἴδιόν
ἐστιν ἑκάστης αἰσθήσεως, τὸ δὲ κοινὸν πασῶν.

͵ 2 Mf \ a 4 2 t4 c if 3 ,
λέγω δ᾽ ἴδιον μὲν ὃ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἑτέρᾳ αἰσθήσει

? , ‘ 1a > , 3 -
αἰσθάνεσθαι, καὶ περὶ ὃ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἀπατηθῆναι,

100

ON THE SOUL, LL. v.—-v1.

is of universals ; these in a sense exist in the soul
itself. So it lies in inan’s power to use his mind,
whenever he chooses, but il is not in his power to
experience sensalion ; for the presence of the object
felt is essential. The same thing is true of those
branches of knowledge, which deal with sensible
objects, and, for the same reason, that things are felt
among particular and outside objects.

But there will be a later opportunity to clear our
impressions about these things. For the moment it
will be enough to lay down that the term" potential”
is used with two meanings ; first as we might say
that a boy is a’ potential general, and secondly as we
might say it of an adult; it is only in the latter
meaning that the potential applics to that which
feels. But since there is no name corresponding to
this difference in meaning, and we have now ex-
plained that the meanings differ, and how they differ,
we must continue to use the words “ acted upon”
and ‘ change of state ’’ as though they were precise
terms ; 80 that which feels is potentially what the
thing felt is actually, as has been said. So long as it
is being acted upon it is not like, but, when it has
been acted upon, it becomes like, and is even as the
object. of sense.

VI. We must first of all discuss objects perceived in
relation to each sense. Now the term ‘ object per-
ceived ” is used with three meanings ; in two of them
we say that we perceive directly, and in one in-
directly. Of the first two, one is the particular
thing perceived by each sense, and the other is a
thing perceived by all the senses. By the particular
I mean that which cannot be perceived by any other
sense, and concerning which error is impossible, such

101

Potontial
a3 applied
to sunseation,

The ohjecta
of sense,

418 ἃ

τῷ
a

418 b

ARISTOTLE

e ” vA 4 2 Ν ὔ ᾿ fo
οἷον ὄψις χρώματος Kal ἀκοὴ ψόφου καὶ γεῦσις
χυμοῦ. ἡ δ᾽ ἁφὴ πλείους μὲν ἔχει διαφοράς: ἀλλ᾽
ἑκάστη γε κρίνει περὶ τούτων, καὶ οὐκ ἀπατᾶται
UZ ~ 7.3 a ͵ > ‘ 7 ‘
ὅτι χρῶμα οὐδ᾽ ὅτι ψόφος, ἀλλὰ τί τὸ κεχρω-
σμένον ἢ ποῦ, ἢ τί τὸ ψοφοῦν ἢ ποῦ. τὰ μὲν οὖν

a /
τοιαῦτα λέγεται ἴδια ἑκάστου, κοινὰ δὲ κίνησις,

a \ x ~

ἠρεμία, ἀριθμός, σχῆμα, μέγεθος" τὰ γὰρ τοιαῦτα

a 4
οὐδεμιᾶς ἐστὶν ἴδια, ἀλλὰ Kowa πάσαις" καὶ yap
[ ~ £ A ΄ 7 3 4 7 cla A
ἀφῇ κίνησίς tis ἐστιν αἰσθητὴ καὶ ὄψει. κατὰ
4 > ‘ ᾿
συμβεβηκὸς δὲ λέγεται αἰσθητόν, οἷον εἰ τὸ λευκὸν

y Pa ε \ \
εἴη Διάρους vids: κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς yap τούτου

γ / uv a a , “- Lag
αἰσθάνεται, ὅτι TH λευκῷ συμβέβηκε τοῦτο οὗ

> ͵ εἶ a γῶν / ‘a ~ 1 \
αἰσθάνεται. διὸ καὶ οὐδὲν πάσχει ἡ τοιοῦτον ὑπὸ

a ᾿] ~ ~ ‘ ΕἸ ¢ \ > n \

τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ. τῶν δὲ καθ᾽ αὑτὰ αἰσθητῶν τὰ

NM , 3 κ > / y s a [ἢ > ,

ἴδια κυρίως ἐστὶν αἰσθητά, καὶ πρὸς ἃ ἡ οὐσία

πέφυκεν ἑκάστης αἰσθήσεως.

A » a \

VII. Οὗ μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ ὄψις, τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν
¢ f ¢ A > » ~ ͵ Ν “a /

ὁρατόν. ὁρατὸν δ᾽ ἔστιν χρῶμά τε, καὶ ὃ λόγῳ
- » ~

μὲν ἔστιν εἰπεῖν, ἀνώνυμον δὲ τυγχάνει ὄν' δῆλον

ι A a f lol f 4 4
δὲ ἔσται ὃ λέγομεν προελθοῦσι μάλιστα. τὸ yap

a A ~ ~
ὁρατόν ἐστι χρῶμα. τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τοῦ
καθ᾽ αὑτὸ ὁρατοῦ" καθ᾽ αὑτὸ δὲ οὐ τῷ λόγῳ, ἀλλ᾽

t fol »-
ὅτι ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἔχει τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ εἶναι ὁρατόν. πᾶν
δὲ χρῶμα κινητικόν ἐστι τοῦ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν
διαφανοῦς, καὶ τοῦτ᾽ ἔστιν αὐτοῦ ἡ φύσις. διόπερ

3 ¢ A wv , > δ 5. 3 eo
οὐχ ὁρατὸν ἄνευ φωτός, ἀλλὰ πᾶν τὸ ἑκάστου

rat > \
χρῶμα ἐν φωτὶ ὁρατόν.

109

ON THE SOUL, II. ντ.--τον,,

as the seeing of a colour, or the hearing of a sound, or
the tasting of a flavour. Touch of course has many
varieties of object; but in these cases a separate
sense judges each, nor is it deceived as to that itis a
colour or a sound, but only as to where or what. the
coloured object is, or what and where that is which
sounds. All such things belong to each particular
sense, but perception of movement, rest, number,
shape and size is shared by several senses. For
things of this kind are not peculiar to any special
sense, but are shared hy them all; for instance,
movement is perecived both by touch and by sight.
By an object indirectly perceived I mean, for instance,
that the white object is the son of Diares ; this is an
indirect perception, because that which is perceived
(the son of Diaves) only belongs incidentally to the
whiteness. For the percipient is not acted upon by
the thing perceived (the son of Diares) as such. But
of things directly perceived the objects of a particular
sense are “‘ perceived ” in the fullest sense, and it is
these for which the real nature of each sense exists.

VII. The object of vision is the thing seen. The
thing seen is either colour, or a phenomenon which can
be described in words, but has no name of its own ;
what we mean by this will become clear when we get
further on. The thing seen, then, is colour. And this
lies on the surface of the object seen in itself; by
“in itself’? we mean not that the object is by its
definition visible but that it has in itself the reason
of its being seen. Every colour can produce move-
ment in the “ transparent ” in a state of activity, and
this is its own nature. Therefore nothing is visible
without light, but the colour of each individual thing
is seen in light.

109

Vision.

ARISTOTLE

448 b
Διὸ περὶ φωτὸς πρῶτον λεκτέον τί ἐστιν. ἔστι

δή τι διαφανές. διαφανὲς δὲ λέγω ὃ ἔστι μὲν
τ , > ? 2 \ \ ς bs φ ¢ ~ >? a.

6 ὁρατόν, od καθ᾽ αὐτὸ δὲ ὁρατὸν ὡς ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν,
3 Ἂς > 2 , ~ ~ ιν 2A
ἀλλὰ δι᾿ ἀλλότριον χρῶμα. τοιοῦτον δέ ἐστιν ἀὴρ

ἀπ ay A a ~ ? δ CA

καὶ ὕδωρ Kal πολλὰ τῶν στερεῶν' od yap 4 ὕδωρ
οὐδ᾽ ἦ ἀήρ, διαφανές, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι ἐστὶ φύσις ἐνυπ-
* ~
ἄρχουσα ἡ αὐτὴ ἐν τούτοις ἀμφοτέροις καὶ ἐν τῷ
ἀϊδίῳ τῷ ἄνω σώματι. φῶς δέ ἐστιν ἡ τούτου
ι0 ἐνέργεια τοῦ διαφανοῦς 4 διαφανές. δυνάμει δὲ

> Ὁ a} ας , \ Ay / \ \ -

ἐν ᾧ τοῦτ᾽ ἐστί, καὶ τὸ σκότος. τὸ δὲ φῶς οἷον
~ ~ ~ ij ἣν >

χρῶμά ἐστι τοῦ διαφανοῦς, ὅταν ἧ ἐντελεχείᾳ

διαφανὲς ὑπὸ πυρὸς ἢ τοιούτου οἷον τὸ ἄνω σῶμα:

καὶ yap τούτῳ τι ὑπάρχει Ev καὶ ταὐτόν. τί μὲν
> ,ὔ ral

οὖν τὸ διαφανὲς Kal τί τὸ φῶς, εἴρηται, ὅτι οὔτε
a a 3 \

πῦρ οὔθ᾽ ὅλως σῶμα οὐδ᾽ ἀπορροὴ σώματος
Ἂ / w AY Ἃ “ ΄ὔ \ ω 3 \

οὐδενός (εἴη γὰρ ἂν σῶμά τι καὶ οὕτως), ἀλλὰ

5 . > ~ a
πυρὸς ἢ τοιούτου τινὸς παρουσία ἐν τῷ διαφανεῖ"
οὐδὲ γὰρ δύο σώματα ἅμα δυνατὸν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ
“- a ti ~
εἶναι. δοκεῖ δὲ τὸ φῶς ἐναντίον εἶναι τῷ σκότει.
‘ a

ἔστι δὲ τὸ σκότος στέρησις τῆς τοιαύτης ἕξεως ἐκ

~ ~ a ‘

20 διαφανοῦς, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἦ τούτου παρουσία
τὸ φῶς ἐστίν. καὶ οὐκ ὀρθῶς ᾿Εμπεδοκλῆς, οὐδ᾽
εἴ τις ἄλλος οὕτως εἴρηκεν, ὡς φερομένον τοῦ
φωτὸς καὶ γιγνομένου ποτὲ μεταξὺ τῆς γῆς καὶ
τοῦ περιέχοντος, ἡμᾶς δὲ λανθάνοντος" τοῦτο γάρ
ἐστι καὶ παρὰ τὴν τοῦ λόγου ἐνάργειαν' καὶ παρὰ

45 τὰ φαινόμενα" ἐν μικρῷ μὲν γὰρ διαστήματι λάθοι
M. > 07 3 ~ ον τ Ν | A s , fa
dv, ἀπ᾽ ἀνατολῆς δ᾽ ἐπὶ δυσμὰς τὸ λανθάνειν μέγα

1 γὴν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ἀλήθειαν Β.

μ᾿
in

104

ON THE SOUL, HL. vir.

Consequently we must explain in the first place Light.
what light is. Transparency evidently exists. By
transparency I mean that which is seen, but not
directly seen without qualification, but as it were
owing to a colour from elsewhere. This transparent
character is shared by air, water, and many solid
objects ; it is not transparent because it is water or
air, but because the same nature belongs to these
two as to the everlasting upper firmament. Now
light is the activity of this transparency qua trans-
parent, Potentially, wherever it is present, dark-
ness is also present. Light is then in a sense the
colour of the’ transparency, whenever it becomes
actually transparent. owing to fire or any such
agency as the upper firmament; for one and the
same quality belongs to this also. We have thus
described what light and transparency are, that they
are neither fire, nor in general any body, nor the
emanation from any body (for in that case they would
be a body of some kind themselves), but the presence
of fire, or something of the kindin the transparency ;
for there cannot be two bodies in the same place
at the same time. Light is considered to be the
opposite of darkness ; but darkness is a removal of
an active condition from the transparency, so that
obviously light is the presence of such an active
transparency. Empedocles, and anyone else who
has argued on similar lines, is wrong in saying that
light travels, and comes into being between the earth
and its envelope, but that we cannot see it: this is
contrary both to the light of reason, and to observed
facts; it would be possible for it to escape our observa-
tion in a small intervening space, but for it to do so all
the way between east and west makes too big a de-

105

ARISTOTLE

H8b 4 A » ΒΩ 4 tA 1 A
λίαν τὸ αἴτημα. ἔστι δὲ χρώματος μὲν δεκτικὸν

τὸ ἄχρουν, ψόφου δὲ τὸ ἄψοφον. ἄχρουν δ᾽ ἐστὶ

τὸ διαφανὲς καὶ τὸ ἀόρατον ἢ τὸ μόλις ὁρώμενον,
οἷον δοκεῖ τὸ σκοτεινόν. τοιοῦτον δὲ τὸ διαφανὲς

80 μέυ, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὅταν ῇ ἐντελεχείᾳ διαφανές, ἀλλ᾽
ὅταν δυνάμει: ἡ “γὰρ αὐτὴ φύσις ὁτὲ μὲν σκότος
4166 ὁτὲ δὲ φῶς ἐστίν. οὐ πάντα δὲ ὁρατὰ ἐν φωτί
ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ μόνον ἑκάστον τὸ οἰκεῖον χρῶμα"
ἔνια γὰρ ἐν μὲν τῷ φωτὶ οὐχ ὁρᾶται, ἐν δὲ τῷ
σκότει ποιεῖ αἴσθησιν, οἷον τὰ πυρώδη φαινόμενα
καὶ λάμποντα (ἀνώνυμα δ᾽ ἐστὶ ταῦτα ἑνὶ ὀνόματῃ,
οἷον μύκης, κέρας, κεφαλαὶ ἰχθύων καὶ λεπίδες καὶ
ὀφθαλμοί: ἀλλ᾽ οὐδενὸς ὁρᾶται τούτων τὸ οἰκεῖον
χρῶμα. δι᾿ ἣν μὲν οὖν αἰτίαν ταῦτα ὁρᾶται, ἄλλος
λόγος" νῦν δ᾽ ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον φανερόν ἐστιν, ὅτι τὸ
μὲν ἐν φωτὶ ὁρώμενον χρῶμα. διὸ καὶ οὐχ ὁρᾶται
10 ἄνευ φωτός" τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν αὐτῷ τὸ χρώματι εἶναι
τὸ κιψητικῷ εἶναι τοῦ Kar’ ἐνέργειαν, διαφανοῦς"
ἡ δ᾽ ἐντελέχεια τοῦ διαφανοῦς φῶς ἐστίν. σημεῖον
δὲ τούτου φανερόν' ἐὰν γάρ τις θῇ τὸ ἔχον χρῶμα
ἐπ’ αὐτὴν τὴν ὄψιν, οὐκ ὄψεται. ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν
χρῶμα κινεῖ τὸ διαφανές, οἷον τὸν ἀέρα, ὑπὸ
1s τούτου δὲ συνεχοῦς ὄντος κινεῖται τὸ αἰσθητήριον.
οὐ γὰρ καλῶς τοῦτο λέγει Δημόκριτος οἰόμενος,
εἰ γένοιτο κενὸν τὸ μεταξύ, ὁρᾶσθαι dv ἀκριβῶς
καὶ εἰ μύρμηξ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ εἴη: τοῦτο yap
ἀδύνατόν ἐστιν. πάσχοντος γάρ τι τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ
γίνεται τὸ ὁρᾶν" ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ μὲν οὖν τοῦ δρωμένου
20 χρώματος ἀδύνατον, λείπεται δὲ ὁ ὑπὸ τοῦ μεταξύ,
wor ἀναγκαῖόν τι εἶναι μεταξύ: κενοῦ δὲ γενο-
μένου οὐχ ὅτι ἀκριβῶς, ἀλλ᾽ ὅλως οὐθὲν ὀφθήσεται.

106

ON THE SOUL, IL. vi.

mand on our credulity. The colourless is receptive of
colour, as the soundless of sound. Transparency, and
what is unseen or only just seen, are colourless, just as
darkness is admitted to be. ‘This, then, is the nature
of the transparency. not when it exists actually, but
when it is only potential : for its nature is the same
both when there is darkness and when there is light.
But not everything is visible in the light, but only the
particular colour of cach individual thing ; ; for some
things are not seen in the light, but only produce
sensation in the dark, such as those whieh appear
fiery or luminous (there is no single name for these
two), like fungi, horn, the heads, scales, and eyes of
cerlain fishes ; but in none of these is a par ticular
colour seen ; why such things are visible is another
question ; but at this point it is clear that what is
visible in light is colour, So it is not scen without
Hight 5 for the essential nature of colour is its capacity
to produce movement in the transparency, when it is
active ; and the actuality of the transparency is light.
The evidence for this is clear; for if one puts that
which has colour close up to the eye, it will not be
visible ; but colour moves the transparency, for in-
stance the air, and the sense organ is moved by this
provided that it is continuous. Democritus is mais- The medium
taken in thinking that if the medium were empty, an
even an ant in the sky would be clearly visible ; for
this is impossible. For vision occurs when the
sensitive faculty is acted upon ; as it cannot be acted
upon by the actual colour which is seen, there only
remains the medium to act on it, so that some medium
must exist; in fact, if the intervening space were
void, not merely νου] accurate vision be impossible,
but nothing would be seen at all. We have then

107

ι9

ARISTOTLE

a 353. ἃ \ Bs Ν᾿ & ~ 3 - > \

δι’ ἣν μὲν οὖν αἰτίαν τὸ χρῶμα ἀναγκαῖον ev φωτὶ

ὁρᾶσθαι, εἴρηται. πῦρ δὲ ἐν ἀμφοῖν ὁρᾶται, καὶ
λ

a , 2 ΄ \ a 2 27 \
εν OKOTEL και EV φωτί, και TOVTO ἐξ αναγκΊς" TO

as γὰρ διαφανὲς ὑπὸ τούτου γίνεται διαφανές.

Ὃ δ᾽ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ περὶ ψόφου καὶ ὀσμῆς
ἐστίν: οὐθὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἁπτόμενον τοῦ αἰσθητηρίου
ποιεῖ τὴν αἴσθησιν, ἀλλ᾽ ὑπὸ μὲν ὀσμῆς καὶ ψόφου
τὸ μεταξὺ κινεῖται, ὑπὸ δὲ τούτου τῶν αἰσθητηρίων

ἘΠ ov > >? - ἢ 2 “ \ >
80 εκάτερον" οταν ὃ ΕἾ αὐτὸ Tits ἐπιθῇ TO αἰσθὴ-

τήριον τὸ ψοφοῦν ἢ τὸ ὄζον, οὐδεμίαν αἴσθησιν
ποιήσει. περὶ δὲ ἁφῆς καὶ γεύσεως ἔχει μὲν
ὁμοίως, οὐ φαίνεται dé: δι’ ἣν δ᾽ αἰτίαν, ὕστερον
ἔσται δῆλον. τὸ δὲ μεταξὺ ψόφων μὲν ἀήρ, ὀσμῆς
δ᾽ ἀνώνυμον: κοινὸν γὰρ δή τι πάθος ἐπ᾽ ἀέρος
καὶ ὕδατός ἐστιν, ὥσπερ τὸ διαφανὲς χρώματι,

τ ~ μ᾿ 3 \ a 3 3 # ς /
8 οὕτω τῷ ἔχοντι ὀσμὴν ὃ ἐν ἀμφοτέροις ὑπάρχει

τούτοις" φαίνεται γὰρ καὶ τὰ ἔνυδρα τῶν ζῴων

υ ἔχειν αἴσθησιν ὀσμῆς. ἀλλ᾽ ὃ μὲν ἄνθρωπος καὶ
τῶν πεζῶν ὅσα ἀναπνεῖ, ἀδυνατεῖ ὀσμᾶσθαι μὴ

ἀναπνέοντα. ἡ δ᾽ αἰτία καὶ περὶ τούτων ὕστερον

λεχθήσεται.

VIII. Νῦν δὲ πρῶτον περὶ ψόφου καὶ ἀκοῆς

5 διορίσωμεν. ἔστι δὲ διττὸς ὁ ψόφος" ὁ μὲν γὰρ
ἐνέργειά τις, ὁ δὲ δύναμις: τὰ μὲν γὰρ οὔ φαμεν

ἔχειν ψόφον, οἷον σπόγγον, ἔρια, τὰ δ᾽ ἔχειν, οἷον

χαλκὸν καὶ ὅσα στερεὰ καὶ λεῖα, ὅτι δύναται

ψοφῆσαι. τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ μεταξὺ καὶ τῆς

4 499 Ὁ 84 94.

® Fishes have certain olfactory apparatus, but it is very
doubtful whether they have a sense of smell.

5 421 Ὁ 18 to 422 a 6.

4 There seems to be little point in this distinction, nor does

108

ON THE SOUL, ID. vir.—vitt.

explained why colour can only be seen in the light.
Now fire is visible both in darkness and light, and this
is necessarily so ; for the transparency becomes trans-
parent because of the fire.

The same theory applies both to sound and smell ; ἃ medium

neither of these provokes sensation because it touches bape
the sense organ, but movement is produced in the for sound
medium by scent and sound, and each of the sense Puen
organs is stimulated by the medium ; but, when one
puts either the sound or the scent close up to the
sense organ, no sensation is produced. The same
thing is true of touch and taste, but it is not so
obvious ; why this is so will become clear later on.?
The medium in the case of sound is air, but in the
‘ease of smell has no name; for air and water have
certainly a common characteristic, which is present
in both of them, and bears the same relation to that
which emits smell as the transparency does to colour ;
for even animals which live under water seem to have
the sense of smell. But man, and all the land
animals which breathe, cannot smell except when
they are breathing. The reason for this will be
discussed later?

VIII. Now we must state our definitions of sound The con-
and hearing. Sound has two meanings ; sometimes SEL ania
it is actual, sometimes potential;@ for we say that is heard.
some things have no sound, such as a sponge or wool,
but that others have, such as bronze, and all things
which are both solid and smooth, because they can
give forth sound. That is to say, they are the cause
of sound being actually produced between the object

A. make any use of it. What he means is that bronze has
‘* potential * sound because sound can be produced from it,
whereas from wool no sound can be produced,

109

ARISTOTLE

419 b 3 “~ > a / 3 tg a 2 if
ἀκοῆς ἐμποιῆσαι ψόφον ἐνεργείᾳ. γίνεται δ᾽ ὁ

3 +. ] 4 a ὦ ‘ εἶ 2
10 KaT ενεργειαν ψόφος αεὶ τινος προς τι καὶ εν
τινι" πληγὴ γάρ ἐστιν ἡ ποιοῦσα. διὸ καὶ ἀδύνατον
ey ΕΣ i 7 . \ \ 4
ἑνὸς ὄντος γενέσθαι ψόφον" ἕτερον γὰρ τὸ τύπτον
καὶ τὸ τυπτόμενον" ὥστε τὸ ψοφοῦν πρός τι
A a 2 Ἂ , » a a
ψοφεῖ. πληγὴ δ᾽ od γίνεται ἄνευ φορᾶς. ὥσπερ
δ᾽ εἴπομεν, οὐ τῶν τυχόντων πληγὴ ὁ ψόφος"
10 οὐθένα γὰρ ποιεῖ ψόφον ἔρια ἂν πληγῇ, ἀλλὰ
\ τι tal ι “~ ¢ t / Ὁ
χαλκὸς καὶ ὅσα λεῖα καὶ κοῖλα, ὁ μὲν χαλκός, ὅτι
λεῖος" τὰ δὲ κοῖλα τῇ ἀνακλάσει πολλὰς ποιεῖ
A \ ‘ tA 3 “ >? cal
πληγὰς μετὰ THY πρώτην, ἀδυνατοῦντος ἐξελθεῖν
τοῦ κινηθέντος. ἔτι ἀκούεται ἐν ἀέρι καὶ ὕδατι,
ἀλλ᾽ ἧττον. obs ἔστι δὲ ψόφου κύριος ὁ ἀὴρ οὐδὲ
80 τὸ ὕδωρ- ἀλλὰ δεῖ στερεῶν πληγὴν γενέσθαι πρὸς
IAN A \ ‘ \ 27 ~ \ t
ἄλληλα καὶ πρὸς τὸν ἀέρα. τοῦτο δὲ γίνεται,
ὅταν ὑπομένῃ πληγεὶς ὁ ἀὴρ καὶ μὴ διαχυθῇ.
λ - -
διὸ ἐὰν ταχέως καὶ σφοδρῶς πληγῇ, ψοφεῖ: δεῖ
γὰρ φθάσαι τὴν κίνησιν τοῦ ῥαπίζοντος τὴν
θρύψιν τοῦ ἀέρος, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ σωρὸν ἣ ὁρμαθὸν
86 ψάμμου τύπτοι τις φερόμενον ταχύ.
Ἢ ‘ δὲ , a 2 \ ~ a7 x.
χὼ δὲ γίνεται, ὅταν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀέρος ἑνός
γενομένου διὰ τὸ ἀγγεῖον τὸ διορίσαν καὶ κωλῦσαν
Ent ε 3 3 “Ὁ Ὁ al
θρυφθῆναι πάλιν ὃ ἀὴρ ἀπωσθῇ, ὥσπερ σφαῖρα.
ἔοικε δ᾽ ἀεὶ γίνεσθαι ἠχώ, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ σαφής, ἐπεὶ
ta 35 ἃ ~ / 7 ‘ +. ᾿' ~
συμβαΐνει ye ἐπὶ τοῦ ψόφου καθάπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ
so φωτός" καὶ yap τὸ φῶς ἀεὶ ἀνακλᾶται (οὐδὲ γὰρ
ΕΝ , a 3 κ᾿ t ν me Se
ἂν ἐγίνετο πάντῃ φῶς, ἀλλὰ σκότος ἔξω τοῦ ἡλιου-

110

ON THE SOUL, II. vim.

itself and the sense of hearing. But the sound
actually produced is of something striking against
something else in a medium; for that which pro-
duces the sound is a blow. So if there is only one
condition present there can be no sound; for the
striker and the thing struck are two different things ;
so that what produces the sound sounds against
something else. But no blow occurs without move-
ment. But, as we have said, sound is not caused by
a blow upon any chance thing ; for wool produces no
sound eyen if it is struck, but bronze and things
which are hollow and smooth do; bronze because it
is smooth, and hollow things after the original blow
produce a number of other sounds by reverberation,
because that which is moved (i.e. the medium) cannot
escape. Sound is heard also in water as well as in
air, but less loudly. But neither the air nor the
water is responsible for the sound ; but there must be
a striking of solid objects against each other, and
against the air. This occurs when the air remains in
its place when struck, and is not dispersed. If then
it is struck sharply and violently there is a sound ;
for it is necessary that the movement of the striker
should forestall the escape of air, just as it would be
if one were to strike a heap of sand or a revolving
sandstorm moving rapidly.

Echo oceurs when air rebounds from air, which is
continuous, because of the vessel which confines it,
and prevents it from escaping, like a bouncing ball.
It seems likely that there is always an echo, but it is
not always noticeable, since the same thing happens
with sound as with light ; for light is always reflected
(otherwise there would not be light everywhere, but
there would be darkness in every region outside that

lil

Hicho.

ARISTOTLE

449 b
μένου), GAN οὐχ οὕτως ἀνακλᾶται ὥσπερ ἀφ᾽

ὕδατος ἢ χαλκοῦ ἢ καί τινος ἄλλου τῶν λείων,
ν ‘ nn. ia A - - ᾿ ‘ A
ὥστε σκιὰν ποιεῖν, ἢ τὸ φῶς ὁρίζομεν. τὸ δὲ
κενὸν ὀρθῶς λέγεται κύριον τοῦ ἀκούειν. δοκεῖ
γὰρ εἶναι κενὸν ὁ ἀήρ, οὗτος δ᾽ ἐστὶν ὁ ποιῶν
3 Z a ~ A \ t > Ν \
86 ἀκούειν, ὅταν κινηθῇ συνεχὴς Kal εἷς. ἀλλὰ διὰ
420a τὸ ψαθυρὸς εἶναι οὐ γεγωνεῖ, dv’ μὴ λεῖον 7 τὸ
λ f ᾽ 4 - ΤᾺ oa ὃ \ A > ,ὔ ὃ :
πληγέν. τότε δὲ εἷς γίνεται ἅμα διὰ τὸ ἐπίπεδον
Δ ‘ iY a , Ἐν (ἢ
ἕν γὰρ τὸ τοῦ λείου ἐπίπεδον.
YY 4 A > ¥ \ ey 37
οφητικὸν μὲν οὖν TO κινητικὸν ἑνὸς ἀέρος
συνεχείᾳ μέχρις ἀκοῆς, ἀκοὴ δὲ συμφυὴς ἀέρι.
\ A \ > 37 7 ~ μὲ \
5 διὰ δὲ τὸ ἐν ἀέρι εἶναι, κινουμένου τοῦ ἔξω τὸ
εἴσω κινεῖται.) διόπερ οὐ πάντῃ τὸ ζῷον ἀκούει,
£ A
οὐδὲ πάντῃ διέρχεται ὁ ἀήρ' οὐ yap πάντῃ ἔχει
>
ἀέρα τὸ κινησόμενον μέρος καὶ ἔμψυχον. αὐτὸ
4
μὲν δὴ dibopov ὁ ἀὴρ διὰ τὸ εὔθρυπτον" ὅταν δὲ
κωλυθῇ θρύπτεσθαι, ἡ τούτου κίνησις ψόφος. ὁ
10 δ᾽ ἐν τοῖς ὠσὶν ἐγκατῳκοδόμηται πρὸς τὸ ἀκίνητος
“- 2 '
εἶναι, ὅπως ἀκριβῶς αἰσθάνηται πάσας τὰς δια-
ἣν ~ μ᾿
φορὰς τῆς κινήσεως. διὰ ταῦτα δὲ καὶ ἐν- ὕδατι
> F “
ἀκούομεν, ὅτι οὐκ εἰσέρχεται πρὸς αὐτὸν τὸν
- 2 y
ουμφνῆ ἀέρα: ἀλλ᾽ οὐδ᾽ εἰς τὸ ods διὰ τὰς ἕλικας.
ὅταν δὲ τοῦτο συμβῇ, οὐκ ἀκούει: οὐδ᾽ ἂν ἡ
ὡς [ τ ἡ λον Ὡς
ww μῆνιγξ κάμῃ, ὥσπερ τὸ ἐπὶ τῇ κόρῃ δέρμα ὅταν
͵ a a
κάμῃ. ἀλλὰ καὶ σημεῖον τοῦ ἀκούειν ἢ μὴ τὸ

1 ὧν Β, 3. κινεῖ Β.

112

ON THE SOUL, II. vin.

directly iluminated by the sun), but it is not always
reflected in such a way as to cause a shadow, by which
the light is defined, as it is by water or bronze, or
any other smooth surface. But the empty space is
rightly described as the essential condition of hearing.
For the air is thought to be empty, and it is this
which causes hearing when it is moved and continu-
ous. But the sound is not recognized unless the
object struck is smooth, because the air is apt to be
broken up. But if the object struck is smooth then
the air is continuous because of the surface ; for the
surface of what is smooth is continuous.

That, then, which can produce movement in con-
tinuous air, which remains continuous until it reaches
the hearing, is sound-producing, and the air is con-
nected by nature with the organ of hearing. But
since this organ of hearing is in the air, when what is
outside is moved, what is inside moves too. So that
the animal does not hear with every part of it, nor
does the air penetrate everywhere ; for the part
which will be affected, that is the living animal, has
not air everywhere. The air itself is incapable of
sound, because it is easily thrust aside; but when
there is something to prevent its being thrust aside,
its movement becomes sound. But the air in the ears
is lodged deep, so as to be unmoved, in order that it
may accurately perceive all differences of motion.
That is why we can hear even in water, for the water
does not enter as far as the air which belongs to the
ear ; and it does not do so because of the spirals of
which the ear is formed. When this docs occur, there
is no hearing ; nor again if the membrane is damaged,
just as when the membrane over the eye is damaged.
A proof of our hearing or not is the continual ringing

Ι 118

The process
of hearing.

ARISTOTLE
420 ἃ
? cal > \ AY = ῳ ‘ / >t " 3 ͵
ἠχεῖν αἰεὶ τὸ οὖς ὥσπερ τὸ κέρας" ἀεὶ γὰρ οἰκείαν
τινὰ κίνησιν ὃ ἀὴρ κινεῖται ὁ ἐν τοῖς ὠσίν' ἀλλ᾽ ὁ
Υ 2 ee \ > ow \ N me
ψόφος ἀλλότριος καὶ οὐκ ἴδιος. καὶ διὰ τοῦτό
φασιν ἀκούειν τῷ κενῷ καὶ ἠχοῦντι, ὅτι ἀκούομεν
0 τῷ ἔχοντι ὡρισμένον τὸν ἀέρα. πότερον δὲ ψο-
φεῖ τὸ τυπτόμενον ἢ τὸ τύπτον; ἢ καὶ ἄμφω,
τρόπον δ᾽ ἕτερον' ἔστι γὰρ ὁ ψόφος κίνησις τοῦ
δυναμένου κινεῖσθαι τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ὅνπερ τὰ
3 / 3 ‘ ~ / 2 , >
ἀφαλλόμενα ἀπὸ τῶν λείων, ὅταν Tis Kpovon. οὐ
δὴ πᾶν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ψοφεῖ τυπτόμενον καὶ
a τύπτον, οἷον ἐὰν πατάξῃ βελόνη βελόνην: ἀλλὰ
δεῖ τὸ τυπτόμενον ὁμαλὸν εἶναι, ὥστε τὸν ἀέρα
ἀθροῦν ἀφάλλεσθαι καὶ σείεσθαι. αἱ δὲ διαφοραὶ
~ 7 2 fal > Lave ἃ /
τῶν ψοφούντων ἐν τῷ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν ψόφῳ
δηλοῦνται: ὥσπερ γὰρ ἄνευ φωτὸς οὐχ ὁρᾶται τὰ
, ῳ 3. » , \ » δλ \ ‘
χρώματα, οὕτως οὐδ᾽ ἄνευ ψόφου τὸ ὀξὺ καὶ τὸ
βαρύ. ταῦτα δὲ λέγεται κατὰ μεταφορὰν ἀπὸ
30 τῶν ἁπτῶν" τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὀξὺ κινεῖ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἐν
ont / ΕΘΝ λύ A δὲ β ὺ 7 λλῶ ey 28
γῳ χρόνῳ ἐπὶ πολύ, τὸ δὲ βαρὺ ἐν πολλῷ ἐπ
ὀλίγον. οὐ δὴ ταχὺ τὸ ὀξύ, τὸ δὲ βαρὺ βραϑύ,
ἀλλὰ γίνεται τοῦ μὲν διὰ τὸ τάχος ἡ κίνησις
/ “a A a \ μὲ > ua
a20b τοιαύτη, τοῦ δὲ διὰ βραδυτῆτα. καὶ ἔοικεν ἀνά-
» - εἴ Δ £ \ > ~ \ > -
λογον ἔχειν τῷ περὶ τὴν ἁφὴν ὀξεῖ καὶ ἀμβλεῖ'
4 \ x 3 ἥν ν cal \ ὃ 3 λὺ ἣν
τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὀξὺ οἷον κεντεῖ, τὸ ἀμβλὺ οἷον
? “ ‘ Α - A A 8. 254 A + ᾿
ὠθεῖ διὰ τὸ κινεῖν, τὸ μὲν ἐν ὀλίγῳ, τὸ δὲ ἐν
~ ω f \ 4 \ \ \ 4
πολλῷ, ὥστε συμβαίνει τὸ μὲν ταχὺ τὸ δὲ βραδὺ
δ εἶναι. περὶ μὲν οὖν ψόφου ταύτῃ διωρίσθω.
ε A εἶ ? i a ? A nw 4
H δὲ φωνὴ ψόφος τίς ἐστιν ἐμψύχου" τῶν yap
ἀψύχων οὐθὲν φωνεῖ, ἀλλὰ καθ᾽ ὁμοιότητα λέγεται
114

ON THE SOUL, EI. vit.

in the car like a horn; for the air in the ear always
moves with a special movement of its own; but
sound is from an outside source, and not a property of
the ear. This is why they say that we hear by some-
thing which is empty and resonant, because we hear
by that which has the air enclosed in it. Now which
of the two sounds—the struck or the striker? Per-
haps both but in a different sense ; for sound is the
movement of what can be moved, in the same way as
things leap off a smooth surface when one strikes it.
But, as has been said, not everything struck and
striking produces a sound, as, for instance, if one
strikes a needle with a needle; but that which is
struck must be flat, so that the air compacted may
rebound and vibrate. But the differences in things
which sound are shown in sound actually realized ;
for just as colours cannot be seen in the absence of
light, so high and low pitch cannot be detected in the
absence of sound. These terms are used by analogy
from the sense of touch. The high pitch produces
sensation by penetrating a long way in a short time,
the low pitch penetrates a little way in a long time.
It is not that the high pitch is itself quick, while the
low pitch is slow, but the movement of the former
becomes what it is because of its quickness, and the
latter because of its slowness. It seems to be
analogous to the sharp and blunt in the matter of
touch ; for the sharp stabs, so to speak, but the blunt
pushes its way in by its movement ; the former in a
short time, the latter in a long time, so that the one
is swift and the other slow. This is a sufficient
account of sound.
But voice is the sound produced by a creature pos- Voice.

sessing a soul; for none of the soulless creatures has

115

ARISTOTLE

420 b »
φωνεῖν, οἷον αὐλὸς καὶ λύρα καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τῶν

ἀψύχων ἀπότασιν ἔχει καὶ μέλος καὶ διάλεκτον"
ἔοικε γὰρ ὅτι καὶ ἡ φωνὴ ταῦτ᾽ ἔχει, πολλὰ δὲ
10 τῶν ζῴων οὐκ ἔχουσι φωνήν, οἷον τά τε ἄναιμα
καὶ τῶν ἐναίμων ἰχθύες. καὶ τοῦτ᾽ εὐλόγως, εἴπερ
ἀέρος κίνησίς τίς ἐστιν ὁ ψόφος. ἀλλ᾽ οἱ λεγό-
μένοι φωνεῖν, οἷον ἐν τῷ ᾿Αχελῴῳ, ψοφοῦσι τοῖς
βραγχίοις ἢ τινι ἑτέρῳ τοιούτῳ. φωνὴ δ᾽ ἐστὶ
ζῴου ψόφος, καὶ οὐ τῷ τυχόντι μορίῳ. Bx ἐπεὶ
16 πᾶν ψοφεῖ τύπτοντός τινος καί τι καὶ ἔν τινι,
τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἀήρ, εὐλόγως ἂν “φωνοίη ταῦτα
μόνα ὅσα δέχεται τὸν ἀέρα. ἤδη γὰρ τῷ ἀναπνεο-
μένῳ καταχρῆται ἡ φύσις ἐπὶ δύο ἔργα, καθάπερ
τῇ γλώττῃ ἐπί τε τὴν γεῦσιν καὶ τὴν διάλεκτον,
ὧν ἡ μὲν γεῦσις ἀναγκαῖον (διὸ καὶ πλείοσιν
2 ὑπάρχει), ἡ δ᾽ ἑρμηνεία ἕνεκα τοῦ εὖ, οὕτω καὶ
τῷ πνεύματι πρός τε τὴν θερμότητα τὴν ἐντὸς
ὡς ἀναγκαῖον (τὸ δ᾽ αἴτιον ἐν ἑτέροις εἰρήσεται)
καὶ πρὸς τὴν φωνήν, 6 ὅπως ὑπάρχῃ τὸ εὖ. ὄργα-
νον δὲ τῇ ἀναπνοῇ 6 φάρυγξ' οὗ δ᾽ ἕνεκα καὶ τὸ
μόριόν ἐστι τοῦτο, πλεύμων" τούτῳ γὰρ τῷ μορίῳ
ab πλεῖστον ἔχει τὸ θερμὸν τὰ πεζὰ τῶν ἄλλων.
δεῖται δὲ τῆς ἀναπνοῆς καὶ ὁ περὶ τὴν καρδίαν
τόπος πρῶτος. διὸ ἀναγκαῖον εἴσω ἀναπνεομένου
εἰσιέναι τὸν ἀέρα. ὥστε ἡ πληγὴ τοῦ ἀναπνεομένου
ἀέρος ὑπὸ τῆς ἐν τούτοις τοῖς μορίοις ψυχῆς πρὸς

® Hist. Anim. iv. 9, 535 Ὁ 14 “ the boar in the Achelous.”
A cat-fish has been found in the Achelous of which this is
true.

> Cf. De Resp, ch, viii.
116

ON THE SOUL, 11, vu.

a voice ; they can only be said to give tongue meta-
phorically, as for instance a flute or a lyre, and all the
other soulless things, which have a musical compass,
and tune, and articulation ; it seems that the voice
has these things, but many animals have no voice,
such as all the bloodless animals, and the fishes
among the animals with blood. And this is quite
reasonable, since sound is due to a movement of the
air. But those creatures which are said to have a
voice, such as those in the Achelous,* only make a
sound with their gills, or with some other part of
them. Voice, then, is a sound made by a living
animal, and even then not with any part of it taken
atrandom. But,since sound only occurs when some-
thing strikes something else in a certain medium,
and this medium is the air, it is natural that only
those things should have voice which admit the air.
Nature makes use of the constant supply of air
breathed in for two functions, just as she uses the
tongue both for taste and for articulate speech, of
which taste is an essential to life (and consequently
belongs to more species), and the power of interpre-
tation is for the sake of living well ; so in the same
way she employs breath both to conserve internal
heat, which is an essential (the reason for this will
be explained in another treatise),” and also for the
voice, that well-being may be possible. The throat is
the instrument of respiration ; the reason for which
this part exists is the lung ; it is because of this part
that the land animals have more heat than the rest ;
and the region about the heart is the first to need this
breathing. So it is necessary that during respiration
the air should be breathed in. So the blow given to
the air breathed in by the soul in these parts against

117

420 b

421 a

ARISTOTLE

τὴν καλουμένην ἀρτηρίαν φωνή ἐστιν. οὐ yap πᾶς
ζῴου ψόφος φωνή, καθάπερ εἴπομεν (ἔστι γὰρ
καὶ τῇ γλώττῃ ψοφεῖν καὶ ὡς οἱ βήττοντες), ἀλλὰ
δεῖ ἔμψυχόν τε εἶναι τὸ τύπτον καὶ μετὰ φαντασίας
τινός" σημαντικὸς γὰρ δή τις ψόφος ἐστὶν ἡ
φωνή, καὶ οὐ τοῦ ἀναπνεομένου ἀέρος, ὥσπερ ἡ
βήξ' ἀλλὰ τούτῳ τύπτει τὸν ἐν τῇ ἀρτηρίᾳ πρὸς
αὐτήν. σημεῖον δὲ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι φωνεῖν ἀνα-
πνέοντα μηδ᾽ ἐκπνέοντα, ἀλλὰ κατέχοντα" κινεῖ
γὰρ τοῦτο ὃ κατέχων. φανερὸν δὲ καὶ διότι οἱ
ἰχθύες ἄφωνοι: οὐ γὰρ ἔχουσι φάρυγγα. τοῦτο
δὲ τὸ μόριον οὐκ ἔχουσιν, ὅτι οὐ δέχονται τὸν
ἀέρα οὐδ᾽ ἀναπνέουσιν. δι’ ἣν μὲν οὖν αἰτίαν,
ἕτερός ἐστι λόγος.

ΙΧ. Περὶ δὲ ὀσμῆς καὶ ὀσφραντοῦ ἧττον εὐ-
διόριστόν ἐστι τῶν εἰρημένων: οὐ γὰρ δῆλον ποῖόν
τί ἐστιν ἡ ὀσμή, οὕτως ὡς ὁ ψόφος ἢ τὸ χρῶμα.
αἴτιον δ᾽ ὅτι τὴν αἴσθησιν ταύτην οὐκ ἔχομεν
ἀκριβῆ, ἀλλὰ χείρω πολλῶν ζῴων' φαύλως yap
ἄνθρωπος ὀσμᾶται, καὶ οὐθενὸς αἰσθάνεται τῶν
ὀσφραντῶν ἄνευ τοῦ λυπηροῦ ἢ τοῦ ἡδέος, ὡς
οὐκ ὄντος ἀκριβοῦς τοῦ αἰσθητηρίου. εὔλογον δ᾽
οὕτω καὶ τὰ σκληρόφθαλμα τῶν χρωμάτων αἰσθά-
νεσθαι, καὶ μὴ διαδήλους αὐτοῖς εἶναι τὰς δια-
φορὰς τῶν χρωμάτων πλὴν τῷ φοβερῷ καὶ apap.
οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὰς ὀσμὰς τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος"
ἔοικε μὲν γὰρ ἀνάλογον ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν γεῦσιν καὶ
ὁμοίως τὰ εἴδη τῶν χυμῶν τοῖς τῆς ὀσμῆς, ἀλλ᾽
ἀκριβεστέραν ἔχομεν τὴν γεῦσιν διὰ τὸ εἶναι αὐτὴν

9 Of. Part. Anim. 669 a2.
118

ΟΝ THE SOUL, ID. vir.—rx.

what is called the windpipe causes the voice. For
not every sound made by a living creature is a voice,
as we have said (for even those who cough are making
a sound with their tongue), but that which strikes
must possess a soul, and have some mental picture ;
for the voice is a sound which means something, and
is not merely indicative of air inhaled, as a cough is ;
in this case one strikes the air in the windpipe against
the windpipe itself. Proof of this lies in the fact that
it is impossible to speak either when inhaling or
exhaling, but only when holding the breath: for he
that is holding his breath causes the movement by
his breath. It is clear, then, why fishes are dumb ; it
is because they have no throat. They have not this
organ because they neither admit air nor exhale it.
The reason for this is a different question.¢
IX. Concerning sense of smell and objects smelt, Smelt.

it is less easy to give a precise account than in the
subjects we have already discussed. or the char-
acter of smell is not so obvious as that of sound and
colour. The reason is thal this sense with us is not
highly discriminating, far less so indeed than with
many animals ; for man’s sense of smell is inferior,
and it is also incapable of apprehending the object
smelt without a consciousness that it is either pleasant
or unpleasant, and this is because the sense organ is
not discriminating. It is natural that the hard-eyed
animals should perceive colours in a similar way, and
that they should not be capable of distinguishing
colours except as to be feared or the reverse. The
human race is in the same position towards smells ;
there would seem to be some analogy between taste
and the different kinds of flavours on the one hand,
and the objects of smell on the other, but taste is

119

421 ἃ
a

421 b

Dt
10 ἢ

ARISTOTLE

ἁφήν twa, ταύτην δ᾽ ἔχειν τὴν αἴσθησιν τὸν
ἄνθρωπον ἀκριβεστάτην: ἐν μὲν γὰρ ταῖς ἄλλαις
λείπεται πολλῷ τῶν ζῴων, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἁφὴν
πολλῶν τῶν ἄλλων διαφερόντως ἀκριβοῖ. διὸ καὶ
φρονιμώτατόν ἐστι τῶν ζῴων. σημεῖον δὲ τὸ καὶ
ἐν τῷ γένει τῶν ἀνθρώπων παρὰ τὸ αἰσθητήριον
τοῦτο εἶναι εὐφυεῖς καὶ ἀφυεῖς, παρ᾽ ἄλλο δὲ
μηδέν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ σκληρόσαρκοι ἀφυεῖς τὴν
διάνοιαν, οἱ δὲ μαλακόσαρκοι εὐφυεῖς. ἔστι δ᾽,
ὥσπερ χυμὸς ὁ μὲν γλυκὺς ὁ δὲ πικρός, οὕτω
καὶ ὀσμαί. ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ἔχουσι τὴν ἀνάλογον
ὀσμὴν καὶ χυμόν (λέγω δὲ οἷον γλυκεῖαν ὀσμὴν
καὶ γλυκὺν χυμόν), τὰ δὲ τοὐναντίον. ὁμοίως δὲ
καὶ δριμεῖα καὶ αὐστηρὰ καὶ ὀξεῖα καὶ λιπαρά
ἐστιν ὀσμή.

᾿Αλλ᾽ ὥσπερ εἴπομεν, διὰ τὸ μὴ σφόδρα δια-
δήλους εἶναι τὰς ὀσμὰς ὥστίερ τοὺς χυμούς, ἀπὸ
τούτων͵ εἴληφε τὰ ὀνόματα καθ᾽ ὁμοιότητα τῶν
πραγμάτων" ἡ μὲν yep γλυκεῖα ἀπὸ τοῦ κρόκου
καὶ τοῦ μέλιτος, ἡ δὲ δριμεῖα θύμου καὶ τῶν
τοιούτων" τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.
ἔστι δ᾽ ὥσπερ ἡ ἀκοὴ καὶ ἑκάστη τῶν αἰσθήσεων,
ἡ μὲν τοῦ ἀκουστοῦ καὶ ἀνηκούστου, ἡ δὲ τοῦ
ὁρατοῦ καὶ ἀοράτου, καὶ ἡ ὄσφρησις τοῦ ὀσφραντοῦ
καὶ ἀνοσφράντου. ᾿ἀνόσῴραντον δὲ τὸ μὲν παρὰ
τὸ ὅλως ἀδύνατον ἐ , ἔχειν ὀσμήν, τὸ δὲ μικρὰν ἔχον
καὶ φαύλην. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ ἄγευστον λέγεται.
ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ ὄσφρησις διὰ τοῦ μεταξύ, οἷον ἀέρος
ὕδατος" καὶ γὰρ τὰ ἔνυδρα δοκοῦσιν ὀσμῆς
αἰσθάνεσθαι. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ ἔναιμα καὶ τὰ
ἄναιμα, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι: καὶ γὰρ τούτων

120

ON THE SOUL, II. rx.

with us more discriminating because it is itself a form
of touch, and this sense in man is highly discriminat-
ing; in the other senses he is far behind the animal,
but in the matter of touch he is much more dis-
criminating than most of the rest of creation. This
is why he is of all living creatures the most capable of
thought. Proof of this lies in the fact Lhat among the
human race men are well or poorly endowed with in-
telligence in proportion to their sense of touch, and
no other sense ; for men of hard skin and flesh are:
poorly, and men of soft flesh well endowed with in-
telligence. And just as flavours ave sweet and bitter,
so are smells. . But though there are some analogies
between scents and flavours (I mean, for instance,
we can speak of a sweet smell and a sweet taste), yet
in some attributes they differ. Scent like flavour may
be pungent, rough, acid or oily.

But, as we have said, smells being, unlike flavours,
not easily differentiated, they have taken their names
from their similarities ; for instance from saffron and
honey comes a sweet smell, while from thyme and
such things comes a pungent smell. And the same
thing is true of all such things. As with the other
senses so with hearing: hearing is concerned both
with what is heard and what is not heard ; so vision
refers to what is seen and what is not seen, and smell
to what is smelt and whatis not smelt. That which is
not smelt means both that which, generally speaking,
cannot have smell, and that which has a very small
and slight smell. That which has no taste is used in
the same sense. But the sense of smell also operates
through a medium, such as air or water ; for the water
animals also seem to have a sense of smell; so do
both the animals with and those without blood, just

121

ARISTOTLE
421 b ” 4 > ~ A δ Ἂ 4
ἔνια πόρρωθεν ἀπαντᾷ πρὸς τὴν τροφὴν ὕποσμα
γινόμενα.

Διὸ καὶ «ἄπορον φαίνεται, εἰ πάντα μὲν ὁμοίως
ὀσμᾶται, ὁ δ᾽ ἄνθρωπος ἀναπνέων μέν, μὴ ἀνα-

15 πνέων δὲ ἀλλ᾽ ἐκπνέων 7) κατέχων τὸ πνεῦμα οὐκ
ὀσμᾶται, οὔτε πόρρωθεν οὔτ᾽ ἐγγύθεν, οὐδ᾽ ἂν
ἐπὶ τοῦ μυκτῆρος ἐντὸς τεθῇ. καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐπ᾽
αὐτῷ τιθέμενον τῷ αἰσθητηρίῳ ἀναίσθητον εἶναι
«κοινὸν πάντων" ἀλλὰ τὸ ἄνευ τοῦ ἀναπνεῖν
αἰσθάνεσθαι ἴδιον ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων' δῆλον δὲ

20 πειρωμένοις. ὥστε τὰ ἄναιμα, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἀνα-
πνέουσιν, ἑτέραν ἄν τιν᾽ αἴσθησιν ἔχοι παρὰ τὰς
λεγομένας. ἀλλ᾽ ἀδύνατον, εἴπερ τῆς ὀσμῆς αἰ-
σθάνεται' ἡ “γὰρ τοῦ ὀσφραντοῦ eee καὶ
δυσώδους καὶ εὐώδους ὄσφρησίς ἐστιν. ι δὲ
καὶ φθειρόμενα φαίνεται ὑπὸ τῶν ἰσχυρῶν εὐ

25 ὑφ' ὧνπερ ἄνθρωπος, οἷον ἀσφάλτου καὶ θείου
καὶ τῶν τοιούτων. ὀσφραίνεσθαι μὲν οὖν ἀναγ-
καῖον, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἀναπνέοντα.

[Ἔοικε δὲ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις διαφέρειν τὸ αἰσθη-
τήριον τοῦτο πρὸς τὸ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων, ὥσπε
τὰ ὄμματα πρὸς τὰ τῶν σκληροφθάλμων- τὰ μὲν
γὰρ ἔχει φράγμα καὶ ὥσπερ ἔλυτρον τὰ βλέφαρα,

80 ἃ μὴ κινήσας μηδ᾽ ἀνασπάσας οὐχ ὅρᾷ' τὰ δὲ
σκληρόφθαλμα οὐδὲν ἔχει τοιοῦτον, ἀλλ᾽ εὐθέως
ὁρᾷ τὰ γινόμενα ἐν τῷ διαφανεῖ. οὕτως οὖν καὶ

458 8 Τὸ ὀσφραντικὸν. αἰσθητήριον τοῖς μὲν ἀκάλυφες
εἶναι, ὥσπερ τὸ ὄμμα, τοῖς δὲ τὸν ἀέρα δεχο-
μένοις ἔχειν ἐπικάλυμμα, ὃ ἀναπνεόντων πο-
καλύπτεσθαι, διευρυνομένων τῶν φλεβίων καὶ τῶν
πόρων. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὰ ἀναπνέοντα οὐκ ὀσμᾶται

122

ON THE SOUL, ID rm,

as those in air; for some of these approach from a
great distance towards their food guided by the
scent.

There is a problem here whether all animals smell
in the same way, while man only smells during in-
halation; when not inhaling, but either exhaling or
holding the breath, man does not smell either at a
distance or at close range, nor even if the object of
smell is placed within, or up against the nostril.
That what is placed on the sense organ should be im-
perceptible is common to all senses ; but uot to smell
without inhaling seems to be peculiar to man; any-
one who tries-it will find this quite clear. So that
apparently bloodless animals, since they do not in-
hale, would seem to have another sense beyond the
usually accepted oncs. But this is impossible if they
apprehend smell ; for perception of the object smelt,
both sweet-smelling and evil-smelling, is a sense of
smell. Again, they seem to be destroyed by the
same strong smells as a man, such as bitumen,
sulphur and the like. So they must smell, but with-
out inhaling.

Probably lhe sense organ among men is different
from that of other living creatures, in the same way
as their eyes are different from the animals which
have hard eyes ; for men’s eyes have lids as a cover-
ing, and a sheath as it were, without moving and
withdrawing which, they cannot sce ; but hard-eyed
animals have nothing of the kind, but see directly
what appears in the transparency. So, then, the
sense organ of smell among animals is uncovered like
the eye, but men who admit the air have a veil which
is lifted when they inhale, the veins and passages
dilating. For this reason inhaling animals do not

123

How tho
sense of
sinell oper:
ates,

Man diffors
from the
animal.

pease αι a χα

422 ἃ
5 ἐν τῷ ὑγρῷ" ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ ὀσφρανθῆναι ἀναπνεύ-

σαντα, τοῦτο δὲ ποιεῖν ἐν τῷ ὑγρῷ ἀδύνατον. ἔστι
δ᾽ ἡ ὀσμὴ τοῦ ξηροῦ, ὥσπερ ὁ χυμὸς τοῦ ὑγροῦ"
τὸ δὲ ὀσφραντικὸν αἰσθητήριον δυνάμει τοιοῦτον.
X. Τὸ δὲ γευστόν ἐστιν ἁπτόν τι" καὶ τοῦτ᾽
αἴτιον τοῦ μὴ εἶναι αἰσθητὸν διὰ τοῦ μεταξὺ
Ἂς ,ὕ uy 7 Ἂν x \ ¢ ε va \
10 ἀλλοτρίου ὄντος σώματος" οὐδὲ yap ἡ ἁφή. Kal
τὸ σῶμα δὲ ἐν ᾧ ὁ χυμός, τὸ γευστόν, ἐν ὑγρῷ
ς a ro ¥ ¢ ta , nn ] 2 ow
ὡς ὕλῃ" τοῦτο δ᾽ ἁπτόν τι. διὸ κἂν εἰ ἐν ὕδατι
3 i > an > - ~ ta
εἶμεν, αἰσθανοίμεθ᾽ ἂν ἐμβληθέντος τοῦ γλυκέος,
2 2 ww € " ¢€ “" \ ~ ͵
οὐκ ἣν δ᾽ ἂν ἡ αἴσθησις ἡμῖν διὰ τοῦ μεταξύ,
> \ ~ ~ ~ “- \ fot
ἀλλὰ τῷ μιχθῆναι τῷ ὑγρῷ, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τοῦ
\ A ~ ε a
15 ποτοῦ. τὸ δὲ χρῶμα οὐχ οὕτως ὁρᾶται τῷ
μίγνυσθαι, οὐδὲ ταῖς ἀπορροίαις. ὡς μὲν οὖν τὸ
> -
μεταξὺ οὐθέν ἐστιν: ὡς δὲ χρῶμα τὸ ὁρατόν, οὕτω
τὸ γευστὸν ὁ χυμός. οὐθὲν δὲ ποιεῖ χυμοῦ αἴσθη-
5 a
aw ἄνευ ὑγρότητος, ἀλλ᾽ ἔχει ἐνεργείᾳ ἢ δυνάμει
ὑγρότητα, οἷον τὸ ἁλμυρόν' εὔτηκτόν τε γὰρ αὐτὸ
καὶ συντηκτικὸν γλώττης.
[ἡ A " +. .᾿ > 4 ~ © lol \
20 Ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ ἡ ὄψις ἐστὶ τοῦ τε ὁρατοῦ Kal
“- / Ay \ 2 é
τοῦ ἀοράτου (τὸ γὰρ σκότος ἀόρατον, κρίνει δὲ
καὶ τοῦτο ἡ ὄψις), ἔτι τοῦ λίαν λαμπροῦ (καὶ γὰρ
τοῦτο ἀόρατον, ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον τοῦ σκότους),
ξ , \ \ o£ 9 \ , \ "ἧς .-
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀκοὴ ψόφου τε καὶ σιγῆς, ὧν
τὸ μὲν ἀκουστὸν τὸ δ᾽ οὐκ ἀκουστόν, καὶ μεγάλου
2 ψόφου, καθάπερ ἡ ὄψις τοῦ λαμπροῦ: ὥσπερ γὰρ
4
ὁ μικρὸς ψόφος ἀνήκουστος τρόπον τινά, Kal 6
, 5 ¢ , 392 4 ‘ oe
μέγας τε καὶ ὁ βίαιος" ἀόρατον δὲ τὸ μὲν ὅλως
, a Α 3.5 Mv A 3 a iY ΕἸ
λέγεται, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπ᾽ ἄλλων τὸ ἀδύνατον, τὸ δ᾽,
124

ΟΝ THE SOUL, ITD. τχ.-- αὶ

smell in water; for they can only smell when in-
haling, and it is impossible to do this in water. Smell
is of the dry, as flavour is of the wet. Such is the
nature of the organ of sinell potentially.

X. An object of taste ig an object of touch 3 and Taste like
this is the reason why it is not perceived through the canes ἂμ
medium of any foreign body ; for the same thing is medum,
true of touch, The body in which flavour resides,
that is the object of taste, is in liquid as its matter ;
and this is tangible. And so, even if we were in
water, we should perccive sweetness injected into it,
but our perception would not come through any
medium, but by being mixed with the water, just as
in a drink. But colour is not seen by being mixed,
nor by an emanation, There is nothing, then, in the
place of a medium; but as that which is seen is a
colour, so that which is tasted is a flavour. But vut liquid
nothing can produce a perception of flavour without sas εν
liquid ; it must possess wetness actually or potentially,
like salt ; for that is soluble and easily liquefied by the
tongue.

Now the power of sight is concerned both with
what can be scen and what cannot (for darkness
cannot be seen, and the power of sight recognizes
this), and also with that which is too bright (for this
also cannot be seen, though in a different sense from
darkness), and in the same way the power of hearing
is concerned both with sound and silence, the former
being that which is heard, and the latter that which
is not. heard including a very loud noise, exactly as
the vision is concerned with the too bright ; for as a
slight sound is in a sense inaudible, so also is a loud
and violent one ; the word invisible is then used quite
generally, like the word impossible to see in another

125

422 a

422 ἢ

ARISTOTLE

ἐὰν πεφυκὸς μὴ ἔχῃ ἢ φαύλως, ὥσπερ τὸ ἄπουν
καὶ τὸ ἀπύρηνον: οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἡ γεῦσις τοῦ
γευστοῦ τε καὶ ἀγεύστου: τοῦτο δὲ τὸ μικρὸν 7
φαῦλον ἔχον χυμὸν ἢ φθαρτικὸν τῆς γεύσεως.
δοκεῖ δ᾽ εἶναι ἀρχὴ τὸ ποτὸν καὶ ἄποτον' γεῦσις
γάρ τις ἀμφότερα' ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν φαύλη καὶ φθαρ-
τικὴ τῆς γεύσεως, τὸ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν. ἔστι δὲ
κοινὸν ἁφῆς καὶ γεύσεως τὸ ποτόν.

᾿Ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ᾿ὑγρὸν τὸ γευστόν, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ
αἰσθητήριον αὐτοῦ μήτε ὑγρὸν εἶναι ἐντελεχείᾳ
μήτε ἀδύνατον ὑγραίνεσθαι' πάσχει γάρ τι ἡ γεῦ-
σις ὑπὸ τοῦ γευστοῦ, ἣ γευστόν. ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα
ὑγρανθῆναι τὸ δυνάμενον μὲν ὑγραίνεσθαι σωζό-
μενον, μὴ ὑγρὸν δέ, τὸ γευστικὸν αἰσθητήριον.
σημεῖον δὲ τὸ μήτε κατάξηρον οὖσαν τὴν γλῶτταν
αἰσθάνεσθαι μήτε λίαν ὑγράν: αὕτη γὰρ ἁφὴ γί-
νεταν τοῦ πρώτου ὑγροῦ, ὥσπερ ὅταν προγευμα-
τίσας τις ἰσχυροῦ χυμοῦ γεύηται ἑτέρου" καὶ
οἷον τοῖς κάμνουσι πικρὰ πάντα φαίνεται διὰ τὸ
τῇ γλώττῃ πλήρει τοιαύτης ὑγρότητος αἰσθάνε-
σθαι. τὰ δ᾽ εἴδη τῶν χυμῶν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν
χρωμάτων, ἁπλᾶ μὲν τἀναντία, τὸ γλυκὺ καὶ τὸ
πικρόν, ἐχόμενα δὲ τοῦ μὲν τὸ λιπαρόν, τοῦ δὲ τὸ
ἁλμυρόν: μεταξὺ δὲ τούτων τό τε δριμὺ καὶ τὸ
αὐστηρὸν καὶ στρυφνὸν καὶ ὀξύ: σχεδὸν γὰρ αὗται
δοκοῦσιν εἶναι διαφοραὶ χυμῶν. ὥστε τὸ γευ-
στικόν ἐστι τὸ δυνάμει τοιοῦτον, γευστὸν δὲ τὸ
ποιητικὸν ἐντελεχείᾳ αὐτοῦ.

ΧΙ. Περὶ δὲ τοῦ ἁπτοῦ καὶ ἁφῆς 6 αὐτὸς λόγος.
126

ON THE SOUL, II. x—xt.

connexion, and also in the sense of not having the
quality or having it to a very small extent, though by
nature qualified to possess it, like the words footless
or stoneless. In just the same way the sense of taste
is concerned both with that which is tasted and that
which is not; the latter being that which has little
or slight taste, or which is destructive of taste. Our
starting-point then seems to be drinkable and un-
drinkable ; for each implies a tasting ; but the latter
is slight or destructive of taste, while the former is
natural. But the drinkable is common both to touch
and taste.

Since what is tasted is wet, the sense organ which
perceives it must be not actually liquid but capable
of liquefaction ; for the sense of taste is affected by
what is tasted, in so far as it is tasted. The sense
organ of taste, then, is that which is capable of becom-
ing liquefied, while preserving its identity, but is not
itself liquid. This is proved by the fact that the
tongue cannot taste when it is dry, nor when too
wet; for this contact takes place with the first
moisture, just as when a man having previously tasted
a strong flavour meets another flavour ; and so when
a man is ill everything tastes bitter, because he is
perceiving it with a tongue infected with a bitter
taste. But the types of favours, just as in the case of
colours, in their simplest form are opposite, sweet
and bitter, but connected with these are oily and
saline; in between these come acid, pungent,
astringent and sharp. These seem to be nearly all
the differences in flavours, The faculty of taste is
potentially like this, while that which makes it
actually so is the object lasted.

XI. The same account applies to the tangible and Touch.

127

ARISTOTLE
428 b > A ὃ ¢ \ x / 3 A " = f

εἰ yap ἡ ἀφὴ μὴ μία ἐστὶν αἴσθησις ἀλλὰ πλείους,
ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὰ ἁπτὰ αἰσθητὰ πλείω εἶναι.
20 ἔχει δ᾽ ἀπορίαν πότερον πλείους εἰσὶν 7) μία, καὶ
τί τὸ αἰσθητήριον τὸ τοῦ ἁπτοῦ ἁπτικόν, πότερον
ἡ σὰρξ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ ἀνάλογον, ἢ οὔ, ἀλλὰ
τοῦτο μέν ἐστι τὸ μεταξύ, τὸ δὲ πρῶτον αἰσθη-
τήριον ἄλλο τί ἐστιν ἐντός. πᾶσά τε γὰρ αἴσθησις
μιᾶς ἐναντιώσεως εἶναι δοκεῖ, οἷον ὄψις λευκοῦ
86 καὶ μέλανος καὶ ἀκοὴ ὀξέος καὶ βαρέος καὶ γεῦσις
πικροῦ καὶ γλυκέος" ἐν δὲ τῷ ἁπτῷ πολλαὶ ἔνεισιν
ἐναντιώσεις, θερμὸν ψυχρόν, ξηρὸν ὑγρόν, σκληρὸν
μαλακόν, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα τοιαῦτα. ἔχει δέ
τινα λύσιν πρός γε ταύτην τὴν ἀπορίαν, ὅτι καὶ
ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεών εἰσιν ἐναντιώσεις
go πλείους, οἷον ἐν φωνῇ οὐ μόνον ὀξύτης καὶ
βαρύτης, ἀλλὰ καὶ μέγεθος καὶ μικρότης καὶ
λειότης καὶ τραχύτης φωνῆς Kat τοιαῦθ᾽ ἕτερα.
εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ περὶ χρῶμα διαφοραὶ τοιαῦται ἕτεραι.
ἀλλὰ τί τὸ ἕν τὸ ὑποκείμενον, ὥσπερ ἀκοῇ ψόφος,

οὕτω τῇ ἁφῇ, οὐκ ἔστιν ἔνδηλον.
Πότερον δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ αἰσθητήριον ἐντός, ἢ οὔ,
4888 ἀλλ᾽ εὐθέως ἡ σάρξ; οὐδὲν δοκεῖ σημεῖον εἶναι
τὸ γίνεσθαι τὴν αἴσθησιν ἅμα θιγγανομένων. καὶ
γὰρ νῦν εἴ τις περὶ τὴν σάρκα περιτείνειεν οἷον
ὑμένα ποιήσας, ὁμοίως τὴν αἴσθησιν εὐθέως ἁψά-
μενος ἐνσημαίνει: καίτοι δῆλον. ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν
ὃ τούτῳ τὸ αἰσθητήριον' εἰ δὲ καὶ συμφυὲς γένοιτο,
θᾶττον ἔτι διϊκνοῖτ᾽ ἂν ἡ αἴσθησις. διὸ τὸ τοιοῦτο
μόριον τοῦ σώματος ἔοικεν οὕτως ἔχειν ὥσπερ ἂν
εἰ κύκλῳ ἡμῖν περιεπεφύκει 6 ἀήρ' ἐδοκοῦμεν

198

ON THE SOUL, IE. x:.

the sense of touch. For if touch is not one sense,
but more than one, objects of touch must also be
plural. It is difficult to determine whether touch
ig one sense or more than one, and what the sense
organ is which is affected by the object of touch,
whether it is flesh, and whatever is analogous to this
in creatures without flesh, or whether this is only the
medium, and the primary sense organ is something
distinct and internal. For every sensation appears
to be concerned with one pair of opposites, just as
vision is sight of white and black, hearing of high and.
low pitch, and taste of bitter and sweet ; but in the
object touched there are many pairs of opposites,
hot and cold, dry and wet, hard and soft, and many
other similar pairs. Some solution may be found to
this difficulty in the fact that the other senses too
are conscious of more than one pair of opposites:
so in voice there is not merely high and low pitch,
but also loud and soft, smooth and rough, and
so on. There are similarly other differences in
colour. But what is the single basis in the case of
touch corresponding to sound in hearing is not
obvious.

Whether the sense organ is within, or whether the what is the
flesh feels directly, is not proved by the fact that ¢rigun
things feel as soon as they are touched. For if one
were to surround the whole flesh with a membrane,
for instance, the moment it touched an object sensa-
tion would be registered. And yet it is quite clear
that the sense organ would not reside in the mem-
brane ; though if it grew to be one with the flesh, the
sensation would be transmitted even more quickly.
So this part of the body appears to be in the same
position as if the air were naturally attached to us in

K 129

423 a

428 b

ARISTOTLE

γὰρ ἂν ἑνί τινι αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ ψόφου καὶ χρώ-
= 7
ματος καὶ ὀσμῆς, Kal μία τις αἴσθησις εἶναι ὄψις
2 \ u “- δὲ ὃ A 4 ὃ t 8 ὃ 3 a
ἀκοὴ ὄσφρησις. νῦν δὲ διὰ τὸ διωρίσθαι δι᾿ οὗ
>
γίνονται at κινήσεις, φανερὰ τὰ εἰρημένα αἰσθη-
τήρια ἕτερα ὄντα. ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ἁφῆς τοῦτο νῦν
" y 7 \ 4 Noo 207
ἄδηλον: ἐξ ἀέρος μὲν γὰρ ἢ ὕδατος ἀδύνατον συ-
στῆναι τὸ ἔμψυχον σῶμα: δεῖ γάρ τι στερεὸν
εἶναι. λείπεται δὴ μικτὸν ἐκ γῆς καὶ τούτων
e , - A \ ‘ > / Ὁ“
εἶναι, οἷον βούλεται ἡ σὰρξ καὶ τὸ ἀνάλογον' ὥστε
ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὸ σῶμα εἶναι μεταξὺ τοῦ ἁπτικοῦ
προσπεφυκὸς, δι᾿ οὗ γίνονται αἱ αἰσθήσεις πλείους
᾿ a 2 Ψ a ¢ 34 a A
οὖσαι. δηλοῖ δ᾽ ὅτι πλείους ἡ ἐπὶ τῆς γλώττης
ἁφή: ἁπάντων γὰρ τῶν ἁπτῶν αἰσθάνεται κατὰ
fol \ ¢
τὸ αὐτὸ μόριον Kal χυμοῦ. εἰ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἡ
Mv \ > r¢ ~ lot ? , aw ξ 2
ἄλλη σὰρξ ἠσθάνετο τοῦ χυμοῦ, ἐδόκει ἂν ἡ αὐτὴ
καὶ μία εἷναι αἴσθησις ἡ γεῦσις καὶ ἡ ἁφή" νῦν
δὲ δύο διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀντιστρέφειν.
7A La 3 » > ~ ~ (2 wv
πορήσειε δ᾽ ἂν τις, εἰ πᾶν σῶμα βάθος ἔχει"
on 3 2 \ i i, Pa Ων > >? \ f.
τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ τρίτον μέγεθος" ὧν δ᾽ ἐστὶ δύο
σωμάτων μεταξὺ σῶμά τι, οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ταῦτα
3 , ῳ \ > ‘ Ry " ba
ἀλλήλων ἅπτεσθαι. τὸ δ᾽ ὑγρὸν οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνευ
, γ4λ AY , > ΕΣ 9 a a
σώματος, οὐδὲ τὸ διερόν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀναγκαῖον ὕδωρ
AA μὴ Ὁ, A Ν < 7 ? la >
εἶναι ἢ ἔχειν ὕδωρ. τὰ δὲ ἁπτόμενα ἀλλήλων ἐν
ral 4 nm ~ “a
τῷ ὕδατι, μὴ ξηρῶν τῶν ἄκρων ὄντων, ἀναγκαῖον
U4 3, 4 Φ 3 rd , 3
ὕδωρ ἔχειν μεταξύ, οὗ ἀνάπλεα τὰ ἔσχατα. εἰ
δὲ τοῦτ᾽ ἀληθές, ἀδύνατον ἅψασθαι ἄλλο ἄλλου
ἐν ὕδατι. τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι"
i 4 A ~
ὁμοίως yap ἔχει 6 ἀὴρ πρὸς τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ
ὕδωρ πρὸς τὰ ἐν τῷ ὕδατι. λανθάνει δὲ μᾶλλον
fol Ὁ an
ἡμᾶς, ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ ὕδατι ζῷα, εἰ διερὸν

180

ON THE SOUL, 11. x1.

a circle ; for in that case we should suppose that our
perception of sound, colour, and smell were all due
to the one thing, and that vision, hearing, and smell
were all one and the same sensation. Bul, as it is,
having laid down the medium through which the
movements occur, it is obvious that the sense organs
mentioned are different. But in the case of touch
this is not obvious; for the body possessing soul
cannot be made of water or air ; it must be something
solid. The only alternative is that it is a mixture of
earth and such substances as flesh and the like clain
to be ; so that the body must be the natural medium
of the tangible, through which the various sensations
arise. And it shows that the sense of touch on the
tongue is really plural; for the tongue perceives
all tangible objects with the same part as it perceives
flavour. If then the rest of the flesh could perceive
flavour, tasting and touch would seem to be one and
the same sensation. But, as it is, they are proved
two, because they are not convertible.

But here a difficulty arises ; every body has depth ;
this is the third dimension; in a case, then, in which
a body exists between two others, the two cannot
touch each other. But the liquid and wet cannot
exist without a body, and the body must either be, or
contain, water. Those things, then, which touch each
other in water, as their extremities are not dry, must
have water between them, of which their extremities
are full. If this is true, then it is impossible for one
thing to touch another in water. The same thing
will be true of air, for air has the same relation to
things in it, as water has to things in water. But we
do not notice the problem in the case of water, just
as animals living in water do not notice if wet touches

131

The medium
in the case
of touch.

428 b

ARISTOTLE

- /
διεροῦ ἅπτεται. πότερον οὖν πάντων ὁμοίως ἐστὶν
τ " a » » a -- -
ἡ αἴσθησις, ἢ ἄλλων ἄλλως, καθάπερ νῦν δοκεῖ
€ ‘A “- ἐν ἡ τ 3 a ῳ e δ᾽ tAX
ἡ μὲν γεῦσις καὶ ἡ ἁφὴ τῷ ἅπτεσθαι, at δ᾽ ἄλλαι
» \ 3 2 we 3 4 \ \ +
ἄποθεν; τὸ δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ σκληρὸν
4 \ \ ° c “ > ͵ ao
καὶ τὸ μαλακὸν δι᾿ ἑτέρων αἰσθανόμεθα, ὥσπερ
καὶ τὸ ψοφητικὸν καὶ τὸ ὁρατὸν καὶ τὸ ὀσφραντόν'
5 LS ‘ x Ys εἶ > εἰ ? \
ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν πόρρωθεν, τὰ δ᾽ ἐγγύθεν. διὸ λαν-
θάνει, ἐπεὶ αἰσθανόμεθά γε πάντων διὰ τοῦ μέσου"
3 3. 3 7 , f 7 , uv
GAN ἐπὶ τούτων λαυθάνει. καίτοι καθάπερ εἴπαμεν
καὶ πρότερον, κἂν εἰ δι᾿ ὑμένος αἰσθανοίμεθα τῶν
ἁπτῶν ἁπάντων λανθάνοντος ὅτι διείργει, ὁμοίως
ἂν ἔχοιμεν ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν ἐν τῷ ὕδατι καὶ ἐν τῷ
ot ~ “4
agp: δοκοῦμεν γὰρ αὐτῶν ἅπτεσθαι καὶ οὐδὲν
\ ͵ὕ > A f ‘ τ ‘ ~
εἶναι διὰ μέσου. ἀλλὰ διαφέρει τὸ ἁπτὸν τῶν
~ \ ~ ~
ὁρατῶν καὶ τῶν ψοφητικῶν, ὅτι ἐκείνων μὲν
Fal A cal Sal
αἰσθανόμεθα τῷ τὸ μεταξὺ ποιεῖν τι ἡμᾶς, τῶν
~ ~ 3 ΄“
δὲ ἁπτῶν οὐχ ὑπὸ τοῦ μεταξὺ ἀλλ᾽ ἅμα τῷ μεταξύ,
3 é
ὥσπερ ὃ δι’ ἀσπίδος πληγείς" od yap ἡ ἀσπὶς
πληγεῖσα ἐπάταξεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἅμ᾽ ἄμφω" συνέβη πλη-
γῆναι. ὅλως δ᾽ ἔοικεν ἡ σὰρξ καὶ ἡ γλῶττα, ὡς
ὁ ἀὴρ καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ πρὸς τὴν ὄψιν καὶ τὴν ἀκοὴν
καὶ τὴν ὄσφρησιν ἔχουσιν, οὕτως ἔχειν πρὸς τὸ
αἰσθητήριον ὥσπερ ἐκείνων ἕκαστον. αὐτοῦ δὲ
τοῦ αἰσθητηρίου ἁπτομένου οὔτ᾽ ἐκεῖ οὔτ᾽ ἐνταῦθα
γένοιτ᾽ ἂν αἴσθησις, οἷον εἴ τις σῶμα τὸ λευκὸν
- ,ὔ ~
ἐπὶ τοῦ ὄμματος θείη τὸ ἔσχατον. ἦ καὶ δῆλον
ὅτι ἐντὸς τὸ τοῦ ἁπτοῦ αἰσθητικόν. οὕτω γὰρ
at f Ψ ἐν 3 ‘ ~ uv >
ἂν ovpPatvo. ὅπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων: ἐπι-
‘ 4 ͵
τιθεμένων γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ αἰσθητήριον οὐκ αἰσθάνεται,

1 ἀλλ᾽’ ἄμφω Β.
132

ON THE SOUL, II. x1.

wet. Is then the perception of all things one only,
or is it different of different things, just as it is now
generally supposed that taste and touch both act by
contact, but that the other senses act at a distance ὃ
This is not the truth, but we perceive hard and
soft through a medium, just as we apprehend what
sounds, or is heard, or smelt. But we perceive the
latter from a distance, the former from near by. So
we do not notice that we perceive all things through
a medium; but in the case of objects of touch the
medium is not obvious. Still, as we have said before,
if we were to perceive all tangible things through a
membrane, without noticing the separation caused by
it, we should react exactly in the same way as we do
now in water and in air; for we seem to touch them
directly without the intervention of any medium.
But there is a difference between tangible things,
and visible or audible things. We perceive the
latter because some medium acts on us, bul. we per-
ceive tangible things not by a medium, but at the
same time as the medium, like a man wounded
through his shield ; for it is not the stricken shield
that struck him, but both he and the shield were
struck simultaneously. In a general sense we may
say that just as the air and the water act in the case
of vision, hearing and smell, so is the relation of the
flesh and the tongue to the sense organ in the case of
touch. In neither class of case mentioned would
sensation result from touching the sense organ ; for
instance, if one were to put a white body on the surface
of the eye. From this it is clear that that which is
perceptive of what is touched is within. Thus would
occur what is true in the other cases ; for when placed
on the other sense organs no sensation occurs, but

133

ARISTOTLE

423 b ἢ \ \ A δ 3 ͵ 3 7 @
ἐπὶ δὲ τὴν σάρκα ἐπιτιθεμένων αἰσθάνεται: ὥστε

\ \ a ¢ am ft /
τὸ μεταξὺ τοῦ ἁπτικοῦ ἡ σάρξ.
‘A V \ 4 2A a ὃ ι ~ ,΄
πταὶ μὲν οὖν εἰσὶν αἵ διαφοραὶ τοῦ σώματος ἣ
~ . A Pa δὲ ὃ A a x ~ 5 td
σῶμα: λέγω δὲ διαφορὰς at τὰ στοιχεῖα διορίζουσι,
A
θερμὸν ψυχρόν, ξηρὸν ὑγρόν, περὶ ὧν εἰρήκαμεν
πρότερον ἐν τοῖς περὶ στοιχείων. τὸ δὲ αἰσθη-
tg ~ -
80 τήριον αὐτῶν τὸ ἁπτικόν, καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἡ καλουμένη
ς A ~
ἀφὴ ὑπάρχει πρώτῳ, τὸ δυνάμει τοιοῦτόν ἐστι
# ΕἾ \ ? 7 ’ * 3
424 a μορίον' TO ‘yap αἰσθάνεσθαι πάσχειν TL ἐστιν.
ὥστε τὸ ποιοῦν οἷον αὐτὸ ἐνεργείᾳ, τοιοῦτον ἐκεῖνο
ποιεῖ δυνάμει ὄν. διὸ τοῦ ὁμοίως θερμοῦ καὶ
“ \ “- ~ /
ψυχροῦ ἢ σκληροῦ καὶ μαλακοῦ οὐκ αἰσθανόμεθα,
3 A a rat
ἀλλὰ τῶν ὑπερβολῶν, ὡς τῆς αἰσθήσεως οἷον
, + a ~ al a 2
ὅ μεσότητός τινος οὔσης τῆς ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ἐναν-
,ὔ A ?
τιώσεως. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο κρίνει τὰ αἰσθητά. τὸ
A ¢
yap μέσον κριτικόν" γίνεται yap πρὸς ἑκάτερον
~ n a :
αὐτῶν θάτερον τῶν ἄκρων: καὶ δεῖ ὥσπερ τὸ
ἕλλον αἰσθήσεσθαι λευκοῦ καὶ μέλαν δέτερον
μ ἰσθή μέλανος μηδέτερ
3 ~ ? t , > 2) Ὁ Ν
αὐτῶν εἶναι ἐνεργείᾳ, δυνάμει δ᾽ ἄμφω, οὕτω δὴ
" 3 \ ~ Ν \ 2. Ν a ¢ lod vA ‘
10 καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων Kat ἐπὶ τῆς apis μήτε θερμὸν
΄ é μὴ 3 a ¢ ~ \ > i
μήτε ψυχρόν. ἔτι δ᾽ ὥσπερ ὁρατοῦ καὶ ἀοράτου
x ¢ , A A ε A - >
ἣν πως ἡ ὄψις, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ at λοιπαὶ τῶν ἀντι-
“ - > ͵
κειμένων, οὕτω καὶ ἡ ἁφὴ τοῦ ἁπτοῦ καὶ ἀνάπτου'
ἄναπτον δ᾽ ἐστὶ τό τε μικρὰν ἔχον πάμπαν δια-
a ~ ay ~
φορὰν τῶν ἁπτῶν, οἷον πέπονθεν ὁ ἀήρ, καὶ τῶν
a 7 3
16 ἁπτῶν at ὑπερβολαΐί, ὥσπερ τὰ φθαρτικά. καθ
ἑκάστην μὲν οὖν τῶν αἰσθήσεων εἴρηται τύπῳ.

® De Gen. et Corr. cc, ii. and iii,
134

ΟΝ THE SOUL, II. xz.

when placed on the flesh it does ; so that the medium
in tangible thingss is the flesh.

The distinguishing characterislics of the body, qua Tho sensa
body, are objects of touch ; by distinguishing charac- ᾿δ *™"-
teristics J mean those which differentiate the ele-
ments hot and cold, dry and wet, about which we have
spoken before in our discussion of the elements.*
But the sense organ which perceives them is the
sense of touch, and that in which the sense of touch,
as it is called, primarily resides, a part which has
potentially the qualities of the objects touched. [or
perception is a form of being acted upon, So that
what makes samething actually like itself has these
qualities potentially itself. Consequently we have
no sensation of what is as hot, cold, hard, or soft as
we are, but only of what is more so, sensation being
then a sort of mean between opposites in things felt.
And it is because of this that a man discriminates
between things felt. For the mean is capable of
discriminating ; for it becomes an extreme in relation
to each of the extremes in turn; and just as that
which is going to perceive white and black must be
actually neither, but potentially both, so also in
other cases, and particularly in the case of touch, it
must be neither hot nor cold. And just as we saw
that vision relates both to the visible and Lhe in-
visible, and so also in the same way with the remain-
ing contraries, so touch must relate both to the
tangible and intangible; by intangible we mean
what has the quality of the tangible to an extremely
small extent, as is the case with air, and also those
excesses among tangible things, such as those which
destroy. Now we have described in outline each of
the senses.

135

ARISTOTLE

424 a
XII. Καθόλου δὲ περὶ πάσης αἰσθήσεως δεῖ

λαβεῖν ὅτι ἡ μὲν αἴσθησίς ἐστι τὸ δεκτικὸν τῶν
αἰσθητῶν εἰδῶν ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης, οἷον ὁ κηρὸς τοῦ
20 δακτυλίου ἄνευ τοῦ σιδήρου καὶ τοῦ χρυσοῦ δέ-
yerat τὸ σημεῖον, λαμβάνει δὲ τὸ χρυσοῦν ἢ τὸ
~ - 4 n
χαλκοῦν σημεῖον, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ἦ χρυσὸς ἢ χαλκός,
ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις ἑκάστου ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔχοντος
~ a ‘ an ͵ ? ἰλλ᾽ ? Lid
χρῶμα ἢ χυμὸν ἢ ψόφον πάσχει, a. οὐχ ἧ
ov 3 Fs ἢ > 3 - iz " \
ἕκαστον ἐκείνων λέγεται, ἀλλ᾽ ἧ τοιονδί, καὶ κατὰ
Α / > 3 A - 2 τ ς é
85 τὸν λόγον. αἰσθητήριον δὲ πρῶτον ἐν ᾧ ἡ τοιαύτη
ΟΣ >
δύναμις. ἔστι μὲν οὖν ταὐτόν, τὸ δ᾽ εἶναι ἕτερον"
:
μέγεθος μὲν yap ἄν τι εἴη τὸ αἰσθανόμενον" od
λ Fd ~ > ε Uy
μὴν τό ye αἰσθητικῷ εἶναι, οὐδ᾽ ἡ αἴσθησις
é / > > A , \ , > ,
μέγεθός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ λόγος τις καὶ δύναμις ἐκείνου.
3 ~
φανερὸν δ᾽ ἐκ τούτων καὶ διὰ τί ποτε τῶν
> e ,ὔ
80 αἰσθητῶν αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ φθείρουσι τὰ αἰσθητήρια"
> ~ ,ὔ ε ,
ἐὰν γὰρ ἢ ἰσχυροτέρα τοῦ αἰσθητηρίου ἡ κίνησις,
λύεται ὁ λόγος" τοῦτο δ᾽ ἦν ἡ αἴσθησις, ὥσπερ
καὶ ἡ συμφωνία καὶ ὁ τόνος κρουομένων σφόδρα
τῶν χορδῶν. καὶ διὰ τί ποτε τὰ φυτὰ οὐκ ai-
σθάνεται, ἔχοντά τι μόριον ψυχικὸν καὶ πάσχοντά
φ4"τι ὑπὸ τῶν ἁπτῶν: καὶ γὰρ ψύχεται καὶ θερ-
μαίνεται" αἴτιον γὰρ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν μεσότητα, μηδὲ
3 A ~
τοιαύτην ἀρχὴν οἵαν τὰ εἴδη δέχεσθαι τῶν ai-
σθητῶν, ἀλλὰ πάσχειν μετὰ τῆς ὕλης. ἀπορήσειε
> a
δ᾽ ἄν τις εἰ πάθοι dv τι ὑπ᾽ ὀσμῆς τὸ ἀδύνατον
5 ὀσφρανθῆναι, ἢ ὑπὸ χρώματος τὸ μὴ δυνάμενον
> “- < rs A x > \ ~ ΕΣ > \ A
ἰδεῖν: ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. εἰ δὲ τὸ
> A > a
ὀσφραντὸν ὀσμή, εἴ τι ποιεῖ τὴν ὄσφρησιν, ἡ

186

ON THE SOUL, IT. x1.

XII. On the general question of sensation one Definition of
must lay down that sensation is the reception of the "=":
form of sensible objects without the matter, just as
the wax receives the impression of the signet-ring
without the iron or the gold, and receives the im-
pression of the gold or bronze, but not as gold or
bronze ; so the sense is affected by each thing which
has colour, or flavour, or sound ; not in the sense in
which each of them is so called, but in the sense that
its character is of this kind, and in virtue of its form.
And the sense organ in its primary meaning is that in
which this capacity lies. The sense organ and the
capacity exist in conjunction, but their essential
nature is not the same ; for that which perceives has
a definite magnitude ; but its capacity for perceiving
has not, nor is sensation a magnitude, but the form
and potentiality of this. [rom this it is also clear
why excess of objects perceived destroy the sense
organs ; for if the movement imparted to the sense
organ is too strong, the form is destroyed ; and this
form is the sensation; just as the harmony and
musical note is destroyed when the strings are struck
hard. It also explains why plants do not feel, though
they have some share in the soul, and are affected to
some extent by objects touched ; for they show both
cold and heat; the reason is that they have no mean,
nor any such first principle so as to receive the form
of sensible objects, but are affected by the matter
at the same time as the form. One might wonder
whether anything that cannot smell is affected at
all by smell, or that which cannot see by colour ;
aud in the same way with all other sensible objects.
But seeing that smell is of the thing smelt, if any-
thing affects the sense of smcll, it must be smell, so

137

ARISTOTLE

424 b > \ a v a 3 ,ὔ ᾽ ~
COL ποίει, WOTE TwWY ἀδυνάτων ὀσφρανθῆναι

οὐθὲν οἷόν τε πάσχειν ὑπ᾽ ὀδμῆς" ὃ δ᾽ αὐτὸς
,ὔ \ ἊΨ ΕἾ ~ ΕΣ > \ ~ ~
λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων: οὐδὲ τῶν δυνατῶν,
ἀλλ᾽ ἣ αἰσθητικὸν ἕκαστον. ἅμα δὲ δῆλον καὶ
a va i. ~ εἴ , uw ta
τὸ οὕτως. οὔτε yap φῶς καὶ σκότος οὔτε ψόφος
" > 7 > 4 Cal \ Zé 2 > >
οὔτε ὀσμὴ οὐδὲν ποιεῖ τὰ σώματα, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν οἷς
3 ,ὔ ἔυ oA € A ~ Se A ‘
ἐστίν, οἷον ἀὴρ ὁ μετὰ βροντῆς διΐστησι τὸ ξύλον.
2 AY A ¢ A a ς A ~ > Ly 7
ἀλλὰ τὰ ἁπτὰ καὶ οἱ χυμοὶ ποιοῦσιν: εἰ γὰρ μή,

\ a aN é Ν uv \ 2 -
πὸ τίνος ἂν πάσχοι τὰ ἄψυχα καὶ ἀλλοιοῖτο;

’ ὧν ᾿ Pe
ἄρ᾽ οὖν κἀκεῖνα ποιήσει; ἢ οὐ πᾶν᾽ σῶμα παθη-

\ ς 2 bd ~ Y , \ \ /

is τικὸν ὑπ᾽ ὀσμῆς καὶ ψόφου: Kal τὰ πάσχοντα

3.) \ 2 / ἣν 77 a \ 2
ἀόριστα, καὶ οὐ μένει, οἷον dnp: ὄζει γὰρ ὥσπερ
Fé i “- > \ \ > ~ ‘ \
παθών τι. τί οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ ὀσμᾶσθαι παρὰ τὸ
, at \ τ 3 ~ J /, ε
πάσχειν τι; ἢ τὸ μὲν ὀσμᾶσθαι αἰσθάνεσθαι͵ ὁ

δ᾽ ἀὴρ παθὼν ταχέως αἰσθητὸς γίνεται.

188

ON THE SOUL, II. xu.

that it is impossible for anything which cannot smell
to be affected by a smell; and the same argument
applies to the other senses; mor can any of those
things which can be acted upon be affected, except
in so far as each has the sense in question. And the
point is equally clear from the following argument.
Yor neither light and darkness, nor sound, nor smell
affect the bodies at all : it is the things in which they
reside that produce the effect, just as the air splits
wood when combined with thunder. But it may be
said that tangible objects and flavours do affect bodies ;
otherwise, by what should things not possessing soul
be affected and changed? Will then the objects of
other senses affect things? Or perhaps it is not
every body that is affected by smell and sound: the
things affected are indefinable and are not permanent,
such as air; for it smells as though affected some-
how. What, then, is smelling apart from being
affected in some way? Probably smelling is per-
ception, but the air when affected quickly becomes
perceptible.

139

424 ἢ

το
ἐτ

425 a

I. Ὅτι δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν αἴσθησις ἕτέρα παρὰ τὰς
, , λ ΄ " 2 ? v
πέντε (λέγω δὲ ταύτας ὄψιν, ἀκοήν, ὄσφρησιν,
γεῦσιν, ἀφήν), ἐκ τῶνδε πιστεύσειεν ἄν τις. εἰ
γὰρ παντὸς οὗ ἐστὶν αἴσθησις ἁφή, καὶ νῦν
αἴσθησιν ἔχομεν (πάντα γὰρ τὰ τοῦ ἁπτοῦ ἧ
ς ‘ » a SEA ᾿ς, κα > 4 8 a 7
ἁπτὸν πάθη τῇ ἁφῇ ἡμῖν αἰσθητά ἐστιν), ἀνάγκη
τ᾽, εἴπερ ἐκλείπει τις αἴσθησις, καὶ αἰσθητήριόν
τι ἡμῖν ἐκλείπειν: καὶ ὅσων μὲν αὐτῶν ἁπτόμενοι
? / ind ε ~ > / 2 a é
αἰσθανόμεθα, τῇ ἁφῇ αἰσθητά ἐστιν, ἣν τυγχά-
νομεν ἔχοντες" ὅσα δὲ διὰ τῶν μεταξύ, καὶ μὴ
αὐτῶν ἁπτόμενοι, τοῖς ἁπλοῖς, λέγω δ᾽ οἷον ἀέρι

\ 4 μὲ > « a > > \ 2 ey
καὶ ὕδατι. ἔχει δ᾽ οὕτως, ὥστ᾽ εἰ μὲν δι᾿ ἑνὸς

f ) + ν Μ > / ~ i.
πλείω αἰσθητὰ ἕτερα ὄντα ἀλλήλων τῷ γένει,
ἀνάγκη τὸν ἔχοντα τὸ τοιοῦτον αἰσθητήριον ἀμ-
φοῖν αἰσθητικὸν εἶναι" οἷον εἰ ἐξ ἀέρος ἐστὶ τὸ
> ta \ μ᾿ « JA " / \
αἰσθητήριον, καὶ ἔστιν 6. ἀὴρ καὶ ψόφου καὶ
χρόας. εἰ δὲ πλείω τοῦ αὐτοῦ, οἷον χρόας καὶ
ἀὴρ καὶ ὕδωρ (ἄμφω γὰρ διαφανῆ), καὶ ὃ τὸ
ἕτερον αὐτῶν ἔχων μόνον αἰσθήσεται ἀμφοῖν.
τῶν δὲ ἁπλῶν ἐκ δύο τούτων αἰσθητήρια μόνον
ἐστίν, ἐξ ἀέρος καὶ ὕδατος: ἡ μὲν γὰρ κόρη

140

ΒΟΟΚ ΠῚ

I, One may be satisfied that there are no senses There are
apart from the five (I mean vision, hearing, smell, oly?
taste and touch) from the following arguments. We
may assume that we actually have perception of
everything which is apprehended by touch (for by
touch we perceive all those things which are qualities
of the tangible object, qua tangible). Again, if we
lack any perception, we must lack some sense organ ;
and, again, all the things which we perceive by touch-
ing them are perceived by touch, a sense which we
happen to possess ; but all those things which are
perceived through media, and not by actually
touching them, are perceived through simple ele-
ments, such as air and water. Again, it is a fact
that, if things differing from one another in kind are
perceived through one medium, the man who has the
appropriate sense organ will apprehend both (for
instance, if the sense organ is composed of air, air is
the medium both of sound and of colour), but if
more than one thing is the medium of the same thing,
as for instance both air and water are the media
through which colour is perceived (for both are
transparent), then he that has either of these will
perceive both. But sense organs are only composed
of these two simple elements, air and water (for the
pupil of the eye is composed of water, and the hearing

141

425 a

ARISTOTLE

a ¢ > 3 4 27 A + ow fa
ὕδατος, ἡ δ᾽ ἀκοὴ ἀέρος, ἡ δ᾽ ὄσφρησις θατέρου
τούτων. τὸ δὲ πῦρ ἢ οὐθενὸς ἢ κοινὸν πάντων"
οὐθὲν γὰρ ἄνευ θερμότητος αἰσθητικόν. γῆ δὲ
ἢ οὐθενός, ἢ ἐν τῇ ἁφῇ μάλιστα μέμικται ἰδίως.
διὸ λείποιτ᾽ ἂν μηθὲν εἶναι αἰσθητήριον ἔξω ὕδατος
καὶ ἀέρος. ταῦτα δὲ καὶ νῦν ἔχουσιν ἔνια ζῷα.
πᾶσαν ἄρα αἱ αἰσθήσεις ἔχονται ὑπὸ τῶν μὴ
ἀτελῶν μηδὲ πεπηρωμένων" φαίνεται γὰρ καὶ ἡ
σπάλαξ ὑπὸ τὸ δέρμα ἔχουσα ὀφθαλμούς. ὥστ
εἰ μή τι ἕτερόν ἐστι σῶμα, καὶ πάθος ὃ μηθενός
ἐστι τῶν ἐνταῦθα σωμάτων, οὐδεμία ἂν ἐκλίποι
αἴσθησις. ,

᾿Αλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τῶν κοινῶν οἷόν τ᾽ εἶναι αἱ
σθητήριόν τι ἴδιον, ὧν ἑκάστῃ αἰσθήσει αἰσθανο-
μεθα κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οἷον κινήσεως, στάσεως,
σχήματος, μεγέθους, ἀριθμοῦ, ἑνός: ταῦτα γὰρ
πάντα κινήσει αἰσθανόμεθα, οἷον μέγεθος κινήσει.
ὥστε καὶ σχῆμα: μέγεθος γάρ τι τὸ σχῆμα. τὸ
δ᾽ ἠρεμοῦν τῷ μὴ κινεῖσθαι" ὁ δ᾽ ἀριθμὸς τῇ ἀπο-
φάσει τοῦ συνεχοῦς καὶ τοῖς ἰδίοις" ἑκάστη γὰρ
ἕν αἰσθάνεται αἴσθησις. ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι ἀδύνατον
ὁτουοῦν ἰδίαν αἴσθησιν εἷναι τούτων, οἷον κινή-
σεως" οὕτω γὰρ ἔσται ὥσπερ νῦν τῇ ὄψει τὸ
γλυκὺ αἰσθανόμεθα. τοῦτο δ᾽ ὅτι ἀμφοῖν ἔχοντες
τυγχάνομεν αἴσθησιν, } καὶ ὅταν συμπέσωσιν ἀνα-
γνωρίζομεν' εἰ δὲ μή, οὐδαμῶς ἂν ἀλλ᾽ ἢ κατὰ

* This is the conclusion to which all the preceding argu-
ments lead.

> de. when and because they move,

4 When a thing is ‘‘ continuous” it is ‘ one,” which in
the Greek mind was not a number.

@ A. is definitely wrong here. We do not “perceive”
sweetness by sight; we may assume sweetness by association

142

ON THE SOUL, ΠῚ. τ.

organ of air, while the organ of' smell is composed of
one or other of these). But fire is the medium of no
perception, or else is common to them all (for there is
no possibility of perception without heat), and earth
is the medium of no sense perception, or else is con-
nected with a sense of touch in a special way. So
we are left to suppose that there is no sense organ
apart from water and air ; and some animals actually
have organs composed of these ; @the conclusion is
that all the senses are possessed by all such animals
as are neither undeveloped nor maimed ; even the
mole seems lo have eyes under the skin. If then
there is no other body, and no other property which
belongs to any of the bodies in the world, there can
be no sense perception omitted from our list.

But, again, it is impossible that there should be a The per-
special sense organ to perceive common sensibles, μορίαν οἱ
which we perceive incidentally by each sense, such, sensibles.
I mean, as motion, rest, shape, magnitude, number
and unity ; for we perceive all these things by move-
ment;? for instance we perceive magnitude by
movement, and shape also; for shape is a form of
magnitude. We perceive rest by absence of move-
ment; number is perceived by absence of con-
tinuity,° and by the special senses; for each sense
perceives one thing, So that it is clearly impossible
for there to be any special sense of any one of these
things, such as movement ; if there were, it would be
in the same way as we now perceive sweetness by
sight.¢ But this is because we happen to have per-
ception of both, whereby we recognize them when
they occur together, otherwise we should never per-

of ideas, or infer it in some other way, but we do not per-
ceive it.

143

ARISTOTLE

425 a
2 συμβεβηκὸς ἠσθανόμεθα, οἷον τὸν Κλέωνος υἱὸν

οὐχ ὅτι Κλέωνος υἱός, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι λευκός" τούτῳ δὲ
συμβέβηκεν υἱῷ Κλέωνος εἶναι. τῶν δὲ κοινῶν ἤδη
ἔχομεν αἴσθησιν κοινήν, οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκός" οὐκ
woo Σ ὃ, το Ἵ la A nn > / 3 2
ἄρ᾽ ἐστὶν ἰδία: οὐδαμῶς yap ἂν ἠσθανόμεθα ἀλλ
wn wv A W \ i, ee ¢ “
80%) οὕτως ὥσπερ εἴρηται τὸν Ἰζλέωνος υἱὸν ἡμᾶς
ὁρᾶν. τὰ δ᾽ ἀλλήλων ἴδια κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς
? , ε > / 2 ἂν ἔχ > ‘ 3 >
αἰσθάνονται at αἰσθήσεις, οὐχ ἢ at αὐταί, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ
4660 μία, ὅταν ἅμα γένηται ἡ αἴσθησις ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ,
e \ Ψ A ‘ ὔ ἥ A \ τ /
οἷον χολὴν ὅτι πικρὰ καὶ ξανθή" οὐ yap δὴ ἑτέρας
γε τὸ εἰπεῖν ὅτι ἄμφω ἕν' διὸ καὶ ἀπατᾶται, καὶ
ἐὰν ἦ ξανθόν, χολὴν οἴεται εἶναι. ζητήσειε δ᾽ ἄν
͵ μὴ , a ? ͵ 3 3 Ἴ
ὅτις τίνος ἕνεκα πλείους ἔχομεν αἰσθήσεις, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ
f , yn bu ia λ θ 4 \ > A
μίαν μόνην. ἢ ὅπως ἧττον λανθάνῃ τὰ ἀκολου-
θοῦντα καὶ κοινά, οἷον κίνησις καὶ μέγεθος καὶ
> θ γ Ἃ. e wv / A V4 1 n~
ἀριθμός" εἰ yap ἦν ἡ ὄψις μόνη, καὶ αὕτη; λευκοῦ,
> / Lal lod \ 3 / 3 ‘ ΄
ἐλάνθανεν ἂν μᾶλλον καὶ ἐδόκει ταὐτὸ εἶναι πάντα
A \ > a“ > ,ὔ a lal ‘
διὰ τὸ ἀκολουθεῖν ἀλλήλοις ἅμα γχγρῶμα καὶ
, ~ >? 2 A " > is 7 > n \
10 μέγεθος. viv δ᾽ ἐπεὶ καὶ ἐν ἑτέρῳ αἰσθητῷ τὰ
‘ # 4 ~ a a uv μὲ
κοινὰ ὑπάρχει, δῆλον ποιεῖ ὅτι ἄλλο τι ἕκαστον
αὐτῶν.
11. ᾿Επεὶ δ᾽ αἰσθανόμεθα ὅτι ὁρῶμεν καὶ ἀκούο-
3 , n - Ν ? , μή cA A
μεν, ἀνάγκη ἢ τῇ ὄψει αἰσθάνεσθαι ὅτι ὁρᾷ, ἢ
ς i 3 3 ς 2 4 Ψ a uM ᾿ inl
ἑτέρᾳ. ἀλλ᾽ ἡ αὐτὴ ἔσται τῆς ὄψεως Kal τοῦ
16 ὑποκειμένου χρώματος. ὥστε ἢ δύο τοῦ αὐτοῦ
” Ἃ 2h ς- κα LoS ee ces v tp
ἔσονται ἢ αὐτὴ αὑτῆς. ἔτι δ᾽ εἰ καὶ ἑτέρα εἴη ἡ
- av wy a 3 av a 3
τῆς ὄψεως αἴσθησις, ἢ εἰς ἄπειρον εἶσιν ἢ αὐτή
1 αὐτὴ Β. 2 om. ἡ Β.
144.

ON THE SOUL, III. 1.—1.

ceive them except incidentally ; for instance we per-
ceive Cleon’s son, not because he is Cleon’s son, but
because he is white ; his being Cleon’s son is merely
incidental. We have then a common sense which
apprehends common sensibles, not incidentally ; and
it is not a special sense. If there were such, we
should never perceive in any other way, except as we
said that we saw Cleon’s son. But the senses do per-
eeive cach other’s proper objects incidentally, not in
their own identity, but acting together as one, when
sensation occurs simultaneously in the case of the
same object, as for instance of bile, that it is bitter
and yellow ; for saying that both are one is not. attri-
buting it to another sense ; and so the sense can be
deceived, and, if an object is yellow, thinks that it is
bile. One might ask why we have several senses
and not one only. It may be in order that the ac-
companying and common properties, such as move-
ment, magnitude and number should escape us less ;
for if vision were our only sense, and it perceived
something white, there would be more room for error,
and colour and magnitude would appear to be the
same thing, because they accompany each other.
But, as it is, since the common sensibles exist in a
second object, it becomes clear that each of them is
something separate.

II. But since we are conscious that we see and
hear, either sight itself must perceive that it sees, or
some other sense. But in the former case the same
sense must perceive both sight and colour, the proper
object of sight. So that either two senses perceive
the same object, or sight perceives itself. Again, if
there is a separate sense perceiving sight, either the
process will go on ad infinitum, or a sense must per-

L 145

How do we
know that
we 8001

ARISTOTLE
425 b

τις ἔσται αὑτῆς. ὥστ᾽ ἐπὶ τῆς “πρώτης τοῦτο
ποιητέον. ἔχει δ᾽ “ἀπορίαν. εἰ γὰρ τὸ τῇ ὄψει
αἰσθάνεσθαί ἐστιν ὁρᾶν, ὁρᾶται δὲ χρῶμα ἢ τὸ
ἔχον, εἰ ὄψεταί τις τὸ ὁρῶν, καὶ χρῶμα, ἕξει τὸ
20 ὁρῶν πρῶτον. φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι οὐχ ἕν τὸ τῇ
ὄψει αἰσθάνεσθαι: καὶ γὰρ ὅταν μὴ “ὁρῶμεν, τῇ
ὄψει κρίνομεν καὶ τὸ σκότος καὶ τὸ φῶς, ἀλλ᾽
οὐχ ὡσαύτως. ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὸ ὁρῶν ἔστιν ὡς κε-
χρωμάτιοσται'" τὸ γὰρ αἰσθητήριον δεκτικὸν τοῦ
αἰσθητοῦ ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης ἕκαστον. διὸ καὶ ἀπ-
26 ελθόντων τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἔνεισιν αἱ αἰσθήσεις καὶ

φαντασίαι ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις.
‘H δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἐνέργεια καὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως
ἡ αὐτὴ μέν ἐστι καὶ μία, τὸ δ᾽ εἶναι οὐ ταὐτὸν
αὐταῖς" λέγω δ᾽ οἷον ψόφος ὁ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν καὶ
ἀκοὴ ἡ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν" ἔστι γὰρ ἀκοὴν ἔχοντα
μὴ ἀκούειν, καὶ τὸ ἔχον ψόφον οὐκ ἀεὶ ψοφεῖ.
80 ὅταν δ᾽ ἐνεργῇ τὸ δυνάμενον ἀκούειν καὶ ψοφῇ τὸ
δυνάμενον ψοφεῖν, τότε ἡ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν ἀκοὴ
4868 ἅμα γίνεται καὶ 6 κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν ψόφος, ὧν
εἴπειεν ἄν τις τὸ μὲν εἶναι ἄκουσιν τὸ δὲ ψόφησιν.
Ei δ᾽ ἔστιν ἡ κίνησις καὶ ἡ ποίησις καὶ τὸ πάθος
ἐν τῷ ποιουμένῳ, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸν ψόφον καὶ τὴν
ἀκοὴν τὴν κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν ἐν τῇ κατὰ δύναμιν
δ εἶναι" ἡ γὰρ τοῦ ποιητικοῦ καὶ κινητικοῦ ἐνέργεια
ἐν τῷ πάσχοντι tdi διὸ οὐκ ἀνάγκη τὸ
κινοῦν κινεῖσθαι. ἡ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ψοφητικοῦ ἐνέρ-
γειά ἐστι ψόφος ἢ ψόφησις, ἡ δὲ τοῦ ἀκουστικοῦ

“Τῇ we suppose a special sense to apprehend that we see,
we must suppose another to apprehend this and so on.
> ΟἿ, ch. viii.

146

ON THE SOUL, III. nm.

ceive itself* So we may assume that it occurs with
the first sense. But here is a difficulty ; for if per-
ception by vision is seeing, and that which is seen
either is colour or has colour, then if anyone sees that
which sees, it follows that what primarily sees will
possess colour. It is therefore obvious that the
phrase “ perceiving by vision’ has not merely one
meaning ; for, even when we do not see, we judge
both darkness and light by vision, but not in the
same way. Moreover that which sees does in a
sense possess colour ; for cach sense organ is receptive
of the perccived object, but without its matter. So
that even when the objects of perception are absent,
perception and mental pictures are present in the
sense organ.

But the activity of the object felt and of the
sensation are one and the same thing,” though their
actual essence is not the same ; by saying that they
are the same, I mean the sound actively and the hear-
ing actively ; for it is possible for one who possesses
hearing not to hear, and that which has sound is not
always sounding. But when that which has the
power of hearing is exercising its power, and that
which can sound is sounding, then the active hearing
and the active sound occur together, of which one
may call one hearing and one sounding.

If then the movement, that is, the acting and being
acted upon, takes place in that which is acted upon,
then the sound and the hearing in a state of activity
must reside in the potential hearing ; for the activity
of what is moving and active takes place in what is
being acted upon. Hence that which causes motion
need not be moved. The activity, then, of the object
producing sound is sound, or sounding, and of that

14:7

What is
sensation ?

ARISTOTLE

426 a ἊΣ 1! an »ὕ᾿ A A ε 3 4 ‘ \ e
ἀκοὴ ἢ ἄκουσις" διττὸν yap ἡ ἀκοή, καὶ διττὸν 6
ψόφος. ὁ δ᾽ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων
αἰσθήσεων καὶ αἰσθητῶν. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἡ ποίησις

10 καὶ μ πάθησις ἐν τῷ πάσχοντι ἀλλ᾽ ov ἐν τῷ
ποιοῦντι, οὕτω καὶ ἡ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἐνέργεια καὶ
ἡ τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ ἐν τῷ αἰσθητικῷ. ἀλλ᾽ ἐπ᾽
ἐνίων μὲν ὠνόμασται, οἷον ἡ ψόφησις καὶ ἡ
ἄκουσις, ἐπὶ δ᾽ ἐνίων ἀνώνυμον θάτερον" ὅρασις
γὰρ λέγεται ἡ τῆς ὄψεως ἐνέργεια, ἡ δὲ τοῦ

16 χρώματος ἀνώνυμος, καὶ γεῦσις ἡ τοῦ γευστικοῦ,
ἡ δὲ τοῦ χυμοῦ ἀνώνυμος. ἐπεὶ δὲ μία μέν ἐστιν
ἐνέργεια ἡ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ καὶ ἢ τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ,
τὸ δ᾽ εἶναι ἕτερον, ἀνάγκη ἅμα φθείρεσθαι καὶ
σώζεσθαι τὴν οὕτω λεγομένην ἀκοὴν καὶ ψόφον,
καὶ χυμὸν “δὴ καὶ γεῦσιν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὁμοίως"

20 τὰ δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν λεγόμενα ovie ἀνάγκη, ἀλλ᾽
οἱ πρότερον φυσιολόγοι τοῦτο οὐ καλῶς ἔλεγον,
οὐθὲν οἰόμενοι οὔτε λευκὸν οὔτε μέλαν εἶναι ἄνευ
ὄψεως, οὐδὲ χυμὸν ἄνευ γεύσεως. τῇ μὲν γὰρ
ἔλεγον ὀρθῶς, τῇ δ᾽ οὐκ ὀρθῶς: διχῶς γὰρ λεγο-
μένης τῆς αἰσθήσεως καὶ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ, τῶν “μὲν

26 κατὰ δύναμιν τῶν δὲ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν, ἐπὶ τούτων
μὲν συμβαίνει τὸ λεχθέν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἑτέρων οὐ
συμβανφει. ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖνοι ἁπλῶς ἔλεγον περὶ τῶν
λεγομένων οὐχ ἁπλῶς.

Ke δ᾽ ἡ συμφωνία φωνή τίς ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ pu νὴ
καὶ ἡ ἀκοὴ ἔστιν ὡς ἕν ἐστι καὶ ἔστιν ὡς οὐχ ἕν
τὸ αὐτό, λόγος δ᾽ ἡ συμφωνία, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν

80 ἀκοὴν λόγον τινὰ εἶναι. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ φθείρει

α Tf a red object is in the dark it does not appear red.
Some philosophers maintained that it is not red, and that

148

ON THE SOUL, III. mn.

producing hearing is hearing or audition, for hearing
is used in two senses, and so is sound. The same
argument applies to the case of other senses and
sensible objects. Tor just as acting and being acted
upon resides in that which is acted upon, and not
that which acts, so also the activity of the object per-
ceived and of the percipient lies in the percipient. In
some cases we have names for both, such as sounding
and hearing, but in others one of the terms has no
name ; for the activity of vision is called seeing, but
that of colour has no name; the activity of taste is
called tasting, but that of flavour has no name. But
since the activity of the perceived and of the per-
cipient are the same, though their essence is different,
it necessarily follows that what is called hearing must
be destroyed and preserved at the same time as
sound, and so with flavour and taste and the rest ;
but this does not apply to things potential, though
the earlier natural philosophers did not understand
this, supposing that white and black had no existence
without vision, nor flavour without taste. In one
sense they were right, but in another wrong ἢ for
sensation and the sensible object being used in two
senses, that is potentially and actually, their state-
ments apply to the latter class, but not to the former.

In other words, they were speaking in one sense about
terms which are used in two.

If, then, harmony is a voice of some kind (and voice Sensation
and hearing are in one sense one and the same, and harmony:
in another not), and if harmony is a ratio, then it
follows that hearing is in some sense a ratio. That

“ ved * has no existence except when we see it, A. argues
that such an object is “ potential τ > red, because, given the
right conditions, it will appear re

149

426 a

428 ἢ

ARISTOTLE

ἕκαστον ὑπερβάλλον, Kai τὸ ὀξὺ Kal τὸ βαρύ, τὴν
ἀκοήν' ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν γυμοῖς τὴν γεῦσιν, καὶ
> ᾽ 53 wv i 7 AS δ]
ἐν χρώμασι τὴν ὄψιν τὸ σφόδρα λαμπρὸν ἢ
! es > , € > 5 > N 1
ζοφερόν, καὶ ev ὀσφρήσει ἡ ἰσχυρὰ ὀσμὴ καὶ
γλυκεῖα καὶ πικρά, ὡς λόγου τινὸς ὄντος τῆς
> , ᾿ \ eg? ͵ ῳ ᾽ Ps ᾿
αἰσθήσεως. διὸ καὶ ἡδέα μέν, ὅταν εἰλωςρινῆ καὶ
3 fod ἂν 3 A i 4 a \ wn \
ἀμιγῆ ἄγηται eis τὸν λόγον, οἷον τὸ ὀξὺ ἢ γλυκὺ
κ᾿ ‘A / a ἠδ ᾽ A / ὅλ ὃ \ ~ \
ἢ ἁλμυρόν: ἡδέα yap τότε. ὅλως δὲ μᾶλλον τὸ
\ / wn A εἶ \ a 4 τ ~ A \
μικτὸν συμφωνία ἢ τὸ ὀξὺ ἢ βαρύ, ἁφῇ δὲ τὸ
3
θερμαντὸν ἢ ψυκτόν- ἡ δ᾽ αἴσθησις ὁ λόγος"
ὑπερβάλλοντα δὲ λυπεῖ ἢ φθείρει.
¢ / εἰ x , fol
Exdorn μὲν οὖν αἴσθησις τοῦ ὑποκειμένου
2 “ ? / € / >? ~ > ,
αἰσθητοῦ ἐστίν, ὑπάρχουσα ἐν τῷ αἰσθητηρίῳ ἡ
? va 4 A ~
αἰσθητήριον, καὶ κρίνει τὰς τοῦ ὑποκειμένου al~
fol ,ὕ \ ‘
σθητοῦ διαφοράς, οἷον λευκὸν μὲν καὶ μέλαν ὄψις,
γλυκὺ δὲ καὶ πικρὸν γεῦσις. ὁμοίως δ᾽ ἔχει τοῦτο
..γ}ν ~ » ΤΕ. 4 ἢ \ \ \
καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. ἐπεὶ δὲ Kal τὸ λευκὸν Kat
τὸ γλυκὺ καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν αἰσθητῶν πρὸς ἕκαστον
tf rs +7 ? θ / 8 a ὕ
κρίνομεν, τίνι καὶ αἰσθανόμεθα ὅτι διαφέρει;
9 , ‘ 3 ta > \ 7 > \
ἀνάγκη δὴ αἰοθήσει' αἰσθητὰ γάρ ἐστιν, F καὶ
~ A
δῆλον ὅτι ἡ σὰρξ odk ἔστι τὸ ἔσχατον αἰσθητήριον"
ἀνάγκη γὰρ ἣν ἁπτόμενον αὐτοῦ κρίνειν τὸ κρῖνον.
\
οὔτε δὴ κεχωρισμένοις ἐνδέχεται κρίνειν ὅτι ἕτερον
τὸ γλυκὺ τοῦ λευκοῦ, ἀλλὰ δεῖ ἑνί τινι dudw δῆλα
A ~ lo
εἶναι. οὕτω μὲν yap κἂν εἰ τοῦ μὲν ἐγὼ τοῦ δὲ
Uy ~
σὺ αἴσθοιο, δῆλον ἂν εἴη ὅτι ἕτερα ἀλλήλων. δεῖ
δὲ τὸ ἕν λέγειν ὅτι ἕτερον" ἕτερον γὰρ τὸ γλυκὺ
fod ~ / Ψ A % / o ε 3
τοῦ λευκοῦ. λέγει ἄρα τὸ αὐτό, ὥστε, ὡς λέγει,
150

ON THE SOUL, ITI. τι.

is why both high and low pitch. if excessive. destroy
hearing ; in the same way in flavours excess destroys
taste, and in colours the over-brilliant or over-dark
destroys vision, and in smelling, the strong scent,
whether sweet or bitter, destroys smell, because sen-
sation is some kind of harmony. That is also why
things are pleasant when they are brought into the
proportion pure and unmixed, such as acid, sweet or
salt; for in that case they are pleasant. But generally
speaking a mixed constitution produces a better har-
mony than the high or low pitch, and to the touch
the warm is more pleasurable than the cold ; but per-
ception is a proportion, and excess hurts or destroys.

Hach sensation then relates to the subject per- How do we
ceived, existing in the sense organ as such, and {Pein

judges differences in the subject perceived; for
instance, vision discriminates between white and
black, and taste between sweet and bitter. And the
same process occurs in all other cases. But, since we
distinguish while and sweet, and compare all objects
perceived with each other, by what sense do we per-
ceive that they differ? It must evidently be by some
sense that we perceive the difference ; for they are
objects of sense. Incidentally it becomes clear that
flesh is not the ultimate sense organ ; for, if it were,
judgement would depend on being in contact. Nor,
again, is it possible to judge that sweet and white are
different by separate senses, but both must obviously
be determined by one sense. For, in the other case,
if you perccived one thing and I another, it would be
obvious that they differed from each other. It can
only be one thing which declares the ditference ; for
swect differs from white. The same faculty, then,
makes this statement so that, just as it speaks, so

151

ence
between the
objects of
different
scnses 7

ARISTOTLE

426 b ε 4 - Α ᾽ Vd ig Α + 2
οὕτω καὶ νοεῖ καὶ αἰσθάνεται. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐχ

iA
οἷόν re κεχωρισμένοις κρίνειν τὰ κεχωρισμένα,
~ Lid 3 Se οἱ ͵ / > ~
δῆλον" ὅτι δ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἐν κεχωρισμένῳ χρόνῳ, ἐντεῦθεν.
Ὁ ‘ A 5 \ / a ῳ A > \
ἢν ὥσπερ yap τὸ αὐτὸ λέγει ὅτι ἕτερον τὸ ἀγαθὸν
καὶ τὸ κακόν, οὕτω καὶ ὅτε θάτερον λέγει ὅτι
ig \ 4 2 s \ , ἢ
ἕτερον, καὶ θάτερον od κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς τὸ ὅτε
ῃ > : ia , ῳ “ ry , “
(λέγω δ᾽, οἷον νῦν λέγω ὅτι ἕτερον, οὐ μέντοι ὅτι
~ “ 2 3 a é Ἁ fol 1 ω
νῦν ἕτερον). ἀλλ᾽ οὕτω λέγει, καὶ νῦν, καὶ ὅτι
νῦν: ἅμα ἄρα. ὥστε ἀχώριστον καὶ ἐν ἀχωρίστῳ
3 x A 3 é a A 2 é
80 χρόνῳ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἀδύνατον dua τὰς ἐναντίας
A = , \
κινήσεις κινεῖσθαι τὸ αὐτὸ 4 ἀδιαίρετον καὶ ἐν
1) / i > A \ λ \ ὁδὲ a \
ἀδιαιρέτῳ χρόνῳ. εἰ γὰρ τὸ γλυκὺ ὡδὲ κινεῖ τὴν
iN \ >
ata αἴσθησιν ἢ τὴν νόησιν, τὸ δὲ πικρὸν ἐναντίως,
‘ ‘ \ Ἔν ὦ 2 > a A \
καὶ τὸ λευκὸν ἑτέρως. ἄρ᾽ οὖν dua μὲν καὶ
3 - > , \ 3 \ - -
ἀριθμῷ ἀδιαίρετον καὶ ἀχώριστον τὸ κρῖνον, τῷ
εἶναι δὲ κεχωρισμένον; ἔστι δή πως ὡς τὸ δι-
A ΄- Yd ¥. / με 3 €
αἱρετὸν τῶν διῃρημένων αἰσθάνεται, ἔστι δ᾽ ὡς ἡ
3 , “- A ‘ \
6 ἀδιαίρετον: τῷ εἶναι μὲν yap διαιρετόν, τόπῳ δὲ
\ > a 3 ἐν Ἂ 3 / 4
καὶ ἀριθμῷ ἀδιαίρετον, ἢ οὐχ οἷόν re; δυνάμει
\ ‘ \ a A > , -
μὲν γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἀδιαίρετον τἀναντία, τῷ δ᾽
Νὴ yw Ἰλλὰ - 3 na 8 ὃ , " +
εἶναι οὔ, ἀλλὰ τῷ ἐνεργεῖσθαι διαιρετόν, καὶ ody
/ a \ \ / τ 3 Ok
οἷόν re ἅμα λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν εἶναι, ὥστ᾽ οὐδὲ
A - ~
τὰ εἴδη πάσχειν αὐτῶν, ef τοιοῦτον ἡ αἴσθησις
Vf i, > 8 Ὁ a aT a
τὸ καὶ ἡ νόησις, ἀλλ’ ὥσπερ ἣν καλοῦσί τινες στιγμήν,
, 1 BY : 138 , 4 δ᾿
ἡ μία καὶ ἣ δύο, ταύτῃ καὶ διαιρετή. ἣ μὲν οὖν
10 é a A aes : A τ 4
ἀδιαίρετον, ἕν τὸ κρῖνόν ἐστι καὶ dua, ἧ δὲ

152

ON THE SOUL, ΠῚ. τι.

does it Judge and perceive. It is quite evident that
it is impossible to pass judgement on separate objects
by separate fuculties ; and it is also obvious that they
are not judged at separate times from the following
considerations. For just as the same faculty declares
that good and evil are different, so also when it de-
clares that one thing is different from another thing,
the ‘‘time when” is not merely incidental (in the
sense, that is, that ] now say that there is a difference,
but not that I say that there is now a difference). But
the faculty says now, and also that the difference is
now, and both statements are true at once. So the
judging sense must be inseparable, and also must
judge without aninterval. But, again, itis impossible
that the same faculty should be moved in opposite
directions at the same time, in so far as it is un-
divided, and in undivided time. For if the sweet
promotes sensation or understanding in one direc-
tion, and bitter in the opposite, white moves it in
a different direction altogether. Are we, then, to
suppose that the judging faculty is numerically in-
divisible and inseparable, but is divided in essence ?
It is, then, in its divisible nature that it perceives
divided things, and it is otherwise indivisible. For
it is divisible in essence, but indivisible spatially and
numerically. Or is this impossible? For the same
thing, then, becomes indivisible potentially, but not in
essence, but divisible actually ; but it is impossible
for anything to be black and white at the same time.
So that the forms of these things are not affected, if
sensation and understanding are of this kind. But
just as some men speak of a point as both one and
two, in this sense the point is divisible. In so far,
then, as the judging faculty is indivisible, it is one

153

ARISTOTLE

427 ἃ
διαιρετὸν ὑπάρχει, δὶς τῷ αὐτῷ χρῆται σημείῳ

ἅμα. ri μὲν οὖν δυσὶ χρῆται τῷ πέρατι, δύο
κρίνει, καὶ κεχωρισμένα ἐστὶν ὡς κεχωρισμένῳ""
wh δ᾽ ἕν, ἑνὶ καὶ ἅμα.
\ Ἶ > ἊΝ > a. f ‘ \ a ry

Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς ἀρχῆς ἡ φαμὲν τὸ ζῷον αἰσθη-
τικὸν εἶναι, διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον.

III. ᾿Επεὶ δὲ δύο διαφοραῖς ὁρίζονται μάλιστα
τὴν ψυχήν, κινήσει τε τῇ κατὰ τόπον καὶ τῷ νοεῖν
καὶ τῷ κρίνειν καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαι, δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ

0 νοεῖν καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν ὥσπερ αἰσθάνεσθαί τι εἶναι"
ἐν ἀμφοτέροις γὰρ τούτοις κρίνει τι ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ
~ 4 a \ -
γνωρίζει τῶν ὄντων, καὶ οἵ γε ἀρχαῖοι τὸ φρονεῖν
καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ταὐτὸν εἶναί φασιν, ὥσπερ καὶ
~ ‘ ~
᾿Ἐμπεδοκλῆς εἴρηκε “᾿ πρὸς παρεὸν γὰρ μῆτις
s/s > tA ye νον» Μ᾿ oom é
ἀέξεται ἀνθρώποισιν ᾿᾿ καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις “᾿ ὅθεν σφίσιν
2: 4 \ aA > a , 1) 4 3
a αἰεὶ καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν ἀλλοῖα παρίσταται." τὸ ὃ

> ‘ 4 uA 4 A ft / ae cal A
αὐτὸ τούτοις βούλεται καὶ τὸ “Ομήρου “ τοῖος yap
νόος ἐστίν. πάντες γὰρ οὗτοι τὸ νοεῖν σωμα-

" a \ >? 4 ς i / \
τικὸν ὥσπερ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ὑπόλαμβάνουσιν, καὶ
αἰσθάνεσθαί τε καὶ φρονεῖν τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον,
ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς λόγοις διωρίσαμεν.

uy “a a

410 Καίτοι ἔδει ἅμα καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἠπατῆσθαι αὐτοὺς
λέγειν: οἰκειότερον γὰρ τοῖς ζῴοις, καὶ πλείω

3 ~
χρόνον ἐν τούτῳ διατελεῖ ἡ ψυχή. διὸ ἀνάγκη
ἦτοι ὥσπερ ἔνιοι “λέγουσι, πάντα τὰ φαινόμενα
εἶναι ἀληθῆ, ἢ τὴν τοῦ ἀνομοίου θίξιν ἀπάτην
ὁ εἶναι’ τοῦτο γὰρ ἐναντίον τῷ τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον

Ef a x \ ¢
γνωρίζειν: δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀπάτη καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη

1 κεχωρισμένων B,

« Od. xviii. 136. δ Bk. I, ch, 2,
154

ON THE SOUL, ITI. 1.—11.

and instantaneous in action; but in so far as it is
divisible, it uses the same symbol twice at the same
time. Inso far, then, as it treats a limit as two things
it passes judgement on two, and judges of two distinet:
things in its capacity as distinct ; but in so far as it
judges of it as only one, it judges by one faculty and
at one time.

Concerning the principle in virtue of which we call
the living creature sensible, enough has been said.

(II. But since men generally define the soul by
two different faculties, movement in space on the one
hand, and thinking, judging and perceiving on the
other, they would seem to suppose that thinking
and considering are forms of perception ; for in both
cases the soul in a sense judges and has cognisance of
what exists, and the older philosophers actually assert
that thinking and perceiving are identical. For
instance Empedocles has said,“ Judgement will grow
with a man according to what appears to him,’’ and
in another passage ‘‘ whence their thinking continu-
ally appears to them in different forms.” Homer's
phrase, again, ‘‘ Such is the nature of man’s thought’’*
implies the same thing, Tor all these authors sup-
pose the process of thinking to be a bodily function
like perception, and that men both perccive and
recognize like by like, as we have explained at the
beginning of this treatise.» And yet they ought to
have made some mention of error at the same time ;
for error seems to be more natural to living creatures,
and the soul spends more time in it. From this
belief it will follow, as some say, that all things which
appear to man are true, or that error is contact with
the unlike; for this is the opposite to recognizing
like by like ; but it appears that error and knowledge

155

Rotation
between
seusetion

and
thinking,

ARISTOTLE

427 b - > ¥ ¢ Ry Ἂν ἣ wv Ν = > >
τῶν ἐναντίων ἡ αὐτὴ εἶναι. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐ ταὐ-

τόν ἐστι τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν, φανερόν"
τοῦ μὲν γὰρ πᾶσι μέτεστι, τοῦ δὲ ὀλίγοις τῶν
, 5 2 Oh \ A 2 p 3 ‘ ey as
ζῴων. ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ τὸ νοεῖν, ἐν ᾧ ἐστὶ τὸ ὀρθῶς
ιὸο καὶ τὸ μὴ ὀρθῶς, τὸ μὲν ὀρθῶς φρόνησις καὶ
> tf ay i > , ‘ \ a 2 -
ἐπιστήμη καὶ δόξα ἀληθής, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὀρθῶς
τἀναντία τούτων: οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἐστὶ ταὐτὸ τῷ
9 / ει ‘ A wv ra γ 5.
αἰσθάνεσθαι" ἡ μὲν γὰρ αἴσθησις τῶν ἰδίων ἀεὶ
ἀληθής, καὶ πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει τοῖς ζῴοις, διανοεῖσθαι
3 2 , 4 al \ > ¥ [3 ἐς 4
δ᾽ ἐνδέχεται καὶ ψευδῶς, καὶ οὐδενὶ ὑπάρχει ᾧ
ι μὴ καὶ λόγος" φαντασία γὰρ ἕτερον καὶ αἰσθήσεως
διανοίας" αὐτή τε οὐ γίγνεται ἄνευ αἰσθή-
σεως, καὶ ἄνευ ταύτης οὐκ ἔστιν ὑπόληψις. ὅτι
δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ αὐτὴ νόησις καὶ ὑπόληψις, φανερόν.

n ‘ / a
τοῦτο μὲν yap τὸ πάθος ἐφ᾽ ἡμῖν ἐστίν, ὅταν
βουλώμεθα (πρὸ ὀμμάτων γὰρ ἔστι ποιήσασθαι,
20 ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς μνημονικοῖς τιθέμενοι καὶ εἰδωλο-

~ 2 5
ποιοῦντες), δοξάζειν δ᾽ οὐκ ep ἡμῖν" ἀνάγκη γὰρ
\
ἢ ψεύδεσθαι ἢ ἀληθεύειν. ἔτι δὲ ὅταν μὲν δοξά-
td a
σωμεν δεινόν τι ἢ φοβερόν, εὐθὺς συμπάσχομεν,
ὁμοίως δὲ κἂν θαρραλέον: κατὰ δὲ τὴν φαντασίαν
ὡσαύτως ἔχομεν ὥσπερ ἂν οἱ θεώμενοι ἐν “γραφῇ
μ᾽ τὰ δεινὰ ἢ θαρραλέα. εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ αὐτῆς τῆς
ὑπολήψεως διαφοραΐ, ἐπιστήμη καὶ δόξα καὶ
φρόνησις καὶ τἀναντία τούτων, περὶ ὧν τῆς δια-
φορᾶς ἕτερος ἔστω λόγος.

Περὶ δὲ τοῦ νοεῖν, ἐπεὶ ἕτερον τοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι,
τούτου δὲ τὸ μὲν φαντασία δοκεῖ εἶναι τὸ δὲ

4 In normal cases if a man sees a red object, it is red.
156

ON THE SOUL, III. 11.

in the case of opposites are the same. Now it is
quite clear that the processes of feeling and thinking
are not the same; for all living creatures have a
share in the former, but only a few in the latter. Nor
is it right to suppose that in thinking, which may be
divided into correct and incorrect thinking, correct
thinking is wisdom and knowledge and true opinion,
and that incorrect thinking is the opposite of these ;
nor is this the same thing as perceiving ; for the per-
ception of individual things is always true,* and is a
characteristic of all living creatures, but it is possible
to think falsely, and this belongs to no animal which
has not reasoning power ; for imagination is different
both from perception and thought ; imagination does
not occur without perception, and without imagina-
tion there is no belief. But that thinking and be-
lieving are not identical is obvious. Yor the former
is an affection which lies in our power whenever we
choose (for it is possible to put things before our eyes,
just as those do who invent mnemonics and construct
images), but it is not in our power to form opinions
as we will; for we must either hold a false opinion
ora true one. Again, when we form an opinion that
something is threatening or frightening, we are im-
mediately affected by it, and the same is true of our
opinion of something that inspires courage ; but in
imagination we are like spectators looking at some-
thing dreadful or encouraging in a picture. There
are also differences in belief itself, knowledge,
opinion, thinking, and their opposites, but these
differences must be the subject of another discussion.”

As for thought, since it is distinct from perecption,
and is held to include both imagination and belief, it

>? Mth. Nic. 1139 Ὁ 15.
157

Tmagina-
jon.

ARISTOTLE

4210 c 2 A , ὃ ) us \
ὑπόληψις, περὶ φαντασίας διορίσαντας οὕτω περὶ

428 θατέρου λεκτέον. εἰ δή ἐστιν ἡ φαντασία καθ᾽
ἣν λέγομεν φάντασμά τι ἡμῖν γίγνεσθαι καὶ μὴ
εἴ τι κατὰ μεταφορὰν λέγομεν, μία τίς ἐστι τού-

Τὰ Ἢ Φ 5 a 7 3 3
τῶν δύναμις ἢ ἕξις, καθ᾽ ἣν κρίνομεν καὶ ἀλη-
θεύομεν ἢ ψευδόμεθα. τοιαῦται δ᾽ εἰσὶν αἴσθησις,
ἰδόξα, ἐπιστήμη, νοῦς. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστιν

wv ~ > ~ wt 4 AY ye
αἴσθησις, δῆλον ex τῶνδε. αἴσθησις μὲν yap ἤτοι
δύναμις ἢ ἐνέργεια, οἷον ὄψις καὶ ὅρασις, φαίνεται
δέ τι καὶ μηδετέρου ὑπάρχοντος τούτων, οἷον τὰ
ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις. εἶτα αἴσθησις μὲν ἀεὶ πάρεστι,
φαντασία δ᾽ οὔ. εἰ δὲ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ τὸ αὐτό, πᾶσιν
10 ἂν ἐνδέχοιτο τοῖς θηρίοις φαντασίαν ὑπάρχειν"
~ > La 4 ae , I i.
δοκεῖ δ᾽ οὔ, οἷον μύρμηκι ἢ μελίττῃ ἢ σκώληκι.
€ \ 2 “ ἣν € A ͵ ΄
εἶτα αἱ μὲν ἀληθεῖς αἰεί, αἱ δὲ φαντασίαι γίνονται
¢ , ~ » 2 3 \ / ae
αἱ πλείους ψευδεῖς, ἔπειτ᾽ οὐδὲ λέγομεν, ὅταν
ἐνεργῶμεν ἀκριβῶς περὶ τὸ αἰσθητόν, ὅτι φαίνεται
~ esa » > \ - Ὁ \ 2
τοῦτο ἡμῖν ἄνθρωπος" ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὅταν μὴ ev-
τὸ αργῶς αἰσθανώμεθα. καὶ ὅπερ δὲ ἐλέγομεν πρό-
τερον, φαίνεται καὶ μύουσιν ὁράματα. ἀλλὰ μὴν
LANG ~ Lan 3 / 3 , "
οὐδὲ τῶν ἀεὶ ἀληθευόντων οὐδεμία ἔσται, οἷον
ἐπιστήμη ἢ νοῦς" ἔστι γὰρ φαντασία καὶ ψευδής.
λείπεται ἄρα ἰδεῖν εἰ δόξα- γίνεται γὰρ δόξα καὶ
20 ἀληθὴς καὶ ψευδής, ἀλλὰ δόξῃ μὲν ἕπεται πίστις
" Κ 4 A é - A
(οὐκ ἐνδέχεται. yap So0€dlovra οἷς δοκεῖ μὴ
πιστεύειν), τῶν δὲ θηρίων οὐθενὲ ὑπάρχει πίστις,

ig \ a a δ A / 3
φαντασία δὲ πολλοῖς. ἔτι πάσῃ μὲν δόξῃ ἀκο-
λουθεῖ πίστις, πίστει δὲ τὸ πεπεῖσθαι, πειθοῖ δὲ
λόγος" τῶν δὲ θηρίων ἐνίοις φαντασία μὲν ὑπάρχει,
158

ON THE SOUL, III. mt.

will be best to discuss it after having completed our
definition of imagination. Jf imagination is the pro-
cess by which we say that an image is presented to
us, and not anything which we call imagination meta-
phorically, it is one of those faculties or states of mind
by which we judge and speak truly or falsely. Of
this kind are sensation, opinion, knowledge and mind.
It is clear from the following considerations that
imagination is not sensation. Sensation is cither
potential or actual, such as either vision or seeing,
but imagination oecurs when neither of these is
present, as when objects are scen in dreams.
Secondly, sensation is always present but imagination
is not. If sensation and imagination were identical
in activity, then imagination would be possible for
all wild animals ; and this appears not [0 be the case ;
for instance it is not true of the ant, the bee, or the
earthworm. Again, all sensations are true, but most
imaginations are false. So we do not say when we
are concerned with accurate observation of the sen-
sible object that this seems to us to be a man; but
only when we do uot perceive distinctly. And, as
we have said before, things are seen by men even
with their eyes shut. Nor is imagination one of the
faculties which always speaks the truth, such as
knowledge or mind; for imagination may be false.
It remains, then, to consider whether it is opinion ;
for opinion may be either true or false. But con-
viction follows opinion (for one cannot hold opinions
by which one is not convinced), but no animal has
conviction, but many have imagination. Again, con-
viction is associated with every opinion, being per-
suaded with conviction, and reason with conviction ;
but some wild animals have imagination, but none

159

488 8

80
428 b

1ῦ

ARISTOTLE

λόγος δ᾽ ov. φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι οὐδὲ δόξα μετ᾽
a ia 204 3 2 ‘a 2 Xx \
αἰσθήσεως, οὐδὲ δι’ αἰσθήσεως, οὐδὲ συμπλοκὴ
δόξης καὶ αἰσθήσεως φαντασία ἂν εἴη, διά τε
a 5 - 4 ᾽ uv 4 > {
ταῦτα καὶ δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἄλλου τινός ἐστιν ἡ
δό > 3 > ? 3 Ν Φ ἢ Ἶ ψ i
dfa, ἀλλ᾽ éxelvou ἐστὶν οὗ καὶ αἴσθησις" λέγω
δ᾽, ἐκ τῆς τοῦ λευκοῦ δόξης καὶ αἰσθήσεως ἡ
\ a 2 , 3 \ i > a ὔ
συμπλοκὴ φαντασία ἐστίν" οὐ γὰρ δὴ ἐκ τῆς δόξης
μὲν τῆς τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, αἰσθήσεως δὲ τῆς τοῦ λευκοῦ.
ΠῚ , yy \ , ῳ ἢ ,
τὸ οὖν φαίνεσθαί ἐστι τὸ δοξάζειν ὅπερ αἰσθάνεται
μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ψευδῆ,
ΠῚ fa eo? 3 a ἢ “- ,
περὶ ὧν ἅμα ὑπόληψιν ἀληθῆ ἔχει, οἷον φαίνεται
μὲν ὃ ἥλιος ποδιαῖος, πεπίστευται δ᾽ εἶναι μείζων
τῆς οἰκουμένης" συμβαίνει οὖν ἤτοι ἀποβεβλη-
, \ ε a 3 ~ , a /
κέναι τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀληθῆ δόξαν, ἣν εἶχε, σωζομένου
τοῦ πράγματος, μὴ ἐπιλαθόμενον μηδὲ μεταπει-
rd Ἢ > uv μὰ 3 4 \ 3 \ 3 ~
σθέντα, ἢ εἰ ἔτι ἔχει, ἀνάγκη τὴν αὐτὴν ἀληθῆ
εἶναι καὶ ψευδῆ. ἀλλὰ ψευδὴς ἐγένετο, ὅτε λάθοι
μεταπεσὸν τὸ πρᾶγμα. οὔτ᾽ ἄρα ἕν τι τούτων
ἐστὶν οὔτ᾽ ἐκ τούτων ἡ φαντασία.
᾿Αλλ’ ἐπειδή ἐστι κινηθέντος τουδὲ κινεῖσθαι
ἕτερον ὑπὸ τούτου, ἡ δὲ φαντασία κίνησίς τις
δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ οὐκ ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως γίγνεσθαι ἀλλ᾽
αἰσθανομένοις καὶ ὧν αἴσθησις ἐστίν, ἔστι δὲ
γίνεσθαι κίνησιν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐνεργείας τῆς αἰσθή-
σεως, καὶ ταύτην ὁμοίαν ἀνάγκη εἶναι τῇ αἰσθήσει,
εἴη ἂν αὕτη ἡ κίνησις οὔτε ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως ἐνδε-
χομένη οὔτε μὴ αἰσθανομένοις ὑπάρχειν, καὶ πολλὰ
κατ᾽ αὐτὴν καὶ ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν τὸ ἔχον, καὶ
εἶναι καὶ ἀληθῆ καὶ ψευδῆ. τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει
160

ON THE SOUL, {Π1. 1m.

has reasoning power. It is clear, then, that neither
does opinion exist in conjunction with perception, nor
does itarise through perception, nor could imagination
be a blending of opinion and sensation, and therefore
it is clear that opinion is not concerned with anything
else, but belongs to that to which sensation belongs ;
I mean that imagination is a compound of an opinion
of white with a sensation of white ; it could not be
compounded of an opinion of good with a sensation of
white. In that case imagination would be the forming
of a direct opinion upon what we perccive not inci-
dentally. But it is possible for things to have a false
appearance about which we have a true belief; for in-
stance the sun appearsto measure a foot across, but we
are convinced that it is greater than the inhabited
globe ; imagination appears, then, in this case cither to
have rejected the true opinion which it had, without any
alteration in the thing itself, and without our forgetting
or changing our minds, or, if we still hold our view,
then the same opinion must be both true and false.
A true opinion of course becomes false when we do
not see that the facts have changed. Imagination, then,
is not one of these things, nor a compound of them.
But since when a particular thing is moved another
thing may be moved byit, and since imagination seems
to be some kind of movement, and not to occur apart
from sensation, but only to men when perceiving, and
in connexion with what they perceive, and since move-
ment is caused by the activity of sensation, and this
activity must be similar to the sensation, thismovement
would be impossible without sensation, and could not
exist in insentient beings, and in the light of it the pos-
sessor acts and is acted upon in many ways, and these
effects may be both true and false. This occurs for the

M 161

The region
of error.

ARISTOTLE

428 b s a τ ” - 5 brows a 4 y
διὰ τάδε. ἡ αἴσθησις τῶν μὲν ἰδίων ἀληθής ἐστιν

ἢ ὅτι ὀλίγιστον ἔχουσα τὸ ψεῦδος. δεύτερον δὲ
90 τοῦ συμβεβηκέναι ταῦτα" καὶ ἐνταῦθα ἤδη ἐνδέ-
χεταυν διαψεύδεσθαι" ὅτι μὲν γὰρ λευκόν, οὐ ψεύ-
δεται, εἰ δὲ τοῦτο τὸ λευκὸν ἢ ἄλλο τι, ψεύδεται.
τρίτον δὲ τῶν κοινῶν καὶ ἑπομένων τοῖς συμ-
δὶ ε ca Ν by , + ἐν
βεβηκόσιν, οἷς ὑπάρχει τὰ dia’ λέγω δ᾽ οἷον
κίνησις καὶ μέγεθος, ἃ συμβέβηκε τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς,
25 περὶ ἃ μάλιστα ἤδη ἔστιν ἀπατηθῆναι κατὰ τὴν
αἴσθησιν. ἡ δὲ κίνησις ἡ ὑπὸ τῆς ἐνεργείας γινο-
μένη διοίσει τῆς αἰσθήσεως τῆς ἀπὸ τούτων τῶν
eal é
τριῶν αἰσθήσεων. καὶ ἡ μὲν πρώτη παρούσης
~ ,
τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἀληθής, αἱ δ᾽ ἕτεραι καὶ παρούσης
a εἰ cd
καὶ ἀπούσης elev ἂν ψευδεῖς, καὶ μάλιστα ὅταν
, ἣν > iy >? πα \ A ΜΝ
80 πόρρω τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἧ. εἰ οὖν μηθὲν μὲν ἄλλο
ΜΝ \ 2 t at x ἐς ~ ? 2? \
4298 ἔχει TA εἰρημενα ἢ μὴ φαντασίαν, τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶ
τὸ λεχθέν, ἡ φαντασία ἂν εἴη κίνησις ὑπὸ τῆς
od > ‘
αἰσθήσεως τῆς κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν γιγνομένης. ἐπεὶ
δ᾽ ἡ ὄψις μάλιστα αἴσθησίς ἐστι, καὶ τὸ ὄνομα
3 1 a 4 w a 9, ‘ ἢ μ᾽
ἀπὸ τοῦ φάους εἴληφεν, ὅτι ἄνευ φωτὸς οὐκ ἔστιν
εἰδεῖν. καὶ διὰ τὸ ἐμμένειν καὶ ὁμοίως εἶναι ταῖς
αἰσθήσεσι, πολλὰ κατ᾽ αὐτὰς πράττει τὰ ζῷα, τὰ
μὲν διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν νοῦν, οἷον τὰ θηρία, τὰ δὲ
διὰ τὸ ἐπικαλύπτεσθαι τὸν νοῦν ἐνίοτε πάθει ἢ
νόσοις ἢ ὕπνῳ, οἷον οἱ ἄνθρωποι. περὶ μὲν οὖν
φαντασίας, τί ἔστι καὶ διὰ τί ἐστιν, εἰρήσθω ἐπὶ
τοσοῦτον.
᾿ ΙΝ. Περὶ δὲ τοῦ μορίου τοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς ᾧ γινώ-
σκει τε ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ φρονεῖ, εἴτε χωριστοῦ ὄντος
162

ON THE SOUL, IU). ττ|.---ἶν.

following reasons. The sensation of particular things
is true, or is only capable of error io the least possible
degree. In the second place perception recognizes
that these things are accidental, and therefore there
is a possibility of error; for perception does not err
in perceiving that this is white, but only us to whether
it is this white object or another. Thirdly, sensation
is of properties, which are shared and follow the
accidental qualities to which the individual things
belong; I mean such things as movement and size,
which are accidental properties of sensible objects,
concerning which it is emphatically possible to be
deceived in sense. But the movement produced by
the activity will differ from the sensation which arises
from these three senses. The first is true whenever
the sensation is present, but the others may be false
both when it is present and when it is absent, and
especially when the sensible object is at a distance.
If, then, the facts stated involve the presence of
nothing but imagination, and if this is as we have
described, then imagination would be a movement
produced by sensation actively operating. But since
vision is pre-eminently sensation, the name φαντασία
(imagination) is derived from φάος (Hight), because
without light it is impossible tosee. Again, because
imagination resides within us and corresponds with
the senses, living creatures frequently act in accord-
ance with them, sometimes because they have no
mind, like the wild animals, and sometimes the mind
is temporarily clouded over by feeling, or disease, or
sleep, as in man. Let this suffice about the nature
and cause of imagination.
IV. Concerning that part of the soul with which Feeling and

it knows and thinks, whether it is separable, or not Bins

analogous,

ARISTOTLE

429 a u 4 4 ~ \ / 6 LAA G ‘
εἴτε καὶ μὴ χωριστοῦ κατὰ μέγεθος ἀλλὰ κατὰ

, , > ΄ \ A 4
λόγον, σκεπτέον τίν᾽ ἔχει διαφοράν, καὶ πῶς ποτὲ
γίνεται τὸ νοεῖν. εἰ δή ἐστι τὸ νοεῖν ὥσπερ τὸ

, ~ “-
αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἢ πάσχειν τι ἂν εἴη ὑπὸ τοῦ νοητοῦ
10 ἢ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον. ἀπαθὲς ἄρα δεῖ εἶναι, δεκτι-
κὸν δὲ τοῦ εἴδους καὶ δυνάμει τοιοῦτον ἀλλὰ μὴ
τοῦτο, καὶ ὁμοίως ἔχειν, ὥσπερ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν
πρὸς τὰ αἰσθητά, οὕτω τὸν νοῦν πρὸς τὰ νοητά.
ἀνάγκη ἄρα, ἐπεὶ πάντα νοεῖ, ἀμιγῆ εἶναι, ὥσπερ

\ 3 / a ~ fol > ἢ | ο
φησὶν ᾿Αναξαγόρας, ἵνα κρατῇ, τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἵνα

ἃ ΄ \ Av: \ ἰλλό
29 γνωρίζῃ" παρεμφαινόμενον γὰρ κωλύει τὸ ἀλλό-

“Ὁ “

τριον καὶ ἀντιφράττει, ὥστε μηδ᾽ αὐτοῦ εἶναι

, , 5λλ} 4 , σ΄ n ε
φύσιν μηδεμίαν ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ταύτην, ὅτι δυνατόν. ὁ

, ~ “ ~
dpa καλούμενος τῆς ψυχῆς νοῦς (λέγω δὲ νοῦν ᾧ
διανοεῖται καὶ ὑπολαμβάνει ἡ ψυχή) οὐθέν ἐστιν
ἐνεργείᾳ τῶν ὄντων πρὶν νοεῖν. διὸ οὐδὲ μεμῖχθαι
25 εὔλογον αὐτὸν τῷ σώματι' ποιός τις γὰρ ἂν
A δ Ν᾿ a
γίγνοιτο, ψυχρὸς ἢ θερμός, ἢ κἂν ὄργανόν τι εἴη,
ὥσπερ τῷ αἰσθητικῷ" νῦν δ᾽ οὐθέν ἐστιν. καὶ εὖ
\ ~
δὴ of λέγοντες THY ψυχὴν εἶναι τόπον εἰδῶν, πλὴν
>
ὅτι οὔτε ὅλη ἀλλ᾽ ἡ νοητική, οὔτε ἐντελεχείᾳ ἀλλὰ
, δ ow Ὁ ? > - 4 ¢€ 9 , a
go δυνάμει τὰ εἴδη. ὅτι δ᾽ οὐχ ὁμοία ἡ ἀπάθεια τοῦ
αἰσθητικοῦ καὶ τοῦ νοητικοῦ, φανερὸν ἐπὶ τῶν
,
αἰσθητηρίων καὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως. ἡ μὲν γὰρ
4290 αἴσθησις οὐ δύναται αἰσθάνεσθαι ἐκ τοῦ σφόδρα
αἰσθητοῦ, οἷον ψόφου ἐκ τῶν μεγάλων ψόφων, οὐδ᾽

164

ΟΝ THE SOUL, 111. τν.

separable actually but only in thought, we have to
consider what is its distinguishing characteristic, and
how the process of thinking arises. If the process of
thinking is analogous to feeling, it must be something
acted on by the thing thought, or something else of a
similar kind. It must (accurately speaking) be not
acted upon, but receptive of the form, and potentially
of this character though not actually so, and the
relation of the thinking capacity to the thing thought
must be similar to the relation between the feeling
capacity and the thing felt. It is necessary then,
seeing that it thinks all thoughts, for it to be un-
mixed, as Anaxagoras says, in order that it may be
in control, that is, that it may know ; for otherwise
the foreign body, if it obtruded itself, would hinder
and exclude, so that the mind in itself can have no
characteristic except its capacity to receive. ‘That
part of the soul, then, which we call mind (by mind I
mean that part by which the soul thinks and attains
belief) has no actual existence until it thinks. So it
is unreasonable to suppose that it is mixed with the
body ; for in that case it would have a quality of
some kind, e.g. hot or cold, or would be an organ of
some kind, as is the case with what perceives. But,
as it is, it has no existence. It has been well said
that the soul is the place of forms, except that this
does not apply to the soul as a whole, but only in its
thinking capacity, and the forms are not actual but
only potential. But that the perceptive and thinking
faculties are not alike in their incapacity to be acted
upon is obvious in the case of the sense organs and
sensation. Jor the sense cannot feel at all under the
action of a too violent sensible object; for instance
sounds are not heard when they are loud, and neither

165

ARISTOTLE

429 Ὁ
~ ~ é \ ᾿ cat x A
ἐκ τῶν ἰσχυρῶν χρωμάτων καὶ ὀσμῶν οὔτε ὁρᾶν

οὔτε ὀσμᾶσθαι: ἀλλ᾽ ὃ νοῦς ὅταν τι νοήσῃ σφόδρα
νοητόν, οὐχ ἧττον νοεῖ τὰ ὑποδεέστερα, ἀλλὰ καὶ
ὁ μᾶλλον" τὸ μὲν γὰρ αἰσθητικὸν οὐκ ἄνευ σώματος,
Ἔ sy ) a > [2 oe ͵
6 δὲ χωριστός. ὅταν δ᾽ οὕτως ἕκαστα γένηται
Φ Ε] ͵ td c 3 δ τον ~ 4
ὡς ἐπιστήμων λέγεται ὃ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν (τοῦτο δὲ
i ῳ ͵ > a 3 e Fal ”
συμβαίνει, ὅταν δύνηται ἐνεργεῖν δι᾿ αὑτοῦ), ἔστι
μὲν, καὶ τότε δυνάμει πως, οὐ μὴν ὁμοίως καὶ
πρὶν μαθεῖν ἢ εὑρεῖν: καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ αὐτὸν τότε
10 δύναται νοεῖν.

"Emel δ᾽ ἄλλο ἐστὶ τὸ μέγεθος καὶ τὸ μεγέθει
εἶναι καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ ὕδατι εἶναι: οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἐφ᾽
coy ~ 2) 5? 3 24 , 29 oe
ἑτέρων πολλῶν, GAN οὐκ ἐπὶ πάντων" ἐπ᾽ ἐνίων

\ > 4 > δ " ἷ \ / δ nn ἄλλ.
γὰρ ταὐτόν ἐστι τὸ σαρκὶ εἶναι καὶ σάρκα" ἢ ἄλλῳ
bb » ” ἐ ¢ A \ > » o
ἢ ἄλλως ἔχοντι κρίνει" ἡ yap σὰρξ οὐκ ἄνευ τῆς
a a 3 [2 4 ἅ , ¥ ~ ~
ὕλης, GAN ὥσπερ τὸ σιμὸν τόδε ἐν τῷδε. τῷ

\ μ᾿ ? - \ A \ iN \ ͵

15 μὲν οὖν αἰσθητικῷ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν κρίνει,
καὶ ὧν λόγος τις ἡ σάρξ' ἄλλῳ δὲ ἤτοι Ὁ
γος τις ἡ σάρ ῳ δὲ ἤτοι χωριστῷ,
ΩΣ - < f » ‘ ε \ Ὁ 3 ~
ἢ ὡς ἡ κεκλασμένη ἔχεν πρὸς αὑτὴν ὅταν ἐκταθῇ,
τὸ σαρκὶ εἶναι κρίνει. πάλιν δ᾽ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν ἀφ-
αἱρέσει ὄντων τὸ εὐθὺ ὡς τὸ σιμόν' μετὰ συνεχοῦς
80 γάρ' τὸ δὲ τί ἦν εἶναι, εἰ ἔστιν ἕτερον τὸ εὐθεῖ
εἶναι καὶ τὸ εὐθὺ ἄλλῳ’ ἔστω γὰρ δυάς. ἑτέρῳ
x” Ad ¢ f » rs \ bul av ¢
apa ἢ ἑτέρως ἔχοντι κρίνει. καὶ ὅλως dpa ὡς

1 ἔστι μὲν ὁμοίως By
166

ON THE SOUL, III. ww.

seeing nor smelling is possible when colour and scents
are strong; but when the mind thinks an intense
thought, it is not less able to think of slighter things,
but even more able ; for the faculty of sense is not
apart from the body, whereas the mind is separable.
But when the mind has achieved the power of
thinking all thoughts, as the learned man when
active is said to have done (and this happens,
when he can exercise his functions by himself),
even then the mind is in a sense potential, though
not quite in the same way as before it learned and
discovered ; and so, then, the mind is capable of
thinking itself.

Now size conerete and size in the abstract are
different things, so is water and wateriness; andso also
in many other cases but not in all; for instance at
times fleshiness and flesh are the same thing; the mind
then judges these by a different faculty, or by a
faculty in a different condition ; for flesh cannot exist
without its matter, but just like “ snub-nosed ”’ is
a definite form in a definite matter. Now it is by
the perceptive faculty that sense judges hot and cold,
and all the things of which flesh is the explanation ;
but it is by a different sense, either quite distinct, or
related to it in the same way as a bent line to itself
when pulled out straight, that we judge what fleshi-
ness is; again, among abstractions straightness is
similar to snub-nosed, for it is always combined with
extension; but its essential nature, if ὁ straight ”
and “ straightness ”’ are different things, it judges by
another sense. We may grant that its definition is
the number Two; but in that case it judges by
another faculty, or by the same faculty in a different
condition. And speaking generally, as objects are

167

ARISTOTLE

429 b :
χωριστὰ τὰ πράγματα τῆς ὕλης, οὕτω Kal τὰ περὶ

τὸν νοῦν.

᾿Απορήσειε δ᾽ dv τις, εἰ ὁ νοῦς ἁπλοῦν ἐστὶ καὶ
5 4 4 ν Loo , ev ‘
ἀπαθὲς καὶ μηθενὶ μηθὲν ἔχει κοινόν, ὥσπερ φησὶν
0 ᾿Αναξαγόρας, πῶς νοήσει, εἰ τὸ νοεῖν πάσχειν τί
ἐστιν. ἣ γάρ τι κοινὸν ἀμφοῖν ὑπάρχει, τὸ μὲν
ποιεῖν δοκεῖ τὸ δὲ πάσχειν. ἔτι δ᾽ εἰ νοητὸς καὶ
ΕἸ τὰ nn x a » Ἑ ~ ia 4 ΕΣ \
αὐτός. ἢ yap τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁ νοῦς ὑπάρξει (εἰ μὴ

> » > \ , a. f \ \ ""
κατ᾽ ἄλλο αὐτὸς νοητός, ἕν δέ τι τὸ νοητὸν εἴδει),
ἢ μεμιγμένον τι ἕξει, ὃ ποιεῖ νοητὸν αὐτὸν ὥσπερ
0 τἄλλα. ἢ τὸ μὲν πάσχειν κατὰ κοινόν τι διήρηται
εἶ -
πρότερον, ὅτι δυνάμει πώς ἐστι τὰ νοητὰ ὁ νοῦς,

ἰλλ᾽ ὔ 38 , ᾿" μ᾿ ~ 8 “- δ᾽ Ὁ
ἀλλ᾽ ἐντελεχείᾳ οὐδέν, πρὶν ἂν νοῇ. δεῖ δ᾽ οὕτως
oe ,
4808 ὥσπερ ἐν γραμματείῳ ᾧ μηθὲν ὑπάρχει ἐντελεχείᾳ
γεγραμμένον. ὅπερ συμβαίνει ἐπὶ τοῦ νοῦ. καὶ
αὐτὸς δὲ νοητός ἐστιν ὥσπερ τὰ νοητά. ἐπὶ μὲν
γὰρ τῶν ἄνευ ὕλης τὸ αὐτό ἐστι τὸ νοοῦν καὶ τὸ
5 νοούμενον! ἡ γὰρ ἐπιστήμη ἡ θεωρητικὴ καὶ τὸ
οὕτως ἐπιστητὸν τὸ αὐτό ἐστιν: τοῦ δὲ μὴ ἀεὶ
νοεῖν τὸ αἴτιον ἐπισκεπτέον. ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἔχουσιν
ὕλην δυνάμει ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῶν νοητῶν. ὥστ᾽

? ͵ 3 < td ~ », \ τ
ἐκείνοις μὲν οὐχ ὑπάρξει νοῦς (ἄνευ γὰρ ὕλης
δύναμις 6 νοῦς τῶν τοιούτων), ἐκείνῳ δὲ τὸ νοητὸν

ὑπάρξει,

4“ This and the succeeding sentence are not very satis-
factory; but A. is apparently arguing that if mind is sud
generis it cannot be an object of thought, for this would put
it in the same class as other objects of thought,

> Of. Met. xi. 7 and 9.

168

ON THE SOUL, III. w.

separable from their matter so also are the functions
of the mind.

One might, then, raise the question, if the mind is a Two

simple thing, and not liable to be acted upon, and has Problems:
nothing in common with anything elsc, as Anaxagoras
says, how will it think, if thinking is a form of being (1) Mow doos
acted upon? For in so far as there is something in Po μιὰ
it common to both, it seems partly acting and partly
being acted upon. And our second problem is ΟΝ ele
whether the mind itself can be an object of thought. δ Ϊδοὺ Οἵ
4 Vor either Lhe mind will belong to the same category "hought?
as other objects (if, that is, mind is an object of thought
in itself and not in virtue of something else, what is
thought being always identical in form), or else it
will contain some mixed element, which makes it an
object of thought like other things. Or there is the
explanation which we have given before of the phrase
“being acted upon in virtue of some common
element,” that the objects of thought and the mind
are potentially identical but not actually so, until the
mind thinks. 'Fhis would be in the same sense as
when we say that a tablet which is empty is potentially
written upon ; which actually occurs in the case of the
mind. I+ is, then, itself an object of thought, just like
other objects of thought.® For in the case of things
without matter the process of thinking and being
thought are the same ; just as speculative thinking is
thesame thing as the object speculatively thought; but
we must consider the cause of our not always thinking.
But among things having matter potentially, each is
an object of thought. So that mind will not belong
to the object thought (for mind in such cases is
potential and without matter), but the object of
thought will belong to the mind.

169

ARISTOTLE

430 a
~ ;
10 Υ, Ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ὥσπερ ἐν ἁπάσῃ τῇ φύσει ἐστί τι

\ 4 a ε é i n δὲ a“ ἃ
τὸ μὲν ὕλη ἑκάστῳ γένει (τοῦτο δὲ ὃ πάντα
δυνάμει ἐκεῖνα), ἕτερον δὲ τὸ αἴτιον καὶ ποιητικόν,

a f τ
τῷ ποιεῖν πάντα, οἷον ἡ τέχνη πρὸς τὴν ὕλην

im. - ~ a
πέπονθεν, ἀνάγκη καὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὑπάρχειν ταύτας
2; ᾿ ~ ~ -
τὰς διαφοράς. καὶ ἔστιν ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος νοῦς τῷ
16 πάντα γίνεσθαι, ὁ δὲ τῷ πάντα ποιεῖν, ὡς ἕξις
τις, οἷον τὸ φῶς" τρόπον γάρ τινα καὶ τὸ φῶς
ποιεῖ τὰ δυνάμει ὄντα χρώματα ἐνεργείᾳ χρώματα.
καὶ οὗτος ὁ νοῦς χωριστὸς καὶ ἀπαθὴς καὶ ἀμιγὴς
τῇ οὐσίᾳ ὧν ἐνεργείᾳ. ἀεὶ γὰρ τιμιώτερον τὸ
~ - > 4 Lod 4
ποιοῦν τοῦ πάσχοντος Kal ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς ὕλης. τὸ

> 3 > ~ U

20 δ᾽ αὐτό ἐστιν ἡ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν ἐπιστήμη τῷ πράγ-
/ / ~

ματι: ἡ δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν χρόνῳ προτέρα ἐν τῷ
<7 a ‘ ? f a > > Ls ‘© 4 a « ‘
ἑνί, ὅλως δὲ οὐ χρόνῳ" ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὁτὲ μὲν νοεῖ ὁτὲ

3 * ral \ > > " / ag ω
δ᾽ οὐ νοεῖ. χωρισθεὶς δ᾽ ἐστὶ μόνον τοῦθ᾽ ὅπερ

~ ᾿
ἐστί, καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀΐδιον. οὐ
“- Ν

μνημονεύομεν δέ, ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν ἀπαθές, ὁ δὲ

\ -“"Ἤ / \ Ea a ΔΑ

86 παθητικὸς νοῦς φθαρτός, καὶ ἄνευ τούτου οὐθὲν
VOEL,

VI. Ἢ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἀδιαιρέτων νόησις ἐν τούτοις,

+a ΑἹ a ‘ fos > t sy \ ‘ “

περὶ ἃ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ ψεῦδος" ἐν οἷς δὲ καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος

a A > ’ὔ ΄ iJ ww 4 ce
καὶ τὸ ἀληθές, σύνθεσίς τις ἤδη νοημάτων ὥσπερ
a. ~ -
ἕν ὄντων, καθάπερ ᾿Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ἔφη “᾿ ἧἦ πολλῶν

80 μὲν κόρσαι ἀναύχενες ἐβλάστησαν, ἔπειτα συν-

’, - a
τίθεσθαι TH φιλίᾳ. οὕτω καὶ ταῦτα κεχωρισμένα
συντίθεται, οἷον τὸ ἀσύμμετρον καὶ ἡ διάμετρος,

é ty
420b dv δὲ γινομένων ἣ ἐσομένων, τὸν χρόνον προσ-
170

ON THE SOUL, IL v.—vr.

V. But since in all nature each class has its matter Mind active

(this is what they all are potentially), and separate *"4 pssive.
from this is the cause and the agent, in virtue of its
making all things, just as art is related to its matter,
so similar distinctions must exist in the soul. Mind
is then of one kind in virtue of its becoming every-
thing, and of another by making everything, as
a state like light: for in a sense light makes
what are potentially colours into actual colours.
And this mind when acting is separable, not acted
upon and unmixed in its essence. For acting upon
is always superior to being acted upon, and the final
cause superior to the matter. But knowledge, when
acting, is identical with its object. ‘The potential is
prior in time to the actual in a single individual, but
speaking generally it is not prior in time ; the mind
does not think at times, and at other times not think,
But it only realizes its true nature when it is separ-
ated, and this is the only time when it is immortal
and everlasting. We do not remember because the
mind in this sense cannot be acted upon, but the
mind which is acted upon is perishable and without
this does not think.

VI. Thinking of indivisible units occurs among Individual
things concerning which there is no possibility of 4), 44
falsehood ; in cases where truth and falsehood are concepta.
possible, there is a compounding of thoughts made
into a fresh unity, as Empedocles said, “ whereby
the heads of many beings grew without necks,” and
then were joined together by Love. So also these
separate entities are combined, as for instance the
incommensurable and the diagonal. But if the’
thinking is concerned with things becoming or about
to exist, then in its thought it adds and combines

171

ARISTOTLE

430 b ~ 4 2 ‘ 4 ~ 3
ἐννοῶν καὶ συντιθείς. τὸ yap ψεῦδος ἐν συν-

a \
θέσει del καὶ yap ἂν τὸ λευκὸν μὴ λευκόν, τὸ
Η f
μὴ λευκὸν συνέθηκεν. ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ διαίρεσιν
φάναι πάντα. ἀλλ᾽ οὖν ἔστι γε οὐ μόνον τὸ ψεῦδος
5% ἀληθές, ὅτι λευκὸς λέων ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτι
ἣν ἣ ἔσται. τὸ δὲ ἕν ποιοῦν, τοῦτο ὁ νοῦς ἕκαστον.
Τὸ δ᾽ ἀδιαίρετον ἐπεὶ διχῶς, ἢ δυνάμει ἢ
> Rd ΕΣ 4 oF - 4; LO , Lia
ἐνεργείᾳ, οὐθὲν κωλύει νοεῖν τὸ ἀδιαίρετον, ὅταν
νοῇ τὸ μῆκος" ἀδιαίρετον γὰρ ἐνεργείᾳ καὶ ἐν
; A
χρόνῳ ἀδιαιρέτῳ" ὁμοίως yap ὁ χρόνος διαιρετὸς
Ea > “- >
10 καὶ ἀδιαίρετος τῷ μήκει. οὔκουν ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ἐν
- Β΄. , 2 ~ ¢ 2 νὴ ΄ Η Ἃ
τῷ ἡμίσει τί ἐννοεῖ ἑκατέρῳ" οὐ γάρ ἐστιν, ἂν
~ 3 ᾿ a \ > ¢
μὴ διαιρεθῇ, GAN ἢ δυνάμει. χωρὶς δ᾽ ἑκάτερον
~ i a Lf
νοῶν τῶν ἡμίσεων διαιρεῖ καὶ τὸν χρόνον dua:
2 ε 3
τότε δ᾽ οἷονεὶ μήκη. εἰ δ᾽ ὡς ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, καὶ ἐν
“ Z. “A 3.3 > φ a
τῷ χρόνῳ τῷ ἐπ᾽ ἀμφοῖν.
1 Τὸ δὲ μὴ κατὰ ποσὸν ἀδιαίρετον ἀλλὰ τῷ εἴδει
a Lo / ΄ \ 10 ,ὔ ~ Lan
voet ἐν ἀδιαιρέτῳ χρόνῳ καὶ ἀδιαιρέτῳ τῆς ψυχῆς
‘ A / 4 2 Ὁ Η ~ ἢ
κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δέ, καὶ οὐχ ἡ ἐκεῖνα διαιρετά,
ᾧ νοεῖ καὶ ἐν ᾧ χρόνῳ, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ ἀδιαίρετα" ἔνεστι
A > af 5 ) 3 > " 2
γὰρ κἀν τούτοις τι ἀδιαίρετον, ἀλλ᾽ ἴσως οὐ
- ἢ a
χωριστόν, ὃ ποιεῖ ἕνα τὸν χρόνον Kal τὸ μῆκος.
) δθ᾽ duol ,», ψ᾿ ,» a a \
80 καὶ τοῦθ᾽ ὁμοίως ἐν ἅπαντί ἐστι τῷ συνεχεῖ καὶ
4 ¢ a
χρόνῳ καὶ μήκει. ἡ δὲ στιγμὴ Kal πᾶσα διαίρεσις,
Ἑ A Ὁ 3 ? ~ LA ε
καὶ τὸ οὕτως ἀδιαίρετον, δηλοῦται. ὥσπερ ἡ
172

ON THE SOUL, III. vr.

the notion of time. For falschood always lies in the
process of combination, for if a man calls white
not-white, he has combined the notion not-white. It
is equally possible to say that everything involves
division. Butit is not merely truce or false to say that
Cleon is white, but we must add that he was or will be.
But the principle which unifies is in every case the
mind.

But because the indivisible has two senses— Itndiviaible
potential or actual—there is nothing to prevent the ΑΣΑ Εν
mind from thinking of the indivisible when it thinks
of length ; for it is in actuality indivisible, and is in
indivisible time. Time is also both divisible and in-
divisible in the same sense as length. So it is im-
possible to say what the mind thinks in each half of
the time ; for it has no existence, unless it is divided,
except potentially. But by thinking of each of the
halves separately, it divides the time and the line as
well, and then thinks of the line as two lengths.
But if the mind is thinking of the line as composed of
two halves, so also it is considering the time as com-
posed of two halves.

But when the object of thought is not quanti-
tatively indivisible, but only in form, the mind thinks
of it in indivisible time, and with the indivisible
faculty of the soul; but incidentally this whole is
divisible, not in the sense in which the faculty used
and the time are divisible, but in the sense in which
they are indivisible ; for there is an indivisible ele-
ment even in these, though perhaps incapable of
separate existence, which makes the line and the
length one. And this is equally true of every con-
tinuous thing whether time or length. A point and
every sort of division and everything undivided in this

173

ARISTOTLE

430 b Seas
στέρησις. Kal ὅμοιος ὁ λόγος ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων,

~ A 4 δὲ a zx é ~
οἷον πῶς τὸ κακὸν γνωρίζει ἢ τὸ μέλαν: τῷ
ἐναντίῳ γάρ πως γνωρίζει. δεῖ δὲ δυνάμει εἶναι
τὸ γνωρίζον καὶ ἐνεῖναι ἐν αὐτῷ. εἰ δέ τινι μή
a ἐστιν ἐναντίον, αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ γινώσκει καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ
ἐστὶ καὶ χωριστόν. ἔστι δ᾽ ἡ μὲν φάσις τι κατά
we e 2 " 3 Α Ail ‘Y
τινος, ὥσπερ ἡ κατάφασις, καὶ ἀληθὴς ἢ ψευδὴς
πᾶσα" ὁ δὲ νοῦς οὐ πᾶς, ἀλλ᾽ ὁ τοῦ τί ἐστι κατὰ
τὸ τί ἣν εἶναι ἀληθής, καὶ οὐ τὶ κατά τινος- ἀλλ᾽
o 4 ¢ Pal “- 3 ὔ 5 ͵ὕ > ᾿" wv
80 ὥσπερ TO ὁρᾶν τοῦ ἰδίου ἀληθές, εἰ δ᾽ ἄνθρωπος
4 \ at ν᾿ ἣ > λ ? - Ὁ ” 7
τὸ λευκὸν ἢ μή, οὐκ ἀληθὲς ἀεί, οὕτως ἔχει ὅσα
dvev ὕλης.
\ ? ἣν ΓΕ | ε oe ; > ᾽
asia VII. Τὸ δ᾽ αὐτὸ ἐστιν ἡ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν ἐπιστήμη
- ¢ 4
τῷ πράγματι. ἡ δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν χρόνῳ προτέρα
2 ~ |e ἢ ὅλ δὲ ἡδὲ , Bi uw AY ἐξ >
ἐν τῷ ἑνί, ὅλως δὲ οὐδὲ χρόνῳ" ἔστι yap ἐξ ἐν-
, ΩΣ ra A 7 é ν᾿
τελεχείᾳ ὄντος πάντα τὰ γιγνόμενα. φαίνεται δὲ
Ν ’ a ~ > ~
5 τὸ μὲν αἰσθητὸν ἐκ δυνάμει ὄντος τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ
ἐνεργείᾳ ποιοῦν: οὐ γὰρ πάσχει οὐδ᾽ ἀλλοιοῦται.
διὸ ἄλλο εἶδος τοῦτο κινήσεως" ἡ γὰρ κίνησις τοῦ
3 fo Ἵ i ¢ ? if “n > ͵ ε ,
ἀτελοῦς ἐνέργεια ἦν, ἡ δ᾽ ἁπλῶς ἐνέργεια ἑτέρα
ἡ τοῦ τετελεσμένου. τὸ μὲν οὖν αἰσθάνεσθαι
ὅ 5 ῶ g iy , A ae a δὲ 55 Ay
μοιον τῷ φάναι μόνον καὶ νοεῖν' ὅταν δὲ ἡδὺ
4 / ~ Ἃ > a ,,
107) λυπηρόν, οἷον καταφᾶσα ἢ ἀποφᾶσα, διώκει
Ἂ 4 Vow \ a a a \ ?
ἢ φεύγει" καὶ ἔστι τὸ ἥδεσθαι καὶ λυπεῖσθαι τὸ ἐν-
εργεῖν τῇ αἰσθητικῇ μεσότητι πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν
Ἂ ; > an Ἅ t \ ΕἾ εὖ ε
ἢ κακὸν, ἡ τοιαῦτα. καὶ ἡ φυγὴ δὲ καὶ ἡ
ὄρεξις τοῦτο ἡ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν, καὶ οὐχ ἕτερον τὸ
1 ἐναντίον τῶν αἰτίων B.

174

ON THE SOUL, III. vi.—vn.

sense is made clear to us in the case of negation.
And the same reasoning applies in other cases; for
instance how the mind knows evil or black; for it
recognizes each in some sense by its opposite. But
the recognizing faculty must reside potentially in the
mind. Butifthere is anything which has no opposite
then it recognizes itself, and is also in actuality
separate. But a statement asserts something of some-
thing like any affirmation, and every one is either
true or false ; but this is not always so with the mind :
when it is dealing with the nature of a thing in the
abstract sense, and not with any particular example
of it, it is always true ; just as vision of a particular
thing is always true, but when seeing whether the
white object is a man or not, it is not always true, so
it is with every quality apart from its matter.

VII. Knowledge when actively operative is identi-
cal with its object. In the individual potential know-
ledge has priority in time, but speaking absolutely
it has no such priority; for that which becomes
grows out of that which actually is. And clearly the
sensible object makes the sense capacity actually
operative from being only potential ; it is not acted
upon, nor does it undergo change of state ; and so,
if it is motion, it is motion of a distinct kind; for
movement is the activity of the imperfect, but move-
ment in the simplest sense, that is movement of the
perfect, is different. Sensation, then, is like mere
assertion and mere thinking ; when sensation asserts
or denies that something is pleasant or unpleasant, it
pursues or avoids it. In fact to feel pleasure or pain
is to adopt an attitude with the sensitive mean
towards good and evil as such. This is what avoid-
ance or pursuit, when active, really means, and the

175

The practi-
cal Intellect
in operation.

ARISTOTLE

4518 2 , wv ~
dpextixoy καὶ φευκτικόν, οὔτ᾽ ἀλλήλων οὔτε τοῦ

αἰσθητικοῦ: ἀλλὰ τὸ elvan ἄλλο. τῇ δὲ, διανοητικῇ
ἴ ψυχῇ τὰ φαντάσματα οἷον αἰσθήματα ὑπάρχει.

ὅταν δὲ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν φήσῃ ἢ ἀποφήσῃ, φεύγει

ἢ διώκει. διὸ οὐδέποτε νοεῖ ἄνευ φαντάσματος ἡ

ψυχή, ὥσπερ δὲ 6 ἀὴρ τὴν κόρην τοιανδὲ ἐποίησεν,

αὐτὴ δ᾽ ἕτερον, καὶ ἡ ἀκοὴ ὡσαύτως" τὸ δὲ

ἔσχατον ἕν, καὶ μία μεσότης" τὸ δ᾽ εἶναι αὐτῇ
20 πλείω.

Tive δ᾽ ἐπικρίνει τί διαφέρει γλυκὺ καὶ θερμόν,
εἴρηται μὲν καὶ πρότερον, λεκτέον δὲ καὶ ὧδε,
ἔστι γὰρ ἕν τι, οὕτω δὲ καὶ ὡς ὅρος. καὶ ταῦτα
ἕν τῷ ἀνάλογον καὶ τῷ ἀριθμῷ ὃν ἔχει πρὸς
ἑκάτερον, ὡς ἐκεῖνα πρὸς ἄλληλα" τί γὰρ διαφέρει

27 ἀπορεῖν πῶς τὰ ὁμογενῆ κρίνει ἢ τἀναντία,
οἷον λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν; ἔστω δὴ ὡς τὸ Α τὸ
λευκὸν πρὸς τὸ Β τὸ μέλαν, τὸ Τ' πρὸς τὸ Δ ὡς
ἐκεῖνα πρὸς ἄλληλα: ὥστε καὶ ἐναλλάξ. εἰ δὴ
τὰ DA ἑνὶ εἴη ὑπάρχοντα, οὕτως ἕξει ὥσπερ καὶ
τὰ ΑΒ, τὸ αὐτὸ μὲν καὶ ἕν, τὸ δ᾽ εἶναι οὐ τὸ

481 αὐτό, κἀκεῖνο ὁμοίως. 6 δ᾽ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ εἰ
τὸ μὲν A τὸ γλυκὺ εἴη, τὸ δὲ Β τὸ λευκόν.

Τὰ μὲν οὖν εἴδη τὸ νοητικὸν ἐν τοῖς φαντάσμασι
νοεῖ, καὶ ὡς ἐν ἐκείνοις ὥρισται αὐτῷ τὸ διωκτὸν
καὶ φευκτόν, καὶ ἐκτὸς τῆς αἰσθήσεως, ὅταν ἐπὶ

"τῶν φαντασμάτων ἢ, κινεῖται, οἷον αἰσθανόμενος

4 Aristotle is referring to a mathematical theorem. If
A:B::C:D then A:C::B:D,
176 ;

ON THE SOUL, III. vu.

instincts to pursue or avoid are not really different
from each other, or from the sensitive faculty,
though their actual essence is different. Now
images occur in the soul in its thinking capacity, just
like feelings. But when the soul asserts or denies
that something is good or evil, it avoids or pursues,
Hence the soul never thinks without a mental pic-
ture ; and just as the air is the medium which makes
the eye in such a state, and the eye again affects
something else, so alsa does the hearing ; but the
last thing to be affected is a single unit, and a single
mean. But its essence is really plural.

We have explained before by what means the soul
distinguishes between sweet and hol, but some
further considerations must be added. For it is a
unit, and in this sense some sort of limit. But this
is a unit which, by analogy or by number, bears the
same relation to each of the two, as they do to each
other. For what does it matter whether we ask how
the soul distinguishes things which are not of the
same class, or homogeneous opposites, like white and
black ? Suppose the relation of A (white) to B
(black) to be the same as the relation of C to D.
Then the proposition alternando will be true? If
again C and D belong to one subject, their ratio will
be the same as A to B, the same and a unity, but their
real essence will not be the same, and similarly with
the other term. The same ratio would be estab-
lished if A were sweet and B white.

So the thinking faculty thinks of its forms in mental
pictures, and, just as what is pursued and avoided is
defined in them, so also it is outside sensation ; when-
ever it is a case of mental pictures, there is move-
ment. For instance in perceiving a beacon a man

N 177

ARISTOTLE

431 b 4 4 a A 2 , Lent é
TOV φρυκτὸν οτὺ πὺυρ, γνωρίζει, ορὼν KUWOULEVOP ,

uv τς ς Ν ᾿ - ᾿ = “᾿ ͵
ὅτι πολέμιος. ὁτὲ δὲ τοῖς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ φαντάσμασιν
A) 4 0 tA A ay XY 2
ἢ νοήμασιν ὥσπερ ὁρῶν λογίζεται καὶ βουλεύεται
τὰ μέλλοντα πρὸς τὰ παρόντα' καὶ ὅταν εἴπῃ ὡς
ἐκεῖ τὸ ἡδὺ ἢ λυπηρόν, ἐνταῦθα φεύγει ἢ διώκει,
\ ῳ > Pd , 1 4 δὲ td
ιὸ καὶ ὅλως ἐν πράξει. καὶ τὸ ἄνευ δὲ πράξεως,
‘ 3 4 \ A ~ 2 a b lat / xf \
τὸ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει ἐστὶ
lat εἰ θῶ ἣν mn LAAG a ε λῶ ὃ ͵
τῷ ἀγαθῷ καὶ κακῷ" ἀλλὰ τῷ γε ἁπλῶς διαφέρει
καὶ τινί. τὰ δὲ ἐν ἀφαιρέσει λεγόμενα νοεῖ ὥσπερ
ἂν εἰ τὸ σιμόν, ἣ μὲν σιμόν, οὐ κεχωρισμένως, ἧ
us δὲ κοῖλον, εἴ τις ἐνόει ἐνεργείᾳ, ἄνευ τῆς σαρκὸς
“-“ ‘
ἂν ἐνόει ἐν ἦἧ τὸ κοῖλον. οὕτω τὰ μαθηματικὰ
οὐ κεχωρισμένα ὡς κεχωρισμένα νοεῖ, ὅταν νοῇ
ἐκεῖνα. ὅλως δὲ ὁ νοῦς ἐστὶν ὁ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν
τὰ πράγματα νοῶν. ἄρα δ᾽ ἐνδέχεται τῶν κεχω-
a A
ρισμένων τι νοεῖν ὄντα αὐτὸν μὴ κεχωρισμένον
μεγέθους, ἢ οὔ, σκεπτέον ὕστερον.

29 ΥΠῚ, Νῦν δὲ περὶ ψυχῆς τὰ λεχθέντα συγκεφα-
λαιώσαντες, εἴπωμεν πάλιν ὅτι ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ ὄντω πώς
ἐστι πάντα. ἢ γὰρ αἰσθητὰ τὰ ὄντα ἢ νοητά, ἔστι
δ᾽ ἡ ἐπιστήμη μὲν τὰ ἐπιστητά πως, ἡ δ᾽ αἴσθησις
τὰ αἰσθητά’ πῶς δὲ τοῦτο, δεῖ ζητεῖν. τέμνεται

25 οὖν ἡ ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις εἰς τὰ πράγματα,
[7 4 fa 3 ‘ 4 ¢ 2 2 ,ὔ ᾽
ἡ μὲν δυνάμει εἰς τὰ δυνάμει, ἡ δ᾽ ἐντελεχείᾳ εἰς

,, a a
τὰ ἐντελεχείᾳ, τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς τὸ αἰσθητικὸν καὶ
τὸ ἐπιστημονικὸν δυνάμει ταὐτόν ἐστι, τὸ μὲν
Ἕ 4 A 4 > , 3 f Ἄν τ, 1. % wv
ἐπιστητὸν τὸ δὲ αἰσθητόν. ἀνάγκη δ᾽ ἢ αὐτὰ ἢ

1 πῦρ, τῇ κοινῇ B.

178

ON THE SOUL, IIL. ντι.-τνττι,

recognizes that it is five; then seeing it moving he
knows that it signifies aun enemy. But at other times
one caleulates by images or thoughts residing in the
soul, as if one saw them, and plans for the future in
view of the present ; and when one says in the case
of sensation that it is pleasant or unpleasant, in the
realm of thought one avoids or pursues, and so gener-
ally in action. Setting aside the question of action,
what is true or false belongs to the same category as
what is good or evil; but they differ by being uni-
versal, or referring to some particular. In mathe-
matical abstraction, as it is called, the mind thinks as
if it were considering snub-nosed gua snub-nosed,
not as a quality detached from flesh, but as hollow ;
if the mind were actively thinking it could conceive
snub-nosed apart from the flesh in which the hollow
resides. So when the mind thinks of mathematics,
it thinks of them as separable though actually they
are not. But speaking generally the mind means
the mind actually thinking on its objects. Whether
it is possible for the mind to think of qualities separ-
ated from their objects without being itself separated
from dimension or not, must be considered later.
VIII. Now summing up what we have said about
the soul, let us assert once more that in a sense the
soul is all the existing universe. For the universe
consists of objects felt, and objects thought of, and
knowledge relates to the latter and sensation to the
former ; but we must consider how this comes about.
Both knowledge and sensation are divided into twoin
relation to their objects, the potential to the potential,
and the actual to the actual. The potential faculty
of the soul both sensilive and intellectual is the
same, partly intellectual and partly sensitive. These

179

Summary.

ARISTOTLE

481 b
τὰ εἴδη εἶναι. αὐτὰ μὲν yap δὴ οὔ' od γὰρ ὁ

488 λίθος ἐν τῇ ψυχῆ, ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶδος: ὥστε ἡ ψυχὴ
ὥσπερ ἡ χείρ ἐστιν: καὶ γὰρ ἡ χεὶρ ὄργανόν ἐστιν
> / \ ὃ ~ ΐ ἰδ ~ 4 ε "
ὀργάνων, καὶ ὁ νοῦς εἶδος εἰδῶν καὶ ἡ αἴσθησις
εἶδος αἰσθητῶν. ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐδὲ πρᾶγμα οὐθέν ἐστι

‘ \ 4θ ς ὃ “ A > 6. AS
παρὰ τὰ μεγέθη, ὡς δοκεῖ, τὰ αἰσθητὰ κεχωριο-
ὃ μένον, ἐν τοῖς εἴδεσι τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς τὰ νοητά ἐστι,
τ > 3 , / ,@ ~ 3. ~
τά τε ἐν ἀφαιρέσει λεγόμενα, καὶ ὅσα τῶν αἰσθητῶν
ἕξεις καὶ πάθη. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο οὔτε μὴ αἰσθανό-
μενος μηθὲν οὐθὲν ἂν μάθον οὐδὲ Evvein: ὅταν τε
θεωρῇ, ἀνάγκη ἅμα φάντασμά τι θεωρεῖν" τὰ γὰρ
, v > ? + > \ 4)
10 φαντάσματα ὥσπερ αἰσθήματά ἐστι, πλὴν ἄνευ
>
ὕλης. ἔστι δ᾽ ἡ φαντασία ἕτερον φάσεως καὶ
3 , 4 ἣν / > \ ,
ἀποφάσεως: συμπλοκὴ γὰρ νοημάτων ἐστὶ τὸ
ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος. τὰ δὲ πρῶτα νοήματα τίνι
διοίσει τοῦ μὴ φαντάσματα εἶναι; ἢ οὐδὲ τἄλλα
i 3 5 3 4 Ul
φαντάσματα, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἄνευ φαντασμάτων.
15. ΙΧ, ᾿Επεὶ δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ κατὰ δύο ὥρισται δυνάμεις
ς a ,ὔ an a a ὃ i μ > ᾿
ἡ τῶν ζῴων, τῷ τε κριτικῷ, ὃ διανοίας ἔργον ἐστὶ
καὶ αἰσθήσεως, καὶ ἔτι τῷ κινεῖν τὴν κατὰ τόπον
t + i 3 ra 4 fot /
κίνησιν, περὶ μὲν αἰσθήσεως καὶ vod διωρίσθω
τοσαῦτα, περὶ δὲ τοῦ κινοῦντος, τί ποτέ ἐστι τῆς
20 ψυχῆς, σκεπτέον, πότερον ἕν τι μόριον αὐτῆς
χωριστὸν ὃν ἢ μεγέθει ἢ λόγω, ἢ πᾶσα ἡ ψυχή,
180

ON THE SOUL, HI. vitt.—tx.

faculties, then, are identical either with the objects
themselves or with their forms. Now they are not
identical with the object themselves; for the stone

does not exist in the soul, but only the form of the

stone. The soul, then, acts like a hand; for the hand

is an instrument which employs instruments, and

in the same way the mind is a form which employs
forms, and sensation is a form which employs the

forms of sensible objects. But since apparently Thougit
nothing has a separate existence, except appre- ΜΝ feclme
hended magnitudes, things thought appear in the identical
forms of sensible objects ; so do the so-called mathe- ἐδ ΤΣ
matical abstractions, and all those things which are

the conditions or affections of sensible objects. And

for this reason no one could ever learn or understand
anything, if he had not the faculty of perception ;

even when he thinks speculatively, he must have

some mental picture of which to think ; for mental
images are similar to objects perceived except that

they are without matter. But imagination is not

the same thing as assertion and denial ; for truth and
falsehood is a combination of things thought. How

then will the simplest thoughts differ from mental
pictures? Surely neither these simple thoughts

nor others are mental pictures, but cannot occur
without such mental pictures.

IX. But since the soul in living creatures is defined The relation
by two functions, the judging capacity which is a relate
function of the intellect and of sensation combined, ment.
and secondly by the capacity for movement in space,
we have completed our account of sensation and mind
and must now consider what part of the soul the
capacity for movement is ; whether it is a part separ-
able from the soul itself, either in actual magnitude

181

ARISTOTLE

432 ἃ By > ss , "τ ‘ φῶς ,
καν εἰ μόριον Τί, ποτέρον ἴδιόν τι Tapa τὰ εἰωθότα

t \ A > Za Ἃ 7 o uv
λέγεσθαι καὶ τὰ εἰρημένα, ἢ τούτων ἕν τι. ἔχει
᾿ > i 7 \ ~ ὃ ~ é , Ent
δὲ ἀπορίαν εὐθὺς πῶς τε δεῖ μόρια λέγειν τῆς
~ id / of
ψυχῆς Kal πόσα. τρόπον γάρ Twa ἄπειρα φαίνεται,
\ Ἵ ta a 7 ,ὔ
945 καὶ οὐ μόνον ἅ τινες λέγουσι διορίζοντες, λογι-
Α \ 6 \ 4 2 θ / ε δὲ 4
στικὸν καὶ θυμικὸν καὶ ἐπιθυμητικόν, of δὲ τὸ
λό # \ \ YX 2 \ Lf ‘ ὃ 4
dyov ἔχον καὶ τὸ ἄλογον: κατὰ γὰρ τὰς διαφορὰς
" ἃ ~ ᾿ \ ,, “- /
δι’ ds ταῦτα ywpilovar, καὶ ἄλλα φανεῖται μόρια
μείζω διάστασιν ἔχοντα τούτων, περὶ ὧν καὶ νῦν
εἴρηται, τό τε θρεπτικόν, ὃ καὶ τοῖς φυτοῖς
, 4 a a \ ἢ
80 ὑπάρχει καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ζῴοις, καὶ τὸ αἰσθητικόν,
a "» φ ΜΝ w ¢ ; ΝΜ ΄, ot
ὃ οὔτε ὡς ἄλογον οὔτε ws λόγον ἔχον θείη ἄν τις
/ ἢ \ \ / a n
4825 ῥᾳδίως. ἔτι δὲ τὸ φανταστικόν, ὃ τῷ μὲν εἶναι
πάντων ἕτερον, τινὲ δὲ τούτων ταὐτὸν ἢ ἕτερον,
μ 3 , ΕΣ / /
ἔχει πολλὴν ἀπορίαν, εἴ τις θήσει κεχωρισμένα
lod inl ‘ A
μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τὸ ὀρεκτικόν,
a Ἃ / ‘ # ω aw é
ὃ καὶ λόγῳ καὶ δυνάμει ἕτερον ἂν δόξειεν εἶναι
\ - a. fal
smdyrwv. καὶ ἄτοπον δὴ τοῦτο duacnay: ἔν τε τῷ
fal ς i ~
λογιστικῷ yap ἡ βούλησις γίνεται, καὶ ἐν τῷ
λό ς > θ / COL ¢ θ [4 7 3 δὲ ᾽ ¢
ἀλόγῳ ἡ ἐπιθυμία καὶ 6 θυμός' εἰ δὲ τρία ἡ
4 3 ¢ 4 » Μ“
ψυχή, ἐν ἑκάστῳ ἔσται ὄρεξις.
A 4 Ν 4 a ~ sr 7 s # ,
Καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ οὗ νῦν ὁ λόγος ἐνέστηκε, τί
" on A / ‘ af 2 A 1
τὸ κινοῦν κατὰ τόπον τὸ ζῷόν ἐστιν; τὴν μὲν
Ἂ, 3 vw 4 ᾿ f [ἢ ς
yap κατ᾽ αὔξησιν καὶ φθίσιν κίνησιν, ἅπασιν ὑπ-
/ \ “A -
10 ἄρχουσαν, τὸ πᾶσιν ὑπάρχον δόξειεν ἂν κινεῖν τὸ
182

ON THE SOUL, ΠΙ. rx.

or only in thought, or whether it is the whole soul ;
and if it is a part, whether it is a special part beyond
those usually described, and of which we have given
an account, or whether it is one of them. The first
difficulty that arises is this: in what sense can we
speak of parts of the soul, and how many are there ἢ
lor in one sense they seem to be infinite, and not
confined to those which men refer to, when they
attempt definition ; men call the parts rational, pas-
sionate, and appetitive, or, as others have it, rational
and irrational. Now when we consider the differences
according to which they classify, we shall find other
parts exhibiting greater differences than those of
which we have already spoken; for instance the
nutritive part, which belongs to plants and to all
living creatures, and the sensitive part which one
could not easily assign either to the rational or ir-
rational part, and also the imaginative part, which
appears to be different in essence from them all, but
which is extremely difficult to identify with, or to
distinguish from any onc of them. All this creates
serious problems, if one supposes separate parts of
the soul. Beyond these again is the appetitive part,
which both logically and potentially appears to be
different from them all. And it is unreasonable to
divorce this from the rest; for there is purpose in
the reasoning faculty, and desire and anger in the
irrational part ; but if the soul is divided into three,
appetite will be found in each.

Moreover in the subject with which our present
argument is concerned, which is the part which makes
the living creature move in space? The generative
and nutritive faculties, which all share, would seem
responsible for movement in the sense of growth and

183

Parts of
the soul.

Movement
cannot be
associated
with any
one part of
the soul.

ARISTOTLE

482 b
γεννητικὸν καὶ θρεπτικόν" περὶ δὲ ἀναπνοῆς καὶ

ἐκπνοῆς καὶ ὕπνου καὶ ἐγρηγόρσεως ὕστερον ἐπι-
σκεπτέον" ἔχει γὰρ καὶ ταῦτα πολλὴν ἀπορίαν.
ἀλλὰ περὶ τῆς κατὰ τόπον κινήσεως, τί τὸ κινοῦν
τὸ ξῷον τὴν πορευτικὴν κίνησιν, σκεπτέον. ὅτι
1b μὲν οὖν οὐχ ἡ θρεπτικὴ δύναμις, δῆλον" ἀεί τε
γὰρ ἕνεκά του ἡ κίνησις αὕτη, καὶ ἢ μετὰ φαν-
τασίας 7 ὀρέξεώς ἐστιν" οὐθὲν γὰρ μὴ ὀρεγόμενον
ἢ φεῦγον κινεῖται ἀλλ᾽ ἢ βίᾳ. ἔτι κἂν τὰ φυτὰ
κινητικὰ fv, κἂν εἶχέ τι μόριον ὀργανικὸν πρὸς
τὴν κίνησιν ταύτην. ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδὲ τὸ αἰσθη-
20 τικόν' πολλὰ γάρ ἐστι τῶν ζῴων ἃ ἃ αἴσθησιν μὲν
ἔχει, “μόνιμα δ᾽ ἐστὶ καὶ ἀκίνητα διὰ τέλους. εἰ
οὖν ἡ φύσις μήτε ποιεῖ μάτην μηθὲν μήτε ἀπο-
λείπει τι τῶν ἀναγκαίων, πλὴν ἐν τοῖς πηρώμασι
καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀτελέσιν' (τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα τῶν ζῴων
τέλεια καὶ οὐ πηρώματά ἐστιν" σημεῖον δ᾽ ὃ
85 ἔστι year ica Kal ἀκμὴν ἔχει καὶ φθίσιν") ὥστ᾽
εἶχεν ἃ ἂν καὶ τὰ ὀργανικὰ μέρη τῆς πορείας. ἀλλὰ
μὴν οὐδὲ τὸ λογιστικὸν καὶ 6 καλούμενος νοῦς
ἐστὶν 6 κινῶν' ὃ μὲν γὰρ θεωρητικὸς οὐθὲν νοεῖ
πρακτόν, οὐδὲ λέγει περὶ φευκτοῦ καὶ διωκτοῦ
οὐθέν, ἡ δὲ κίνησις ἢ φεύγοντός τι ἢ διώκοντός
80 τί ἐστιν. ἀλλ᾽ οὐδ’ ὅταν θεωρῇ τι τοιοῦτον, ἤδη
κελεύει φεύγειν 7) διώκειν, οἷον πολλάκις διανοεῖται
φοβερόν τι ἢ ἡδύ, οὐ κελεύει δὲ φοβεῖσθαι, ἡ δὲ
488. καρδία κινεῖται, ἂν δ᾽ ἡδύ, ἕτερόν τι μόριον. ἔτι,

πο το τ τ ee
α 2,9. if movement in space were due to the sensitive faculty..
184

ON THE SOUL, IIT. rx.

decay, as this movement belongs to them all; later
on we shall have to consider inspiration and expira-
tion, and sleep and wakefulness ; for these also pre-
sent considerable difficulty. But dealing with move-
ment in space, we must consider what it is that
causes the living animal to exhibit a travelling move-
ment. It is obvious that it is not the nutritive
capacity ; for this movement always has an object in
view, and is combined with imagination or appetency ;
for nothing moves except under compulsion, unless it
is seeking or avoiding something. But then plants
should show capacity for movement, and should be
seen to have some part instrumental towards this
movement. Nor is it the sensitive faculty ; for there
are many living creatures which have feeling, bul are
stationary, and do not move throughout their exist~-
ence. Then seeing that uature does nothing in vain,
nor omits anything essential, except in maimed or
imperfect animals (and the sort of animal under con-
sideration is perfect and not maimed ; this is proved
by the fact that they propagate their species and
have a zenith and decline), they would have parts
instrumental to that end.* Nor is the reasoning
faculty, which is called mind, the motive principle,
for the speculative mind thinks of nothing practical,
and does not comment on what is to be avoided or
pursued ; but movement is characteristic of one who
is either avoiding or pursuing something. Even
when the mind speculates on anything of the kind,
it does not issue orders to avoid or pursue ; for in-
stance it often reflects that something is fearful or
sweet, but gives no orders to fear. It is the heart
which produces this movement, and if it is sweet
some other part. But when the mind gives any

185

ARISTOTLE

483 a
~ ~ 4 ~
καὶ ἐπυτάττοντος τοῦ νοῦ καὶ λεγούσης τῆς διανοίας

eA a A | a 3 5 E ἢ \
φεύγειν τι ἢ διώκειν od κινεῖται, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν
7 Fs 7 ε > ta 4 <A \
ἐπιθυμίαν πράττει, οἷον 6 ἀκρατής. καὶ ὅλως δὲ
δρῶμεν ὅτι ὃ ἔχων τὴν ἰατρικὴν οὐκ ἰᾶται, ὡς
3 ἑτέρου τινὸς κυρίου ὄντος τοῦ ποιεῖν κατὰ τὴν
> 7 3 3 3 ~ > 7 3 4 \
ἐπιστήμην, ἀλλ’ οὐ τῆς ἐπιστήμης. ἀλλὰ μὴν
οὐδ᾽ ἡ ὄρεξις ταύτης κυρία τῆς κινήσεως" οἱ γὰρ
ἐγκρατεῖς ὀρεγόμενοι καὶ ἐπιθυμοῦντες οὐ πράτ-
- ” x ” 2\\> 9 -
τουσιν ὧν ἔχουσι τὴν ὄρεξιν, GAN ἀκολουθοῦσι
τῷ νῷ.
το Χ, Daiverar δέ γε δύο ταῦτα κινοῦντα, ἢ ὄρεξις
~ is
ἢ νοῦς, εἴ τις τὴν φαντασίαν τιθείη ὡς νόησίν τινα'
πολλὰ γὰρ παρὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἀκολουθοῦσι ταῖς
,ὔ " > a Μ ὰ " /
φαντασίαις, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις od νόησις
3
οὐδὲ λογισμός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ φαντασία. ἄμφω dpa
~ ‘ / ~
ταῦτα κινητικὰ κατὰ τόπον, νοῦς Kai ὄρεξις.
νοῦς δὲ ὁ ἕνεκά του λογιζόμενος καὶ ὁ πρακτικός"
10 διαφέρει δὲ τοῦ θεωρητικοῦ τῷ τέλει, καὶ ἡ
ΕΣ ca ,ὔ o e ‘ - ΝΜ Ὁ
ὄρεξις ἕνεκά του πᾶσα" οὗ γὰρ ἡ ὄρεξις, αὕτη
ἀρχὴ τοῦ πρακτικοῦ vod: τὸ δ᾽ ἔσχατον ἀρχὴ τῆς
͵ ν 2 f ~ 8 4 f. \
πράξεως. wore εὐλόγως ταῦτα δύο φαίνεται τὰ
κιψοῦντα, ὄρεξις καὶ διάνοια πρακτική" τὸ ὀρεκτὸν
-" 4, a
γὰρ κινεῖ, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἡ διάνοια κινεῖ, ὅτι ἀρχὴ
ΓΝ... > λ \ > \ \ Ld 7 εἶ Lg
20 αὐτῆς ἐστὶ τὸ ὀρεκτὸν. καὶ ἡ φαντασία δὲ ὅταν
κινῇ, οὐ κινεῖ ἄνευ ὀρέξεως. ἕν δή τι τὸ κινοῦν
> \ ~ \
τὸ ὀρεκτόν. εἰ yap δύο, νοῦς καὶ ὄρεξις, ἐκίνουν,

186

ON THE SOUL, ITI. rx.—x.

orders, and reflection suggests avoidance or pursuit,
the man does not move, but his action is prompted by
desire, as we see in the incontinent man. Speaking
generally, we see that the man possessing knowledge
of the healing art is not always healing, so that there
is some other factor which causes action in accordance
with knowledge, and not knowledge itself. Tinally,
it is not appetency which is responsible for move-
ment ; for the self-controlled, though they may crave
and desire, do not do these things tor which they have
an appetite, but follow their reason,

Χ, There are clearly, then, two agents which pro-
duce movement, appetite and mind, if, that is, one
regards imagination as some sort of thinking process ;
for men often follow their imaginations contrary to
knowledge, and in living creatures other than man
there is neither thinking nor calculation, but only
imagination. These together, then, mind and appe-
tite, are responsible for movement in space. But the
mind in question is that which makes its calculations
with an end in view, that is the practical mind: it
differs from the speculative mind in that it has an
endin view. And every appetite is directed towards
an end; for the thing at which appetite aims is the
starting-point of the practical mind ; the last step of
the practical mind is the beginning of the action. So
that these two, appetite and practical mind, seem
reasonably considered as the producers of movement ;
for that which is craved for produces movement, and
the mind produces movement for this reason, that
the thing craved for is its beginning. Whenever
imagination produces movement, it does not do so
without appetite. And so the main single moving
cause seems to be what is desired. If there were

187

Causes of
movement.

ARISTOTLE

488 a τ 1 ” αι ὦ. ~ δὲ G 4
KATA κοινὸν ἂν TL EKLYOUY εἶδος. νυν € oO μεν

fal ? i ~ A ee "ἢ \
νοῦς οὐ φαίνεται κινῶν ἄνευ ὀρέξεως: ἡ yap
, » a \ \ \ ἢ
βούλησις ὄρεξις" ὅταν δὲ κατὰ τὸν λογισμὸν
a Α 4 , a ε 2
%KIVATOL, Kal κατὰ βούλησιν κινεῖται. ἡ δ᾽ ὄρεξις
κινεῖ παρὰ τὸν λογισμόν: ἡ γὰρ ἐπιθυμία ὄρεξίς
" , ~ \ ve “- > ? ” \ \
τις ἐστίν. νοῦς μὲν οὖν πᾶς ὀρθός" ὄρεξις δὲ καὶ
, \ > \ λ 3 > 84 ὃ \ 2 a
φαντασία καὶ ὀρθὴ καὶ οὐκ ὀρθή. διὸ ἀεὶ κινεῖ
\ \ > ri > \ a? > ‘ ἃς, 4 > ‘ ”
μὲν τὸ ὀρεκτόν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν ἢ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ
τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν. οὐ πᾶν δέ, ἀλλὰ τὸ
4 3 , x > > ‘ % > 4
80 πρακτὸν ἀγαθόν. πρακτὸν δ᾽ ἐστὲ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον
καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν.
“ 4 a ¢ , ͵ ΡΥ "Ἢ
Ore μὲν οὖν ἡ τοιαύτη δύναμις κινεῖ τῆς ψυχῆς
¢ A f ¥ , n δὲ ὃ “~ x
ἡ καλουμένη ὄρεξις, φανερόν. τοῖς δὲ διαιροῦσι τὰ
f ~ ~ 4 ‘ S. if. ~
488υ μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς ἐὰν κατὰ τὰς δυνάμεις διαιρῶσι
°
καὶ ywpilwor, πάμπολλα γίνεται, θρεπτικόν, al-
σθητικόν, νοητικόν, βουλευτικόν, ἔτι ὀρεκτικόν'
ταῦτα γὰρ πλέον διαφέρει ἀλλήλων ἢ τὸ ἐπιθυμη-
5 τικὸν καὶ θυμικόν. ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ὀρέξεις γίνονται ἐναν-
τίαι ἀλλήλαις, τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει ὅταν ὁ λόγος
καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία ἐναντίαι ὦσι, γίνεται δ᾽ ἐν τοῖς
χρόνου αἴσθησιν ἔχουσιν (ὁ μὲν γὰρ νοῦς διὰ τὸ
μέλλον ἀνθέλκειν κελεύει, ἡ δ᾽ ἐπιθυμία διὰ τὸ
ἤδη" φαίνεται γὰρ τὸ ἤδη ἡδὺ καὶ ἁπλῶς ἡδὺ καὶ
10 ἀγαθὸν ἁπλῶς, διὰ τὸ μὴ ὁρᾶν τὸ μέλλον), εἴδει
μὲν ἕν ἂν εἴη τὸ κινοῦν τὸ ὀρεκτικόν, ἦ ὀρεκτικόν,
πρῶτον δὲ πάντων τὸ ὀρεκτόν (τοῦτο γὰρ κινεῖ οὐ

188

ON THE SOUL, ΠΙ. x.

really two causes, mind as well as appetite, they
would produce movement in virtue of a common
characteristic. But, as things are, mind is never seen
to produce movement without appetite ; for choice
is a form of appetite. But when a man moves accord-
ing to calculation, he also moves according to choice,
but appetite produces movement contrary to cal-
culation ; for desire is a form of appetence. Again,
mind is always right; but appetence and imagina-
tion may be right or wrong, Consequently that
which is desired always produces movement, but
this is either good, or what seems to be good;
and not every sort of good, but only practical
good. Practical good is that which is capable of
being otherwise.

It is clear, then, that the capacity of the soul which
is called appetence is what produces movement.
But those who divide up the parts of the soul, if they
divide and distinguish them according to their
functions, have many divisions, nutritive, sensitive,
thinking, deliberative and even craving; for these
show more difference between each other than the
desiring and the passionate. But cravings are
opposite to each other, and this happens wherever
reason and desire are contradictory, and this occurs
in creatures which are sensitive to time. (For the
mind advises us to resist with a view to the future,
while desire only looks to the present ; for what is
momentarily pleasant seems to be absolutely pleasant
and absolutely good, because desire cannot look to
the future.) In form, then, the moving cause will
be one, that is the appetitive faculty in so far as it is
appetitive, and first of all the object craved for (for
this, though not itself moving, produces movement,

189

Appetence
produces
moveinent,

ARISTOTLE

488 b 4 - θῆ aN 6A > 8 -
KLVOUPLEVOP τῳ νοησηναι ἢ φαντασ ἢναι), αριῦμῳ

δὲ πλείω τὰ κινοῦντα.
᾿Ἐπειδὴ δ᾽ ἐστὶ τρία, ἕν μὲν τὸ κινοῦν, δεύτερον
“- cal \ ~
δ᾽ ᾧ κινεῖ, τρίτον τὸ κινούμενον: τὸ δὲ κινοῦν
ta A \ > , A de ~ ‘ ta
1s διττόν, TO μὲν ἀκίνητον, τὸ δὲ κινοῦν Kal κινού-
y \ AY A > f \ \ > é
μένον" ἔστι δὲ το μεν αΚΙΟΨΉΤΟΨ το πρακτον ἀγαθόν,
τὸ δὲ κινοῦν καὶ κινούμενον τὸ ὀρεκτιικόν (κινεῖται
‘ \ / e 2 7 ἘΝ ἃ ᾽ ” ͵
γὰρ τὸ κινούμενον ἣ ὀρέγεται, καὶ ἡ κίνησις ὄρεξίς
, Ε] > sf A \ 4 A ~
τίς ἐστιν evépyeta), τὸ δὲ κινούμενον τὸ ζῷον"
Ὁ δὲ a > iy ς{» ξ 40 a KO
ᾧ δὲ κινεῖ ὀργάνῳ ἡ ὄρεξις, ἠδὴ τοῦτο σωματικόν
2 ~ “ \ π᾿ lj
a9 ἐστιν" διὸ ἐν τοῖς κοινοῖς σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς ἔργοις
a lot A
θεωρητέον περὶ αὐτοῦ. viv δὲ ὡς ἐν κεφαλαίῳ
εἰπεῖν τὸ κινοῦν ὀργανικῶς, ὅπου ἀρχὴ Kat τελευτὴ
/ / > ~ \ 4
τὸ αὐτό, οἷον 6 puyyAupds: ἐνταῦθα yap τὸ κυρτὸν
~ 4 >
καὶ κοῖλον τὸ μὲν τελευτὴ τὸ δ᾽ ἀρχή" διὸ τὸ μὲν
Η an \ δὲ “ λό \ wv » ‘OQ
25 ἠρεμεῖ τὸ δὲ κινεῖται, λόγῳ μὲν ἕτερα ὄντα, μεγέθει
δ᾽ ἀχώριστα πάντα yap woe καὶ edger κινεῦται.
διὸ δεῖ ὥσπερ ἐν κύκλῳ μένειν τι, καὶ ἐντεῦθεν
w \ , a x = a
ἄρχεσθαι τὴν κίνησιν. ὅλως μὲν οὖν, ὥσπερ
εἴρηται, ἣ ὀρεκτιιςὸν τὸ ζῷον, ταύτῃ αὑτοῦ Kwy-
/ > i \ > La ,ὔ ,
τικόν" ὀρεκτικὸν δὲ οὐκ ἄνευ φαντασίας" φαντασία
Fon Ἂ
80 δὲ πᾶσα ἢ λογιστικὴ ἢ αἰσθητική. ταύτης μὲν
οὖν καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ζῷα μετέχει.
4A fal ~
XI. Σκεπτέον δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀτελῶν, τί τὸ
a. f ἐ
48ι8 κινοῦν ἐστί, οἷς ἁφὴ μόνον ὑπάρχει αἴσθησις,
100

ON THE SOUL, III. x.—xt.

by being thought of or imagined), but the actual
moving causes are plural.

But there are three things to be considered : first How move-
the moving cause, secondly the means by which it ena
produces movement, and thirdly the thing moved,
The moving cause has two senses, one unmoved and
one producing movement. and moving; but the
practical good is unmoved; while the moving and
the moved are the appetite (for that which is moved
moves, in so far as there is a craving, and the move-
ment is a form of appetence actualized), but the
thing moved is the living creature ; the instrument
of moving is the craving, and this is bodily ; so it
must be considered among the functions which are
common to body and soul. But for the present it is
sufficient to summarize by saying that movement by
means of instruments is where the beginning and end
coincide, as in a ball-and-socket joint. Tor there the
convex surface (the ball) and the concave surface (the
socket) are respectively the end and the beginning
of the movement ; consequently the latter is at rest
while the former moves. Logically they are two
different things, but in position inseparable ; for all
movement consists of pushing and pulling; so that
as in a wheel one point (the centre) remains fixed,
and from that point the movement is initiated.
Speaking generally then, as has been said, in so far
as the living creature is subject to appetence, it is
also subject to movement ; but appetence does not
exist without imagination, and all imagination in-
volves either calculation or sensation, This latter
all living creatures share,

XI. We must now consider what the moving prin- How [8

ciple is in the case of those imperfect animals, whose Seals

191

ARISTOTLE

/ > ,, 7 c ΄ ΄ A
πότερον ἐνδέχεται φαντασίαν ὑπάρχειν τούτοις, ἢ
οὔ, καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν. φαίνεται γὰρ λύπη καὶ ἡδονὴ
2 ~ 3 A lot a ? 7 3 ,ὔ
ἐνοῦσα. εἰ δὲ ταῦτα, καὶ ἐπιθυμίαν ἀνάγκη.

, ἣν ~ xs > ͵ a ω \ ἊΝ
φαντασία δὲ πῶς ἂν ἐνείη; ἢ ὥσπερ καὶ κινεῖται
8 ’ " aA 3 Mv 4 > ,ὔ Ἢ:
ἀορίστως, καὶ ταῦτ᾽ ἔνεστι μέν, ἀορίστως ὃ
» ς χ ᾿ 2 \ , ῳ
ἔνεστιν. ἡ μὲν οὖν αἰσθητικὴ φαντασία, ὥσπερ

ΜΝ \ ? - ” a ¢ ta ξ Α
εἴρηται, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις ὑπάρχει, ἡ δὲ
βουλευτικὴ ἐν τοῖς λογιστικοῖς" πότερον γὰρ πρά-

/ Ἅ ᾿ ~ , ? \ μὲ \
feu τόδε ἢ τόδε, λογισμοῦ ἤδη ἐστὶν ἔργον" καὶ
3 / ey - ‘ cal A Ἂ Ὁ
ἀνάγκη ἑνὶ μετρεῖν: τὸ μεῖζον γὰρ διώκει. ὥστε
δύναται ἕν ἐκ πλειόνων φαντασμάτων ποιεῖν. καὶ

ε Γ᾿ “- Fs \ - ν a \
αὔτιον τοῦτο τοῦ δόξαν μὴ δοκεῖν ἔχειν, ὅτι τὴν
ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ οὐκ ἔχει, αὕτη δὲ ἐκείνην. διὸ

\ A > μ᾿ tom fod 7. ὦ
τὸ βουλευτικὸν οὐκ ἔχει ἡ ὄρεξις. νικᾷ δ᾽ ἐνίοτε

Ἅ a Δ , ey > > i ,
καὶ κινεῖ τὴν BovAnow: ὁτὲ δ᾽ ἐκείνη ταύτην,
o Lal € v 4 Mu Ὁ - ἢ ,
ὥσπερ σφαῖρα, ἡ ὄρεξις τὴν ὄρεξιν, ὅταν ἀκρασία
γένηται. φύσει δὲ ἀεὶ ἡ ἄνω ἀρχικωτέρα καὶ

- 4 = 4 v4 a 4 3
κινεῖ, ὥστε τρεῖς φορὰς ἤδη κινεῖσθαι. τὸ ὃ
’ ᾿ + aA > N L ἡ ὦ > ¢
ἐπιστημονικὸν od κινεῖται, ἀλλὰ μένει. ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἡ
μὲν καθόλου ὑπόληψις καὶ λόγος, ἡ δὲ τοῦ Kal?
μὲ ς A εν 2 a a \ ~ \
ἕκαστα (ἡ μὲν γὰρ λέγει ὅτι δεῖ τὸν τοιοῦτον τὸ

/ "κα ε 4 a , ‘ “- é
τοιόνδε πράττειν, ἡ δὲ ὅτι τόδε TO νῦν τοιόνδε,

102

ON THE SOUL, II. x1.

only sensation is that of touch, and whether it is the lowar
Olmns Ὁ.

possible for them to have imagination or not, and
desire. For it is evident that they are liable to pain
and pleasure. If they have these they must also
have desire. But in what sense could they have
imagination ? Or, just as they move, but only in an
indeterminate fashion, do they also have imagination,
but only in an indeterminate fashion ? Tmagination
in the form of sense exists, as we have said, in other
animals, but deliberative imagination only in those
which can reason ; for it is the function of reason to
decide whether one shall do this or that, and one must
measure by a single standard; for one pursues the
greater good. So one can make one mental picture
out of a number of images; and the reason why
animals are not considered capable of having opinion
is that they have not the type of imagination which
arises from inference; but the possession of the
power of reasoning implies the other. This is why
appetence does not imply capacity for deliberation,
In fact it sometimes conquers and moves the will.
But when one appetence controls another, as one
celestial sphere controls another, is the occasion when
incontinence occurs. But in nature the upper sphere
always asserts the larger measure of control and pro-
duces the movement, so that there are three move-
ments combined in one. But the faculty of know-
ledge does not move but remains still. But there is
such a thing as belief in and argument from the
universal, and also the belief in and argument from
the particular. (The former asserts that a man in
such a position should act in such a way, but the
latter asserts that this is matter of such a kind
and that I am a man in such a position.) It is this

0 193

ani

mal life?

vement

may be
eomplicated

οἷν

a conflict
mpulses.

ARISTOTLE
484 ἃ 3 4 A / v 4 a ¢ ra ΕΣ ε
2 κἀγὼ δὲ τοιόσδε) ἤδη αὕτη κινεῖ ἡ δόξα, οὐχ ἡ

καθόλου. ἣ ἄμφω, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ μὲν ἠρεμοῦσα μᾶλλον,
¢ > ww
ἡ δ᾽ ov.
XID. Τὴν μὲν οὖν θρεπτικὴν ψυχὴν ἀνάγκη πᾶν
» μὲ nv a \ 4 Ψ > A ͵7
ἔχειν ὅτι περ ἂν ζῇ καὶ ψυχὴν ἔχῃ ἀπὸ γενέσεως
μέχρι φθορᾶς" ἀνάγκη γὰρ τὸ γενόμενον αὔξησιν
” 4 > \ \ a, “ δ᾽ of ~
25 ἔχειν καὶ ἀκμὴν καὶ φθίσιν, ταῦτα δ᾽ ἄνευ τροφῆς
3, na \
ἀδύνατον: ἀνάγκη ἄρα evelvar τὴν θρεπτικὴν
δύναμιν ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς φυομένοις καὶ φθίνουσιν.
αἴσθησιν δ᾽ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἐν ἅπασι τοῖς ζῶσιν"
" \ u ‘ ~ © = 3, ὃ ΄ Cry
οὔτε yap ὅσων τὸ σῶμα ἁπλοῦν, ἐνδέχεται ἁφὴν
Mw Mw » uA Τό θὲ t ~
ἔχειν, οὔτε ἄνευ ταύτης οἷόν τε οὐθὲν εἶναι ζῷον"
"» “ \ ‘ ~ IQA »“, ~ ὠ
ο οὔτε daa μὴ δεκτικὰ τῶν εἰδῶν ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης.
\ δὲ ζῷ 3 - w θ " ’ θὲ
τὸ δὲ ζῷον ἀναγκαῖον αἴσθησιν ἔχειν, εἰ μηθὲν
a A
μάτην ποιεῖ ἡ φύσις. ἕνεκά του γὰρ πάντα ὑπ-
ἄρχει τὰ φύσει, ἢ συμπτώματα ἔσται τῶν ἕνεκά
του. εἰ οὖν πᾶν σῶμα πορευτικὸν μὴ ἔχον
484υ αἴσθησιν, φθείροιτο ἂν καὶ εἰς τέλος οὐκ ἂν ἔλθοι,
a 2 é μὲ ~ ‘ iA a“
ὅ ἐστι φύσεως ἔργον: πῶς yap θρέψεται; τοῖς
μὲν γὰρ μονίμοις ὑπάρχει τὸ ὅθεν πεφύκασιν" οὐχ
/ 4 lat Ds A \ ᾿ »-- /
οἷόν τε δὲ σῶμα ἔχειν μὲν ψυχὴν καὶ νοῦν κριτιικόν,
wv 4 ΜΙΝ A 7 ΕΣ ᾿ i
αἴσθησιν δὲ μὴ ἔχειν, μὴ μόνιμον dv, γεννητὸν δέ.
5 ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ἀγέννητον" διὰ τί γὰρ ἔξει; ἢ γὰρ
τῇ ψυχῇ βέλτιον ἢ τῷ σώματι. νῦν δ᾽ οὐδέτερον"
ἡ; A
ἡ μὲν yap οὐ μᾶλλον νοήσει, τὸ δ᾽ οὐθὲν ἔσται
104.

ΟΝ THE SOUL, IIT. x1—xu.

latter opinion which produces movement and not the
opinion of the universal. Or clse it is both, but the
opinion of the universal tends to move less, the other
more.

XIT, Every living thing must have the nutritive
soul that it may live, and have a soul from its birth
until its death; for that which is born must have
growth, a highest point of development and decay,
and these things are impossible without food. The
nutritive capacity must then exist in all things which
grow and decay. But sensation is not necessary to
all living creatures; it is not necessary to those
which have simple bodies to have a sense of touch,
nor without this can any animal exist; nor need
those living things have a sense of touch which are
not receptive of forms without matter, But the
living animal must have sensation, if it is a fact that
nature does nothing in vain. For everything in
nature exists for a purpose, except for those accidental
properties which subscribe to a purpose. An animal
capable of moving from place to place, if it had no
sensation, would be destroyed, and would not reach
the end which is its natural function ; for how could
it be nourished? Stationary living things can draw
their food from the source from which they were
born, but it is impossible for the body to possess a
soul and a mind capable of judgement without having
sensation, if it is not stationary but generated by birth,
Nor could it lack sensation even if it is not generated
by birth ; for what would be the object of its having
it? Ifit possessed sensation it would necessarily be
the better for it either in soul or in body ; but in our
present case it will not benefit in either way ; for the
former will not think any better for this reason, and

195

The soul
and Ife.

ARISTOTLE

484 b a 3 * a > 4 » μ᾿ ἢ ~
μᾶλλον δι’ ἐκεῖνο. οὐθὲν dpa ἔχει ψυχὴν σῶμα

μὴ μόνιμον ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως.
᾿Αλλὰ μὴν εἴγε αἴσθησιν ἔχει, ἀνάγκη τὸ σῶμα
ha] ¢ - δ / Ἴ tr Ν £ ΄-

10 εἶναι ἢ ἁπλοῦν ἢ μικτόν. οὐχ οἷόν τε δὲ ἁπλοῦν"
¢ 4 A ? e » 4 > , , Le
ἁφὴν yap οὐχ ἕξει, ἔστι δὲ ἀνάγκη ταύτην ἔχειν.

~ Αι 2 - fal 3 " δ \ “
τοῦτο δὲ ἐκ τῶνδε δῆλον. ἐπεὶ γὰρ τὸ ζῷον
σῶμα ἔμψυχόν ἐστι, σῶμα δὲ ἅπαν ἁπτόν, ἁπτὸν
a 4 3 ‘ £ - 5 7 ι ‘ -“ ᾽
δὲ τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἁφῇ, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ τοῦ ζῴου
- ε εἶ > / 7 \ ~
σῶμα ἁπτικὸν εἶναι, εἰ μέλλει σώζεσθαι τὸ ζῷον.
ε A ” ’ ὔ 3 ar 4 > /

wat yap ἄλλαι αἰσθήσεις δι’ ἑτέρων αἰσθάνονται,
. ” » ᾽ , « , ͵ Π \
οἷον ὄσφρησις ὄψις ἀκοή: ἁπτόμενον δέ, εἰ μὴ
ig wv 2 , \ \ 4 ἣν A
ἕξει αἴσθησιν, od δυνήσεται τὰ μὲν φεύγειν τὰ δὲ

al ? 4 “ 3 rd , tA \
λαβεῖν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, ἀδύνατον ἔσται σώζεσθαι τὸ
ζῶ ὃ A A ε a 7 2 ω id i ‘
@ov. διὸ καὶ ἡ γεῦσίς ἐστιν ὥσπερ ἁφή τις

~ f 2 La δὲ 4 bY ~ A og 4
τροφῆς γάρ ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ τροφὴ τὸ σῶμα τὸ ἁπτόν.

20 ψόφος δὲ καὶ χρῶμα καὶ ὀσμὴ οὐ τρέφει, οὐδὲ

a » 3 4 a ᾿ Ὁ \ \
ποιεῖ οὔτ᾽ αὔξησιν οὔτε φθίσιν. ὥστε καὶ τὴν
a Lee ἐ , \ \ “ κε -
γεῦσιν ἀνάγκη adh εἶναί τινα, διὰ τὸ τοῦ ἁπτοῦ
καὶ θρεπτικοῦ αἴσθησιν εἶναι. αὗται μὲν οὖν
ἀναγκαῖαι τῷ ζῴῳ, καὶ φανερὸν ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τε
ἄνευ ἁφῆς εἶναι ζῷον.

a Αἔ δὲ ἄλλαι τοῦ τε εὖ ἕνεκα καὶ γένει ζῴων
ἤδη οὐ τῷ τυχόντι, ἀλλὰ τισίν, οἷον τῷ πορευτικῷ
5...) τ A 3 A / lA )
ἀνάγκη ὑπάρχειν’ εἰ γὰρ μέλλει σώζεσθαι, οὐ

7 “κ᾿ / 3 4 3 ‘ soy”
μόνον δεῖ ἁπτόμενον αἰσθάνεσθαι ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄποθεν.

~ 2. ἡ w ἡ 5 AS a AS ? 4 uw
τοῦτο δ᾽ ἂν εἴη, εἰ διὰ τοῦ μεταξὺ αἰσθητικὸν εἴη

106

ON THE SOUL, 1Π|. χη.

the latter will be no better for the possession, No
body, then, which is not stationary possesses a soul
without sensation.

Further, if it does possess sensation, the body must
be either simple or compound. But it cannot be
simple; for in that case it will have no sense of
touch, and this is indispensable to it. ‘This is obvious
from the following considerations. For since the
living animal is a body possessing soul, and every
body is tangible, and that which is apprehended by
touch is the sensible object, it follows that the body
of the animal must have the faculty of touch if the
animal is to survive. For the other senses perccive
through the medium of something else such as smell,
vision and hearing ; but the animal when it touches,
if it has no sensation, will not be able to avoid some
things and seize others. In that case it will be im-
possible for the animal to survive. And so tasting is
a form of touching ; for it belongs to food, but food
is a tangible body, Sound, colour and smell supply
no food, nor do they produce growth and decay. So
that taste must be some form of touch, because it
is the perception of what is touched and nutritive.
These qualities are then essential to the living animal,
and it is obvious that the animal cannot exist without
a sense of touch.

But there are other qualities necessary to living Living
well, which do not belong to any class of living το:
creatures taken at random, but only to certain ones,
as for instance they belong to the animal which is
capable of locomotion ; for if it is to survive, not only
must it perceive when in contact, but also from a
distance. And this will occur only if it exercises its
perceptive faculty through a medium in which the

197

ARISTOTLE

484 Ὁ
ὡς a a ΜΝ ;
τῷ ἐκεῖνο μὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ πάσχειν καὶ

- 2 4 2 ¢ > 2 la o Ν ᾿
80 κινεῖσθαι, αὐτὸ δ᾽ ὑπ᾽ ἐκείνου. ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ
κινοῦν κατὰ τόπον μέχρι του μεταβάλλειν ποιεῖ,
καὶ τὸ ὦσαν ἕτερον ποιεῖ ὥστε ὠθεῖν, καὶ ἔστι
διὰ μέσου ἡ κίνησις, καὶ δὴ τὸ μὲν πρῶτον κινοῦν

? ~ | 4 ? \ so” f i ~
ὠθεῖ οὐχ ὠθούμενον, τὸ δ᾽ ἔσχατον μόνον ὠθεῖται
486 οὐκ doar, τὸ δὲ μέσον dudw, πολλὰ δὲ μέσα,

Ὁ > > > ’ Ν iid ͵ 2 ~
οὕτως ἐπ᾽ ἀλλοιώσεως, πλὴν ὅτι μένοντος ἐν τῷ
αὐτῷ τόπῳ ἀλλοιοῖ, οἷον εἰ εἰς κηρὸν βάψειέ τις,
μέχρι τούτου ἐκινήθη, ἕως ἔβαψεν" λίθος δὲ οὐδέν,

A ~
ἀλλ᾽ ὕδωρ μέχρι πόρρω. ὁ δ᾽ ἀὴρ ἐπὶ πλεῖστον
ὁ κινεῖται καὶ ποιεῖ καὶ πάσχει, ἐὰν μένῃ καὶ εἷς
ῇ ὃ \ Ἃ ἢ 5» λά βέλ δ > Ἶ ὄψ'
ἧ. διὸ καὶ περὶ ἀνακλάσεως βέλτιον ἢ τὴν ὄψιν
᾽ ~ a , a7 4 €: \ “a
ἐξιοῦσαν κλᾶσθαι, τὸν ἀέρα πάσχειν ὑπὸ τοῦ
A e

σχήματος καὶ χρώματος, μέχρι περ οὗ ἂν εἷς Hy

\ 4 A t oy \ , ᾿ nN
ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ λείου ἐστὶν εἷς" διὸ πάλιν οὗτος τὴν
ὄψιν κινεῖ, ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ τὸ ἐν τῷ κηρῷ σημεῖον

10 διεδίδοτο μέχρι τοῦ πέρατος.

XII. “Ὅτι δ᾽ οὐχ οἷόν τε ἁπλοῦν εἶναι τὸ τοῦ
ζῴου σῶμα, φανερόν, λέγω δ᾽ οἷον πύρινον ἢ
57 wv 4 \ ε End 7 ? 3 ld
dépwov, ἄνευ μὲν γὰρ ἁφῆς οὐδεμίαν ἐνδέχεται
χλλ' uv ΝΜ A A ~ £ + \
ἄλλην αἴσθησιν ἔχειν: τὸ yap σῶμα ἁπτικὸν τὸ

τό ἔμψυχον πᾶν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται. τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ἔξω

“- 3 ¥ A a id f A -" Ἶ
γῆς αἰσθητήρια μὲν ἂν γένοιτο, πάντα δὲ τῷ δι
ἑτέρου αἰσθάνεσθαι ποιεῖ τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ διὰ τῶν
108

ON THE SOUL, WII. xm.—xim.

animal is affected, and is moved hy the sensible object,
and the sensible object by the inedium. For that
which produces tnovement in space causes change up
to a certain point, and that which has given a push
causes something else to push also, and movement
takes place through a medium, and again that which
initiates a movement pushes without being pushed,
but the last link in the chain is pushed without push-
ing, but the intermediate link both pushes and is
pushed, and there may be many such intermediate
links. Exactly the same thing oceurs in change of
state, except that it suffers change while remaining
in Lhe same place, just as if one were to dip something
into wax, the movement would occur in the wax just
so far as one dipped it. Now stone would not move
at all, but water would be affected to a great distance.
But it is air that moves, acts, and is acted upon most,
if it remains still and is continuous. Tor that reason
in connexion with the reflection of light it is better
to suppose, not that the ray leaving the eye is
reflected, but rather that the air is affected by the
shape and colour, so long as it remains continuous.
And it is continuous supposing that it is smooth ;
then the air in its turn moves the vision, just as if the
impression on the wax had passed right through to
the other side.

XIII. It is obvious that the body of the animal Touch is tho
cannot consist of a single element such as five or air. Gementary
For without a sense of touch it is impossible to have and saat
any other sensation ; for every body possessing soul Taal tasutty,
has the faculty of touch, as has been said. Now
except for earth, all the other elements could pro-
duce sense organs, but all these produce sensation
by means of something else, that is through media.

199

ARISTOTLE
485 a e > eg an γα Ψ Ay 4
μεταξύ. ἡ ὃ ἁφὴ τῷ αὐτῶν ἅπτεσθαί ἐστιν, διὸ
καὶ τοὔνομα τοῦτο ἔχει. καίτοι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα
αἰσθητήρια ἁφῇ αἰσθάνεται, ἀλλὰ δι᾽ ἑτέρου αὕτη

80 δὲ δοκεῖ μόνη δι᾽ αὑτῆς, ὥστε τῶν μὲν τοιούτων
στοιχείων οὐθὲν ἂν εἴη σῶμα τοῦ ζῴου, οὐδὲ δὴ
γήϊνον. πάντων γὰρ ἡ ἁφὴ τῶν ἁπτῶν ἐστὶν
ὥσπερ μεσότης, καὶ δεκτικὸν τὸ αἰσθητήριον οὐ
μόνον ὅσαι διαφοραὶ γῆς εἰσίν, ἀλλὰ καὶ θερμοῦ
καὶ ψυχροῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπτῶν ἁπάντων. καὶ

95 διὰ τοῦτο τοῖς ὀστοῖς καὶ ταῖς θριξὶ καὶ τοῖς

486} τοιούτοις μορίοις οὐκ αἰσθανόμεθα, ὅτι γῆς ἐστίν.
A ~
καὶ τὰ φυτὰ διὰ τοῦτο οὐδεμίαν ἔχει αἴσθησιν, ὅτι
fal 2 ’, yw 4 ε a )ὃ ,ὕ ἃ v
γῆς ἐστίν. ἄνευ δὲ ἀφῆς οὐδεμίαν οἷόν τε ἄλλην
~ "
ὑπάρχειν, τοῦτο δὲ τὸ αἰσθητήριον οὐκ ἔστιν οὔτε
γῆς οὔτε ἄλλου τῶν στοιχείων οὐδενός. φανερὸν

ὁ τοίνυν ὅτι ἀνάγκη μόνης ταύτης στερισκόμενα τῆς
αἰσθήσεως τὰ ζῷα ἀποθνήσκειν: οὔτε γὰρ ταύτην
ἢ» / \ nA » ~ xv ΕΣ yu
ἔχειν οἷόν te μὴ ζῷον, οὔτε ζῷον dv ἄλλην ἔχειν
3 Ἂ \ ὦ" A x ~ \ »Ἱ
ἀνάγκη πλὴν ταύτης. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὰ μὲν ἄλλα

? ‘ a ¢ » 3 , AY ~
αἰσθητὰ tats ὑπερβολαῖς οὐ διαφθείρει τὸ ζῷον,
᾿Ὶ - ᾿ , . » ͵ > \ ΄ NY
οἷον χρῶμα καὶ ψόφος καὶ ἀσμή, ἀλλὰ μόνον τὰ
,

10 αἰσθητήρια, ἂν μὴ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οἷον ἂν ἅμα
τῷ ψόφῳ ὦσις γένηται καὶ πληγή, καὶ ὑπὸ dpa-
μάτων καὶ ὀσμῆς ἕτερα κινεῖται, ἃ τῇ ἀφῇ φθείρει.
καὶ ὃ χυμὸς δὲ ἡ ἅμα συμβαίνει ἁπτικὸν εἶναι,

i f ¢ A ~ - - δ 4
ταύτῃ φθείρει. ἡ δὲ τῶν ἁπτῶν ὑπερβολή, οἷον
θερμῶν καὶ ψυχρῶν καὶ σκληρῶν, ἀναιρεῖ τὸ ξῷον'

16 παντὸς μὲν γὰρ αἰσθητοῦ ὑπερβολὴ ἀναιρεῖ 78
αἰσθητήριον, ὥστε καὶ τὸ ἁπτὸν τὴν ἁφήν, ταύτῃ
δὲ ὥρισται τὸ ζῆν: ἄνευ γὰρ ἁφῆς δέδεικται ὅτι

200

ON THE SOUL, III. xm.

But the sense of touch arises from touching the
objects themselves, and that is why it has its name.
The other sense organs perceive by touch too, but
through a medium. This alone seems to perceive
by itself, so that no one of these clements could
compose the animal body. Nor could earth. For the
touching of all tangible objects is a kind of mean, and
the sense organ is receptive not only in as many ways
as there are differences of earth, but also of heat,
cold, and all other tangible things. Vor this reason
we do not perceive by our bones and hair, and such
parts of the body, because they are composed of
earth. And for this reason plants have no sensation,
because they are composed of earth. But without
touch no other sensation can exist, but this sense
organ is neither composed of earth, nor of any other
of the elements. It is obvious, then, that deprived of
this, their only sensation, animals must die; for it is
impossible for anything but an animal to possess this,
nor need an animal possess any sense but this. And
for this reason the other sensible objects do not
destroy the animal by excess, such as colour and
sound and smell, but only the sense organs, except
incidentally, as for instance when a thrust or blow is
delivered at the same time as the sound, and other
movements are produced by sight and smell, which
destroy by touch. Flavour, again, destroys by con-
tact in so far as the animal happens to be affected by
touch. But the excess of tangible objects, such as
hot, cold, and hard, destroys the animal; for excess
in any sensible object destroys the sense organ ; so
the tangible object destroys touch, and by this living
is determined, for it has been admitted that without

201

ARISTOTLE

485 Ὁ
ἀδύνατον εἶναι ζῷον. διὸ ἡ τῶν ἁπτῶν ὑπερβολὴ

οὐ μόνον τὸ αἰσθητήριον φθείρει, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ
ζῷον, ὅτι ἀνάγκη μόνην ἔχειν ταύτην. τὰς δ᾽
” > ? ” \ A ΟΣ ” 5
80 ἄλλας αἰσθήσεις ἔχει τὸ ζῷον, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, οὐ
τοῦ εἶναι ἕνεκα ἀλλὰ τοῦ εὖ, οἷον ὄψιν, ἐπεὶ ἐν
a7 , oo ῳ cm & 73 \> Aa
ἀέρι καὶ ὕδατι, ὅπως ὁρᾷ, ὅλως δ᾽ ἐπεὶ ev διαφανεῖ,
lol , A λ ς a \ 7 μὰ > re
γεῦσίν τε διὰ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ λυπηρόν, ἵνα. αἰσθάνηται
\ ~ A lod ~
τὸ ἐν τροφῇ καὶ ἐπιθυμῇ καὶ κινῆται, ἀκοὴν
4 oe t e ~ lat \ o
dé ὅπως σημαίνῃ τι αὐτῷ, γλῶτταν δὲ ὅπως

σημαίνῃ τι ἑτέρῳ.

202

ON THE SOUL, WT. xin.

touch the animal cannot exist. Therefore excess in
the objects touched not only destroys the sense organ,
but also the animal, because touch is the one sense
which the animal must possess. But the animal
possesses the other senses, as has been said, not in
order that it may exist, but that its existence may
be good ; for instance the animal has sight, when it
lives in air or water, or generally in a transparent
medium, in order that it may see; and it has taste
because of what is sweet and bitter, in order that it
may perceive these qualities in food and may desire
and be moved; and hearing that it may interpret
something to itself, and tongue that it may interpret
something to another.

203

ON SENSE AND SENSIBLE
OBJECTS

INTRODUCTION

Tus treatise is the first of a series known as Parva
Naturalia, which professes to deal with the special
activities of the soul. The De Sensu treats of Sense
and Sensible Objects, but incompletely, as touch is
omitted altogether, and the treatment of hearing is
very slight. From the point of view of the modern
reader the account is not altogether satisfactory,
because Aristotle's Physics and Physiology are very
remote from the thought of to-day. But it does not
follow that the account he gives is devoid of interest.
The first five chapters deal with the senses them-
selves and the objects ofsense. The author attempts
to give a real account of the nature of the latter, and
although his meaning is often obscure and his Meta-
physics quite foreign to our modes of thought, he
makes it clear that he regards sensible objects as
having a real existence apart from the organs of
sense which perceive them.

The last two chapters raise some very interesting
questions, although they can hardly be said to answer
them satisfactorily. Of these the most important
are: “Can there be an imperceptible magnitude ? ”
and ‘‘ Can two objects of sense be perceived simul-
taneously ἢ To both of these questions Aristotle
answers No, though with certain qualifications.

207

ΠΕΡῚ AIZSOHZEOS
ΚΑΙ AISOHTQN

486 ἃ ᾿Επεὶ δὲ περὶ ψυχῆς καθ᾽ αὑτὴν διώρισται
καὶ ᾿ περὶ τῶν δυνάμεων ἑκάστης κατὰ μόριον
αὐτῆς, ἐχόμενόν ἐστι “ποιήσασθαι. τὴν ἐπίσκεψιν
περὶ τῶν ζῴων καὶ τῶν ζωὴν ἐχόντων ἁπάντων,

ὅ τίνες εἰσὶν ἴδιαι καὶ τίνες κοιναὶ πράξεις αὐτῶν.
τὰ μὲν oot εἰρημένα περὶ ψυχῆς ὑποικείσθω, περὶ
δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν λέγωμεν, καὶ πρῶτον. περὶ τῶν
πρώτων. φαίνεται δὲ τὰ μέγιστα, καὶ τὰ κοινὰ
καὶ τὰ ἴδια τῶν ζῴων, κοινὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄντα καὶ
τοῦ σώματος, οἷον αἴσθησις καὶ μνήμη καὶ θυμὸς

10 καὶ ἐπιθυμία, καὶ ὅλως ὄρεξις, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις
ἡδονή τε καὶ “λύπη: καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα σχεδὸν ὑπ-
άρχει πᾶσι τοῖς ζῴοις. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις͵ τὰ μὲν
πάντων ἐστὶ τῶν μετεχόντων ζωῆς κοινά, τὰ δὲ
τῶν ξῴων ἐνίοις, τυγχάνουσι δὲ τούτων τὰ
μέγιστα τέτταρες οὖσαι συζυγίαι τὸν ἀριθμόν, οἷον

16 ἐγρήγορσις καὶ ὕπνος, καὶ νεότης καὶ γῆρας, καὶ
ἀναπνοὴ καὶ ἐκπνοή, καὶ ζωὴ καὶ θάνατος" περὶ
ὧν θεωρητέον, τί τε ἕκαστον αὐτῶν, καὶ διὰ τίνας
αἰτίας συμβαίνει.

Φυσικοῦ δὲ καὶ περὶ ὑγιείας καὶ νόσου τὰς
πρώτας ἰδεῖν ἀρχάς" οὔτε γὰρ ὑγίειαν οὔτε νόσον
208

ON SENSE AND SENSIBLE
OBJECTS

I. Since our account of the soul itself is complete, Ou, sunject

and also of the faculties existing in cach part of it, special
our next task is to examine living creatures and all aah and
things which have animal life, and to discover what are ὃ
their peculiar and what are their common activities.
All that has already been said about the soul is to be
assumed, but let us now discuss Lhe remaining ques-
tions, dealing first of all with those which naturally
come first. The most important characteristics of
animals, both general and special, appear to be those
which are common both to soul and body, such as
sensation, memory, passion, desire, and appetence
satel and in addition to these pleasure and pain ;
or these belong to almost all living creatures. In
addition to these some are common to all those
creatures that share in animal life, and others are
peculiar to certain animals. The most important of
these are the four pairs, namely waking and sleep,
youth and age, breathing in and out, life and death ;
about these we have to consider what each of them
is, and what are the reasons for their existence.

It is further the duty of the physical philosopher to Disease and
reflect on the first principles of disease and health ; '!».
for neither health nor disease can be the properties of

Ρ 900

ARISTOTLE

486 a Θ᾽ vA a 3 é , - 1
οἷόν τε γίνεσθαι τοῖς ἐστερημένοις ζωῆς. διὸ

20 σχεδὸν τῶν τε περὶ φύσεως οἱ πλεῖστοι καὶ τῶν
ἰατρῶν of φιλοσοφωτέρως τὴν τέχνην μετιόντες,
4885 οὗ μὲν τελευτῶσιν εἰς τὰ περὶ ἰατριιςῆς, οἱ δ᾽ ἐκ
τῶν περὲ φύσεως ἄρχονται περὶ τῆς ἰατριιῆς.
Ὅτι δὲ τὰ λεχθέντα κοινὰ τῆς τε ψυχῆς ἐστὶ
καὶ τοῦ σώματος, οὐκ ἀδηλον. πάντα γὰρ τὰ
\ 2 3 ͵ , ἢ \ > ? τὴ
μὲν μετ᾽ αἰσθήσεως συμβαίνει, τὰ δὲ δι᾿ αἰσθήσεως"
ἔνια δὲ τὰ μὲν πάθη ταύτης ὄντα τυγχάνει, τὰ δ᾽
ω ‘ \ ‘ \ , Ν 4 \
ἕξεις, τὰ δὲ φυλακαὶ καὶ σωτηρίαι, τὰ δὲ φθοραὶ
καὶ στερήσεις. ἡ δ᾽ αἴσθησις ὅτι διὰ σώματος
γίνεται τῇ ψυχῇ, δῆλον καὶ διὰ τοῦ λόγου καὶ
τοῦ λόγου χωρίς.
la ~
᾿Αλλὰ περὶ μὲν αἰσθήσεως καὶ τοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι,
τί ἐστι καὶ διὰ τί συμβαίνει τοῖς ζῴοις τοῦτο τὸ
10 πάθος, εἴρηται πρότερον ἐν τοῖς περὶ ψυχῆς. τοῖς
δὲ ζῴοις, ἧ μὲν ζῷον ἕκαστον, ἀνάγκη ὑπάρχειν
y ~
αἴσθησιν: τούτῳ yap τὸ ζῷον εἶναι καὶ μὴ ζῷον
i Os 3 4 > a a \ ξ A
διορίζομεν. ἰδίᾳ δ᾽ ἤδη καθ᾽ ἕκαστον ἡ μὲν ἁφὴ
καὶ γεῦσις ἀκολουθεῖ πᾶσιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ἡ μὲν
£ \ ὃ AY A > Ἐ 5. ¥ 2 a“ \ ~
τὸ ἀφὴ διὰ τὴν εἰρημένην αἰτίαν ἐν τοῖς περὶ ψυχῆς,
¢ Ἂ, lel ὃ i: \ ra εἶ ‘ ¢ \ ,ὔ
ἡ δὲ γεῦσις διὰ τὴν τροφήν" τὸ γὰρ ἡδὺ διακρίνει
καὶ τὸ λυπηρὸν αὕτη περὶ τὴν τροφήν, ὥστε τὸ
Ἀ ες εἶ δὲ La \ Lu ¢ ?
μὲν φεύγειν τὸ δὲ διώκειν, καὶ ὅλως 6 χυμός ἐστι
~ θ ~ , / ec \ A a“ μὴ
τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ μορίου πάθος. αἱ δὲ διὰ τῶν ἔξωθεν
αἰσθήσεις τοῖς πορευτικοῖς αὐτῶν, οἷον ὄσφρησις
80 Καὶ ἀκοὴ καὶ ὄψις, πτᾶσι μὲν τοῖς ἔχουσι σωτηρίας
ἕνεκεν ὑπάρχουσιν, ὅπως διώκωσί τε προαισθανό-
μενα τὴν τροφὴν καὶ τὰ φαῦλα καὶ τὰ φθαρτικὰ
9 413 b ete. » 434 a, ch. 12.
210

ON SENSE AND SENSIBLE OBJECTS, 1.

things deprived of life. For this reason most in-
quirers into nature, and those doctors who pursue
their craft with scientific interest, are alike. [or the
former at the end of their inquiries reach a discussion
of medicine, while the latter begin their investiga-
tions into medicine with an inquiry into nature.

It is obvious that the characteristics already men-
tioned belong both to soul and body. For all of
them appear either in conjunction with sensation or
arise through sensation: some again are affections
of sensations and some are regular conditions ; some
again tend to guard and preserve life, and others to
destroy and extinguish it. That sensation is felt by
the soul through the medium of the body is obvious
on theoretical grounds and also apart from theory.

However we have already treated of sensation
and. feeling in our work On the Soul,? what they
are, and why this affection appears among animals.
Living creatures as such must possess sensation.
For it is by this that we differentiate between living
creatures and those which are not alive ; and in each
individual case touch and taste necessarily accom-
pany them all, touch for the reason given in our
work On the Soul,® and taste for the acquisition
of food ; for it is taste which discriminates between
pleasant and unpleasant in food, so that the one is
avoided and the other pursued, and speaking gener-
ally flavour is an affection of the nutritive part of
the soul. But those sensations which reach animals
capable of locomotion through an outside medium,
such as smell, hearing and vision, belong to all those
that possess them for the sake of safety, in order that
they may be aware of their food before they pursue
it, and may avoid what is infcrior or destructive,

211

Connexion
of body
and soul,

Sensation

is esaentinl
Lo the living
creature.

ARISTOTLE

18 φεύγωσι, τοῖς δὲ καὶ φρονήσεως τυγχάνουσι τοῦ

σι

εὖ ἕνεκα" πολλὰς γὰρ εἰσαγγέλλουσι διαφοράς, ἐξ
ὧν ἥ τε τῶν νοητῶν ἐγγίνεται φρόνησις καὶ ἡ
τῶν πρακτῶν.

Αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων πρὸς μὲν τὰ ἀναγκαῖα κρείτ-

ον ‘ > ¢ ta s δὲ a. ι ‘
τῶν ἡ ὄψις καὶ καθ᾽ αὑτήν, πρὸς δὲ νοῦν καὶ κατὰ

\ t 2 , N bY \ \

συμβεβηκὸς ἡ ἀκοή. διαφορὰς μὲν yap πολλὰς
Η ͵ \ ὃ A ¢ Aa a -
εἰσαγγέλλει καὶ παντοδαπὰς ἡ τῆς ὄψεως δύναμις
διὰ τὸ πάντα τὰ σώματα μετέχειν χρώματος, ὥστε
καὶ τὰ κοινὰ διὰ ταύτης αἰσθάνεσθαι μάλιστα
(λέγω δὲ κοινὰ σχῆμα, μέγεθος, κίνησιν, ἀριθμόν)"
ἡ δ᾽ ἀκοὴ τὰς τοῦ ψόφου διαφορὰς μόνον, ὀλίγοις
δὲ καὶ τὰς τῆς φωνῆς. κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ πρὸς
φρόνησιν ἡ ἀκοὴ πλεῖστον συμβάλλεται μέρος. ὁ
γὰρ λόγος αἴτιός ἐστι τῆς μαθήσεως ἀκουστὸς
dv, οὐ καθ᾽ αὑτὸν ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός: ἐξ
ὀνομάτων γὰρ σύγκειται, τῶν δ᾽ ὀνομάτων ἕκαστον
σύμβολόν ἐστιν. διόπερ φρονιμώτεροι τῶν ἐκ
γενετῆς ἐστερημένων εἰσὶν ἑκατέρας τῆς αἰσθήσεως
οἱ τυφλοὶ τῶν ἐνεῶν καὶ κωφῶν.

Il. Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς δυνάμεως ἣν ἔχει τῶν al-
σθήσεων ἑκάστη, πρότερον εἴρηται. τοῦ δὲ σώμα-
τος ἐν οἷς ἐγγίγνεσθαι πέφυκεν αἰσθητηρίοις, viv"
μὲν ζητοῦσι κατὰ τὰ στοιχεῖα τῶν σωμάτων" οὐκ
εὐποροῦντες δὲ πρὸς τέτταρα πέντ᾽ οὖσας συνάγειν,

3 a a
γλίχονται περὶ τῆς πέμπτης. ποιοῦσι δὲ πάντες

\ Μ 4 A 4 7 A > a A
τὴν ὄψιν πυρὸς διὰ τὸ πάθους τινὰς ἀγνοεῖν τὴν

1 ἔνιοι B.
212

ON SENSI. AND SENSIBLE OBJECTS, 1.—1.

while in the case of those that have thinking power
these senses exist for the sake of well-being; for
they give warning of many differences, from which
arise understanding both of the objects of thought
and of the affairs of practical life.

Of these faculties, for the mere necessities of ife Bight und

and in itself, sight is the more important, but for the Bea IDB:
mind and accidentally hearing is the more important.
For the faculty of sight gives warning of many differ-
ences of all kinds, because all bodies have a share of
colour, so that by this medium the soul perceives
most of the common sensibles. (By common I mean
such as shape, size, movement and number.) But
hearing only records differences of sound, and to a
few living creatures differences of voice. Accident-
ally, then, hearing makes the largest contribution to
wisdom. For the spoken word, which is responsible
for all instruction, is heard ; but this does not belong
to hearing in itself but only accidentally, because
speech is composed of words, and each word is a
symbol. Consequently, of those who have been
deprived of one sense or the other from birth, the
blind are more intelligent than the deaf and the
dumb.

II, Concerning the capacity which each of these Are the
senses has, we have already spoken. But when they joned of the
consider in what bodily sense-organs each of these *lements?
senses naturally develops, modern thinkers seek to
refer them to the elements of which the body is com-
posed. But finding it difficult to bring the four
elements into harmony with the five senses, they
make anxious inquiry about the fifth. They all
make vision consist of fire, because they do not
understand the reason of one of the peculiarities of

213

487b ὃ

ARISTOTLE

αἰτίαν: θλιβομένου “γὰρ καὶ κινουμένου τοῦ ὀῴφ-
θαλμοῦ φαίνεται πῦρ ἐκλάμπειν" τοῦτο δ' ἐν τῷ
σκότει πέφυκε συμβαίνειν, ἢ τῶν βλεφάρων ἐπι-
κεκαλυμμένων' γίνεται γὰρ καὶ τότε σκότος. ἔχει
δ᾽ ἀπορίαν τοῦτο καὶ ἑτέραν. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἔστι
λανθάνειν αἰσθανόμενον. καὶ “ὁρῶντα ὁρώμενόν τι,
ἀνάγκη dp’ αὐτὸν ἑαυτὸν ὁρᾶν τὸν ὀφθαλμόν. διὰ
τί οὖν ἠρεμοῦντι τοῦτ᾽ οὐ συμβαίνει; τὰ δ᾽ αἴτια
τούτου, καὶ τῆς ἀπορίας καὶ τοῦ δοκεῖν πῦρ εἶναι
τὴν ὄψιν, ἐντεῦθεν ληπτέον. τὰ γὰρ λεῖα πέφυκεν
Ἢ τῷ σκότει λάμπειν, οὐ μέντοι φῶς γε ποιεῖ, τοῦ

᾿ ὀφθαλμοῦ τὸ καλούμενον μέλαν καὶ μέσον λεῖον
φαίνεται. φαίνεται δὲ τοῦτο κινουμένου τοῦ ὄμ-
ματος διὰ τὸ συμβαίνειν ὥσπερ δύο γίνεσθαι τὸ
ἕν, τοῦτο δ᾽ ἡ ταχυτὴς ποιεῖ τῆς κινήσεως, ὥστε
δοκεῖν ἑ ἕτερον εἶναι τὸ ὁρῶν καὶ τὸ ὁρώμενον. διὸ
καὶ οὐ γίνεται, ἂν μὴ ταχέως καὶ ἐν σκότει τοῦτο
συμβῇ: τὸ γὰρ λεῖον ἐν τῷ σκότει πέφυκε λάμπειν,
οἷον κεφαλαὶ ἰχθύων τινῶν καὶ ὁ τῆς σηπίας θολός:
καὶ βραδέως μεταβάλλοντος τοῦ ὄμματος οὐ συμ-
βαίνει ὥστε δοκεῖν &, ἅμα ἕν καὶ δύο εἶναι τό θ᾽ “ὁρῶν
καὶ τὸ ὁρώμενον, ἐκείνως δ᾽ αὐτὸς αὐτὸν ὁρᾷ ὁ
ὀφθαλμός, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀνακλάσει, ἐπεὶ εἴ γε
πῦρ ἦν, καθάπερ ᾿Ἐμπεδοκλῆς φησὶ καὶ ἐν τῷ
Τιμαίῳ γέγραπται, καὶ συνέβαινε τὸ ὁρᾶν ἐξιόντος
ὥσπερ ἐκ λαμπτῆρος τοῦ φωτός, διὰ τί οὐ καὶ ἐν
τῷ σκότει ἑώρα ἂν ἡ ὄψις; τὸ δ᾽ ἀποσβέννυσθαι

α i.e, seeing sparks.

> A. appears to be thinking of what we call persistence of
vision. If the movement is sufficiently rapid, for instance
ina vibrating string, we shall appear to see not one string
in successive positions but two strings each stationary in the
two extreme positions.

214

ON SENSE AND SENSIBLE OBJECTS, πὶ

vision. When the eye is pressed or rolling, it seems
to send forth fire. This may occur in darkness or
when the eyes are closed ; in the latter case there is
also darkness. But their explanation only raises
another difficulty. For unless we suppose that it is
possible to perceive and see an object of vision with-
out knowing it, the eye must on this theory see itself.
Why then does this not happen when the eye is at
rest? The reason for this and the solution of our
difficulty, and the theory that vision is firc, must be
found in the following considerations. It is always
smooth surfaces that shine in the dark, though they
do not create light, and the centre of the eye which
men call the “black” of the eye is clearly smooth.
But when the eye is moved it is seen because the
occurrence is equivalent to making one thing appear
two, It is the rapidity of the movement? which
produces the effect, so that the seeing sense and
the object seen appear different. Consequently the
phenomenon does not occur, unless it happens
quickly and in the dark ; for it is in the dark that a
smooth surface appears to shine, for instance the
heads of certain fishes, and the dark fluid of the
cuttlefish ; when the movement of the eye is slow, it
is impossible that the seeing organ and the object
seen should appear to be both one and two at the
same moment. But in the other case (when the
movement is rapid) the eye merely sees itself in the
same sense as in reflection ; if the eye were actually
fire, as EEmpedocles says, and as is stated in the
Timaeus,° and if vision occurred when light issued
from the eye as from a lantern, why should not vision
be equally possible in the dark? It is quite futile

° Tim. 45 0.
Q15

Niteulties
of this
theory.

ARISTOTLE

437 b 4 > “ , 3 lod @ ξ ,
ι φάναι ἐν τῷ σκότει ἐξιοῦσαν, ὥσπερ ὁ Τίμαιος

λέγει, κενόν ἐστι παντελῶς" τίς γὰρ ἀπόσβεσις
φωτός ἐστιν; σβέννυται γὰρ ἢ ὑγρῷ ἢ ψυχρῷ τὸ
θερμὸν καὶ ξηρόν, οἷον δοκεῖ τό τ᾽ ἐν τοῖς dvOpa-
κώδεσιν εἶναι πῦρ καὶ ἡ φλόξ, ὧν τῷ φωτὶ οὐδέ-
τέρον φαίνεται ὑπάρχον. εἰ δ᾽ ἄρα ὑπάρχει μὲν
"0 ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ ἠρέμα λανθάνει ἡμᾶς, ἔδει μεθ᾽ ἡμέραν
τε καὶ ἐν τῷ ὕδατι ἀποσβέννυσθαι τὸ φῶς, καὶ ἐν
τοῖς πάγοις μᾶλλον γίνεσθαι σκότον" ἡ γοῦν φλὸξ
καὶ τὰ πεπυρωμένα σώματα πάσχει τοῦτο" νῦν δ᾽
οὐδὲν συμβαίνει τοιοῦτον. ᾿μπεδοκλῆς δ᾽ ἔοικε
8 νομίζοντε ὁτὲ μὲν ἐξιόντος τοῦ φωτός, ὥσπερ
εἴρηται πρότερον, βλέπειν" λέγει γοῦν οὕτως.

ὡς δ᾽ ὅτε τις πρόοδον νοέων ὡπλίσσατο λύχνον,
χειμερίην διὰ νύκτα πυρὸς σέλας αἰθομένοιο,
ἅψας παντοίων ἀνέμων λαμπτῆρας ἀμοργούς,
οἵτ᾽ ἀνέμων μὲν πνεῦμα διασκιδνᾶσιν ἀέντων,
80 φῶς δ᾽ ἔξω διαθρῶσκον, ὅσον ταναώτερον ἦεν,
λάμπεσκεν κατὰ βηλὸν ἀτειρέσιν ἀκτίνεσσιν"
ὡς δὲ τότ᾽ ἐν μήνιγξιν ἐεργμένον ὠγύγιον πῦρ
4880 λεπτῇσιν ὀθόνῃσι λοχάζετο κύκλοπα κούρην"
αἱ δ᾽ ὕδατος μὲν βένθος ἀπέστεγον ἀμφινάοντος,
πῦρ δ᾽ ἔξω διαθρῶσκον, ὅσον ταναώτερον Fev.
ὁτὲ μὲν οὖν οὕτως ὁρᾶν φησίν, ὁτὲ δὲ ταῖς ἀπορ-
ὁ ροίαις ταῖς ἀπὸ τῶν ὁρωμένων. Δημόκριτος δ᾽
ὅτι μὲν ὕδωρ εἶναί φησι, λέγει καλῶς, ὅτι δ᾽ οἴεται
τὸ ὁρᾶν εἶναι τὴν ἔμφασιν, οὐ καλῶς" τοῦτο μὲν
γὰρ συμβαίνει ὅτι τὸ ὄμμα λεῖον, καὶ ἔστιν odk
ἐν ἐκείνῳ ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τῷ δρῶντι: ἀνάκλασις γὰρ τὸ
πάθος. ἀλλὰ καθόλου περὶ τῶν ἐμφαινομένων καὶ
« Tim. 45 τ».

216

ON SENSE AND SENSIBLE OBJECTS, τι.

to say, as the Timaeus* does, that on its emergence
from the eye it is extinguished in the dark ; for what
meaning can we attach to this extinguishing of light ?
The dry is extinguished by the wet, and the hot by
the cold, as we see in the case of fire and flame in
coals, but hot and dry are not qualities of light. If
they do belong to light, but we do not notice it
because Lhey are motionless, the light would be ex-
tinguished in the daytime when it rains, and darkness
would occur more commonly in frosty weather.
Flame and bodies on fire show this phenomenon ;
but no such thing occurs in the other case. Em- Empedoctes’
pedocles seems to imagine that vision takes place ry of
when light leaves the eye, as we have said before ;
for instance he says :

“ Just as when a man before sallying forth fur-
nishes him with a lamp of gleaming fire in the stormy
night, and fits thereto screens to protect it against
all winds, which scatter the breath of the breezes as
they blow; and the light leaps out therefrom inas-
much as it spreads further, and shines over his
threshold with tireless rays, thus also did he entrap
with light webs the primaeval fire, even the round
pupil of the eye, in a membrane ; and the webs shut
out the depth of surrounding water, but the fire
leaps out therefrom inasmuch as it spreads further.”

This is the account which he gives of vision at
times, but at other times he speaks of emanations
from objects seen. Democritus is right when he says Democritus
that the eye is water, but wrong when he supposes Ὁ “"™
vision to be mere reflection. The reflection visible
in the eye occurs because the eye is smooth, and does
not exist in the eye, but in the observer; for the
phenomenon is only reflection, But in general the

217

488 ἃ
10

80
438 b

ARISTOTLE

ἀνακλάσεως οὐδέν πω δῆλον ἦν, ὡς ἔοικεν. ἄτοπον
δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ ἐπελθεῖν αὐτῷ ἀπορῆσαι διὰ τί ὃ
ὀφθαλμὸς ὁρᾷ μόνον, τῶν δ᾽ ἄλλων οὐδὲν ἐν οἷς
ἐμφαίνεται τὰ εἴδωλα. τὸ μὲν οὖν τὴν ὄψιν εἶναι
ee ἀληθὲς μέν, οὐ μέντοι συμβαίνει τὸ ὁρᾶν
ἡ ὕδ Ὁ ἀλλ᾽ ἡ διαφανές" ὃ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀέρος κοινόν
ae ἀλλ' irs tela καὶ εὐπιλητότερον τὸ
ὕδωρ τοῦ ἀέρος" διόπερ ἡ ἧ κόρη καὶ τὸ ὄμμα ὕδατός
ἐστιν. τοῦτο δὲ καὶ ἐπ᾽ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων δῆλον:
φαίνεται γὰρ ὕδωρ τὸ ἐκρέον διαφθειρομένων, καὶ
ἔν γε τοῖς πάμπαν ἐμβρύοις τῇ ψυχρότητι ὑπερ-
βάλλον καὶ τῇ λαμπρότητι. καὶ τὸ λευκὸν τοῦ
ὄμματος. ἐν τοῖς ἔχουσιν αἷμα πῖον καὶ λιπαρόν'
ὅπερ διὰ τοῦτ᾽ ἐστέ, πρὸς τὸ διαμένειν τὸ ὑγρὸν
ἄπηκτον. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τοῦ σώματος ἀρριγότατον
ὁ ὀφθαλμός ἐστιν' οὐδεὶς γάρ πω τὸ ἐντὸς τῶν
βλεφάρων ἐρρίγωσεν. τῶν δ᾽ ἀναίμων σκληρό-
δερμοι οἱ ὀφθαλμοί εἰσι, καὶ τοῦτο ποιεῖ τὴν
σκέπην.

"Adoy ov δὲ ὅλως τὸ ἐξιόντι τινὶ τὴν ὄψιν ὁρᾶν,
καὶ ἀπ τε θαι μέχρι τῶν ἄστρων, ἢ μέχρι τινὸς
ἐξιοῦσαν συμφύεσθαι, καθάπερ λέγουσί τινες.
τούτου μὲν γὰρ βέλτιον τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ συμφύεσθαι τοῦ
ὄμματος. ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο εὔηθες" τό τε “γὰρ συμ-
φύεσθαι τί ἐστι φωτὶ πρὸς φῶς; ἢ πῶς οἷόν θ᾽
ὑπάρχειν; οὐ yap τῷ τυχόντι «συμφύεται τὸ τυχόν.
τό τ᾽ ἐντὸς τῷ ἐκτὸς πῶς; a yap μῆνιγξ μεταξύ
ἐστιν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ἄνευ φωτὸς μὴ ὁρᾶν
εἴρηται ἐν ἄλλοις" ἀλλ᾽ εἴτε φῶς εἴτ᾽ ἀήρ ἐστι τὸ
μεταξὺ τοῦ ὁρωμένου καὶ τοῦ ὄμματος, ἡ διὰ

5. 418 Ὁ 8,
218

ON SENSE AND SENSIBLE: OBJECTS, τι.

whole theory of things mirrored and reflected is so
far not clear. But itis strange that it never occurred
to him to wonder why the eye is the only thing which
sees, and why none of the other things in which
images appear do so. It is true that the eye con-
sists of water, but its power of vision exists not be-
cause it is water, but because it is transparent ; an
attribute which it shares with air. But water is more
easily controlled and enclosed than air because it is
denser, That the pupil and the eye are composed
of water is obvious from the following facts; for
when they decay it is water that flows out of them,
and this, especially in embryos, is exceedingly cold
and clear. And the white of the eye in animals
which have blood is fat and oily ; this is so in order
that the moisture may remain unfrozen. For this
reason the eye is the part of the body least sensitive
to cold; for no one has ever felt cold in the interior
of the eye. But the eyes of the bloodless animals
have a hard cuticle, and this constitutes a protection,
But in general it is unreasonable to suppose that Vision as

seeing occurs by something issuing from the eye, and tion from
reaching as far as the stars, or issuing to a certain the eye.
point and there coalescing with the object, as some
think. It would be better to suppose that coales-
cence occurs in the eye to start with. But even
this is foolish ; what is the meaning of light coalescing
with light? How could it occur? For chance
coalescence is impossible. And how could the inside
coalesce with the outside? For the membrane is
between them. TElsewhere* we have discussed the
impossibility of vision without light; but whether
light or air is the medium between the sensible object
and the eye, the motion through this medium is

219

438 b
6

τὸ

ARISTOTLE

TOUTOU κίνησίς ἐστιν ἡ ποιοῦσα τὸ ὁρᾶν. καὶ
εὐλόγως τὸ ἐντός ἔστιν ὕδατος" διαφανὲς γὰρ τὸ
ὕδωρ. ὁρᾶται δὲ ὥσπερ καὶ ἔξω οὐκ ἄνευ φωτός,
οὕτω καὶ ἐντός" διαφανὲς ἄρα δεῖ εἶναι. καὶ ἀνάγκη
ὕδωρ εἶναι, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἀήρ. οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦ
ἐσχάτου ὄμματος ἡ ψυχὴ ἢ ἢ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ αἰσθητή-
ριόν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι ἐντός" διόπερ ἀνάγκη
διαφανὲς εἶναι, καὶ δεκτικὸν φωτὸς τὸ ἐντὸς τοῦ
ὄμματος. καὶ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν συμβαινόντων
δῆλον" ἤδη γάρ τισι πληγεῖσιν ἐ ἐν πολέμῳ παρὰ τὸν
κρόταφον οὕτως ὥστ᾽ ἐκτμηθῆναι τοὺς πόρους τοῦ
ὄμματος, ἔδοξε γενέσθαι σκότος ὥσπερ λύχνου
ἀποσβεσθέντος, διὰ τὸ οἷον λαμπτῆρά Twa ἀπο-
τμηθῆναι τὸ διαφανές, τὴν καλουμένην κόρην.
Ὥστ᾽ εἴπερ τούτων τι συμβαίνει, καθάπερ λέγο-
μεν, φανερὸν ὡς δεῖ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἀποδιδό-
ναι καὶ προσάπτειν ἕκαστον τῶν αἰσθητηρίων ἑνὶ
τῶν στοιχείων. τοῦ “μὲν ὄμματος τὸ ὁρατικὸν
ὕδατος ὑποληπτέον, ἀέρος δὲ τὸ τῶν ψόφων αἰσ-
θητικόν, πυρὸς δὲ τὴν ὄσφρησιν. ὃ γὰρ ἐνεργείᾳ ἡ
ὄσφρησις, τοῦτο δυνάμει τὸ ὁσ ραντικόν" τὸ γὰρ
αἰσθητὸν ἐ ἐνεργεῖν ποιεῖ τὴν αἴσθησιν, ὥσθ᾽ ὑπάρχειν
ἀνάγκη αὐτὴν δυνάμει πρότερον. ἡ δ᾽ ὀσμὴ kam
νώδης τίς ἐστιν ἀναθυμίασις, ἡ δ᾽ ἀναθυμίασις ἡ
καπνώδης ἐκ πυρός. διὸ καὶ τῷ περὶ τὸν ἐγκέ-
φαλον τόπῳ τὸ τῆς ὀσφρήσεως αἰσθητήριόν ἐστιν
ἴδιον: » δυνάμει γὰρ θερμὴ ἡ τοῦ ψυχροῦ ὕλη ἐ ἐστιν.
καὶ ἡ τοῦ ὄμματος γένεσις τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχει τρόπον"
ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου γὰρ συνέστηκεν" οὗτος γὰρ
ὑγρότατος καὶ ψυχρότατος τῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι

489 a μορίων ἐστί. τὸ δ᾽ ἁπτικὸν γῆς. τὸ δὲ γευστικὸν

εἶδός τι ἁφῆς ἐστίν, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πρὸς τῇ καρδίᾳ
220

ON SENSE AND SENSIBLE OBJECTS, τι.

what produces vision. And it is natural that what is
within should consist of water ; for water is transpar-
ent. And just as there is no vision outside without
light, so also within, there must be a transparency.
And this can only be water because it is not air.
For the soul or the sense organ of the soul does not
reside in the surface of the eye, but must evidently
be within; consequently the part within the eye
must be transparent and reccptive of light. This is
clear from what actually oceurs ; for it is a fact that
when in war men have been struck on the temple so
as to sever the passages connected with the eye,
darkness has fallen on them like the extinguishing of
a lamp, because the transparency, called the pupil,
has been cut off, as by a lamp screen.

If the facts are as we have described, it is evident
that the following is the only method by which we can
allot and adapt each of the sense organs to one of the
elements. One would have to suppose the seeing
part of the eye to be water, that which is perceptive
of sound to be air, and smell to be fire. That which
is smelling actually is the faculty of smelling potenti-
ally; for the object perceived causes the sense to
operate, so that this sense must have existed
potentially before. For smell is a kind of smoky
vapour, and a smoky vapour arises from fire. Con-
sequently the sense organ of smell is peculiar to the
region about the brain ; for mattcr which is cold is
potentially hot. And the genesis of the eye arises
in the same way, for itis developed from the brain;
for this is the most moist and coldest of all parts of
the body. The faculty of touch then consists of
earth ; and taste is a form of touch. For this reason

221

Senses
and the
elements,

489 ἃ

σι

ARISTOTLE

τὸ αἰσθητήριον αὐτῶν, τῆς τε γεύσεως καὶ τῆς
ἁφῆς" ἀντίκευται γὰρ τῷ ἐγκεφάλῳ αὕτη, καὶ ἔστι
θερμότατον τῶν μορίων. καὶ περὶ μὲν τῶν αἰσθη-
τικῶν τοῦ σώματος μορίων ἔστω τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον
διωρισμένα.

Il. Περὶ δὲ τῶν αἰσθητῶν τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστον
αἰσθητήριον, οἷον λέγω χρώματος καὶ ψόφου καὶ
ὀσμῆς καὶ χυμοῦ καὶ ἁφῆς, καθόλου μὲν εἴρηται
ἐν τοῖς περὶ ψυχῆς, τί τὸ ἔργον αὐτῶν καὶ τί τὸ
ἐνεργεῖν καθ᾽ ἕκαστον τῶν αἰσθητηρίων" τί δέ
ποτε δεῖ λέγειν ὁτιοῦν αὐτῶν, οἷον τί χρῶμα ἢ
τί ψόφον ἢ τί ὀσμὴν ἢ χυμόν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
περὶ ἁφῆς, ἐπισκεπτέον, καὶ πρῶτον περὶ χρώ-
ματος.

Ἔστι μὲν οὖν ἕκαστον διχῶς λεγόμενον, τὸ μὲν
ἐνεργείᾳ τὸ δὲ δυνάμει. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐνεργείᾳ
χρῶμα καὶ δ ψόφος πῶς ἐστὶ τὸ αὐτὸ 7 ἕτερον
ταῖς κατ ἐνέργειαν αἰσθήσεσιν, οἷον ὁράσει καὶ
ἀκούσει, εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς περὶ ψυχῆς" τί δὲ é ἕκαστον
αὐτῶν ὃν ποιήσει τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν,
νῦν λέγωμεν. ὥσπερ οὖν εἴρηται περὶ φωτὸς ἐν
ἐκείνοις, ὅτι ἐστὶ χρῶμα τοῦ δια ανοῦς κατὰ συμ-
βεβηκός" ὅταν γὰρ ἐνῇ τι πυρῶδες ἐν διαφανεῖ,
ἡ μὲν παρουσία φῶς, ἡ δὲ στέρησίς ἐστι σκότος.
ὃ δὲ λέγομεν διαφανές, οὐκ ἔστιν ἴδιον ἀέρος ἢ
ὕδατος οὐδ᾽ ἄλλου τῶν οὕτω λεγομένων σωμάτων,
ἀλλά τίς ἐστι κοινὴ φύσις καὶ δύναμις, ἣ “χωριστὴ
μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐν τούτοις δ᾽ ἐστί, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις
σώμασιν ἐνυπάρχει, τοῖς μὲν μᾶλλον τοῖς δ᾽ ἧττον.
ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ τῶν σωμάτων ἀνάγκη τι εἶναι
ἔσχατον, καὶ ταύτης. ἡ μὲν οὖν τοῦ φωτὸς φύσις
ἐν ἀορίστῳ τῷ διαφανεῖ ἐστίν" τοῦ δ᾽ ἐν τοῖς
222

ON SENSE AND SENSIBLE OBJECTS, u.—11.

the sense organ both of taste and of touch is near the
heart. For the heart is the antithesis of the brain,
and is the hottest of all parts of the body. This
then completes our account of the parts of the body
which have perceptive faculties.

III, The sense organs concerned with each of the
sensible objects, I mean with colour, sound, smell,
flavour and touch, have been treated generally in the
treatise On the Soul, where the function of each is
explained, and what the activity of each sense organ
is in itself; but we have now to consider how we are
to describe the essence of each, to answer Lhe ques-
tion what is sound, or colour, or smell, or favour, and Colour,
similarly with regard to touch. Let us deal with
colour first.

Each of these terms is used in two senses, one
actually and one potentially. We have explained
in the treatise On the Soul the sense in which
actual colour and sound are identical with or different
from the actual sensations, that is, seeing or hearing.*
Now let us consider what there is in each of them
which will produce the sensation actually realized.
In that treatise we have already said of light, that it
is the colour of the transparent accidentally ; for
whenever there is a fiery quality in the transparence,
its presence is light and its absence darkness. What
we call transparence is not a quality peculiar to air
or water or any other so-called body, but is a common
nature and faculty, which is not separable but resides
in these bodies and in others, in some to a greater
and some to a less extent. Now just as every body
must have some limit, so must this. Again it is the
nature of light to exist in a limitless transparency ;

5. De An. 425b 26,
223

ARISTOTLE

489 8 , “ \ » Ld δ » »
σώμασι διαφανοῦς τὸ ἔσχατον, ὅτι μὲν εἴη ἄν τι,

“- a 4 A > 3 \ ‘ n 3 7
δῆλον, ὅτι δὲ τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ χρῶμα, ἐϊς τῶν συμ-
80 βαινόντων φανερόν. τὸ γὰρ χρῶμα ἢ ἐν τῷ πέρατί
ἐστιν ἢ πέρας" διὸ καὶ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι τὴν ἐπι-
φάνειαν χροιὰν ἐκάλουν. ἔστι μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ τοῦ
σώματος πέρατι, ἀλλ᾽ οὔ τι τὸ τοῦ σώματος πέρας,
ἀλλὰ τὴν αὐτὴν φύσιν δεῖ νομίζειν, ἥπερ καὶ ἔξω
490 χρωματίζεται, ταύτην καὶ ἐντός. φαίνεται δὲ καὶ
ἀὴρ καὶ ὕδωρ χρωματιζόμενα: καὶ γὰρ ἡ αὐγὴ
τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν. ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖ μὲν διὰ τὸ ἐν ἀορίστῳ
4 ~
οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν ἐγγύθεν καὶ προσιοῦσι καὶ πόρρωθεν
y x wHs ©€ 3h wy? ot 4 Ὶ \ ~
ὁ ἔχει χροιὰν οὔθ᾽ ὁ ἀὴρ οὔθ᾽ ἡ θάλαττα" ἐν δὲ τοῖς
σώμασιν ἐὰν μὴ τὸ περιέχον ποιῇ τὸ μεταβάλλειν,
« ~ a
ὥρισται καὶ ἡ φαντασία τῆς χρόας. δῆλον dpa
ὅτι τὸ αὐτὸ κἀκεῖ κἀνθάδε δεκτικὸν τῆς χρόας
> , \ » ἈῚ > ὦ ξ , ? “
ἐστίν. τὸ dpa διαφανὲς καθ᾽ ὅσον ὑπάρχει ἐν τοῖς
tA e ΄ Ἄ “ ‘ 2 -
σώμασιν (ὑπάρχει δὲ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον ἐν πᾶσι
10 χρώματος ποιεῖ μετέχειν. ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἐν πέρατι ἡ
χρόα, τούτου ἂν ἐν πέρατι εἴη. ὥστε χρῶμα ἂν
εἴη τὸ τοῦ διαφανοῦς ἐν σώματι ὡρισμένῳ πέρας.
καὶ αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν διαφανῶν, οἷον ὕδατος καὶ εἴ
» “ ν ὦ , - ""
τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον, καὶ ὅσοις φαίνεται χρῶμα ἴδιον
ὑπάρχειν κατὰ τὸ ἔσχατον, ὁμοίως πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει.
τὸ ἔστι μὲν οὖν ἐνεῖναι ἐν τῷ διαφανεῖ τοῦθ᾽ ὅπερ
K \ > ~ Ce 4 t a on Mv δὲ κα IAW?
αἱ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι ποιεῖ φῶς, ἔστι δὲ μή, ἃ
ἐστερῆσθαι.
Ὥσπερ οὖν ἐκεῖ τὸ μὲν φῶς τὸ δὲ σκότος, οὕτως
ἐν τοῖς σώμασιν ἐγγίνεται τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ μέλαν.
224

ON SENSI. AND SENSIBLE OBJECTS, m1.

but it is obvious that there must be some limit to the
transparence in bodies, and it is plain from the facts
that this limit is actually colour ;. for colour either
has its existence in the limit or else is the limit
itself. This is why the Pythagorcans call the visible
surface of a body its colour. Colour lies at the limit
of the body, but is not its limit ; but it is fair to sug-
gest that the same nature which causes its colour
outside, also exists within. Air and water are evi-
dently coloured ; for their brightness is of the nature
of colour. But in their case because the colour exists
in something which has no limit, air and sea have not
the same colour near by and to those who approach
them as they have at a distance. But in bodies,
unless the surrounding envelope causes a change,
even the appearance of the colour is defined. It is
obvious then that the same thing must be receptive
of the colour, both in the one case and in the other.
It is then the transparence in the proportion as it
exists in bodies, which causes them to share in colour
(and this transparence exists in them all to a greater
or less extent). But since colour exists in the limit,
it must lie in the limit of transparence. So that
colour would prove to be the limit of transparence in
a limited body. And in the same way colour is a
property both of all transparent objects, such as
water and anything of a similar nature, and also of
those things in which a special colour seems to exist
at the limit. And whatever it is which causes light
in air, sometimes seems to exist in the transparence,
and at other times seems not to exist, but to have
been removed.

Just then as in air we have light and darkness, so
in bodies we have white and black. But we must

225

The forma-
tion of
colours

ARISTOTLE

480 b
περὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων χρωμάτων ἤδη διελομένους

- > ͵ ἐν rd > ᾿
90 ποσαχῶς ἐνδέχεται γίγνεσθαι λεκτέον. ἐνδέχεται
4 4 > » 4 iY A ῖ A
μὲν yap map’ ἄλληλα τιθέμενα τὸ λευκὸν Kal τὸ
é a 3 ¢ id 4 3.3 ᾿
μέλαν, ὥσθ᾽ ἑκάτερον μὲν εἶναι ἀόρατον διὰ
7 ᾿ | eee 5, 3 ~ δ [2 ᾿
σμικρότητα, τὸ δ᾽ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ὁρατὸν οὕτω γίνεσθαι.
τοῦτο γὰρ οὔτε λευκὸν οἷόν τε φαίνεσθαι οὔτε
μέλαν’ ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἀνάγκη μέν τι ἔχειν χρῶμα, τούτων
δ᾽ οὐδέτερον δυνατόν, ἀνάγκη μικτόν τι εἶναι καὶ
εἶδός τι χρόας ἕτερον. ἔστι μὲν οὖν οὕτως ὑπο-
λαβεῖν πλείους εἶναι χρόας παρὰ τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ
A A \ “-“ 4 ,ὔ Ἂς 4 va
μέλαν, πολλὰς δὲ τῷ λόγῳ’ τρία yap πρὸς δύο,
καὶ τρία πρὸς τέτταρα, καὶ κατ᾽ ἄλλους ἀριθμοὺς
wu ΕἸ wt Cal \ 3 ia ‘. A
ἔστι παρ᾽ ἄλληλα κεῖσθαι, τὰ δ᾽ ὅλως κατὰ μὲν
80 λόγον μηδένα, καθ᾽ ὑπεροχὴν δέ τινα καὶ ἔλλειψιν
ἀσύμμετρον, καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον ἔχειν ταῦτα
ταῖς συμφωνίαις: τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ἀριθμοῖς εὐλογί-
στοις χρώματα, καθάπερ ἐκεῖ τὰς συμφωνίας, τὰ
40a ἥδιστα τῶν χρωμάτων εἶναι δοκοῦντα, οἷον τὸ
ἁλουργὸν καὶ φοινικοῦν καὶ ὀλίγ᾽ ἄττα τοιαῦτα,
5" oe | ae 3 x ε ,ὕὔ ΣᾺ 7 \ A
δι’ ἥνπερ αἰτίαν καὶ af συμφωνίαι ὀλίγαι, τὰ δὲ
μὴ ἐν ἀριθμοῖς τἄλλα χρώματα, ἢ καὶ πάσας τὰς
χρόας ἐν ἀριθμοῖς εἶναι, τὰς μὲν τεταγμένας τὰς
5 δὲ ἀτάκτους, καὶ αὐτὰς ταύτας, ὅταν μὴ καθαραὶ
ὦσι, διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐν ἀριθμοῖς εἶναι τοιαύτας γίνεσθαι.
Εἷς μὲν οὖν τρόπος τῆς γενέσεως τῶν χρωμάτων
οὗτος, εἷς δὲ τὸ φαίνεσθαι δι᾽ ἀλλήλων, οἷον ἐνίοτε
~ ~ 3
of γραφῆς ποιοῦσιν, ἑτέραν χρόαν ἐφ᾽ ἑτέραν
ἐναργεστέραν ἐπαλείφουσιν, ὥσπερ ὅταν ἐν ὕδατί
τὸ τὶ ἢ ἐν ἀέρι βούλωνται ποιῆσαι φαινόμενον, καὶ
226

ΟΝ SENSE AND SENSIBLE OBJECTS, m.

now speak of colours other than white and black, other than
and explain in how many ways it is possible for them μι Δ δια
to occur. One possibility is that white and black are

put side by side in such a way that each separate

colour is invisible because of its smallness, and that

what is seen is a compound of the two. This clearly

cannot appear as either white or black ; but since it

must have some colour, and cannot have either of

these, it must evidently be some kind of mixture and

some other form of colour. It is thus possible to Colours due
believe that there are more colours than just white a RHA a
and black, and that their number is due to the pro- ae
portion of their components ; for they may lie side proportions.
by side in the ratio of three to two, or three to four,

and in other proportions also, and speaking quite
generally they may be in no finite numerical relation

at all, but may be in asymmetrical excess or defect,

and these may act in the same way as when in har-
monious proportions. Now colours that depend on
calculable numbers, as there are harmonies there,

seem to be the most attractive colours, such as

purple and red and a few others of a similar kind, but

only a few, because there are few simple ratios, and
possibly all the other colours are not in numerical

ratios ; or again it is possible that all colours are in

ratios, but that some are symmetrically arranged and

others not, and that these last, whenever they are not

simple colours, owe their character to the absence of
symmetrical arrangement.

This is one way in which colours arise, but there is Cotour due
another ; namely when they appear through each ald aa
other, as sometimes painters produce them, when
they smear one colour over another more vivid one,
when they want to make a thing appear to be in

227

440 0

440 b

ARISTOTLE

᾿ ,
οἷον ὁ ἥλιος καθ᾽ αὑτὸν μὲν λευκὸς φαίνεται, διὰ
δ᾽ ἀχλύος καὶ καπνοῦ φοινικοῦς. πολλαὶ δὲ καὶ
A
οὕτως ἔσονται χρόαι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τῷ πρότερον
- > -
εἰρημένῳ" λόγος γὰρ ἂν εἴη τις τῶν ἐπιπολῆς πρὸς
AY > / A X\ ,@ 2 >
τὰ ἐν βάθει, τὰ δὲ καὶ ὅλως οὐκ ἐν λόγῳ.
Τὸ μὲν οὖν, ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ ἀρχαῖοι, λέγειν ἀπορ-
ροίας εἶναι τὰς χροίας καὶ ὁρᾶσθαι διὰ τοιαύτην
~ > ἊΝ
αἰτίαν ἄτοπον: πάντως γὰρ δι’ ἁφῆς ἀναγκαῖον
αὐτοῖς ποιεῖν τὴν αἴσθησιν, ὥστ᾽ εὐθὺς κρεῖττον
φάναι τῷ κινεῖσθαι τὸ μεταξὺ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ὑπὸ
~ - A ΕΣ “a
τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ γίνεσθαι τὴν αἴσθησιν, ἁφῇ καὶ μὴ
a , 24 A x >
ταῖς ἀπορροίαις. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν map ἄλληλα
κειμένων ἀνάγκη ὥσπερ καὶ μέγεθος λαμβάνειν
, \ iy
ἀόρατον, οὕτω Kal χρόνον ἀναίσθητον, ἵνα λάθωσιν
αἱ κινήσεις ἀφικνούμεναν καὶ ἕν δοκῇ εἶναι διὰ τὸ
, 2 lol >
ἅμα φαίνεσθαι. ἐνταῦθα δὲ οὐδεμία ἀνάγκη, ἀλλὰ
τὸ ἐπιπολῆς χρῶμα ἀκίνητον ὃν καὶ κινούμενον
ὑπὸ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου οὐχ ὁμοίαν ποιήσει τὴν
κίνησιν. διὸ καὶ ἕτερον φαίνεται καὶ οὔτε λευκὸν
ΕΣ , Ὁ 3 ἢ ΕἾ > / \
οὔτε μέλαν. ὥστ᾽ εἰ μὴ ἐνδέχεται μηδὲν εἶναι
μέγεθος ἀόρατον, ἀλλὰ πᾶν ἔκ τινος ἀποστήματος
ὁρατόν, καὶ αὕτη τις ἂν εἴη χρωμάτων μίξις.
3 i > aQi , é ,ὔ ͵
κἀκείνως δ᾽ οὐδὲν κωλύει φαίνεσθαί τινα χρόαν
κοινὴν τοῖς πόρρωθεν" ὅτι γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲν
μέγεθος ἀόρατον, ἐν τοῖς ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον.
Ei δ᾽ ἐστὶ μίξις τῶν σωμάτων μὴ μόνον τὸν
τρόπον τοῦτον ὅνπερ οἴονταί τινες, παρ᾽ ἄλληλα
~ 3 f i > 4 > ε cal ‘ "ἢ
τῶν ἐλαχίστων τιθεμένων, ἀδήλων δ᾽ ἡμῖν διὰ τὴν
228

ON SENSI, AND SENSIBLE OBJECTS, un.

water or in air; just as the sun appears white when
seen directly, but red when viewed through mist and
smoke. And in this way there will be many colours
in the samme way as we have described. Vor there
will be some definite relation between the super-
imposed colours and those below, and others again
will not be in finite ratio.

But to say, as the old philosophers did, that colours
are emanations from objects and are visible on this
account is unreasonable ; for in that case they would
all have to produce sensation by means of touch, so
that it would be better to say at once that sensation
is caused because the sensible object sets in motion
the medium of the sensation, that is by touch and
not by emanations. But on the supposition that
they lie side by side, just as their size is invisible, so
also the time must be imperceptible, for the arrival
of the movement at the eye to escape notice and to
appear one, because they are seen simultaneously,
In the other case il is not necessary, but the colour
of the upper layer will not produce the sainc move-
ment when unmoved and when moved by the layer
beneath, For this reason it appears different, and
neither white nor black. So that if it is impossible
for any magnitude to be unseen, but if on the other
hand every magnitude is visible from some distance,
then this would be some blending of colour, In that
case there is nothing to prevent any colour from
appearing to come from a distance; later on we
must examine the statement that no magnitude can
be invisible,

But if a mingling of bodies occurs, it is not inerely
in the way in which some people think, when very
small coloured objects are placed side by side, which

229

Colours as
emanalions
from
objects.

Mixture,

440 b

τῷ

ARISTOTLE

Wy > 3. ὦ , é ¢ 3 -
αἴσθησιν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅλως πάντῃ πάντως, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς
περὶ μίξεως εἴρηται καθόλου περὶ πάντων. ἐκείνως
μὲν γὰρ μίγνυται ταῦτα μόνον ὅσα ἐνδέχεται
διελεῖν εἰς τὰ ἐλάχιστα, καθάπερ ἀνθρώπους ἵππους
ἢ τὰ σπέρματα: τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀνθρώπων ἄνθρωπος
ἐλάχιστος, τῶν δ᾽ ἵππων ἵππος" ὥστε τῇ τούτων

> κ ᾿ , Η n , an
map ἄλληλα θέσει τὸ πλῆθος μέμικται τῶν συν-

/ ” Lo feu gd b) ‘
αμῴφοτέρων'" ἄνθρωπον δὲ ἕνα ἑνὶ ἵππῳ od λέγομεν
μεμῖχθαι. ὅσα δὲ μὴ διαιρεῖται εἰς τὸ ἐλάχιστον,
τούτων οὐκ ἐνδέχεται μίξιν γενέσθαι τὸν τρόπον
τοῦτον ἀλλὰ τῷ πάντῃ μεμῖχθαι, ἅπερ καὶ μάλιστα
μίγνυσθαι πέφυκεν. πῶς δὲ τοῦτο γίγνεσθαι
δυνατόν, ἐν τοῖς περὶ μίξεως εἴρηται πρότερον.
ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι ἀνάγκη μιγνυμένων καὶ τὰς χρόας μίγνυ-
» , a
σθαι, δῆλον, καὶ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν εἷναι κυρίαν τοῦ
\ , > \ \ \ ᾽ , \
πολλὰς εἶναι χροίας, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὴν ἐπιπόλασιν μηδὲ
τὴν παρ᾽ ἄλληλα θέσιν. οὐ γὰρ πόρρωθεν μὲν
ἐγγύθεν δ᾽ οὗ φαίνεται μία χρόα τῶν μεμιγμένων,

2 Ν / \ 2 uv ͵ \ \
ἀλλὰ πάντοθεν. πολλαὶ δ᾽ ἔσονται χρόαι διὰ τὸ

‘ AY 7 > ΄͵ ͵ 2
κατὰ πολλοὺς λόγους ἐνδέχεσθαν μίγνυσθαι ἀλ-
λήλοις τὰ μιγνύμενα, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐν ἀριθμοῖς τὰ
δὲ καθ᾽ ὑπεροχὴν μόνον. καὶ τἄλλα δὴ τὸν αὐτὸν
τρόπον ὅνπερ ἐπὶ τῶν παρ᾽ ἄλληλα τιθεμένων
χρωμάτων ἢ ἐπιπολῆς, ἐνδέχεται λέγειν καὶ περὶ
τῶν μιγνυμένων: διὰ τίνα δ᾽ αἰτίαν εἴδη τῶν
χρωμάτων ἐστὶν ὡρισμένα καὶ οὐκ ἄπειρα, καὶ
χυμῶν καὶ ψόφων, ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν.

i 4 = 2 Ν ~ 4 Ν 5 oF

IV. Τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ χρῶμα καὶ διὰ τίν᾽ αἰτίαν

a ta > Mv ‘ A / 4
πολλαὶ χροιαΐί εἰσιν, εἴρηται" περὶ δὲ ψόφου καὶ
φωνῆς εἴρηται πρότερον ἐν τοῖς περὶ ψυχῆς" περὶ
230

ON SENSE AND SENSIBLE OBJECTS, m.—w.

are not obvious to the sense, but generally every-
where and in every way, as has been said in our
discussion of mixtures in general.¢ In that case
mixture is only possible in the case of those things
which can be divided into the infinitely small, such
as men, horses or seeds ; for man is the smallest unit.
of men, and a horse of horses ; 80 that by the placing
of these side by side, the whole number becomes a
mixture of both; but we cannot speak of one man
being mixed with one horse. But with things which
are not divided into theiy smallest units there can

be no mixture in this sense, but only a complete”

mingling, which is the most natural sense of mixture.
How this can occur has been discussed previously in
our discussion of mixture. But it is clear that
colours must be mixed when the substances in which
they occur are mixed, and that is the real reason
why there are many colours ; it is not due either to
overlaying or to placing side by side ; for it is not that
from a distance and not from near by there appears
to be one colour from the mixture, but from all dis-
tances. But there will be many colours, because it
is possible for the mixed element to be combined
in various ratios, some being numerical and some
merely an excess of one over another. In the case
of mixtures all that can be said of colours put side by
side or overlaid applies ; but why the possible forms
of colour are limited and not unlimited, which is also
true of flavours and sounds, we will discuss later on.

IV, We have now explained what colour is, and
why there ave many colours. We have previously
discussed sound and voice in our treatise Ox the

* So far as is known this does not refer to any special
treatise.

231

Smell and
flavour.

440 b

441 ἃ

ti)

ARISTOTLE

δὲ ὀσμῆς καὶ χυμοῦ viv λεκτέον. σχεδὸν γάρ
ἐστι τὸ αὐτὸ πάθος, οὐκ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς δ᾽ ἐστὶν
ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν. ἐναργέστερον δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἡμῖν τὸ
τῶν χυμῶν γένος ἢ τὸ τῆς ὀσμῆς. τούτου δ᾽
αἴτιον ὅτι χειρίστην ἔχομεν τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων τὴν
ὄσφρησιν καὶ τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς αἰσθήσεων, τὴν
2 ¢ x > ff rat wv z ς A
δ᾽ ἁφὴν ἀκριβεστάτην τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων. ἡ δὲ
γεῦσις ἁφή τις ἐστίν.
Ἢ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ὕδατος φύσις βούλεται ἄχυμος
εἶναι: ἀνάγκη δ᾽ ἢ ἐν αὑτῷ τὸ ὕδωρ ἔχειν τὰ
a ~ /
γένη τῶν χυμῶν ἀναίσθητα διὰ μικρότητα, καθάπερ
? a t BY “λ , > om Φ
Ἐμπεδοκλῆς φησίν, ἢ ὕλην τοιαύτην ἐνεῖναι οἷον
a \
πανσπερμίαν χυμῶν, Kal ἅπαντα μὲν ἐξ ὕδατος
3
γίγνεσθαι, ἄλλα δ᾽ ἐξ ἄλλου μέρους, ἢ μηδεμίαν
ἔχοντος διαφορὰν τοῦ ὕδατος τὸ ποιοῦν αἴτιον
Ἂ > \ \ n 4 ¢ ’
εἶναι, οἷον εἰ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸν ἥλιον φαίη τις.
4 > ς 4 3 a / , Ἂν:
τούτων δ᾽, ὡς μὲν ᾿Εἰμπεδοκλῆς λέγει, λίαν εὐ-
oA s ~ - iy
σύνοπτον τὸ ψεῦδος: δρῶμεν yap μεταβάλλοντας
ὑπὸ τοῦ θερμοῦ τοὺς χυμοὺς ἀφαιρουμένων τῶν
‘
περικαρπίων εἰς τὸν ἥλιον καὶ πυρουμένων, ὡς
οὐ τῷ ἐκ τοῦ ὕδατος ἕλκειν τοιούτους γινομένους,
ἀλλ᾽ > > a n~ a, {AAO "
ἀλλ᾽ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ περικαρπίῳ μεταβάλλοντας, καὶ
1
ἐξικμαζομένους δὲ Kal κειμένους, διὰ τὸν χρόνον,
x
αὐστηροὺς ἐκ γλυκέων καὶ πικροὺς Kal παντο-
δαποὺς γινομένους, καὶ ἑψομένους, εἰς πάντα τὰ
γένη τῶν χυμῶν ws εἰπεῖν μεταβάλλοντας. ὁμοίως
δὲ καὶ τὸ πανσπερμίας εἶναι τὸ ὕδωρ ὕλην ἀδύνα-
τον' ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γὰρ δρῶμεν ὡς" τροφῆς γινο-
1 ἐκ τῆς αὐτῆς ins, B.

232

ON SENSE AND SENSIBLE OBJECTS, rt.

Soul. We have now to consider smell and flavour.
These two are almost the same affection, though they
do not oecur in the same circumstances. The class of
flavours is more easily defined than that of smells.
The reason for this is that our sense of smell is inferior
to that ofall other living creatures, and’also inferior to
all the other senses we possess, but our sense of touch
ismore accurate than that of any other living creature.
‘Taste is a form of touch.

Now it is the nature of water to be tasteless 3 Theortes
there are therefore three possibilities; (1) Water ° ἤλϑίδ,
may possess within itself all kinds of flavours, which
are imperceptible because of their small quantity,
as |'mpedocles suggests. (2) Water may contain
matter of such a kind as to be the seed of all flavours,
that is to say that all flavours arise from water, some
from one part and some from another. (3) Without
water having any effect on it at all, that which acts
on it may be the cause, as for instance one might
suggest heat or the sun as the cause. Now of these () Bm
three theories, the first—that of Empedocles—is pantelee
palpably false ; for we find flavours changing under
the influence of heat, when seed pods are detached
from the trees and scorched in the sun, so that flavours
have not become what they are by extraction from
water, but have changed in the seed pod itself, and
by evaporation and lying still, in time, have changed
from sweet to harsh, and bitter and all other kinds,
and by being baked have changed, so to speak, into
all kinds of flavours. In the same way, that water (2) Water
should be the material of all the origin of flavours is ΡῈ ΡΝ
impossible ; for one notices different kinds of flavours flavours.
arising from the same water, considered as food. ‘The

4 De An, 419 b, 420 a.
233

4440

30
441 Ὁ

165

ARISTOTLE

μένους ἑτέρους χυμούς. λείπεται δὴ τῷ πάσχειν
τι τὸ ὕδωρ μεταβάλλειν. ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν οὐχ ὑπὸ
τῆς τοῦ θερμοῦ δυνάμεως λαμβάνει ταύτην τὴν
δύναμιν ἣν καλοῦμεν χυμόν, φανερόν: λεπτότατον
γὰρ τῶν πάντων ὑγρῶν τὸ , ὕδωρ ἐστί, καὶ αὐτοῦ
τοῦ ἐλαίου. ἀλλ᾽ ἐπεκτείνεται ἐπὶ πλεῖον τοῦ
ὕδατος τὸ ἔλαιον διὰ τὴν γλισχρότητα. τὸ δ᾽
ὕδωρ ψαθυρόν ἐστι" διὸ καὶ χαλεπώτερον φυλάξαι
ἐν τῇ χειρὶ ὕδωρ ἢ ἔλαιον. ἐπεὶ δὲ θερμαινόμενον
οὐδὲν φαίνεται παχυνόμενον τὸ ὕδωρ αὐτὸ μόνον,
δῆλον ὅτι ἑτέρα τις ἂν εἴη αἰτία. οἱ γὰρ χυμοὶ
πάντες πάχος ἔχουσι μᾶλλον" τὸ δὲ θερμὸν συν-
αἴτιον. φαίνονται δ᾽ οἱ χυμοὶ ὅσοιπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς
περικαρπίοις, οὗτοι ὑπάρχοντες καὶ ἐν τῇ γῇ. διὸ
καὶ πολλοί φασι τῶν ἀρχαίων φυσιολόγων τοιοῦτον
εἶναι τὸ ὕδωρ be οἵας ἂν γῆς πορεύηται. καὶ τοῦτο
δῆ Ady ἐστιν ἐπὶ τῶν ἁλμυρῶν ὑδάτων μάλιστα"
οἱ γὰρ ἅλες γῆς τι εἶδός εἰσιν. καὶ τὰ διὰ τῆς
τέφρας διηθούμενα πικρᾶς οὔσης πικρὸν ποιεῖ τὸν
χυμόν. εἰσί τε κρῆναι πολλαὶ αἱ “μὲν πικραΐ, αἱ

ὀξεῖαι, αἱ δὲ παντοδαποὺς ἔχουσαι χυμοὺς
ἄλλους. διὸ' εὐλόγως δ᾽ ἐν τοῖς φυομένοις τὸ τῶν
χυμῶν γίνεται γένος μάλιστα. πάσχειν γὰρ πέφυκε
τὸ ὑγρόν, ὥσπερ καὶ τἄλλα, ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου"
ἐναντίον δὲ τὸ ξηρόν. διὸ καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ πυρὸς
πάσχει τι" ξηρὰ γὰρ ἡ τοῦ πυρὸς φύσις. ἀλλ᾽
ἴδιον τοῦ πυρὸς τὸ θερμόν ἐστι, γ γῆς δὲ τὸ ξηρόν,
ὥσπερ εἴρηται. ἐν τοῖς περὶ στοιχείων. μὲν οὖν
πῦρ καὶ ἡ γῇ, οὐδὲν πέφυκε ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν,
οὐδ᾽ ἄλλο οὐδέν: ἦ δ᾽ ὑπάρχει ἐναντιότης ἐν
ἑκάστῳ, ταύτῃ πάντα, καὶ ποιοῦσι καὶ πάσχουσιν.
ὥσπερ οὖν οἱ ἐναποπλύνοντες ἐν τῷ ὑγρῷ τὰ
2345

ON SENSH AND SENSIBLE OBJECTS, τν.

alternative solution is that the water changes by (8) water is
being affected in some way. Now it is clear that it ae
does not acquire the faculty which we call taste from ᾿
the power of heat ; for water is the lightest of all
liquids, lighter even than oil. But oil will spread
over a larger surface than water because of its
viscosily. But water docs not cohere so closely ;
consequently it is more difficult lo hold water in the
hand than oil. But since water by itself when heated
shows no sign of thickening, it is clear that there must
be some other reason ; for all flavours show density ;
and heat is a contributory cause. All the flavours
which exist in seed pods alsn exist in the earth.
Consequently some of the old philosophers stated that
water draws its character from the earth through
which it passes. This is obviousin the case of brackish
water ; for salt is a form of earth. Water which has
percolated through ashes which are hitter has a
bitter flavour. But of the many water fountains
some arc bitter, some sharp, and others have different
kinds of flavours. But the class of flavours is most
obvious in plants, and this is natural, Tor “ wet,”
like everything else, is naturally affected by its
opposite ; and its opposite is “dry.” This is why it
is affected to some extent by fire ; for the nature of
fire is dry. But the special quality of fire is heat, and
of earth dryness, as has been said in our discussion of
the elements.* Neither fire nor carth is likely to How the
produce or suffer an effect qua fire or qua earth ; but water is
all effect is produced and suffered, in so far as some ᾿
contrariety exists in each. So just as those who wash
off colours or flavours in liquid cause the water to

4 De Gen, et Corr. 329 a,

1 διὸ om. B.

235

ARISTOTLE

Μ410
χρώματα καὶ τοὺς χυμοὺς τοιοῦτον ἔχειν ποιοῦσι

τὸ ὕδωρ, οὕτω καὶ ἡ φύσις τὸ ξηρὸν καὶ τὸ
γεῶδες, καὶ διὰ τοῦ ξηροῦ καὶ γεώδους διηθοῦσα
καὶ κινοῦσα τῷ θερμῷ ποιόν τι τὸ ὑγρὸν παρα-
σκευάζει. καὶ ἔστι τοῦτο χυμὸς τὸ γιγνόμενον
20 ὑπὸ τοῦ εἰρημένου ξηροῦ πάθος ἐν τῷ ὑγρῷ τῆς
γεύσεως τῆς κατὰ δύναμιν ἀλλοιωτικὸν εἰς ἐνέρ-
γειαν' dyer γὰρ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν εἰς τοῦτο δυνάμει
mpotmdpyov: οὐ γὰρ κατὰ τὸ μανθάνειν ἀλλὰ κατὰ
τὸ θεωρεῖν ἐστὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι.
[ > ͵ A ~ > AY ~ , ς
Ort δ᾽ οὐ παντὸς ξηροῦ ἀλλὰ τοῦ τροφίμου οἱ
25 χυμοὶ ἢ πάθος εἰσὶν ἣ στέρησις, δεῖ λαβεῖν ἐντεῦθεν,
ὅτι οὔτε τὸ ξηρὸν dvev τοῦ ὑγροῦ οὔτε τὸ ὑγρὸν
ἄνευ τοῦ ξηροῦ: τροφὴ γὰρ οὐδὲν αὐτῶν τοῖς
ζῴοις, ἀλλὰ τὸ μεμιγμένον. καὶ ἔστι τῆς προσ-
φερομένης τροφῆς τοῖς ζῴοις τὰ μὲν ἁπτὰ τῶν
αἰσθητῶν αὔξησιν ποιοῦντα καὶ φθίσιν. τούτων
80 μὲν γὰρ αἴτιον ἧ θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν τὸ προσφερό-
42a pevov ταῦτα γὰρ ποιεῖ καὶ αὔξησιν καὶ φθίσιν.
τρέφει δὲ ἣ γευστὸν τὸ προσφερόμενον" πάντα
γὰρ τρέφεται τῷ γλυκεῖ, ἣ ἁπλῶς 1 ἢ μεμιγμένως.
δεῖ μὲν οὖν διορίζειν περὶ τούτων ἐν τοῖς περὶ
γενέσεως, νῦν δ᾽ ὅσον ἀναγκαῖον ἅψασθαι αὐτῶν.
υ τὸ γὰρ θερμὸν αὐξάνει καὶ δημιουργεῖ τὴν τροφήν,
καὶ τὸ μὲν κοῦφον ἕλκει, τὸ δ᾽ ἁλμυρὸν καὶ πικρὸν
καταλείπει διὰ βάρος. ὃ δὴ ἐν τοῖς ἔξω σώμασι
ποιεῖ τὸ ἔξω θερμόν, τοῦτο ἐν τῇ φύσει τῶν ζῴων
καὶ φυτῶν" διὸ τρέφεται τῷ γλυκεῖ. συμμίγνυνται
δ᾽ οἱ ἄλλοι χυμοὶ εἰς τὴν τροφὴν τὸν αὐτὸν τρό-
10 πὸν τῷ ἁλμυρῷ καὶ ὀξεῖ, ἀντὶ ἡδύσματος. ταῦτα

9 Cf. De dn, 417 Ὁ 19.
236

ON SENSE AND SENSIBLE OBJECTS, τν.

assume these colours or flavours, so also nature treats
what is dry and earthy, and causing water to percolate
through what is dry and earthy, and moving it by
heat, causes the liquid to assume some character. And
this affection produced by the dry, as explained, being
washed in the moist, transforms potential taste into
actual taste, which is flavour, Vor it brings the
capacity for sensation to actuality ; for sensation is
analogous not to the acquisition of knowledge, but to
the exercise of it.*

The flavours however are not the affection nor the
absence of every dry thing, but only of dry food,
which one can deduce from the fact that there is no
dry without wet, nor wet without dry ; for neither
of these is adequate as food for living creatures, but
a mixture of the two. But of the food offered to
animals which is perceptible, it is the tangible parts
that cause growth and decay ; and the food offered
is responsible for these, qua hot and cold ; for these
things cause both growth and decay ; but the food
offered nourishes because it is tasted ; for everything
is nourished by the sweet, either isolated or in com-
bination. The details of this must be discussed in
the treatise On Generation,» but for the moment can
only be referred to as far as is essential. Yor heat
increases and fashions the food, and extracts from it
what is light, leaving behind what is harsh and bitter
owing to its weight. The functions performed by
external heat in external bodies is performed by their
natural heat in animals and plants; therefore they
are nourished by what is sweet. But all the other
flavours are mixed with food in the same way as the
harsh and acid, for the purpose of seasoning. These

b De Gen. et Corr, i. 5, 350-352.
237

ARISTOTLE

442 a \ \ 1° a A , ? \
δὲ διὰ τὸ ἀντισπᾶν τῷ Mav τρόφιμον εἶναι τὸ
λυκὺ καὶ ἐπιπολαστικόν.

Ὥσπερ δὲ τὰ χρώματα ἐκ λευκοῦ καὶ μέλανος
μίξεώς ἐστιν, οὕτως οἱ χυμοὶ ἐκ γλυκέος καὶ
πικροῦ. καὶ κατὰ λόγον δὴ τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον

ws ἕκαστοί εἰσιν, εἴτε κατ᾽ ἀριθμούς τινας τῆς μίξεως
καὶ κινήσεις, εἴτε καὶ ἀορίστως. οἱ δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν
ποιοῦντες μιγνύμενοι, οὗτοι ἐν ἀριθμοῖς. μόνος
μὲν οὖν λιπαρὸς 6 τοῦ" γλυκέος ἐστὶ χυμός, τὸ
δ᾽ ἁλμυρὸν καὶ πικρὸν σχεδὸν τὸ αὐτό, ὁ δὲ
αὐστηρὸς καὶ δριμὺς καὶ στρυφνὸς καὶ ὀξὺς ἀνὰ
μέσον.

20 Σχεδὸν γὰρ ἴσα καὶ τὰ τῶν χυμῶν εἴδη καὶ τὰ
τῶν χρωμάτων ἐστίν. ἑπτὰ γὰρ ἀμφοτέρων εἴδη,
ἄν τις τιθῇ, ὥσπερ εὔλογον, τὸ φαιὸν μέλαν τι
εἷναι" λείπεται γὰρ τὸ ξανθὸν μὲν τοῦ λευκοῦ εἶναι
ὥσπερ τὸ λιπαρὸν τοῦ γλυκέος, τὸ φοινικοῦν δὲ
καὶ ἁλουργὸν καὶ πράσινον καὶ κυανοῦν μεταξὺ

οῃ τοῦ λευκοῦ καὶ μέλανος, τὰ δ᾽ ἄλλα μικτὰ ee
τούτων. καὶ ὥσπερ τὸ μέλαν στέρησις ἐν τῷ
διαφανεῖ τοῦ λευκοῦ, οὕτω τὸ ἁλμυρὸν καὶ πικρὸν
τοῦ γλυκέος ἐν τῷ τροφίμῳ ὑγρῷ. “διὸ καὶ ἡ
τέφρα τῶν κατακαομένων πικρὰ πάντων: ἐξ-
ἔκμασται γὰρ τὸ πότιμον ἐξ αὐτῶν.

80. Δημόκριτος δὲ καὶ οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν φυσιολόγων,
ὅσοι λέγουσι περὶ αἰσθήσεως, ἀτοπώτατόν τι
ψδν ποιοῦσιν" πάντα γὰρ τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἁπτὰ ποιοῦσιν.

Kaito. εἰ οὕτω τοῦτ᾽ ἔχει, δῆλον ὡς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων

αἰσθήσεων ἑκάστη ἁφή τις ἐστίν: τοῦτο δ᾽ ὅτι

ἀδύνατον, οὐ χαλεπὸν συνιδεῖν. ἔτι δὲ τοῖς κοινοῖς

ὁ τῶν αἰσθήσεων πασῶν χρῶνται ὡς ἰδίοις" μέγεθος

γὰρ καὶ σχῆμα καὶ τὸ τραχὺ καὶ τὸ λεῖον, ἔτι

238

ON SENSE AND SENSIBLE OBJECTS, tv.

are required tu counteract the excessive sweetness of
food, which would lic undigested in the stomach.

Just then as colours are a mingling of white and Mavours
black, so flavours are a mixing of sweet and bitter. putenlgns
And each pair, in some greater or smaller ratio, is loxous.
either with definite numerical values and movements
in the mixture, or without definite limits. But those
which when mingled give pleasure are all in numerical
ratios. Only the flavour of the sweet is rich, and the
brackish is almost the same as the bitter, but the
harsh, pungent, astringent and sharp are inter-
mediate.

The kinds of flavour are almost the same as those of ‘rhe analogy
colours. For there are seven forms of cach, if one *mt
regards prey, as is natural, as a variant of black. It
remains to consider yellow as a variant of white, just
us we regard rich as a variant of sweet, then red, sca-
purple, green and blue are colours intermediate
between white and black, and the rest are a mixture
of these. And just as black is an absence of white
in the transparent medium, so brackish and bitter is
an absence of swect in moist food. This is why the
ash of everything burned is bitter ; for the drinkable
moisture has been evaporated from them.

But Democritus and most of the physical philo- some
sophers who treat of sensation produce a most un- thinkers
reasonable hypothesis; for they make all sensible senses to
objects objects of touch. And yet it is obvious that, puch,
if this be so, each of the other senses is a kind of
touch. Now it is not difficult to see that this is
impossible. Again they treat of objects perceived,
which are common to all the senses, as if they were
peculiar to one; for size, shape, rough and smooth,

1 ἀριθμοῖς μόνον. ὁ μὲν οὖν λιπαρὺς τοῦ κτὰ. BL

239

ARISTOTLE
442 b
δὲ τὸ ὀξὺ Kal τὸ ἀμβλὺ τὸ ἐν τοῖς ὄγκοις κοινὰ
τῶν αἰσθήσεών ἐστιν, εἰ δὲ μὴ πασῶν, ἀλλ᾽ ὄψεώς
γε καὶ ἁφῆς. διὸ καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἀπατῶνται,
περὶ δὲ τῶν ἰδίων οὐκ ἀπατῶνται, οἷον ὄψις περὶ
10 χρώματος καὶ ἀκοὴ περὶ ψόφων. οἱ δὲ τὰ ἴδια
εἰς ταῦτα ἀνάγουσιν, ὥσπερ Δημόκριτος' τὸ γὰρ
λευκὸν καὶ τὸ μέλαν τὸ μὲν τραχύ φησιν εἶναι τὸ
δὲ λεῖον, εἰς δὲ τὰ “σχήματα ἀνάγει τοὺς χυμούς.
καίτοι ἢ οὐδεμιᾶς ἢ μᾶλλον τῆς ὄψεως τὰ κοινὰ
γνωρίζειν. εἰ δ᾽ ἄρα τῆς γεύσεως μᾶλλον, τὰ
1 γοῦν ἐλάχιστα τῆς ἀκριβεστάτης ἐστὶν αἰσθήσεως
διακρίνειν περὶ ἕκαστον γένος, ὥστε ἐχρῆν τὴν
γεῦσιν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κοινῶν αἰσθάνεσθαι μάλιστα
καὶ τῶν σχημάτων εἶναι. κριτικωτάτην. ἔτι τὰ
μὲν αἰσθητὰ πάντα ἔχει ἐναντίωσιν, οἷον ἐν χρώ-
ματι τῷ μέλανι τὸ λευκὸν καὶ ἐν χυμοῖς τῷ γλυκεῖ
20 τὸ πικρόν" σχῆμα δὲ σχήματι οὐ δοκεῖ εἶναι
ἐναντίον' τίνι γὰρ τῶν πολυγώνων τὸ" περιφερὲς
ἐναντίον; ἔτι ἀπείρων ὄντων τῶν σχημάτων
ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τοὺς χυμοὺς εἶναι ἀπείρους" διὰ τί
γὰρ ὁ μὲν ἂν ποιήσειεν αἴσθησιν, ὁ δ᾽ οὐκ ἂν
ἔς
ποιήσειεν; καὶ περὶ μὲν τοῦ γευστοῦ καὶ χυμοῦ
45 εἴρηται" τὰ γὰρ ἄλλα πάθη τῶν χυμῶν οἰκείαν
ἔχει τὴν σκέψιν ἐν τῇ φυσιολογίᾳ τῇ περὶ τῶν
φυτῶν.

V. Τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον δεῖ νοῆσαι καὶ περὶ τὰς
ὀσμάς: ὅπερ “γὰρ ποιεῖ ἐν τῷ ὗγρῷ τὸ ξηρόν,
τοῦτο ποιεῖ ἐν ἄλλῳ γένει τὸ ἔγχυμον ὑγρόν, ἐν

80 ἀέρι καὶ ὕδατι ὁμοίως. κοινὸν δὲ κατὰ τούτων νῦν
448. μὲν λέγομεν τὸ διαφανές, ἔστι δ᾽ ὀσφραντὸν οὐχ
ἡ διαφανές, GAN ἧ πλυντικὸν ἢ ῥυπτικὸν ἐγχύμου
ἃ τὸ om, Β.
210

ON SENSE AND SENSIBLE OBJECTS, 1v.—v.

besides sharp and blunt, as found in solid bodies, are
common, if not to all the senses, at least to sight and
touch. So the senses are liable to error in dealing
with common sensibles, but they are not mistaken
about the objects of special senses; for instance
vision is not in error about colour, nor hearing about
sound. But these thinkers attribute special objects
to general senses, as Democritus does. For he says
that white and black are rough and smooth respec-
tively, and he refers flavours to shapes. And yet
surely it is not the function of any one sense or rather
only of sight to recognize common sensibles, If we
attribute such a function to taste, seeing that it is
the mark of the most discriminating sense to recog-
nize the smallest in each class, taste ought to have
been most capable of perceiving shapes. Again
sensible objects show pairs of opposites, for instance
black and white in colours, and bitter and sweet in
flavours. But no figure appears opposite to any
other; in what sense is a sphere opposite to a
polygon? Again, as figures are infinite in number,
flavours would necessarily be also infinite ; for why
should one flavour produce sensation and not another?
This finishes our discussion of taste and flavour ; the
other affections of flavour have their proper place of
inquiry in the Natural History of Plants.*

V. Now we must consider smelling in the same
way; for the effect which the dry produces in the
wet is also produced by liquid flavour in another
class, both in air and in water. In these transparence
is a common property, but the object is not smelt
because it is transparent, but because it is capable
of washing or cleansing the moistened dryness ; for

α No such treatise by Aristotle has come down to us.
R 94}

Small,

443 a

ARISTOTLE

/ ry 2 A , > 3, LAA X \ Σ “ὃ
ξηρότητος" οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἐν ἀέρι ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ὕδατι
\ ~ > , ὔ ~ ~ PT ? b “~ 3 ὔ
τὸ τῆς ὀσφρήσεώς ἐστιν. δῆλον δ᾽ ἐπὶ τῶν ἰχθύων
καὶ τῶν ὀστρακοδέρμων" φαίνονται γὰρ ὀσφραινό-
μενα οὔτε ἀέρος ὄντος ἐν τῷ ὕδατι (ἐπιπολάζει γὰρ
ὃ ἀήρ, ὅταν ἐγγένηται) οὔτ᾽ αὐτὰ ἀναπνέοντα. εἰ
δὰ , ᾿ ‘ 27 ι κ᾿. ὦ ἍΜ e /
οὖν τις θείη καὶ τὸν ἀέρα Kal TO ὕδωρ ἄμφω ὑγρά,

~ ~ a rt
εἴη av ἡ ἐν ὑγρῷ τοῦ ἐγχύμου ξηροῦ φύσις ὀσμή,
καὶ ὀσφραντὸν τὸ τοιοῦτον. ὅτι δ᾽ ἀπ᾽ ἐγχύμου
ἐστὶ τὸ πάθος, δῆλον ἐκ τῶν ἐχόντων καὶ μὴ
ἐχόντων ὀσμήν" τά τε γὰρ στοιχεῖα ἄοσμα, οἷον πῦρ
~ n \
ἀὴρ ὕδωρ γῆ, διὰ τὸ τά τε ξηρὰ αὐτῶν Kal τὰ ὑγρὰ
4 ~ A
ἄχυμα εἶναι, ἐὰν μή τι μιγνύμενον ποιῇ. διὸ καὶ
ἡ θάλαττα ἔχει ὀσμήν' ἔχει γὰρ χυμὸν καὶ ξηρό-
, ω Pond ,ὔ > ,ὔ na A
τητα. καὶ ἅλες μᾶλλον λίτρου ὀσμώδεις" δηλοῖ δὲ
δὴν , 2 > om ya \ \ , ~
τὸ ἐξικμαζόμενον ἐξ αὐτῶν ἔλαιον" τὸ δὲ λίτρον γῆς
ἐστὶ μᾶλλον. ἔτι λίθος μὲν ἄοσμον, ἄχυμον γάρ,
4 > y / ‘ 4
τὰ δὲ ξύλα ὀσμώδη, ἔγχυμα γάρ' Kal τούτων τὰ
ὑδατώδη ἧττον. ἔτι τῶν μεταλλευομένων χρυσὸς
ra A \ ¢ i
doopov, ἄχυμον γάρ, ὁ δὲ χαλκὸς καὶ ὁ σίδηρος
ὀσμώδη. ὅταν δ᾽ ἐκκαυθῇ τὸ ὑγρόν, ἀοσμότεραι αἱ
σκωρίαι γίγνονται πάντων. ἄργυρος δὲ καὶ κατ-
τίτερος τῶν μὲν μᾶλλον ὀσμώδη τῶν δ᾽ Frrov:
ὑδατώδη γάρ.

Δοκεῖ δ᾽ ἐνίοις ἡ καπνώδης ἀναθυμίασις εἶναι
ὀσμή, οὖσα κοινὴ γῆς τε καὶ ἀέρος. καὶ πάντες
ἐπιφέρονται ἐπὶ τοῦτο περὶ ὀσμῆς" διὸ καὶ ‘Hpd-

uy λ
κλειτος οὕτως εἴρηκεν, ὡς εἰ πάντα τὰ ὄντα καπ-
1 ἅπαν χυμοῦ B.

5 This is very doubtful, although fishes have an olfactory
nerve,

242

ON SENSE AND SENSIBLE) OBJECTS, v.

this phenomenon of smelling occurs not only in air,
but also in water. This is obvious in the case of
fishes and hard-shelled creatures ; fur they evidently
have the power of smelling,? though there is no air
in water (for whenever it is generated in water it
rises to the surface), nor do such creatures inhale.
If one were to assume that water and air are both
moist, the characteristic of flavoured dryness in the
wet would be smell, and anything of this kind would
be an object smelt, That the affection we call smell
is based on flavour is obvious from a consideration of
those things which have, and those which have not
smell. The elements are scentless, such as fire, air,
water and earth, because both those which are dry
and those which are wet have no flavour, unless some-
thing is mixed with them. This is the reason why
the sea has a smell ; for it possesses both flavour and
dryness. Salt has more smell than sodium carbonate:
the oil which exudes from the former proves this ; but
sodium carbonate belongs more to earth. Stone
again has no smell because it has no taste, but woods
have a smell! because they have also taste ; and wet
woods have less taste than dry. In the case of the
metals gold has no smell because it has no taste, but
bronze and iron have smell. But when the moisture
is burned out of them, the slag of all of them has less
smell. But silver and tin have more smell than gold,
and less than bronze and iron; for they contain
water.

Some people think that smell is a smoky vapour,
which is partly earth and partly air. Everyone in
fact inclines to this view about smell: it is with this
idea that Heracleitus has said that, if everything
that exists became smoke, the nose would be the

243

The nature
of smell.

448 ἃ
2h

443 b

ARISTOTLE

υὸς γένοιτο, ῥῖνες ἂν διαγνοῖεν. ἐπὶ δὲ τὴν ὀσμὴν
πάντες ἐπιφέρονται οἱ μὲν ὡς ἀτμίδα, οἱ δ᾽ ὡς
ἀναθυμίασιν, οἱ δ᾽ ὡς ἄμφω ταῦτα. ἔστι δ᾽ ἡ μὲν
ἀτμὶς ὑγρότης τις, ἡ δὲ καπνώδης ἀναθυμίασις,
.ἤ 3} \ 27 - \ ᾽
ὥσπερ εἴρηται, κοινὸν ἀέρος καὶ γῆς" καὶ συνίσταται
ἐκ μὲν ἐκείνης ὕδωρ, ἐκ δὲ ταύτης γῆς τι εἶδος.
ἀλλ᾽ οὐδέτερον τούτων ἔοικεν" ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀτμίς
ἐστιν ὕδατος, ἡ δὲ καπνώδης ἀναθυμίασις ἀδύνατος
ἐν ὕδατι γενέσθαι. ὀσμᾶται δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ ὕδατι,
ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρότερον. ἔτι ἡ ἀναθυμίασις ὁμοίως
λέγεται ταῖς ἀπορροίαις. εἰ οὖν μηδ᾽ ἐκείνη καλῶς,
οὐδ᾽ αὕτη καλῶς.

ω \ s > εὐ 3 7 \ ‘ \ \

Ore μὲν οὖν ἐνδέχεται ἀπολαύειν τὸ ὑγρὸν Kat τὸ
ἐν τῷ πνεύματι καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ ὕδατι καὶ πάσχειν τι
ὑπὸ τῆς ἐγχύμου ξηρότητος, οὐκ ἄδηλον: καὶ γὰρ
ὁ ἀὴρ ὑγρὸν τὴν φύσιν ἐστίν. ὅτι δ᾽ ὁμοίως ἐν
τοῖς ὑγροῖς ποιεῖ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι οἷον ἀποπλυνόμενον
τὸ ξηρόν, φανερόν. ἔτι δεῖ ἀνάλογον εἶναι τὰς
ὀσμὰς τοῖς χυμοῖς. ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γε ἐπ᾽ ἐνίων
συμβέβηκεν" καὶ γὰρ δριμεῖαι καὶ γλυκεῖαί εἰσιν
ὀσμαὶ καὶ αὐστηραὶ καὶ ᾿στρυφναὶ καὶ λιπαραί, καὶ
τοῖς πικροῖς τὰς σαπρὰς ἄν τις ἀνάλογον εἴποι.
διὸ ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνα δυσκατάποτα, τὰ σαπρὰ δυσανά-
πνευστά ἐστιν. δῆλον ἀ ἄρα ὅτι ὅπερ ἐν τῷ ὕδατι ὁ ὃ
χυμός, τοῦτ᾽ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι καὶ ὕδατι ἡ ἡ ὁσ, μή. καὶ διὰ
τοῦτο τὸ ψυχρὸν καὶ ἡ πῆξις καὶ τοὺς χυμοὺς ἀμβλύνει
καὶ τὰς ὀσμὰς ἀφανίζει" τὸ γὰρ θερμὸν τὸ κινοῦν
καὶ δημιουργοῦν ἀφανίζουσιν ἡ ἡ ψύξις καὶ ἡ πῆξις.

Eién δὲ τοῦ ὀσφραντοῦ δύο ἐστίν" οὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ
τινές φασιν, οὐκ ἔστιν εἴδη τοῦ ὀσφραντοῦ, ἀλλ᾽
ἔστιν. διοριστέον δὲ πῶς ἔστι καὶ πῶς οὐκ ἔστιν"
τὸ μὲν γάρ ἐστι κατὰ τοὺς χυμοὺς τεταγμένον
24d

ON SENSE, AND SENSIBLE OBJECTS, v.

organ to perecive it. The general attitude to smell
includes those who regard il as steam, those who
regard jt as smoke and those who regard it as a
mixture of the two. Stcam is mercly moisture, but
smoky vapour, as has been said, is a mixture of air
and earth ; from the first water only is formed, but
from the lalter some sort of earth. But probably
smell is neither of these ; for steam consists of water,
and smoky vapour cannot exist in water at all. But
things in water have a sense of smell, as has been
said before. Further the smoky vapour theory is
like the theory of emanations. If the latter is un-
sound, so also is the former.

It is obvious that it is possible that the moisture Analogy

both in atv and in water absarbs the nature of and is

between
pmell and

affected by tastable dryness ; for air is by nature taste.

moist. It is obvious then that it produces in the
wet, as in air, the effect of washing something dry.
And smells must then be analogous to flavours, More:
over this certainly happens in some cases; for smells
like flavours are pungent, sweet, harsh, astringent
and yich, and one could call the "fetid analogous to
the bitter. So as these flavours are unpleasant to
drink, so are the fetid unpleasant to inhale. It is
clear then that smell in air and in water is the same
thing as favour in water alone, This is why cold
and “freezing blunts flavours, and causes smells to
disappear ; for cold and freezing counteracts the heat
which sets in motion and produces flavour.

But there are two kinds of objects smelt ; for it is
untrue to say, as some do, that there are no different
kinds of object smelt, for there are. But we must
define in what sense there are, and in what sense there
are not (kinds of smells). ‘There is one kind of odour

245

Objects
smelt aie
of ditferent
kinds.

ARISTOTLE

443 b
20 αὐτῶν, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν, καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ λυπηρὸν

κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἔ ἔχουσιν: διὰ γὰρ τὸ τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ
πάθη εἶναι, ἐπιθυμούντων μὲν ἡδεῖαι αἱ ὀσμαὶ
τούτων εἰσί, πεπληρωμένοις δὲ καὶ inde: δεομένοις
οὐχ ἡδεῖαι, οὐδ᾽ ὅσοις μὴ καὶ ἡ τροφὴ ἡ ἔχουσα
zo τὰς ὀσμὰς ἡδεῖα, οὐδὲ τούτοις. ὥστε αὗται μέν,
καθάπερ εἴπομεν, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἐ ἔχουσι τὸ ἡδὺ
καὶ λυπηρόν, διὸ καὶ πάντων εἰσὶ κοιναὶ τῶν ζῴων:
αἱ δὲ καθ᾽ αὑτὰς ἡδεῖαι τῶν ὀσμῶν εἰσίν, οἷον αἱ
8. τῶν ἀνθῶν: οὐδὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον οὐδ᾽ ἧττον πρὸς τὴν
τροφὴν παρακαλοῦσιν, οὐδὲ συμβάλλεται πρὸς
ἐπιθυμίαν οὐδέν, ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον μᾶλλον: ἀληθὲς
γὰρ ὅπερ Ἐὐριπίδην σκώπτων εἶπε Στράττις,
ee ὅταν φακῆν ἕψητε, μὴ ᾿πιχεῖν" μύρον.᾽" οὗ δὲ νῦν
4448 μιγνύντες εἰς τὰ πόματα τὰς τοιαύτας δυνάμεις
βιάζονται τῇ “συνηθείᾳ τὴν ἡδονήν, ἕως ἂν ἐκ δύ᾽
αἰσθήσεων γένηται τὸ ἡδὺ ὡς ἕν καὶ ἀπὸ μιᾶς.
τοῦτο μὲν οὖν τὸ ὀσφραντὸν ἴδιον ἀνθρώπου ἐστίν,
υ ἡ δὲ κατὰ τοὺς χυμοὺς τεταγμένη καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
ζῴων, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρότερον" κἀκείνων μέν, διὰ
τὸ κατὰ “συμβεβηκὸς ἔχειν, τὸ ἡδύ, “διήρηται τὰ
εἴδη κατὰ τοὺς χυμούς, ταύτης δ᾽ οὐκέτι, διὰ τὸ
τὴν φύσιν αὐτῆς εἶναι καθ᾽ αὑτὴν ἡδεῖαν ἢ ἢ λυπηράν.
Αἴτιον δὲ τοῦ ἴδιον εἶναι ἀνθρώπου τὴν τοιαύτην
ὀσμὴν διὰ τὴν ψύξιν τὴν περὶ τὸν ἐγκέφαλον.
10 ψυχροῦ γὰρ ὄντος τὴν φύσιν τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου, καὶ
τοῦ αἵματος τοῦ περὶ αὐτὸν ἐν τοῖς φλεβίοις ὅ ὄντος
λεπτοῦ μὲν καὶ καθαροῦ, εὐψύκτου δέ (διὸ καὶ 4
τῆς τροφῆς ἀναθυμίασις ψυχομένη διὰ τὸν τόπον τὰ
νοσηματικὰ ῥεύματα ποιεῖ), τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πρὸς

1 ἐπιχεῖν Β,
246

ON SENSE AND SIENSIBLE OBJECTS, ν.

which may be placed in the same category as flavours,
as we have said, and to these the terms sweet and
bitter belong incidentally ; for because they are
affections of the nutritive faculty, these smells are
pleasant when animals desire them, but when they
are sated and do not need them they are not pleasant,
nor is the smell pleasant to those animals to whom the
food having the smell is unpleasant. So that these
possess the qualities of sweetness or the reverse only
incidentally, and in this way are common to all living
creatures. Some smells are pleasant in themselves, for
instance the smells of Howers ; for they do not act as an
invitation to food either to a greater or a Jess extent,
nor do they contribute anything to desire, but rather
the opposite ; for what Strattis said in caricaturing
Euripides is truc, “ When you make soup do not
pour perfume over it."’ But those who mix flavours
of this kind into beverages only force our enjoyment
by habit, until pleasure arises from two senses as if it
were a single pleasure from one. The pleasure de-
rived from this kind of smell] is peculiar to man, but
that which is associated with flavours is shared by all
other animals, as has been said before: the latter,
because their sweetness is incidental, can be divided
into classes, according to flavours, but the former
cannot, because the sweetness, or the reverse, is part
of its own nature in itself.

The reason why the former sense of smell is peculiar
to man is due to the coldness which exists in the
région of the brain. Vor the brain is naturally cold,
and the blood in the veins surrounding it is light and
pure, but easily cooled. (This is why the flavour
arising from food, when it becomes cool, produces
colds in the neighbourhood of the brain.) Man then

247

The
funetion
of the
sense of
smell,

ARISTOTLE
“4a

10 βοήθειαν ὑγιείας γέγονε τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶδος τῆς
ὀσμῆς" οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ἔ ἔργον ἐστὶν αὐτῆς ἢ τοῦτο.
τοῦτο δὲ ποιεῖ φανερῶς" 7 μὲν γὰρ τροφὴ ἡδεῖα
οὖσα, καὶ ἡ ξηρὰ καὶ ἡ ὑγρά, πολλάκις νοσώδης
ἐστί, ἡ δ᾽ ἀπὸ τῆς ὀσμῆς τῆς καθ᾽ αὑτὴν εὐώδους
ὁπωσοῦν ἔχουσιν ὠφέλιμος ὡς εἰπεῖν ἀεί. καὶ διὰ
20 τοῦτο γίνεται διὰ τῆς ἀναπνοῆς, οὐ πᾶσιν ἀλλὰ τοῖς
ἀνθρώποις καὶ τῶν ἐναίμων οἷον τοῖς τετράποσι
καὶ ὅσα μετέχει μᾶλλον τῆς τοῦ ἀέρος φύσεως’
ἀναφερομένων γὰρ τῶν ὀσμῶν πρὸς τὸν ἐγκέφαλον
διὰ τὴν ἐν αὐταῖς τῆς θερμότητος κουφότητα,
ὑγιεινοτέρως ἔχει τὰ περὶ τὸν τόπον τοῦτον" ἡ γὰρ

a τῆς ὀσμῆς δύναμις θερμὴ τὴν φύσιν ἐστῷ.
Κατακέχρηται. δ᾽ ἡ φύσις τῇ ἀναπνοῇ ἐπὶ δύο,
ὡς ἔργῳ μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν εἰς τὸν θώρακα βοήθειαν, ὡς
παρέργῳ δ᾽ ἐπὶ τὴν ὀσμήν: ἀναπνέοντος γὰρ ὥσπερ
ἐκ παρόδου ποιεῖται διὰ τῶν μυκτήρων τὴν κίνησιν.
ἴδιον δὲ τῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου φύσεώς ἐστι τὸ τῆς
a ὀσμῆς τῆς τοιαύτης γένος διὰ τὸ πλεῖστον ἐγ-
κέφαλον καὶ ὑγρότατον ἔχειν τῶν ζῴων. ὡς κατὰ
μέγεθος" διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ μόνον ὡς εἰπεῖν αἰσ-
θάνεται τῶν ξῴων ἄνθρωπος καὶ χαίρει ταῖς τῶν
ἀνθῶν καὶ ταῖς τῶν τοιούτων ὀσμαῖς" σύμμετρος
Mab γὰρ αὐτῶν ἡ θερμότης καὶ ἡ κίνησις, πρὸς τὴν
ὑπερβολὴν τῆς ἐν τῷ τόπῳ ὑγρότητος καὶ ψυχρότη-
τός ἐστιν. τοῖς δ᾽ ἄλλοις ὅσα πλεύμονα ἔχει διὰ
τὸ ἀναπνεῖν τοῦ ἑτέρου γένους τῆς ὀσμῆς τὴν
αἴσθησιν ἀποδέδωκεν ἡ ἡ φύσις, ὅ ὅπως μὴ δύο αἰσθη-
5 τήρια ποιῇ. ἀπόχρη γάρ, ἐπείπερ καὶ ὡς ἀνα-
πνέουσιν, ὥσπερ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀμφοτέρων τῶν
ὀσφραντῶν, τούτοις τῶν ἑτέρων μόνων ὑπάρχουσα,

348

ON SENSI AND SENSIBLE OBJECTS, ν.

possesses this kind of smell for the benefit, of his
health ; for smell has no other function except this.
And it obviously performs this function; for food
which is sweet, both dry and moist, is often un-
healthy, whereas that which has a smell which is in
itself pleasant is, generally speaking, beneficial to
persons in any state of health. And for this reason
itis conveyed by inhalation, not to everything, but to
men and to the warm-blooded animals such as the
four-footed beasts and those which have a larger
share in Lhe nature of air; for as the smells reach
the brain because of the lightness of the heat. con-
tained in them, the parts of the body near the brain
are the healthier for these smells ; for the faculty of
smell is naturally hot.
Nature employs respiration for two purposes, first, Smell and

and as its main function, for a protection to the Greene
throat, and in a secondary sense for the purpose of
smell; for when a living creature inhales smell, it
enters through Lhe movement of the nostrils as
though from a side entranec. Smell of this type is
peculiar to man, because he has the largest and
moistest brain in proportion to his size of all animals ;
and it is for this reason too that of all animals man
alone is conscious of and enjoys the smell of flowers
and such things; for the heat and movement pro-
duced by these balances excess of wetness and cold-
ness in the region of the body which apprehends
them. But nature has allotted perception of the
second class of smell to all the other animals which
have lungs through respiration, to avoid making two
separate sense organs ; for it is sufficient, since they
breathe in this way, that man should have perception
of both classes of things smelt, while animals should

249

ARISTOTLE
“.4ν,,

αἴσθησις. τὰ δὲ μὴ ἀναπνέοντα, ὅτι “μὲν ἔχει
αἴσθησιν τοῦ ὀσφραντοῦ, φανερόν' καὶ γὰρ ἰχθύες
καὶ τὸ τῶν ἐντόμων γένος πᾶν ἀκριβῶς καὶ πόρρω-
10 θεν αἰσθάνεται, διὰ τὸ θρεπτικὸν εἶδος τῆς ὀσμῆς,
ἀπέχοντα πολὺ τῆς οἰκείας τροφῆς, οἷον αἵ τε
μέλιτται ποιοῦσι πρὸς τὸ μέλι καὶ τὸ τῶν μικρῶν
μυρμήκων γένος, ots καλοῦσί τινες κνίπας, καὶ
τῶν θαλαττίων αἱ πορφύραι, καὶ πολλὰ τῶν ἄλλων
τῶν τοιούτων ζῴων ὀξέως αἰσθάνεται τῆς τροφῆς
15 διὰ τὴν ὀσμήν. ὅτῳ δὲ αἰσθάνεται, οὐχ ὁμοίως
φανερόν. διὸ κἂν ἀπορήσειέ τις τίνι αἰσθάνονται
τῆς ὀσμῆς, εἴπερ ἀναπνέουσι μὲν γίνεται τὸ ὀσμᾶ-
σθαι μοναχῶς: τοῦτο yap φαίνεται ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνα-
πνεόντων συμβαῖνον πάντων, ἐκείνων δ᾽ οὐθὲν ἀνα-
πνεῖ αἰσθάνεται “μέντοι, εἰ μή τις παρὰ τὰς
20 πέντε αἰσθήσεις ἑτέρα. τοῦτο δ᾽ ἀδύνατον' τοῦ
γὰρ ἀσφραντοῦ ὄσφρησις, ἐκεῖνα δὲ τούτου αἰσθά-
νεται," ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν ἴσως τρόπον, ἀλλὰ τοῖς
μὲν ἀναπνέουσι τὸ πνεῦμα ἀφαιρεῖ τὸ ἐπικείμενον
ὥσπερ πῶμά τι (διὸ οὐκ αἰσθάνεται μὴ ἀναπνέοντα),
"τοῖς δὲ μ ἀναπνέουσιν ᾿ἀφήρηται τοῦτο, καθάπερ
25 ἐπὶ τῶν ΩΣ τὰ μὲν ἔχει βλέφαρα τῶν ζῴων,
ὧν μὴ ἀνακαλυφθέντων οὐ δύναται ὁρᾶν, τὰ δὲ
σκληρόφθαλμα οὐκ ἔχει, διόπερ οὐ προσδεῖται
οὐδενὸς τοῦ ἀνακαλύ Ὄντος, ἀλλ᾽ ὁρᾷ ἐκ τοῦ δυνα-
τοῦ ὁρᾶν αὐτῷ εὐθύς. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
ζῴων ὁτιοῦν οὐδὲν δυσχεραίνει τῶν καθ᾽ αὑτὰ δυσω-

80 δῶν τὴν ὀσμήν, ἂν μή τι τύχῃ φθαρτικὸν ὄν. ὑπὸ
τούτων δ᾽ ὁμοίως φθείρεται καθάπερ καὶ οἱ ἄνθρω-
ποι ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν ἀνθράκων ἀτμίδος καρηβαροῦσι
καὶ φθείρονται πολλάκις: οὕτως ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ θείου

1 αἰσθάνονται Β,

950

ΟΝ SENSE AND SENSIBLE OBJECTS, v.

only perevive one. But it is clear that animals which
do not breathe have perception of a scented object ;
for tishes and the whole class of insects have a very
accurate perception even at a distance, owing to the
nutritive kind of smell, even when they are at a
great distance from their proper food. For instance,
bees show it about honey, and the class of small ants
which some call aphis, and among marine animals
the murex, and many other similar creatures have a
keen perception of their food by its smell. But the
organ whereby they have this perception is not so
certain, So one might be in considerable doubt with 8meiling
what organ they apprehend smell, if smell can only (orang,
exist when animals inhale ; that this occurs with all
animals that breathe is obvious, but perhaps, since none
of those under discussion breathes and yet can smell,
there is another sense besides the accepted five. But
this is impossible ; for a perception of odour is a sense
of smell, and these animals do perceive it, but perhaps
not in the same way; but, in the case of animals
which breathe, the breath removes something which
lies on the organ like a kind of lid (and su they do not
perceive smell unless they breathe), but in the case
of non-breathing animals this is removed, just as is
true of the eyes, Some animals have eyelids, and
cannot see when these are shut, but the hard-eyed
animals have no eyelids, and so do not need anything
to uncover the eyes, but can see directly as soon as
the object is within visible distance. Similarly in the
case of other animals none of the essentially evil-
smelling things offend them, unless they happen to
be destructive. By these they are destroyed exactly
in the same way as inen get headaches, and are often
even killed, by the gas arising from coals; so the

251

ARISTOTLE

445 0 δυνάμεως καὶ τῶν ἀσφαλτωδῶν φθείρεται τἄλλα
ζῷα, καὶ φεύγει διὰ τὸ πάθος. αὐτῆς δὲ καθ᾽
αὑτὴν τῆς δυσωδίας οὐδὲν φροντίζουσιν, καίτοι
πολλὰ τῶν φυομένων δυσώδεις ἔχει τὰς ὀσμάς, ἐὰν
μή τι συμβάλληται πρὸς τὴν γεῦσιν. ἢ τὴν ἐδωδὴν

«αὐτοῖς. ἔοικε δ᾽ ἡ αἴσθησις ἡ τοῦ ὀσφραίνεσθαι
περιττῶν οὐσῶν τῶν αἰσϑήσεων καὶ τοῦ ,ἀριθμοῦ
ἔχοντος “μέσον τοῦ περιττοῦ καὶ αὐτὴ μέση εἶναι
τῶν τε ἁπτικῶν, οἷον ἁφῆς καὶ γεύσεως. καὶ τῶν δι᾽
ἄλλου αἰσθητικῶν, οἷον ὄψεως καὶ ἀκοῆς. διὸ καὶ
τὸ ὀσφραντὸν. τῶν θρεπτικῶν ἐστὶ πάθος τι (ταῦτα

10 δ᾽ ἐν τῷ ἁπτῷ γένεὴ, καὶ τοῦ ἀκουστοῦ δὲ καὶ τοῦ
ὁρατοῦ, διὸ καὶ ἐν ἀέρι καὶ ἐν ὕδατι ὀσμῶνται.
ὥστ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ ὀσφραντὸν κοινόν τι τούτων ἀμφοτέ.
ρων, ὃ καὶ τῷ ἁπτῷ ὑπάρχει καὶ τῷ ἀκουστῷ καὶ
τῷ διαφανεῖ" διὸ εὐλόγως παρείκασται ξηρότητος
ἐν ὑγρῷ καὶ χυτῷ οἷον βαφή τις εἶναι καὶ πλύσις.

1b πῶς μὲν οὖν εἴδη δεῖ λέγειν καὶ πῶς οὐ δεῖ τοῦ
ὀσφραντοῦ, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω.

Ὃ δὲ λέγουσί τινες τῶν Πυθαγορείων, οὐκ ἔστιν
εὔλογον" τρέφεσθαι γάρ φασιν ἔ ἔνια ζῷα ταῖς ὀσμαῖς.
πρῶτον μὲν ἀρ ὁρῶμεν ὅτι τὴν τροφὴν δεῖ εἶναι
σύνθετον' καὶ γὰρ τὰ τρεφόμενα οὐχ ἁπλᾶ ἐστίν,

80 διὸ καὶ περιττώματα γίνεται τῆς τροφῆς, ἣ ἐν
αὐτοῖς ἢ ἔξω, ὥσπερ τοῖς φυτοῖς. ἔτι δ᾽ οὐδὲ τὸ
ὕδωρ ἐθέλει αὐτὸ μόνον ἄμικτον ὃν τρέφειν" σω-
ματῶδες γάρ τι δεῖ εἶναι τὸ συστησόμενον. ἔτι
πολὺ ἧττον εὔλογον τὸν ἀέρα σωματοῦσθαι. πρὸς
δὲ τούτοις, ὅτι πᾶσίν ἐστι τοῖς ζῴοις τόπος δεικτικὸς

85 τῆς τροφῆς, ἐξ οὗ ἕλκον λαμβάνει τὸ σῶμα' τοῦ δ᾽
ὀσφραντοῦ ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ τὸ αἰσθητήριον, καὶ μετὰ

252

ON SENSE AND SENSIBLE OBJECTS, v.

other animals are destroved by the power of sulphur
and bitumen, and avoid such things because they
affect them. But they care nothing for the un-
pleasant smell in itself (and yet many plants have
offensive smells), if they do not contribute anything
to their taste or food. As the number of the senses is
odd, and an odd number always has a unit for its
middle term, the sense of smell would seem to be the
middle term of the senses of touch—I mean touch
and taste on the one hand and on the other the
senses which perceive through a medium, that is
vision and hearing. So the object of smell is an
affection of substances used for food (for these belong
to the class of tangible objects), and also an affection of
what is heard and seen. Consequently smell occurs
in air and water. So smell is common to both these,
that is, it belongs to touch and also to hearing and
the transparent: ; so il is a reasonable conjecture that
it is a dipping or washing of the dry in the wet and
liquid, Let this be a sufficient account of the extent to
which we can and cannot describe the forms of smell.

But the theory advanced by some of the Pyth-
agoreans is not reasonable; for they say that some
animals are nourished by smells. For first of all we
sec that food must be composite ; for the animals
nourished are not simple, and for this rcason there is
waste matter left over from food either in the bodies
themselves or outside asin plants ; even water cannot
serve for food, if it is unmixed; for there must be
something corporeal to make it cohere. It is even
less probable that air can be made corporeal. In
addition to this, it is evident that all animals possess
a region which receives the food, from which the
body draws it. Now the sense organ of smell lies in

253

The
supposed
nutritive
funetion
of smell.

ARISTOTLE

445 a
πνευματώδους εἰσέρχεται ἀναθυμιάσεως, ὥστ᾽ els

τὸν ἀναπνευστικὸν βαδίζοι ἂν τόπον. ὅτι μὲν οὖν
οὐ συμβάλλεται εἰς τροφὴν τὸ ὀσφραντόν, ἣ ὀσῴραν-
τόν, δῆλον: ὅτι μέντοι εἰς ὑγίειαν, καὶ ἐκ τῆς

80 αἰσθήσεως καὶ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων φανερόν, ὥστε

ὅπερ ὁ χυμὸς ἐν τῷ θρεπτιικῷ καὶ πρὸς τὰ τρεφό-
445b μενα, τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶ πρὸς ὑγίειαν τὸ ὀσῴφραντόν. καθ᾽
ἕκαστον μὲν οὖν αἰσθητήριον διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον
τοῦτον.

VI. ᾿Απορήσειε δ᾽ ἄν τις, εἰ πᾶν σῶμα εἰς ἄπει-
pov διαιρεῖται, dpa καὶ τὰ παθήματα τὰ αἰσθητά,
οἷον χρῶμα καὶ χυμὸς καὶ ὀσμὴ καὶ βάρος καὶ
ψόφος καὶ ψυχρὸν καὶ θερμὸν καὶ κοῦφον καὶ
σκληρὸν καὶ μαλακόν; ἢ ἀδύνατον" ποιητικὸν γάρ
ἐστιν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν τῆς αἰσθήσεως" τῷ δύνασθαι

ῦ

ta) >
γὰρ κινεῖν αὐτὴν λέγεται πάντα. ὥστ᾽ ἀνάγκη τήν
τε αἴσθησιν εἰς ἄπειρα διαιρεῖσθαι καὶ πᾶν εἶναι
fr > 4 > ’ A A \ eC «-
τὸ μέγεθος αἰσθητόν" ἀδύνατον γὰρ λευκὸν μὲν ὁρᾶν,
\ \ / > Ἅ' εἶ 4 2 a 2. ἡ ὕὔ,
μὴ ποσὸν δέ. εἰ γὰρ μὴ οὕτως, ἐνδέχουτ᾽ ἂν εἶναί
-" \ "» ~ \ , > »
τι σῶμα μηδὲν ἔχον χρῶμα μηδὲ βάρος μηδ᾽ ἄλλο
a / v bat J 0.3 > ΑΙ a
τι τοιοῦτον πάθος. ὥστ᾽ οὐδ᾽ αἰσθητὸν ὅλως"
ΓΟ ‘ A >? i A vid > ‘ μὴ
ταῦτα γὰρ τὰ αἰσθητά. τὸ ἄρ᾽ αἰσθητὸν ἔσται
i ΕἸ > 3 ~ 32 3 > ~ x ἢ
συγκείμενον οὐκ ἐξ αἰσθητῶν. ἀλλ᾽ ἀναγκαῖον" ob
ιὸ γὰρ δὴ ἔκ γε τῶν μαθηματικῶν. ἔτι τίνι κρινοῦμεν
ταῦτα ἢ γνωσόμεθα; ἣ τῷ νῷ; ἀλλ᾽ οὐ νοητά,
a - 4
οὐδὲ νοεῖ ὁ νοῦς τὰ ἐκτὸς μὴ μετ᾽ αἰσθήσεως ὄντα.
" lal an ~
ἅμα δ᾽ εἰ ταῦτ᾽ ἔχει οὕτως, ἔοικε μαρτυρεῖν τοῖς τὰ
254

ON SENSE AND SENSIBLE OBJECTS, v.—v1.

the head, and smell enters at the same time as a
vapour inhaled with the breath, so that it must go
to some place which the breath reaches. So it is
obvious that smell gua smell does not contribute
to food; but it is equally clear, both from our own
sensation and from what we have already said, that
it does contribute to health, so that the function per-
formed by flavour in nutrition and for what is
nourished, is performed by smell for health in general.
Let this thensuffice for an account of each sense organ.

VI. A difficulty might arise as to whether, if every Can sensa-
body is susceptible of infinite division, the attributes [tty
perceived are also so susceptible, I mean colour, divided?
flavour, smell, weight, sound, as well as cold and hot,
light, hard and soft. Perhaps this is impossible ; for
each of these produces sensation; in fact they all
derive their names from their capacity to effect this
impulse. Then on the above assumption sensation
must be capable of infinite division, and every magni-
tude must be perceptible ; for it is impossible to see
‘white’ without a magnitude which is white. Other-
wise it would be possible for a body to exist which
had neither colour nor weight, nor any other attri-
bute. But in this case it could not be perceptible at
all; for things perceptible are those enumerated
above. In this case every perceptible body will irso, wnat
consist of imperceptible parts. But its parts must be ΚΝ
perceptible ; for they cannot consist of mathematical ἀγαπ εν νι
abstractions. Again, by what faculty should we judge ible part?
or recognize these? By the mind? But they are
not apprehended by the mind, nor does the mind
recognize any external objects, except those which
are combined with sensation. At the same time, if
this is true, it favours the assumption of those who

255

ARISTOTLE

445 b
ἄτομα ποιοῦσι μεγέθη" οὕτω γὰρ ἂν λύοιτο ὁ ὁ λόγος.

20 ἀλλ᾽ ἀδύνατα: εἴρηται δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις
τοῖς περὶ κινήσεως. περὶ δὲ τῆς λύσεως αὐτῶν
ἅμα δῆλον ἐ ἔσται καὶ διὰ τί πεπέρανται τὰ εἴδη καὶ
χρώματος καὶ χυμοῦ καὶ φθόγγων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων
αἰσθητῶν. ὧν μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἔσχατα, ἀνάγκη
πεπεράνθαι τὰ ἐντός" τὰ δ᾽ ἐναντία ἔσχατα. πᾶν

25 δὲ τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἔχει ἐναντίωσιν, οἷον ἐν χρώματι τὸ
λευκὸν καὶ τὸ μέλαν, ἐν χυμῷ γλυκὺ καὶ πικρόν'
καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις δὴ aot ἐστιν ἔσχατα τὰ ἐναν-
τία. τὸ μὲν οὖν συνεχὲς εἰς ἄπειρα τέμνεται
ἄνισα, εἰς δ᾽ ἴσα πεπερασμένα' τὸ δὲ μὴ καθ᾽
αὑτὸ συνεχὲς εἰς πεπερασμένα εἴδη. ἐπεὶ οὖν τὰ

80 μὲν πάθη ὡς εἴδη λεκτέον, ὑπάρχει δὲ συνέχεια
ἀεὶ ἐν τούτοις, ληπτέον ὅτι τὸ δυνάμει καὶ τὸ
ἐνεργείᾳ ἕτερον" καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὸ μυριοστημόριον

4468 λανθάνει τῆς κέγχρου “ὁρωμένης, καίτοι ἡ ὄψις
ἐπελήλυθεν, καὶ δ ἐν τῇ διέσει φθόγγος λανθάνει,
καύτοι συνεχοῦς ὄντος ἀκούει τοῦ μέλους παντός.
τὸ δὲ διάστημα τὸ τοῦ μεταξὺ πρὸς τοὺς ἐσχάτους
λανθάνει. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις, αἰσθητοῖς

"τὰ μικρὰ πάμπαν" δυνάμει. γὰρ ὁρατά, ἐνεργείᾳ δ᾽
οὔ, ὅταν μὴ χωρὶς ἢ" καὶ γὰρ ἐνυπάρχει δυνάμει
ἡ ποδιαία τῇ δίποδι, ἐνεργείᾳ δ᾽ ἤδη διαιρεθεῖσα.
χωριζόμεναι δ᾽ αἱ τηλικαῦται ὑπεροχαὶ εὐλόγως
μὲν ἂν καὶ διαλύοιντο εἰς τὰ περιέχοντα, ὥσπερ

10 καὶ ἀκαριαῖος χυμὸς εἰς τὴν θάλατταν ἐκχυθείς.
οὐ μὴν ἀλλ᾽ ἐπειδὴ οὐδ᾽ ἡ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ὑπεροχὴ

1 χωρισθῇ Β,

« What we call the Physics.
256

ON SENSE AND SENSIBLE OBJECTS, νι.

support the theory of atoms ; for our difficulty might
be solved on these lines; the theory has been dis-
cussed in the treatise on movement.? The solution
of these questions will make it clear why the types of
colour, flavour, sounds, and other sensible objects
are limited; for where there are limits, the inter-
mediate stages must be limited ; but the opposites
are extremes. But every sensible object involves an
opposition, for instance in colour white and black, in
flavour sweet and bitter; and in all other sensible
objects opposites are the extremes. Now what is
continuous can be divided into an infinite number of
unequal parts, but into a limited number of equal
parts ; but that which is not in itself continuous can
be divided into a limited number of kinds. Since
then the attributes in question may be spoken of as
kinds, and continuity is one of their natural character-
istics, one must consider the difference between the
potential and the actual; it is for this reason, when
a grain of millet is looked at, that the ten-thousandth
part of the grain cannot be seen, and yet vision has
covered it all, and the quarter-tone cannot be recog-
nized, although one can hear the whole tune as
continuous. But the interval between the extremes
is not recognized. ‘The same thing is true of all very
small quantities in the other sensible objects ; poten-
tially they are seen but not actually, unless they are
isolated from the whole. Potentially the one-foot
length exists in the two-foot length, but actually only
when separated from it. But it is only natural that
increments of this kind should be merged in their
environment, just as an evanescent flavour when
poured into the sea. But it is important to realize
that the increment of sense is not perceptible by

s Q57

Very amall
parta must
be potenti.
ally if not
actually
perceptible,

446 a

30
446 Ὁ

ARISTOTLE

> ¢ x > x + x la ¥ 4
καθ᾽ αὑτὴν αἰσθητὴ οὐδὲ χωριστή (δυνάμει yap
ἐνυπάρχει ἐν τῇ ἀκριβεστέρᾳ ἡ ὑπεροχή), οὐδὲ τὸ
τηλικοῦτον αἰσθητὸν χωριστὸν ἔσται ἐνεργείᾳ
αἰσθέσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως ἔσται αἰσθητόν: δυνάμει τε

» a
γάρ ἐστιν ἤδη, Kat ἐνεργείᾳ ἔσται προσγενόμενον.
wt \ ἫΝ Ba 5. ᾿ iO λ θ ΄ ‘
ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἔνια μεγέθη καὶ πάθη λανθάνει, καὶ
διὰ τίν᾽ αἰτίαν, καὶ πῶς αἰσθητὰ καὶ πῶς οὔ,
εἴρηται. ὅταν δὲ δὴ ἐνυπάρχοντα οὕτω πως ἄττα
ἢ ὥστε καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ αἰσθητὰ εἶναι, καὶ μὴ μόνον
> ~ Yo 3 5 24 \ x a > ἐξ
ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ ἀλλὰ καὶ χωρὶς ἢ πεπερασμένα, ἀνάγκη
3 \ A ͵ \
εἶναι τὸν ἀριθμὸν καὶ χρώματα Kal χυμοὺς Kal
φθόγγους.
5 “-
᾿Απορήσειε δ᾽ ἄν τις, ap’ ἀφικνοῦνται ἢ τὰ
αἰσθητὰ ἢ αἱ κινήσεις ai ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ὅπο-
¢ Ψ -
τέρως ποτὲ γίνεται ἡ αἴσθησις, ὅταν ἐνεργῶσιν, εἰς
n eo 3 f 5,
τὸ μέσον πρῶτον, οἷον ἢ τε ὀσμὴ φαίνεται ποιοῦσα
oe 4 4 ‘ © 3 τ > , -
καὶ ὁ ψόφος" πρότερον γὰρ ὁ ἐγγὺς αἰσθάνεται τῆς
ὀσμῆς, καὶ ὁ ψόφος ὕστερον ἀφικνεῖται τῆς πληγῆς.
: \ a
dp’ οὖν οὕτω καὶ TO ὁρώμενον Kal τὸ φῶς; καθ-
amep καὶ ᾿Ἐμπεδοκλῆς φησὶν ἀφικνεῖσθαι πρότερον
‘ \ ~ / ~ \
τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου φῶς εἰς τὸ μεταξὺ πρὶν πρὸς
\ ᾿ Δ» -
τὴν ὄψιν ἢ ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν. δόξειε δ᾽ ἂν εὐλόγως
τοῦτο συμβαίνειν' τὸ γὰρ κινούμενον κινεῖταί ποθέν
ποι, ὥστ᾽ ἀνάγκη εἶναί τινα καὶ χρόνον ἐν ᾧ κινεῖται
7 / Δ ἐς ¢ i / ~
ἐκ θατέρου πρὸς θάτερον: ὁ δὲ χρόνος πᾶς δὃι-
/ a F Lig Le c > 2 > wot 3 Lg
αἱρετός, ὥστε ἦν OTE οὔπω ἑωρᾶτο GAA’ ἔτ᾽ ἐφέρετο
ἡ ἀκτὶς ἐν τῷ μεταξύ. καὶ εἰ ἅπαν ἅμα ἀκούει
258

ON SENSE AND SENSIBLE OBJECTS, v1.

itself, or in isolation (for this movement has only
potential existence in more distinguishable sense per-
ception), nor will it be possible actually to perceive a
sensible object of this kind when it is separated from

the whole, yet it is a sensible object; for it is so
potentially, and will become so actually when joined

to the whole. We have then stated that some magni-
tudes and some attributes escape us; we have ex-
plained the reason for this, and the sense in which
they are sensible objects, and the sense in which they

are not. But since some of these exist in such a way

that they become actually perceptible, and have a
determinate existence not merely in the whole, but
even in isolation, it follows that colours, flavours and
sounds must be limited in number.

There is a further question to be considered : do Does a

these sensible objects, or the movements arising from brceptme

aliject
them (in whichever way sensation arises), come first become first

to a mid-point when they become actual, as smell and oes Σ
sound seem to do? For the man nearer to it is the setually κυ,
first to perceive the smell, and the sound of the blow ee
reaches us after the blow has been struck. Is the

same thing true of the object seen and the light?
Empedocles for instance states that the light from the

sun reaches an intermediate point, before it reaches

the vision, or the earth. This sounds a probable
account of what happens; for that which is moved

is moved from some source, and in some direction,

so that some interval of time must elapse in which

the movement takes place from the one point to the

other. But all time is divisible, so that an interval

existed during which the light was not yet seen, but

the ray was still moving in the intermediate space.

And even supposing that “ hearing’ and “ having

259

446 ἢ

1ῦ

ARISTOTLE

, 18 νι ry ᾿ νὸν Ἢ
και αΚΉΚΟΕ καὶ ὅλως αἰσθάνεται Kat ἤσθηται, και
μή ἐστι γένεσις αὐτῶν, ἀλλ᾽ εἰσὶν ἄνευ τοῦ γίνεσθαι
Π Oh φ« - , us ,
ὅμως οὐδὲν ἧττον, ὥσπερ ὁ ψόφος ἤδη γεγενημένης
τῆς πληγῆς οὔπω πρὸς τῇ ἀκοῇ. δηλοῖ δὲ τοῦτο
καὶ ἡ τῶν γραμμάτων μετασχημάτισις, ὡς γιγνο-
μένης τῆς φορᾶς ἐν τῷ μεταξύ' οὐ γὰρ τὸ λεχθὲν
φαίνονται ἀκηκοὄτες διὰ τὸ μετασχηματίζεσθαι
φερόμενον τὸν ἀέρα. ἄρ᾽ οὖν οὕτω καὶ τὸ χρῶμα
καὶ τὸ φῶς; οὐ γὰρ δὴ τῷ πῶς ἔχειν τὸ μὲν ὁρᾷ
τὸ δ᾽ ὁρᾶται, ὥσπερ ἴσα ἐστίν: οὐθὲν γὰρ ἔδει που
ἑκάτερον εἶναι" τοῖς γὰρ ἴσοις γινομένοις οὐδὲν

\
διαφέρει 7 ἢ ἐγγὺς ἣ πόρρω ἀλλήλων εἶναι, ἢ περὶ
μὲν τὸν ψόφον καὶ τὴν ὀσμὴν τοῦτο συμβαίνειν
εὔλογον: ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ ἀὴρ καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ, συνεχῆ
μέν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως μεμέρισται ἀμφοτέρων ἡ κίνησις.
διὸ καὶ ἔστι μὲν ὡς τὸ αὐτὸ ἀκούει ὁ πρῶτος καὶ

\ > ,ὔ > a

ὁ ὕστερος καὶ ὀσφραίνεται, ἔστι δ᾽ ὡς ov. δοκεῖ
>

δέ τισιν εἶναι ἀπορία καὶ περὶ τούτων: ἀδύνατον

rd ‘ a A \ +] \ > / av fom

γάρ φασί τινες ἄλλον ἄλλῳ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀκούειν ἢ ὁρᾶν

" ? te 2 A / > A
καὶ ὀσφραίνεσθαι: οὐ yap οἷόν τ᾽ εἷναι πολλοὺς
καὶ χωρὶς ὄντας ἀκούειν ἢ ὀσφραίνεσθαι' τὸ γὰρ

‘ Ὁ a
ἕν χωρὶς ἂν αὐτὸ αὑτοῦ εἶναι. ἢ τοῦ μὲν κινή-
σαντος πρῶτον, οἷον τῆς κώδωνος ἢ λιβανωτοῦ ἢ
πυρός, τοῦ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἑνὸς ἀριθμῷ αἰσθάνονται

/ an δὲ δὴ isd ie ὦ > θ an ἴδ δὲ
πάντες, τοῦ δὲ δὴ ἰδίου ἑτέρου ἀριθμῷ, εἴδει δὲ
τοῦ αὑτοῦ, διὸ ἅμα πολλοὶ ὁρῶσι καὶ ὀσμῶνται

* A. is thinking of a word incorrectly heard, He sup-
poses that the air through which the word is transmitted
takes a definite “‘shape.” When this ‘shape’? is altered
the word reaches the listener incorrectly.

260

ON SENSE, AND SENSIBLE OBJECTS, νι.

heard,” “feeling? and “ having felt” are simnl-

taneous, and την ον no process oft becoming, but exist

without any such process, nevertheless the interval

still exists, just as sound las not yet reached our ear,

although the blow causing it has been struck. The

alteration in the letters of a word as heard proves that

some movement tukes place in the intervening space ;¢

for the reason why the listener does not hear what is

said, is that air in moving towards him has undergone

some change. Is the same thing true of colour and

light ? Por it is not true that the one sees, and the

other js seen, just because the two are in a certain

condition, as if Lhey were equal; for in that case

there would be no need for each of them to be in

some particular place ; for when things are identical]

it makes no difference whether they are near to or

far from one another. Now it is reasonable to sup-

pose that the same thing happens with sound and

smell ; for just as their media, air and water, are

continuous, so are they, and yet the movement of

both is divided into parts. And so there is a sense in

which the first and last hear and smell the same thing,

and also a sense in which they do not, But some find τὰ what

a further difficulty in this; for they say that it is {Wo persons

impossible for one person to hear, or see, or smell ata the

the same thing as another; for they argue that it is ἜΣ

impossible for many people who are apart from one

another to hear or smell the same thing ; for in that

case one thing would be apart from itself. The cause

of the original movement such as the bell, or the

incense, or the fire, which all perceive is the same and

numerically one, but each perceives a quality which

is different numerically though the same in form, for
many see, smell, or hear it at the same time. These

261

ARISTOTLE

446 b \ Ww 3 a , ~ 3 Ν
90. καὶ ἀκούουσιν. ἔστι δ᾽ οὔτε σώματα ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ

πάθος καὶ κίνησίς τις (οὐ γὰρ ἂν τοῦτο συνέβαινεν),
οὔτ᾽ ἄνευ σώματος.

Περὶ δὲ τοῦ φωτὸς ἄλλος λόγος: τῷ εἶναι γάρ

~ ? A > 3 > ,ὔ , ῳ 4 ? \

τι φῶς ἐστίν, ἀλλ᾽ od κίνησίς tis. ὅλως δὲ οὐδὲ

ὁμοίως ἐπί τε ἀλλοιώσεως ἔχει καὶ φορᾶς" αἱ μὲν

80 γὰρ φοραὶ εὐλόγως εἰς τὸ μεταξὺ πρῶτον ἀφ-

“- ΄ 3 τ / [ἢ Αἢ

410 ἱκνοῦνται (δοκεῖ δ᾽ ὁ ψόφος εἶναι φερομένου τινὸς
κίνησις), ὅσα δ᾽ ἀλλοιοῦται, οὐκέτι ὁμοίως: ἐν-
δέχεται γὰρ ἀθρόον ἀλλοιοῦσθαι, καὶ μὴ τὸ ἥμισυ
πρότερον, οἷον τὸ ὕδωρ ἅμα πᾶν πήγνυσθαι. οὐ
μὴν ἀλλ᾽ ἂν a πολὺ τὸ θερμαινόμενον ὴ πηγνύ-

ὃ μενον, τὸ ἐχόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐχομένου πάσχει, τὸ
δὲ πρῶτον ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀλλοιοῦντος μεταβάλλει,

\ 7 ὅν. a LAA o~ θ \ if ,

καὶ οὐκ ἀνάγκη ἅμα ἀλλοιοῦσθαι Kat ἀθρόον. ἣν
δ᾽ ἂν καὶ τὸ γεύεσθαι ὥσπερ ἡ ὀσμή, εἰ ἐν ὑγρῷ

> / ~ n /
ἦμεν καὶ πορρωτέρω ἔτι πρὶν θιγεῖν αὐτοῦ ἠσθανό-

3. 5 > \ \ “ 2 ,
μεθα. εὐλόγως δ᾽ ὧν ἐστὶ μεταξὺ τοῦ αἰσθητηρίου,
10 οὐχ ἅμα πάντα πάσχει, πλὴν ἐπὶ τοῦ φωτὸς διὰ
τὸ εἰρημένον. διὰ τὸ αὐτὸ δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ὁρᾶν"
τὸ γὰρ φῶς ποιεῖ τὸ ὁρᾶν.

VIL. "Ἔστι δέ τις ἀπορία καὶ ἄλλη τοιάδε περὶ
αἰσθήσεως, πότερον ἐνδέχεται δυοῖν: ἅμα αἰσθάνε-
σθαι ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ ἀτόμῳ χρόνῳ, ἢ οὔ, εἰ δὴ
ἀεὶ ἡ μείζων κίνησις, τὴν ἐλάττω ἐκκρούει- διὸ
ἐπιφερομένων ἐπὶ τὰ ὄμματα οὐκ αἰσθάνονται, ἐὰν
τύχωσι σφόδρα τι ἐννοοῦντες ἢ φοβούμενοι 7}
3 4 \ / ~ \ 4 ν
ἀκούοντες πολὺν ψόφον. τοῦτο δὴ ὑποκείσθω,

δὴ bu e ? = μὲ ? fA ς ~
καὶ ὅτι ἑκάστου μᾶλλον ἔστιν αἰσθάνεσθαι ἁπλοῦ

1 due Β,
262

ON SENSE AND SENSIBLE. OBJECTS, vi.—vu.

are not badics, but are an affection or movement of
some kind (for otherwise it would not occur), though
not apart from a body.

The position with regard to light is different ; for right isa
light is an existing thing, and is not a movement. special case,
Generally speaking, change of state and travel in
space are different; for spatial movements naturally
travel first in the intervening space (and sound
appears to be the movement of something travelling),
but with things which change their state the position
is not the same; for it is possible that such change of
state should occur in a thing all at once, and not in
half first; for instance, water may all freeze at one
time. It must, however, be admitted that when much
of it grows hot or freezes, each part is affected by the
next, and the first part owes its change to that which
produces the change, and it need not change all at the
same time together. Tasting indeed would be like
smelling, if we lived in water, and perceived at a
distance before making contact. But naturally those
senses which act through a medium are not all affected
simultaneously, except in the case of light for the
reason given, and for the same reason it is true of
seeing, for light causes seeing.

VII. There is a further question about sensation, Can two
whether it is possible to perceive two things in one etenivad
and the same indivisible time or not; or in other ae
words, does the greater movement eliminate the oon.
lesser? For men do not see things impinging on
their eyes, if they happen to be concentrating on
some thought, or in a state of fear, or listening to a
loud noise. Let this be granted, and also that it is
more possible to perceive each individual thing when
simple, than when mixed with another. For instance

203

447 ἃ

80
447 b

ARISTOTLE

ὄντος ἢ κεκραμένου, οἷον οἴνου ἀκράτου ἢ κεκρα-
Η “- 2
μένου, καὶ μέλιτος, καὶ χρόας, καὶ τῆς νήτης μόνης
ἢ ἐν τῷ διὰ πασῶν, διὰ τὸ ἀφανίζειν ἄλληλα.
“ , ”a ? Kn Ὁ 2 2 ‘ ¢ ᾿
τοῦτο δὲ ποιεῖ ἐξ ὧν ἕν τι γίνεται, εἰ δὴ ἡ μείζων
τὴν ἐλάττω κίνησιν ἐκκρούει, ἀνάγκη, ἂν ἅμα
ἫΝ \ | ἃ > 6 \ > a ᾿ ,
ὦσι, καὶ αὐτὴν ἧττον αἰσθητὴν εἶναι ἢ εἰ μόνη
A 4
ἦν' ἀφαιρεῖται γάρ Te ἡ ἐλάττων μιγνυμένη, εἴπερ
a A ¢ “ 5 fond > 4 > 7 dA Ea
ἅπαντα τὰ ἁπλᾶ μᾶλλον αἰσθητά ἐστίν. ἐὰν dpa
” > a iN y 7 ” y
ἴσαι ὦσιν ἕτεραι οὖσαι, οὐδετέρας ἔσται αἴσθησις"
3 a AY « ε ὔ € ? \ 3 ; £ tal
ἀφανιεῖ γὰρ ἡ ἑτέρα ὁμοίως τὴν ἑτέραν. ἁπλῆς
> Ε " ? / a Ἃ ? 7 a
δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν αἰσθάνεσθαι. ὥστε ἢ οὐδεμία ἔσται
“- \
αἴσθησις ἢ ἄλλη ἐξ ἀμφοῖν. ὅπερ καὶ γίνεσθαι
- “ ,ὔ > φ “
δοκεῖ ex τῶν κεραννυμένων ἐν ᾧ dv μιχθῶοιν.
? ‘ 4 ? \ tae ΄ , 2 > > + >
ἐπεὶ οὖν ex μὲν ἐνίων γίνεταί τι, ἐκ δ᾽ ἐνίων οὐ
f a \ ‘ 5.13 ¢ 7 "
γίνεται, τοιαῦτα δὲ τὰ ὑφ᾽ ἑτέραν αἴσθησιν'
Ψ A Φ: 4 Ψ > i poe 2 vw >
(μίγνυνται yap ὧν τὰ ἔσχατα ἐναντίαλ" οὐκ ἔστι ὃ
ἐκ λευκοῦ καὶ ὀξέος ἕν γενέσθαι ἀλλ᾽ ἢ κατὰ
συμβεβηκός, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ὡς ἐξ ὀξέος καὶ βαρέος
᾽ ΩΣ ΤΩΣ 7 ͵ 2 ¥
συμφωνία) οὐκ dpa οὐδ᾽ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἐνδέχεται
Ἂν «τὰς Ὁ " A x. s € / >
αὐτῶν ἅμα. ἴσαι μὲν γὰρ οὖσαι αἱ κινήσεις ἀφα-
ley > f i 2 Ἄν ἐς > £ 2 b “Ὁ
νιοῦσιν ἀλλήλας, ἐπεὶ μία οὐ γίνεται ἐξ αὐτῶν.
2 > ν᾽ ¢ f wv > ὕ 2 \
ἐὰν δ᾽ ἄνισοι, ἡ κρείττων αἴσθησιν ἐμποιήσει, ἐπεὶ
- cal > ~ “-“
μᾶλλον ἅμα δυοῖν" αἴσθοιτ᾽ ἂν ἡ ψυχὴ τῇ μιᾷ
αἰσθήσει ὧν μία αἴσθησις, οἷον ὀξέος καὶ βαρέος"
1 ἕν Β, 2 δυεῖν B,
264

ON SENSE AND SENSIBLE OBJECTS, vir.

it is easier to Laste pure wine than wine mixed wilh
water, and so also with honey, or with colour; and
Lhe lowest of the strings is easier to hear by itself
than when mixed with the octave, hecause the
different notes neutralize each other. This always
happens with individual things out of which one whole
is formed. If then the greater movement eliminates
the less, it follows that, if they occur together, the
greater must be less perceptible than if it occurs
alone; for the lesser when mixed with it subtracts
something, since all simple things are more per-
ceptible. If then the different movemenis are
exactly cqual, there can be no perception of either ;
for each will similarly efface the other. But it is
impossible in this case to perceive either in its simple
form, So thal either there is no perception at all,
or clse there is perception of something formed from
the two and different from either. This result seems
actually to occur when two things are mixed in what-
ever way they are combined. From some things,
then, one whole is produced, from others it is not, and
to the latter class belong all such things as come
under different senses (for amalgamation can only
take place with things whose extremes are con-
traries ; so no single erik can be formed from white
and sharp, except incidentally, for there is no har-
mony possible, as with high and low); and so it
is impossible also to perceive these together. ‘The
movements, if equal, will efface each other, when one
impulse does not arise from them. But if they are
not equal the greater will provoke sensation, since
the soul would be more likely to perceive two things
at the same time with one sense perception, if the
things both belong to the same sense perception,

265

ARISTOTLE
447 b ester, τὸ sen π; 5 2 , 4
μᾶλλον γὰρ dua ἡ κίνησις τῆς μιᾶς ταύτης ἢ
τοῖν δυοῖν, οἷον ὄψεως καὶ ἀκοῆς.

10 Τῇ μιᾷ δὲ ἅμα δυοῖν οὐκ ἔστιν αἰσθάνεσθαι ἂν
μὴ μιχθῇ: τὸ γὰρ μῖγμα ἕν βούλεται εἶναι, τοῦ
δ᾽ ἑνὸς μία αἴσθησις, ἡ δὲ μία ἅμα αὑτῇ. ὥστ᾽
ἐξ ἀνάγκης τῶν μεμιγμένων ἅμα αἰσθάνεται, ὅτι
μιᾷ αἰσθήσει κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν αἰσθάνεται: ἑνὸς μὲν
γὰρ ἀριθμῷ ἡ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν μία, εἴδει δὲ ἡ κατὰ

1s δύναμιν μία. καὶ εἰ μία τοίνυν ἡ αἴσθησις ἡ κατ᾽

ἢ a Η ᾿
ἐνέργειαν, ἕν ἐκεῖνα ἐρεῖ. μεμῖχθαι ἄρα ἀνάγκη
αὐτά. ὅταν ἄρα μὴ ἢ μεμιγμένα, δύο ἔσονται
αἰσθήσεις αἱ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν. ἀλλὰ κατὰ μίαν
δύναμιν καὶ ἄτομον χρόνον μίαν ἀνάγκη εἷναι τὴν
ἐνέργειαν: μιᾶς γὰρ εἰσάπαξ μία κίνησις καὶ

20 χρῆσις, μία δὲ ἡ δύναμις. οὐκ ἄρα ἐνδέχεται δυοῖν
ἅμα αἰσθάνεσθαι τῇ μιᾷ αἰσθήσει. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ
τὰ ὑπὸ τὴν αὐτὴν αἴσθησιν ἅμα ἀδύνατον, ἐὰν ἢ
δύο, δῆλον ὅτι ἧττον ἔτι τὰ κατὰ δύο αἰσθήσεις
ἐνδέχεται ἅμα αἰσθάνεσθαι, οἷον λευκὸν καὶ γλυκύ.
φαίνεται γὰρ τὸ μὲν τῷ ἀριθμῷ ἕν ἡ ψυχὴ οὐδενὶ

ἐν ἑτέρῳ λέγειν ἀλλ᾽ ἢ τῷ ἅμα, τὸ δὲ τῷ εἴδει ἐν
τῇ κρινούσῃ αἰσθήσει καὶ τῷ τρόπῳ. λέγω δὲ
τοῦτο, ὅτι ἴσως τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ μέλαν, ἕτερον
τῷ εἴδει ὄν, ἡ αὐτὴ κρίνει, καὶ τὸ γλυκὺ καὶ τὸ

2 A, seems to mean this. If you look δὲ (6...) two white
objects and are conscious of them as two white objects you
are receiving not one impression, but two, and therefore
cannot receive both with one sense faculty simultaneously.
If the two white objects give only a general impression of
white (2.6. specifically or as a class), then your sense faculty
may be one, but it is only potential and not actualized.

266

ON SENSE AND SENSIBLE OBJECTS, vu.

such as high and low; for the simultaneous move-
ment of this one sensation is greater than it would be
in the case of two, such as vision and hearing.

But it is not possible to perceive two objects with
one sense, unless they are amalgamated; for the
amalgamation tends to make one whole, and there
is one sensation of the unit, and this one sensation of
course coincides with itself. So that there is neces-
sarily simultancous perception of the objects amal-
gamated, because the soul actually perceives with
one sensation ; for the sensation which is actually a
unit is of something numerically also a unit, but, of an
object one only in species, the faculty is only potenti-
ally a unit. Whereas if the faculty is actually one,
it, will call its objects one. And so they must be
amalgamated. When they are not amalgamated,
the actual sensations will he two. But in the case of
a single faculty in an indivisible moment of Lime, the
activity must be single ; for the movement and em-
ployment of one faculty at a single instant implies
that the activity is one, and the Faulty in this case
is only one. It is not then possible to perceive two
objects with a single sensation. Moreover if it is
impossible to perceive two things at the same
moment which fall under the same sense, it is clear
that it is still more impossible to perceive simul-
taneously two things which fall under two senses,
such as white and sweet. For the soul cannot refer
to what is numerically one in any way except simul-
taneously, but that which is specifically one, it refers
to with discriminating sense and method. I mean
this: that probably the same sense pronounces judge-
ment on white and black, which are specifically
different, and on sweet and bitter; the same sense

207

Two objects
cannot be
sean as two
with one
sense.

ARISTOTLE

447 b re
πικρόν, ἡ αὐτὴ μὲν ἑαυτῇ, ἐκείνης δ᾽ ἄλλη, ἀλλ᾽

ξ τς - 7 ~ 3 Τὰ τ δ᾽ La ε -
ἑτέρως ἑκάτερον τῶν ἐναντίων, ὡς δ᾽ αὕτως ἑαυταῖς
~ ἢ;
80 τὰ σύστοιχα, οἷον ὡς ἡ γεῦσις τὸ γλυκύ, οὕτως
co” 4 é ¢ ? 4 Ν f a
ugar) ὄψις TO λευκόν: ὡς δ᾽ αὕτη τὸ μέλαν, οὕτως
ἐκείνη τὸ πικρόν.
» ’ « ~ 2 , ᾽ ? f “
Er εἰ αἱ τῶν ἐναντίων κινήσεις ἐναντίαι, ἅμα
~ ~ A
δὲ τὰ ἐναντία ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ ἀτόμῳ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται
c / ς ‘ \ Ἂν wv εἶ ,ὔ > a
ὑπάρχειν, ὑπὸ δὲ τὴν αἴσθησιν τὴν μίαν ἐναντία
2 , \ ~ 4 > 4, > f
6 ἐστίν, οἷον γλυκὺ πωςρῷ, τούτων οὐκ ἂν ἐνδέχουτο
αἰσθάνεσθαι ἅμα, ὁμοίως δὲ δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲ τὰ
μὴ ἐναντία: τὰ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ λευκοῦ τὰ δὲ τοῦ
Δ , 2 * > - HAA £ ,
μέλανός ἐστιν, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁμοίως, οἷον
al - ¢ A lon , ¢ A a -
τῶν χυμῶν οἱ μὲν τοῦ γλυκέος οἱ δὲ τοῦ πικροῦ.
Ὁ ἈΝ AY / a / / ? 3
οὐδὲ τὰ μεμιγμένα ἅμα (λόγοι γάρ εἰσιν ἀντι-
͵ A Ἂς ~ \ \ A é aN
10 κειμένων, οἷον τὸ διὰ πασῶν καὶ τὸ διὰ πέντε), ἂν
\ e a 3 , Ὁ > / ¢ ἴω
μὴ ὡς ἕν αἰσθάνηται. οὕτως δ᾽ εἷς λόγος 6 τῶν
3, , ” 5 u v A. v 4
ἄκρων γίνεται, ἄλλως δ᾽ ot: ἔσται yap ἅμα ὃ
4 a ‘ Ὰ 7 a ~ \ v
μὲν πολλοῦ πρὸς ὀλίγον ἢ περιττοῦ πρὸς ἄρτιον,
£ > γᾺἋ ‘ Ay AD 3 , s /
ὁ δ᾽ ὀλίγου πρὸς πολὺ ἢ ἀρτίου πρὸς περιττόν.
> ~
εἰ οὖν πλεῖον ἔτι ἀπέχει ἀλλήλων Kal διαφέρει τὰ
Fé ΑἾ i > uy \ ΄ lat 2
15 συστοίχως μὲν λεγόμενα ἐν ἄλλῳ δὲ γένει τῶν ἐν
a 2A Pa fe 2 \ + \ ΕἾ
τῷ αὐτῷ γένει (λέγω δ᾽ οἷον τὸ γλυκὺ καὶ τὸ
\ ~
λευκὸν καλῶ σύστοιχα, γένει δ᾽ ἕτερα" τὸ γλυκὺ
᾿ - - ~
δὲ τοῦ μέλανος πλεῖον ἔτι τῷ εἴδει διαφέρει ἢ τὸ
i ᾿ ἢ
λευκόν), ἔτι ἂν ἧττον ἅμα ἐνδέχοιτο αὐτὰ αἰσθά-
268

ON SENSE AND SENSIBLE OBJECTS, vi.

that is in itself, but different from thal which judges
white and black; each differs from itself in its
method of perceiving opposites, but each acts in the
same way in its method of perceiving corresponding
qualities ; for instance vision apprehends white in
the same way as taste apprehends sweet ; and as the
former apprehends black, so the latter apprehends
bitter.

Moreover, if the movements produced by opposite simnitane-
objects are opposite, and it is not possible that (ion of
opposites should reside in what is the same and two aens-
indivisible, and if opposites fall under one sense, such bie
as sweet and bitter, it would not be possible to per-
ceive these opposites simultaneously. In the same
way clearly things which are not opposite cannot be
simultaneously perceived ; for instance some colaurs
belong to white and some to black, and similarly other
sensible objects, for instance some flavours belong
to sweet and some to bitter. Nor can amalgamated
objects be simultaneously perceived (for they are
ratios of opposites, such as the whole octave or the
fifth), unless they are perceived as one. For in this
sense the ratio of extreme sounds becomes one, but
in no other sense; for we shall have the ratio of
many to few, and odd to even, and on the other hand
few to many and even to odd, If then the objects
which I call corresponding stand further apart from
each other, and are more different in other classes
than those in the same class (I call sweet and white
corresponding, though different in class; and in
specific form sweet differs from black even more
than white does), it would be even less possible to
perceive these (e.g. swect and white) simultaneously
than things belonging to the same class (e.g. white

269

448 ἃ

μη

448 b

ὃ

ARISTOTLE

Ἃ A “- / 2 4 τε >? Ἵ Li a
νεσθαι ἢ τὰ τῷ γένει ταὐτά. ὥστ᾽ εἰ μὴ ταῦτα,
οὐδ᾽ ἐκεῖνα.

- \
Ὃ δὲ λέγουσί τινες τῶν περὶ τὰς συμφωνίας,
lig ? a A - ~ € / =
ὅτι οὐχ ἅμα μὲν ἀφικνοῦνται of ψόφοι, φαίνονται
, ,
δέ, καὶ λανθάνει, ὅταν 6 χρόνος 7 ἀναίσθητος,
/ > ~ i Ral at , A vn 3
πότερον ὀρθῶς λέγεται ἢ ov; τάχα yap ἂν φαίη
τις καὶ νῦν παρὰ τοῦτο δοκεῖν ἅμα ὁρᾶν καὶ
ἀκούειν, ὅτι of μεταξὺ χρόνοι λανθάνουσιν. ἢ
ma? 3 3 / 2g? 2 i /
τοῦτ᾽ οὐκ ἀληθές, οὐδ᾽ ἐνδέχεται χρόνον εἶναι
ἀναίσθητον οὐδένα οὐδὲ λανθάνειν, ἀλλὰ παντὸς
/ , ,ὔ > A Ls \ “΄-
ἐνδέχεται αἰσθάνεσθαι. εἰ γὰρ ὅτε αὐτὸς αὑτοῦ
A Ν - \
τις αἰσθάνεται ἢ ἄλλου ἐν συνεχεῖ χρόνῳ, μὴ
3 f / "ἢ o ἢ ΄ » / >
ἐνδέχεται τότε λανθάνειν ὅτι ἐστίν, ἔστι δέ τις ἐν
-“ cal \ ~ τὰ ,ὔ
τῷ συνεχεῖ καὶ τοσοῦτος ὅσος ὅλως ἀναίσθητός
2 a a , Xr 4 nn > om + am
ἐστι, δῆλον ὅτι τότε λανθάνοι ἂν εἰ ἔστιν αὐτὸς
Ζ. \ 3 toa \ > /
αὑτόν, καὶ ef ὁρᾷ, καὶ οὐκ αἰσθάνεται' καὶ εἰ
1B
αἰσθάνεται ἔτι, οὐκ ἂν εἴη οὔτε χρόνος οὔτε
~ 3 \ a 2 4 ἊΝ Σ ae > \ a
πρᾶγμα οὐδὲν ὃ αἰσθάνεται ἢ ἐν ᾧ, εἰ μὴ οὕτως,
ε 4 ty a
ὅτι ἐν τούτου Twi ἢ ὅτι τούτου τι ὁρᾷ, εἴπερ
/ f
ἔστι τι μέγεθος καὶ χρόνον Kal πράγματος ἀν-
μὲ ‘ ,
αίσθητον ὅλως διὰ μικρότητα' εἰ γὰρ τὴν ὅλην
- ‘ ~
ὁρᾷ, καὶ αἰσθάνεται τὸν αὐτὸν συνεχῶς χρόνον, οὐ
mm “ 4 , 3 4 ς ‘ 2
τῶν νῦν τούτων τινί. ἀφῃρήσθω ἡ τὸ TB, ἐν ἡ
οὐκ ἠσθάνετο. οὐκοῦν ἐν ταύτης τινὶ ἢ ταύτης τι,
“ \ a a ~
ὥσπερ τὴν γῆν ὁρᾷ ὅλην, ὅτι τοδὶ αὐτῆς, καὶ ἐν
- 2 ~ f a > ~ ~ 7 “
τῷ ἐνιαυτῷ βαδίζει, ὅτι ἐν τῷδε τῷ μέρει αὐτοῦ.
> A A 2 ~ LENS 2 ΄ “-- a
ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐν τῷ BY οὐδὲν αἰσθάνεται. τῷ dpa

« This is-intended to be a reductio ad absurdum.
270

ON SENSE AND SENSIBLE OBJECTS, vu.

and black). So that if the latter is impossible, the
forincr is certainly so.

Now for the point which some raise about concords ;
they say that sounds do not arrive simultancously,
but only seem to do so, and deceive us, when the
interval of time is imperceptible. Are they right or
not? One might perhaps say at once that we only
suppose that we see and hear simultaneously, because
the intervening tinic is not noticeable. Probably
this is untrue, and it is impossible for any time to be
imperceptible and be unnoticed, bul one must be
conscious of every such interval. For when a man
perceives himself or anything else in continuous
time, it is impossible for him to be unaware of his
existence, and if again in continuous time there can
be time of such short duration as to be imperceptible,
it is clear that, in the case supposed, man would be
unaware of his existence and, if he saw, would not be
aware that he was seeing; and, if he were aware,
there would be neither time nor any object of which
he was aware, except in the sense that he sces in
some fraction of time, or sees some fraction of the
object ; if, that is, there exists any magnitude either
of time or object which is imperceptible owing to its
smallness; for if he sees a whole line and per-
ceives the sarne time continuously, he does not 566
some fraction of this. Suppose from the whole line
AB a part CB cut off, being a time in which he per-
ceives nothing. In that case he perceives either in a
fraction of time, or a fraction of the line, in the sense
that he may see the whole world in that he sees part
of it, or walks over it for a year, because he walks for
part of a year.* But by our assumption during the
part BC he sees nothing. In that case he is said to

271

How this
apples to
inusical
harmonies.

448 b

ARISTOTLE

ἐν τούτου τινὶ τοῦ AB αἰσθάνεσθαι λέγεται τοῦ
ὅλου αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τὴν ὅλην. ὁ δ᾽ αὐτὸς λόγος
\ Lyn! a ee | A 2 s \ / a
καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς AT: ἀεὶ γὰρ ἐν rut καὶ τινός, ὅλου
> 2 Ν Ψ / [2 \ Ἂν. ? ΄ὔ
δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν αἰσθάνεσθαι. ἅπαντα μὲν οὖν αἰσθητά
3 Ε] Ἂ 2 , iia > a ~ 4 ¢ ,
ἐστιν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ φαίνεται ὅσα ἐστίν: τοῦ γὰρ ἡλίου
\ , tos Α A / , 3 Ἵ
τὸ μέγεθος ὁρᾷ καὶ τὸ τετράπηχυ πόρρωθεν, ἀλλ
οὐ φαίνεται ὅσον, ἀλλ᾽ ἐνίοτε ἀδιαίρετον, ὁρᾷ δ᾽
ΕῚ 3 Z ς 3 ἍΝ uw 2 ~ v
οὐκ ἀδιαίρετον. ἡ δ᾽ αἰτία εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς ἔμ-
προσθεν περὶ τούτου. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐθείς ἐστι
χρόνος ἀναίσθητος, ἐκ τούτων φανερόν.
- / i
Περὶ δὲ τῆς πρότερον λεχθείσης ἀπορίας σκε-
>
πτέον, πότερον ἐνδέχεται ἅμα πλειόνων αἰσθάνεσθαι
BI ? > , εἴ 3 ῳ ᾿ > Ct \
ἢ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται, τὸ δ᾽ ἅμα λέγω ἐν ἑνὶ καὶ
‘ la ~
ἀτόμῳ χρόνῳ πρὸς ἄλληλα. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ap’
3 > cf A ~
ὧδ᾽ ἐνδέχεται, ἅμα μέν, ἑτέρῳ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς
2 , λ > ~ 3 ,ὔ Ὁ > 2 7
αἰσθάνεσθαι, καὶ οὐ τῷ ἀτόμῳ, οὕτω δ᾽ ἀτόμῳ
fal a i“ nw
ὡς παντὶ ὄντι συνεχεῖ; ἢ ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν τὰ
A \ é μὴ , » >on”
κατὰ τὴν μίαν αἴσθησιν, οἷον λέγω ὄψιν, εἰ ἔσται
ἄλλῳ αἰσθανομένη ἄλλου καὶ ἄλλου χρώματος,
ἢ , ¢ uw ~ \ \ a
πλείω τε μέρη ἕξει εἴδει ταῦτα; καὶ yap ἃ
᾽ , ? ~ 3 ~ ͵ > cs > A ω
αἰσθάνεται, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει ἐστίν. εἰ δὲ ὅτι
ὡς δύο ὄμματα φαίη τις, οὐδὲν κωλύει, οὕτω καὶ
lal “- u >
ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ὅτι lows ἐκ μὲν τούτων ἕν τι γίνεται
καὶ μία ἡ ἐνέργεια αὐτῶν' ἐκεῖ δέ, εἰ μὲν ἕν τὸ
3 3 " ? - A > / wy > 4
ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, ἐκεῖνο τὸ αἰσθανόμενον ἔσται, εἰ δὲ

4 Of. 445 11.
272

ON SENSI] AND SENSIBLE OBJECTS, vit.

see the whole line AB in the whole time, because he
sees a part of it in a part of the time. The same
argument applies to the part AC : for it will be found
that one always perecives a part in a part of the time,
and that one can never perceive the whole. ‘There-
fore everything can be perceived, but the magnitude
does not present itself to our senses; for instance
one sees a magnitude such as that of the sun, or a
four-foot rod at a distance, but one does not see what.
size it is; indeed it sometimes seems an indivisible
whole, but what we see is not really indivisible. The
reason for this has been given in our previous words
on the subject. It is clear then from this that there
is no such thing as imperceptible time.

But in regard to the difficulty mentioned before ἃ further
we must. consider whether it is possible or impossible Aaa
to perceive more than one thing at once. By “ at taneous
once ” I mean in a time which is one and indivisible κότον
for different things in relation to each other. In the Mas the
first place is it possible to perceive two things at Hp
once, but with a different part of the soul, that is not
really in indivisible time, but only indivisible in the
sense of being continuous? Or does this imply in
the first place that in one sense, for instance sight,
if it shall be capable of perceiving one colour with
one part and one with another, the soul will possess
a number of parts specifically different? Vor the
objects which it perceives are in the same class. If
one were to urge, that just as there are two eyes, so
there is nothing to prevent there being two identical
parts in the soul, we should answer that probably one
unit is made up of the two eyes, and in actual opera-
tion they are one ; in that case, I mean, if one seeing
organ is composed of the two, that organ will be the

Tv 273

ARISTOTLE

448 b , > £ , φ, wv 2 θή ἐ ? \
80 χώριξς, OVX OLLOLWS ἕξει. €Tt ALT σεις at GAUTAL

? » ω ΕΣ 2 a i
4498 πλείους ἔσονται, ὥσπερ εἴ τις ἐπιστήμας διαφόρους
dain’ οὔτε γὰρ ἡ ἐνέργεια ἄνευ τῆς καθ᾽ αὑτὴν
a ,ὔ vo? » 4 " μὲ
ἔσται δυνάμεως, οὔτ᾽ ἄνευ ταύτης ἔσται αἴσθησις.
Ei δὲ τούτων ἐν ἑνὶ καὶ ἀτόμῳ αἰσθάνεται,
δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων: μᾶλλον γὰρ ἐνεδέχετο
- an ε
ὅσ τούτων ἅμα πλειόνων ἢ τῶν τῷ γένει ἑτέρων.
εἰ δὲ δὴ ἄλλῳ μὲν γλυκέος ἄλλῳ δὲ λευκοῦ αἱ-
᾽ ε + 7 " ᾿ ? ͵ μὲ ,ὔ
σθάνεται ἡ ψυχὴ μέρει, ἤτοι τὸ ἐκ τούτων ἕν τί
2 an 2 bia = > > / ῳ ΠῚ ,ὔ ‘
ἐστιν ἣ οὐχ ἕν. ἀλλ᾽ ἀνάγκη ἕν" ἕν γάρ τι TO
> / >? s fd > 2 - ΡΟΝ ὦ
αἰσθητικόν ἐστι μέρος. τίνος οὖν ἐκεῖνο ἑνός;
? \ ‘ >? fd cid > f uv a
οὐδὲν yap ἐκ τούτων ἕν. ἀνάγκη dpa ἕν τι εἶναι
- a - ν ? / / wy
τῆς ψυχῆς, ᾧ ἅπαντα αἰσθάνεται, καθάπερ εἴρη-
Ἰὸται πρότερον, ἄλλο δὲ γένος δι’ ἄλλου. dp’ οὖν
ge A > , / 3 ? ὦ ῳ Lae 4
ἡ μὲν ἀδιαίρετόν ἐστι κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν, ἕν τί ἐστι
τὸ αἰσθητικὸν γλυκέος καὶ λευκοῦ, ὅταν δὲ δι-
auperov γένηται Kar’ ἐνέργειαν, ἕτερον; ἢ ὥσπερ
ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων αὐτῶν ἐνδέχεται, οὕτω καὶ
τι a nd s A 2% \ bis > ~
ent τῆς ψυχῆς. τὸ yap αὐτὸ καὶ ἕν ἀριθμῷ
τὸ λευκὸν καὶ γλυκύ ἐστι, καὶ ἄλλα πολλά, εἰ μὴ
5
χωριστὰ τὰ πάθη ἀλλήλων, ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι ἕτερον
¢ 7 ε , , £ + 24 - a“
ἑκάστῳ. ὁμοίως τοίνυν θετέον καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς
4 ᾿ ‘ Va > an i > 4 /
τὸ αὐτὸ Kal ἕν εἶναι ἀριθμῷ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν πάντων,
- 4
τῷ μέντοι εἶναι ἕτερον καὶ ἕτερον τῶν μὲν γένει
274

ON SENSE AND SENSIBLE OBJECTS, vn.

pereipient, but if they acl separately the ease will be
different, Moreover the same senses will then be-
come plural, just as one might speak of different
branches of knowledge. For no actualization can
oceur without each having its own potentiality, nor
will there be any perception without this.

But if the soul perceives these things in one in-
divisible time, it is clear that it does so in all other
cases ; for it would be more possible for it to per-
ceive several of these simultancously than things
different in class. If then it is true that the soul
perceives sweet with one part and white with another
part, then either the result formed of these is one,
or itis not. But it must be one ; for the perceptive
faculty is a unit. Which one object, then, does that
one faculty perceive ? For surely no one vbject can
be composed of these. ‘here must then be one part
of the soul with which it perccives everything, as
has been said before, but another, a different one,
through which it perceives different objects. In so
far, then, as it is indivisible in operation, there must be
somc one faculty perceptive of sweet and white, but,
when in actual operation it is divisible, the faculties
are different. As this is possible in objects of sense
the same thing can be true of the soul. For the same
thing which is numerically one may be both white and
sweet and have many other qualities as well, if the
attributes are not separated from each other, but
their essential existence is different in each case. So
we must suppose the same thing to be true of the
soul, and that the faculty which perceives everything
is one and the same numerically, but that its essential
existence is different in perceiving things different
sometimes in genus and sometimes in spccies. So

275

This theary
18. unsound,

ARISTOTLE

440 0 - \ ui Ὁ A > , 3 By Ψ a
τῶν be εἴδει. ὥστε Kal αἰσθάνοιτ᾽ ἂν dua τῷ
80 αὐτῷ καὶ ἑνί, λόγῳ δ᾽ οὐ τῷ αὐτῷ.
Ψ ν A b > ‘ ~ 2 \ i: Q \ b
Ore δὲ τὸ αἰσθητὸν πᾶν ἐστὶ μέγεθος καὶ οὐκ
wy > ,ὔ > rd a μὲ \ ov
ἔστιν ἀδιαίρετον αἰσθητόν, δῆλον. ἔστι γὰρ ὅθεν
μὲν οὐκ ἂν ὀφθείη, ἄπειρον τὸ ἀπόστημα, ὅθεν
~ A
δὲ ὁρᾶται, πεπερασμένον. ὁμοίως δὲ Kal τὸ
ὀσφραντὸν καὶ ἀκουστὸν καὶ ὅσων μὴ αὐτῶν ἁπτό-
25 μενοι αἰσθάνονται. ἔστι δέ τι ἔσχατον τοῦ ἀποστή-
ματος ὅθεν οὐχ ὁρᾶται, καὶ πρῶτον ὅθεν ὁρᾶται.
τοῦτο δὴ ἀνάγκη ἀδιαίρετον εἶναι, οὗ ἐν μὲν τῷ
ἐπέκεινα οὐκ ἐνδέχεται αἰσθάνεσθαι ὄντος, ἐν δὲ
~ [ \ 3 / > / > , , »
τῷ ἐπὶ ταδὶ ἀνάγκη αἰσθάνεσθαι. εἰ δή τί ἐστιν
- \ -
ἀδιαίρετον αἰσθητόν, ὅταν τεθῇ ἐπὶ τῷ ἐσχάτῳ
\ fat
80 ὅθεν ἐστὶν ὕστατον μὲν οὐκ αἰσθητὸν πρῶτον δ᾽
αἰσθητόν, ἅμα συμβήσεται δρατὸν εἶναι καὶ ἀόρατον"
lal > 3
τοῦτο δ᾽ ἀδύνατον.
\ \ > ~ > f Α “" > ~
49} Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν αἰσθητηρίων καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν
td 4 ‘ al
τίνα τρόπον ἔχει Kal κοινῇ καὶ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον
αἰσθητήριον εἴρηται" τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν πρῶτον
¥ , ~
σκεπτέον περὶ μνήμης Kal τοῦ μνημονεύειν.

4 The modern definition of a point, which “ has no magni-
tude,” really solves Aristotle’s difficulty; for no sensible

276

ΟΝ SENSK AND SENSIBLE OBJECTS, vu.

Uhat it would abvays perceive with onc and the same
part, but theoretic ally not the same.

It is of course clear that every sensible object is a νυ
magnitude, and that no sensible object is indivisible. ee 7
The distance at which an object cannot be scen is inaguituds,
infinite, but the interval over which it can be seen is
limited. This is also true of the object of smell and
hearing, and all the other objects which we perceive
without contact. But there is an extreme point of
the interval at which it is not seen, and a first point
at which it is seen. This point must necessarily be
indivisible, the point beyond which it is impossible to
see anything, and within which one must be able to
see it, If, then, any sensible object is indivisible,
when it is placed at the limiting pvint, that is the
last. point”? at which it cannot be seen and the first
at which it can be seen, it will be both visible and
invisible at the same time ; which is impossible.

Concerning the sense organs and objects of sense,
their character in general and in relation to each
sense organ, we have concluded our discussion. Of
the remaining subjects we must first consider memory
and remembering.

object, which by implication has magnitude, can be ** placed
at a point.”

277

ON MEMORY AND
RECOLLECTION

INTRODUCTION

Trius short treatise is perhaps of higher value than
the preceding. In places its obseurity has been
made worse by errors in the manuscripts, and some
passages are not satisfactorily elucidated. But it
contains some noteworthy ideas. The distinction
drawn between memory and recollection is on the
whole valid, and from it follows directly the assertion
that, whereas memory is shared by all the animal
kingdom, recollection is the exclusive prerogative of
man. In the second chapter Aristotle outlines what
we call the Association of Ideas, and, although it is
in his description of the process by which recollection
recovers the past that the greatest obscurity prevails,
it is clear that his general theory of that process is
very near to modern views on the subject.

281

ΠΕΡῚ ΜΝΗΜΗΣ ΚΑΙ
ΑΝΑΜΝΗΣΕΩΣ

4490 : ;
I. Περὶ μνήμης καὶ τοῦ μνημονεύειν λεκτέον

5 τί ἐστι, καὶ διὰ τίν᾽ αἰτίαν γίγνεται, καὶ τίνι τῶν
τῆς ψυχῆς μορίων συμβαίνει τοῦτο τὸ πάθος καὶ
τὸ ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι" οὐ γὰρ οἱ αὐτοί εἰσι μνημο-
νικοὶ καὶ ἀναμνηστικοί, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ
μνημονικώτεροι μὲν οἱ βραδεῖς, ἀναμνηστικώτεροι
δὲ οἱ ταχεῖς καὶ εὐμαθεῖς.

Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ληπτέον ποῖά ἐστι τὰ μνημο-

19 veurd πολλάκις γὰρ ἐξαπατᾷ τοῦτο. οὔτε γὰρ
τὸ μέλλον ἐνδέχεται μνημονεύειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἔστι δοξα-
στὸν καὶ ἐλπιστόν (εἴη δ᾽ ἂν καὶ ἐπιστήμη τις
ἐλπιστική, καθάπερ τινές φασι τὴν μαντικήν),
οὔτε τοῦ παρόντος, ἀλλ᾽ αἴσθησις: ταύτῃ γὰρ οὔτε
τὸ μέλλον οὔτε τὸ γενόμενον γνωρίζομεν, ἀλλὰ τὸ

15 παρὸν μόνον. ἡ δὲ μνήμη τοῦ γενομένου: τὸ δὲ
παρὸν ὅτε πάρεστιν, οἷον τοδὶ τὸ λευκὸν ὅτε ὁρᾷ,
οὐδεὶς ἂν dain μνημονεύειν, οὐδὲ τὸ θεωρούμενον,
ὅτε θεωρῶν τυγχάνει καὶ ἐννοῶν: ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν
αἰσθάνεσθαί φησι, τὸ δ᾽ ἐπίστασθαι μόνον" ὅταν
282

ON MEMORY AND
RECOLLECTION

I. Our task is now to discuss memory and remem-
bering: what it is, why it occurs and to what part
of the soul this affection and that of recollection
belongs. Men who have good memories are not the
same as those who are good at recollecting, in fact,
generally speaking the slow-witted have better
memories, but the quick-witted and Lhose who learn
easily are better at recollecting.

Now our first subject for consideration is the nature
of things remembered ; for this is a frequent source
of error. It is impossible to remember the future ;
that is expecting or hoping. (There might perhaps
be a science of expectation as some say there is of
prophecy.) Nor has it to do with the present: this
is perception ; for we do not have knowledge either
of the future or the past by perception, but only of
the present. Memory then is of the past; no one
could claim to remember the present while it is
present. For instance one cannot remember a
particular white object while one is looking at it, nor
can one remember a subject of theoretical specula-
tion while one happens to be speculating and think-
ing aboutit. The former one claims to perceive und
the latter merely to know. But when one has know-

283

What van
be remem:
hered ?

ARISTOTLE

449 b
δ᾽ ἄνευ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν ἔχῃ τὴν ἐπιστήμην καὶ

0 τὴν αἴσθησιν, οὕτω μέμνηται τὰς τοῦ τριγώνου
Ὁ a > “a uv 4 4 a yw oy 3 τὰ
ὅτι δύο ὀρθαῖς ἴσαι, τὸ μὲν ὅτι ἔμαθεν ἢ ἐθεώρησεν,
\ A iva 7 a wn Ὁ ~ > 4
τὸ δὲ ὅτι ἤκουσεν ἢ εἶδεν ἢ ὅ τι τοιοῦτον" ἀεὶ
γὰρ ὅταν ἐνεργῇ κατὰ τὸ μνημονεύειν, οὕτως ἐν
τῇ ψυχῇ λέγει, ὅτι πρότερον τοῦτο ἤκουσεν ἢ
ἤὔσθετο ἢ ἐνόησεν.
uv 4 > € va a y va
Ἔστι μὲν οὖν ἡ μνήμη οὔτε αἴσθησις οὔτε
5 4
2 ὑπόληψις, ἀλλὰ τούτων τινὸς ἕξις ἢ πάθος, ὅταν
γένηται χρόνος. τοῦ δὲ νῦν ἐν τῷ νῦν οὐκ ἔστι
μνήμη, καθάπερ εἴρηται καὶ πρότερον, ἀλλὰ τοῦ
4 , ~
μὲν παρόντος αἴσθησις, τοῦ δὲ μέλλοντος ἐλπίς,
~ \ a
τοῦ δὲ γενομένον μνήμη. διὸ μετὰ χρόνον πᾶσα
μνήμη. ὥσθ᾽ ὅσα χρόνου αἰσθάνεται, ταῦτα μόνα
~ 4 ͵ , ft a 3 ΓᾺ
30 τῶν ζῴων μνημονεύει, καὶ τούτῳ ᾧ αἰσθάνεται.
3 \ ͵ ᾿ ,
Ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ φαντασίας εἴρηται πρότερον ἐν
a . ~ 7 “a
τοῖς περὶ ψυχῆς, Kat νοεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνεν dav-
4 4 A 1 3 4 Ζ x a
450 a τάσματος συμβαίνει γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ πάθος ἐν τῷ
~ ῳ \ ~ 7 3. a ᾿- ?
νοεῖν ὅπερ καὶ ἐν τῷ διαγράφειν' ἐκεῖ τε γὰρ οὐθὲν
προσχρώμενοι τῷ τὸ ποσὸν ὡρισμένον εἶναι τὸ
i - ,
τριγώνου, ὅμως γράφομεν ὡρισμένον κατὰ τὸ
ποσόν" καὶ ὁ νοῶν ὡσαύτως, κἂν μὴ ποσὸν νοῇ,
τίθεται πρὸ ὀμμάτων ποσόν, νοεῖ δ᾽ ody ἦ ποσόν,
xn 2 a ~ >
sav δ᾽ ἡ φύσις ἢ τῶν ποσῶν, ἀόριστον δέ, τίθεται
A ε , ~
μὲν ποσὸν ὡρισμένον, νοεῖ δ᾽ ἧ ποσὸν μόνον. διὰ
é a.
τίνα μὲν οὖν αἰτίαν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται νοεῖν οὐδὲν ἄνευ
ln a γ8᾽9 ,Ρ ζ΄. A \ > /
τοῦ συνεχοῦς, οὐδ᾽ ἄνευ χρόνον τὰ μὴ ἐν χρόνῳ

9 De sin, iii, 7, ete.
284

ON MEMORY AND RECOLLECTION, 1.

ledge or sensation without the exercise of these
activities, then one remembers: for instance one
knows that the angles of a triangle are together equal
to two right angles, a fact which one has learned or
thought out, or one feels something which ouc has
heard or seen or something of the kind ; for when a
man is exerting his memory he always says in his
mind that he has heard, or fell, or thought this before.

Memory, then, is neither sensation nor supposition, What 1s

but is a condition or attribute of one of these, when ΠΡΟ.
time has elapsed. There can be no memory of some-
thing now present at the present time, as has been
said, but sensation refers to what is present, expecta-
tion to what is future, and memory to what is past.
All memory, then, implies lapse of time. So that only
those living creatures which are conscious of time can
be said to remember, and they do so with that part
which is conscious of time.

As has been said before in my treatise On the The μεν
Soul* about imagination, it is impossible even to iene
think without a mental picture. The same process tion,
occurs in thinking as in drawing a diagram ; for in
this case although we make no use of the fact that
the magnitude of a triangle is a finite quantity, yet we
draw it as having a finite magnitude. In the same
way the man who is thinking, though he may not. be
thinking of a finite magnitude, still puts a finite
magnitude before his eyes, though he does not think
of it as such. And even if its nature is that of a
magnitude, but an unlimited one, he still puts before
him a finite magnitude, but thinks of it as a magni-
tude without limit. The reason why it is impossible
to think of anything without continuity, or to think
of things which have no time except in terms of time,

285

ARISTOTLE

450 8 * _
ὄντα, ἄλλος λόγος. μέγεθος δ᾽ ἀναγκαῖον γνωρί-

. Ef ΓΝ ᾿ é \ 7
τὸ lew καὶ κίνησιν» ᾧ καὶ χρόνον, καὶ τὸ φάντασμα
~ - > hg tA
τῆς κοινῆς αἰσθήσεως πάθος ἐστίν. ὥστε φανερὸν
- > ~ ¢ ~ /
ὅτι τῷ πρώτῳ αἰσθητικῷ τούτων ἡ γνῶσίς ἐστιν,
ἡ δὲ μνήμη καὶ ἡ τῶν νοητῶν οὐκ ἄνευ φαν-
“- i
τάσματός ἐστιν. ὥστε τοῦ νοουμένου κατὰ συμ-
ι ay ᾿ > ει ᾿ “ , >
βεβηκὸς ἂν εἴη, καθ᾽ αὑτὸ δὲ τοῦ πρώτου αἰσθη-

ft ‘ , £7 " ς- a ?
10 TLEOV. διὸ καὶ ετεροὺς TLOLY υπάρχευ τῶν ζῴων,

ay 2 / ϑ Ἕ " -“ μὰ ta AM
καὶ οὐ μόνον ἀνθρώποις καὶ τοῖς ἔχουσι δόξαν ἢ
φρόνησιν. εἰ δὲ τῶν νοητικῶν τι μορίων ἦν, οὐκ
av ¢ “- - ~ wt 4 Ww a
ἂν ὑπῆρχε πολλοῖς τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων, ἴσως ὃ

" \ a ~ LD y DN ~ = \ εἶ i
οὐδενὶ τῶν θνητῶν, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ νῦν πᾶσι διὰ τὸ μὴ
πάντα χρόνου αἴσθησιν ἔχειν" ἀεὶ γὰρ ὅταν ἐνεργῇ

~ oe

0 τῇ μνήμῃ, καθάπερ καὶ πρότερον εἴπομεν, ὅτι εἶδε
4 ,
τοῦτο ἢ ἤκουσεν ἢ ἔμαθε, προσαισθάνεται ὅτι
πρότερον: τὸ δὲ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον ἐν χρόνῳ
ἐστίν.

Tivos μὲν οὖν τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐστὶν ἡ μνήμη,
φανερόν, ὅτι οὗπερ καὶ ἡ φανταοία' καὶ ἔστι
μνημονευτὰ Kal? αὑτὰ μὲν ὅσα ἐστὶ φανταστά,

Ἄ 4 a a a » ,
a κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ ὅσα μὴ ἄνευ φαντασίας.
ἀπορήσειε δ᾽ ἄν τις πῶς ποτὲ τοῦ μὲν πάθους
παρόντος τοῦ δὲ πράγματος ἀπόντος μνημονεύεται
τὸ μὴ παρόν. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι δεῖ νοῆσαι τοιοῦτον
τὸ γινόμενον διὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ
τῷ μορίῳ τοῦ σώματος τῷ ἔχοντι αὐτήν, οἷον

80 ζωγράφημά τι τὸ πάθος, οὗ φαμὲν τὴν ἕξιν μνήμην

286

ON MEMORY AND RECOLLECTION, τ.

is another question. But it is essential to think of
size and motion in terms of time, and the mental
picture is an affection of the gencral sense. So that
it is clear that the knowledge of these things belongs
to the first perceptive faculty. But memory and the
knowledge of things thought cannot exist without a
mental picture. So that they would seem to belong
incidentally to the thinking faculty, but in themselves
to the first sense perception. This is why memory
exists in some animals, and not exclusively in man
and those who are capable of opinion and thought.
But if memory belonged purely to the intellectual
fuculty, it would not exist, as it does, in many other
animals; perhaps it would not exist even in any human
being, since even as it is it does not occur in all
because they have not all a consciousness of time ;
for, as we said before, whenever a man exercises his
memory, to recall that he has seen, heard or learned
something, he always has the additional consciousness
that he has heard it before; now ‘‘ before’ and
“after ” relate to time,

It is, then, obvious that memory refers to that part Memory and
of the soul to which imagination refers ; all things ane
which are mental pictures are in themselves subjects
of memory, and those which cannot exist apart from
imagination are only incidentally subjects of memory.
A. difficulty may arise as to how one can remember
something which 18 not present; that is, the affection
ofthe mind being present, but its object absent. For
it is obvious that one must consider such a thing which
occurs in the soul by means of the sense perception,
and in that part of the body which contains the soul,
88 a kind of painted portrait—an affection, the lasting
state of which we describe as memory ; for the move-

287

ARISTOTLE

ἰδὲ εἶναι" ἡ γὰρ γινομένη κίνησις ἐνσημαίνεται οἷον
τύπον τινὰ τοῦ αἰσθήματος, καθάπερ οἱ σφραγιζό-
480" μενοι τοῖς δακτυλίοις. διὸ καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἐν κινήσει
πολλῇ διὰ πάθος ἢ δι᾿ ἡλικίαν οὖσιν οὐ γίνεται
μνήμη, καθάπερ ἂν εἰς ὕδωρ ῥέον ἐμπιπτούσης
τῆς κινήσεως καὶ τῆς σφραγῖδος: τοῖς δὲ διὰ τὸ
ψήχεσθαι, καθάπερ τὰ παλαιὰ τῶν οἰκοδομημάτων,
5 καὶ διὰ σκληρότητα τοῦ δεχομένου τὸ πάθος οὐκ
ἐγγίνεται ὁ τύπος. διόπερ οἵ τε σφόδρα νέοι καὶ
οἵ γέροντες ἀμνήμονές εἰσιν" ῥέουσι γὰρ οἱ μὲν
διὰ τὴν αὔξησιν, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὴν φθίσιν. ὁμοίως
δὲ καὶ οἱ λίαν ταχεῖς καὶ οἱ λίαν βραδεῖς οὐδέτεροι
φαίνονται μνήμονες" οἱ μὲν γάρ εἰσιν ὑγρότεροι τοῦ
10 δέοντος, οἱ δὲ σκληρότεροι" τοῖς μὲν οὖν οὐ μένει
τὸ φάντασμα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, τῶν δ᾽ οὐχ ἅπτεται.
᾿Αλλ εἰ δὴ τοιοῦτόν ἐστι τὸ συμβαῖνον περὶ
τὴν μνήμην, πότερον τοῦτο μνημονεύει τὸ πάθος,
ἣ ἐκεῖνο ἀφ᾽ οὗ ἐγένετο; εἰ μὲν γὰρ τοῦτο, τῶν
ἀπόντων οὐδὲν ἂν μνημονεύοιμεν'" εἰ δ᾽ ἐκεῖνο,
15 πῶς αἰσθανόμενοι τούτου μνημονεύομεν, οὗ μὴ
αἰσθανόμεθα, τὸ ἀπόν; εἴ τ᾽ ἐστὶν ὅμοιον ὥσπερ
τύπος ἢ γραφὴ ἐν ἡμῖν, τούτου αὐτοῦ ἡ αἴσθησις
διὰ τί ἂν εἴη μνήμη ἑτέρου, ἀλλ’ οὐκ αὐτοῦ
τούτου; 6 γὰρ ἐνεργῶν τῇ μνήμῃ θεωρεῖ τὸ πάθος
τοῦτο καὶ αἰσθάνεται τούτου. πῶς οὖν τὸ μὴ παρὸν
μνημονεύει; εἴη γὰρ ἂν καὶ ὁρᾶν τὸ μὴ παρὸν
80 καὶ ἀκούειν. ἢ ἔστιν ὡς ἐνδέχεται καὶ συμβαίνει
τοῦτο; οἷον γὰρ τὸ ἐν τῷ πίνακι γεγραμμένον
ζῷόν ἐστι καὶ εἰκών, καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἕν
τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν ἄμφω, τὸ μέντοι εἶναι οὐ ταὐτὸν ἀμ-

288

ON MEMORY AND RECOLLECTION, 1.

ment produced implies some impression of sense
movement, just as when men seal with siynel rings.
For this reason some men in the presenee of consider-
able stimulus have no memory owing to discase or
age, just as if a stimulus or a seal were impressed on
flowing water. With them the design makes no
impression because they are worn down, like old walls
in buildings, or because of the hardness of that which
is to receive the impression. Tor this reason the very
young and the old have poor memories ; they are ina
state of flux, the young because of their growth, the
old because of their decay. For a similar reason
neither the very quick nor the very slow appear to
have good memories ; the former are moister than
they should be, and the latter harder; with the
former the picture has no permanence, with the latter
it makes no impression,

If this is a true picture of what occurs with memory,
is what one remembers the present effect, or the
original from which it arose? If the former, then we
could not remember anything in its absence ; if the
latter, how can we remember by perceiving that which
we do not perceive—the absent ? If the effect on us
is the same as with an impression or a painting, why
is the perception of this memory of something else
and not of itself? For the man while exercising his
memory considers and perceives this affection. How,
then, does he remember that which is not present ?
For this would imply that it is possible to sce and hear
what is not present. Surely this is both possible and
does actually occur. For just as the portrait painted
on the panel is both a picture and a portrait, and both
these are one and the same thing, yet the aciual
existence of the two is not the same thing, and it is

u 289

What dood
one aetually
remember?

450 b

461 a

ARISTOTLE

- ἄς nf < ~ κ᾿ ε γ᾽ ‘
φοῖν, καὶ ἔστι θεωρεῖν καὶ ws ζῷον καὶ ὡς εἰκόνα,
Γ | εἰ > ε a, 4, lal ¢ - \
οὕτω καὶ τὸ ev ἡμῖν φάντασμα δεῖ ὑπολαβεῖν καὶ

3 4 θ᾽ ¢ A ἢ θ tA " ἴλλ /
αὐτό τι καθ᾽ αὑτὸ εἶναι θεώρημα καὶ ἄλλου ddv-
e οἷς 3 > εν , aN , ;
τασμα. ἣ μὲν οὖν καθ᾽ αὑτό, θεώρημα ἢ φαάντασμά

? > Ψ > 4 \ /
ἐστιν, ἦ δ᾽ ἄλλου, οἷον εἰκὼν καὶ μνημόνευμα.
ὥστε καὶ ὅταν ἐνεργῇ ἡ κίνησις αὐτοῦ, ἂν μέν, ἣ
32 ¢€ / 3 v4 Ν ς \ 3 fot
καθ᾽ αὑτό ἐστι, ταύτῃ αἴσθηται ἡ ψυχὴ αὐτοῦ,
ry } , ” 3 , ? a Ἂν
οἷον νόημά τι ἢ φάντασμα φαίνεται ἐπελθεῖν" ἂν
δ᾽ ἦ ἄλλου, ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ ὡς εἰκόνα θεωρεῖ,
καὶ μὴ ἑωρακὼς τὸν Κορίσκον ὡς ἸΚορίσκου'
> ~ 4 »” \ a ~ / 4 \
ἐνταῦθά τε ἄλλο τὸ πάθος τῆς θεωρίας ταύτης Kal
ὅταν ὡς ζῷον γεγραμμένον θεωρῇ, ἔν τε τῇ ψυχῇ
τὸ μὲν γίνεται ὥσπερ νόημα μόνον, τὸ δ᾽ ὡς ἐκεῖ
ὅτι εἰκών, μνημόνευμα. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐνίοτ᾽ οὐκ
ἴσμεν, ἐγγινομένων ἡμῖν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τοιούτων
κινήσεων ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰσθέσθαι πρότερον, εἰ κατὰ
ἣ 3 ~ , ᾿ > vy δ, at n
τὸ ἠσθῆσθαι συμβαίνει, καὶ εἰ ἔστι μνήμη ἢ od
διστάζομεν: ὁτὲ δὲ συμβαίνει ἐννοῆσαι καὶ ἀνα-
μνησθῆναι ὅτι ἠκούσαμέν τι πρότερον ἢ εἴδομεν.
τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει, ὅταν θεωρῶν ὡς αὐτὸ μετα-
βάλλῃ καὶ θεωρῇ ὡς ἄλλου. γίνεται δὲ καὶ
τοὐναντίον, οἷον συνέβη ᾿Αντιφέροντι τῷ ᾿Ωρείτῃ
4 yw x Fe A 6S Ζ

καὶ ἄλλοις ἐξισταμένοις. τὰ γὰρ φαντάσματα
ἔλεγον ὡς γενόμενα καὶ ὡς μνημονεύοντες. τοῦτο
δὲ γίνεται, ὅταν τις τὴν μὴ εἰκόνα ὡς εἰκόνα
θεωρῇ. αἱ δὲ μελέται τὴν μνήμην σώζουσι τῷ

290

ON MEMORY AND RECOLLECTION, τ.

possible to think of it both as a living original and as
a portrait, so in the same way we must regard the
mental picture within us both as a thing for considera-
tion in itself and as a mental picture of something
else. In so far as we consider it in itself, it is a sub-
ject: of consideration or a mental picture, but in so far
as we consider it as a portrait of something else, we
are thinking of it as an image and an object of
memory. So that when the stimulus is operative, if
it is considered in itself, the soul perceives it in this
way, and it appears as a subject of thonght, or a
mental picture ; but if it is considered as a portrait
of another, just as one regards a figure in a picture as
a portrait, and though one does not see Coriscus, one
looks at it as a portrait of Coriscus. In the latter
case the feeling aroused by looking at it in this way
is not the same as when one considers it as a painted
picture ; the former exists in the soul merely as an
object. of thought, but the latter, inasmuch as it is
there a picture, is a subject of memory. And for this
reason sometimes we do not know, when such stimuli
in our soul originally arise from sense perception,
whether it occurs because we have perceived, and
we are in doubt whether it is memory or not. But
sometimes it happens that we reflect and remember
that we have heard or seen this something before.
Now this occurs whenever we first think of it as itself,
and then change and think of it as referring to some-
thing else. The opposite also occurs, as happened to
Antipheron of Oreus, and other lunatics; for they
spoke of their mental pictures as if they had actually
taken place, and as if they actually remembered
them, Now this happens when one regards as a
portrait what is not a portrait ; but practice preserves

291

ARISTOTLE

461 a 2 a a 3 2 \ γῷ κι .« al
ETTAVALLULVYTKELV* τοῦτο ὃ εστιν οὐδέν ετέρον ἢ

\ ~ 4 ae > 7 \ ‘ © 2
τὸ θεωρεῖν πολλάκις ὡς εἰκόνα καὶ μὴ ὡς καθ
αὑτό.

, \ x 2 N , \ \ ,
is Τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὲ μνήμη καὶ τὸ μνημονεύειν,
εἴρηται, ὅτι φαντάσματος, ὡς εἰκόνος οὗ φάντασμα,
ἕξις, καὶ τίνος μορίου τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν, ὅτι τοῦ πρώτου
αἰσθητικοῦ, καὶ ᾧ χρόνου αἰσθανόμεθα.

II, Περὶ δὲ τοῦ ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι λοιπὸν εἰπεῖν.
πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ὅσα ἐν τοῖς ἐπιχειρηματικοῖς

/ ? εἶ 5» tnd tal ts 6 ¢ ΄

"0 λόγοις ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ, δεῖ τίθεσθαι ὡς ὑπάρχοντα.
οὔτε γὰρ μνήμης ἐστὶν ἀνάληψις ἡ ἀνάμνησις οὔτε
λῆψις" ὅταν γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον ἢ μάθῃ ἢ πάθῃ, οὔτ᾽
ἀναλαμβάνει μνήμην οὐδεμίαν (οὐδεμία γὰρ προ-

΄, 5» 3 a Xr la . £ δὲ > /
γέγονεν) οὔτ᾽ ἐξ ἀρχῆς λαμβάνει" ὅταν δὲ ἐγγένηται
ἡ ἕξις καὶ τὸ πάθος, τότε ἡ μνήμη ἐστίν. ὥστε
“- >

2% μετὰ τοῦ πάθους ἐγγινομένου οὐκ ἐγγίνεται. ἔτι
δ᾽ ὅτε τὸ πρῶτον ἐγγέγονε τῷ ἀτόμῳ καὶ ἐσχάτῳ,
τὸ μὲν πάθος ἐνυπάρχει ἤδη τῷ παθόντι καὶ ἡ
> > a - > i \ Lua RA’ εἰ
ἐπιστήμη, εἰ δεῖ καλεῖ ἐπιστήμην τὴν ἕξιν ἢ τὸ

2 \ + ra ‘ \ \
πάθος (οὐθὲν δὲ κωλύει κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς καὶ
μνημονεύειν ἔνια ὧν ἐπιστάμεθα)" τὸ δὲ μνημονεύειν

ao καθ᾽ αὑτὸ οὐχ ὑπάρχει πρὶν χρονισθῆναι" μνημο-
νεύει γὰρ νῦν ὃ εἶδεν ἢ ἔπαθε πρότερον, οὐχ ὃ νῦν

4615 ἔπαθε, νῦν μνημονεύει. ἔτι δὲ φανερὸν ὅτι μνη-
μονεύειν ἐστὶ μὴ νῦν ἀναμνησθέντα, ἀλλ᾽’ ἐξ ἀρχῆς

9 This does not appear to refer to any extant treatise.
® A, here rejects Plato’s identification of “ learning ” with
“ yecollection.”

292

ON MEMORY AND RECOLLECTION, 1.—11.

the memory by the process of recollection. This is
nothing but the repeated contemplation of an object
as an image, and not as existent in itself.

We have then explained what memory and remem-
bering is, that it is a condition of mental picture, as of
a portrait of which it is the mental picture, and to
what part of us it belongs, that it belongs to primary
sensation, and to that part with which we are con-
scious of time.

11. It remains to speak about recollecting. But
first of all what has been said in our dialectical
treatise * is true, and must be regarded as proved.
For recollection is neither the recovery nor the acquisi-
tion of memory ; for when one first learns or receives
a sense impression, one does not recover any memory ἢ
(for none has gone before), nor docs one acquire
memory from this first impression; but when the
condition (2.e. the learning) or the affection (ie, the
sense impression) has already been received, then
there is memory ; so that memory does not arise at
the same time as the reception of the affection.
Moreover, at the time when memory exists for the
first time in the indivisible and ultimate sense organ,
the affection already exists in the affected, and so
does the knowledge, if one can call the state or the
affection knowledge (for there is nothing to prevent
our remembering incidentally some of the things we
know) ; but memory in itself does not arise until time
has elapsed ; for one remembers in the present what
one saw or suffered in the past; one does not
remember in the present what one experiences in the
present. Moreover it is evident that it is possible
to remember things which are not recalled at the
moment, but which one has perccived or suffered all

293

Recollection
and
Memory.

451"

ARISTOTLE

αἰσθόμενον ἢ παθόντα. ἀλλ᾽ ὅταν ἀναλαμβάνῃ ἣν
πρότερον εἶχεν ἐπιστήμην ἢ αἴσθησιν ἢ οὗ ποτὲ τὴν
ἕξιν ἐλέγομεν μνήμην, τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶ καὶ τότε τὸ
ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι τῶν εἰρημένων τι. τὸ δὲ μνη-
Ψ' ft Α 4 ὃ > a ? "ἢ A
μονεύειν συμβαίνει, καὶ μνήμη ἀκολουθεῖ. οὐδὲ δὴ
ταῦτα ἁπλῶς, ἐὰν ἔμπροσθεν ὑπάρξαντα πάλιν
> , > > oy t wv > Ξε va ‘ x
ἐγγένηται, ἀλλ᾽ ἔστιν ὡς, ἔστι δ᾽ ὡς οὔ, δὶς γὰρ
μαθεῖν καὶ εὑρεῖν ἐνδέχεται τὸν αὐτὸν τὸ αὐτό,
δεῖ οὖν διαφέρειν τὸ ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι τούτων, καὶ
ἐνούσης πλείονος ἀρχῆς ἢ ἐξ ἧς μανθάνουσιν
ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι.
} > ε 3 ὕ 4 4 7:
Συμβαίνουσι δ᾽ αἱ ἀναμνήσεις, ἐπειδὴ πέφυκεν
¢ ) 55 4 θ \ / ὃ ¥ y ‘ 3
ἡ Know ἦδε γενέσθαι μετὰ τήνδε: εἰ μὲν ἐξ
ἀνάγκης, δῆλον ὡς ὅταν ἐκείνη κινηθῇ, τήνδε κινη-
\ 4 2 >
θήσεται: εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀλλ᾽ ἔθει, ὡς ἐπὶ
‘ \ 4 ἃ > 24 @
τὸ πολὺ κινηθήσεται. συμβαίνει δ᾽ ἐνίους ἅπαξ
ἐθισθῆναν μᾶλλον ἢ ἄλλους πολλάκις κινουμένους"
\ μὲ a > re a , Ἂ
διὸ ἔνια ἅπαξ ἰδόντες μᾶλλον μνημονεύομεν ἢ
ἕτερα πολλάκις. ὅταν οὖν ἀναμιμνησκώμεθα,
κινούμεθα τῶν προτέρων τινὰ κινήσεων, ἕως ἂν
“ 3 a > f ” A " \
κινηθῶμεν μεθ᾽ ἣν ἐκείνη εἴωθεν. διὸ καὶ τὸ
> “ [4 a > \ ~ ~ a ΕΣ
ἐφεξῆς θηρεύομεν νοήσαντες ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν ἢ ἄλλου
τινός, καὶ ἀφ᾽ ὁμοίου ἢ ἐναντίου ἢ τοῦ σύνεγγυς.
διὰ τοῦτο γίνεται ἡ ἀνάμνησις" αἱ γὰρ κινήσεις
τούτων τῶν μὲν αἱ αὐταί, τῶν δ᾽ ἅμα, τῶν δὲ

σ 7,6. although memory does not imply recollection,
294

ON MEMORY AND RECOLLECTION, πὶ,

along. But when one recovers knowledge or sensa-
tion which one had before, or recovers that the con-
dition of which we have previously called memory, at
that moment this may be called recollection, and is
followed by the things we have mentioned. Yet 4
the process of recollection implies memory, and is
followed by memory. Nor is it true merely to say
that things previously existing arise again, but in one
sense this is true, in another not. For it is possible
for the same man to learn and discover the same thing
twice; now recollection must differ from this, and
to remember must imply some impulse beyond that
from which they learn in the first instance.

Acts of recollection occur when one impulse natur- The process
ally succeeds another : now if this order occurs of Sens:
necessity, it is plain that when one impulse is pro-
duced the next will be produced also ; but if the
order is not inevitable, but only usual, the second
movement will normally follow, But it happens that
with some persons the habit is more effectively formed
from one impulse than with others, from receiving the
impulse many times ; and so we have a better recol-
lection of some things, that we have seen once, than of
others, that we have seen many times. When, then,
we recollect, we are moved by one of our former
impulses, until at last we are moved by that after
which this impulse usually occurs. This is why,
starting in thought from a present incident, we follow
the trail in order, beginning from something similar,
or contrary, or closely connected. In this way recol-
lection arises; for the impulses of these starting-points
are sometimes identical with what we seek, some-
times occurred simultaneously, and sometimes actually

205

ARISTOTLE

454 b uv a A ‘ 1 a > 54
μέρος ἔχουσιν, ὥστε τὸ λοιπὸν μικρὸν ὃ ἐκινήθη

μετ᾽ ἐκεῖνο.
Ζητοῦσι μὲν οὖν οὕτω, καὶ μὴ ζητοῦντες δ᾽
οὕτως ἀναμιμνήσκονται, ὅταν μεθ᾽ ἑτέραν κίνησιν
os ἐκείνη γένηται" ὡς δὲ τὰ πολλὰ ἑτέρων γενομένων
κινήσεων οἵων εἴπομεν, ἐγένετο ἐκείνη. οὐδὲν δὲ
δεῖ σκοπεῖν τὰ πόρρω, πῶς μεμνήμεθα, ἀλλὰ τὰ
σύνεγγυς" δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι ὃ αὐτός ἐστι τρόπος,
λέγω δὲ τὸ ἐφεξῆς, οὐ προζητήσας οὐδ᾽ ἀναμνη-
σθείς. τῷ γὰρ ἔθει ἀκολουθοῦσιν αἱ κινήσεις ἀλλή-
30 λαις, ἦδε μετὰ τήνδε. καὶ ὅταν τοίνυν ἀναμιμνή-
σκεσθαι βούληται, τοῦτο ποιήσει: ζητήσει λαβεῖν
ἀρχὴν κινήσεως, μεθ᾽ ἣν ἐκείνη ἔσται. διὸ τάχιστα
455 α καὶ κάλλιστα γίνονται ἀπ᾽ ἀρχῆς αἱ ἀναμνήσεις"
ὡς γὰρ ἔχουσι τὰ πράγματα πρὸς ἄλληλα τῷ
ἐφεξῆς, οὕτω καὶ αἱ κινήσεις. καὶ ἔστιν εὐμνη -
μόνευτα ὅσα τάξιν τινὰ ἔχει, ὥσπερ τὰ μαθήματα'
τὰ δὲ φαῦλα, χαλεπῶς. καὶ τούτῳ διαφέρει τὸ
ὁ ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι τοῦ πάλιν μανθάνειν, ὅτι δυνή-
σεταί πως δι’ αὑτοῦ κινηθῆναι ἐπὶ τὸ μετὰ τὴν
ἀρχήν. ὅταν δὲ μή, ἀλλὰ δι’ ἄλλου, οὐκέτι

μέμνηται.

Πολλάκις δ᾽ ἤδη μὲν ἀδυνατεῖ ἀναμνησθῆναι,
ζητεῖν δὲ δύναται καὶ εὑρίσκει. τοῦτο δὲ γίνεται
κινοῦντι πολλά, ἕως ἂν τοιαύτην κινήσῃ κίνησιν ἧ

1 φαύλως καὶ Β.

296

ON MEMORY ΑΝῸ RECOLLECTION, πὶ

form ἃ parl of what we seek, so {ΠῚ} the portion which
was stimulated after that is only a small one,

This is the way in which men seek to evoke recol- ‘thy method.
lection, and the we ay in which they recollect, even if
they do not try to, when one impulse oceurs after
another ἢ but generally speaking it is when other
impulses, such as we have mentioned, have been
aroused that the particular impulse arises. There is
no need to consider how we remember far off events,
but we may confine ourselves to near ones ; for it is
clear that the method is the same in both cases, I
mean by a chain of succession, without previous
search or recollection. Lor the impulses follow each
other by custom, one after another, When a man
wishes to recall anything, this will be his method ;
he will try to find a starting-point for the impulse,
after which the one he seeks will appear. ‘This is
why recollections which have a beginning to start
from are always achieved soonest and most success-
fully ; for just as the objects are related to each other
in an order of succession, so are the impulses, Those
subjects which possess an orderly arrangement are the
easiest to remember, like mathematical problems ;
others are inferior and are recovered with difficulty.
It is in this that the difference between recollecting
and learning afresh ties, that he will be able in some
way to move on by his own effort to what succeeds
the starting-point. But when this is impossible, and
it can only proceed through another agency, there is
no memory,

It often happens that a man cannot recall at the why it
moment, but can search for what he wants and find it. ™¥ [α
This oceurs when a man initiates many impulses,
until at last he initiates that which the object of his

207

ARISTOTLE
452 a
53 f 4 - A Ν ~ ὅν Α
10 ἀκολουθήσει τὸ πρᾶγμα. τὸ γὰρ μεμνῆσθαΐ ἐστι τὸ
ἐνεῖναι δυνάμει τὴν κινοῦσαν" τοῦτο δέ, ὥστ᾽ ἐξ
αὐτοῦ καὶ ὧν ἔχει κινήσεων κινηθῆναι, ὥσπερ
Ww tal \ 4 2 “a \ 3 εἶ /
εἴρηται. Set δὲ λαβέσθαι ἀρχῆς. διὸ ἀπὸ τόπων
δοκοῦσιν ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι ἐνίοτε. τὸ δ᾽ αἴτιον ὅτι
4 3 2 wa 3 > wv va e 3 \ ’ὔ
ταχὺ ἀπ᾽ ἄλλου ἐπ᾽ ἄλλο ἔρχονται, οἷον ἀπὸ γάλα-
3 ἂν / 3 \ “a 2 | See 9.3 4-3 \
κτος ἐπὶ λευκόν, ἀπὸ λευκοῦ δ᾽ ἐπ᾽ ἀέρα, Kal ἀπὸ
᾿ ? ? ¢ / 3 5 ea 3 é rd ,
15 τούτου ἐφ᾽ ὑγρόν, ad’ οὗ ἐμνήσθη μετοπώρου, ταύ-
τὴν ἐπιζητῶν τὴν ὥραν. ἔοικε δὴ καθόλου ἀρχὴ
καὶ τὸ μέσον πάντων' εἰ γὰρ μὴ πρότερον, ὅταν
3 \ ~ ” ͵ nw 2 25. Ψ' \ Μ
ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἔλθῃ, μνησθήσεται, ἢ οὐκέτ᾽ οὐδὲ ἄλλο-
θεν, οἷον εἴ τις νοήσειεν ἐφ’ ὧν ABPAEZHO-
3 \ 4, > 4 - / 2: ¥ ~ 12°: fa
Ὁ εἰ yap μὴ ἐπὶ τοῦ EK μέμνηται, ἐπὶ τοῦ Θ' ἐμνήσθη"
ἐντεῦθεν γὰρ ἐπ’ ἄμφω κινηθῆναι ἐνδέχεται, καὶ
2 v4 iar een ον 2 > Qh \ , 3
ἐπὶ τὸ Δ καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ 2.) εἰ δὲ μὴ τούτων τι ἐπιζη-
a >
ret, ἐπὶ τὸ Τ' ἐλθὼν μνησθήσεται, εἰ τὸ Ἡ ἢ τὸ Z
* n > \ ᾽ >? \ \ ‘\ ἢ A “
ἐπιζητεῖ. εἰ δὲ μή, ἐπὶ τὸ A+ καὶ οὕτως ἀεί. τοῦ
δ᾽ ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐνίοτε μὲν μνησθῆναι ἐνίοτε δὲ
25 μή, αἴτιον ὅτι ἐπὶ πλείω ἐνδέχεται κινηθῆναι ἀπὸ
τῆς αὐτῆς ἀρχῆς, οἷον ἀπὸ τοῦ T ἐπὶ τὸ Zi) τὸ A.
? * > \ A a ~ : Ὁ \ θέ
Hay οὖν μὴ διὰ παλαιοῦ κινῆται, ἐπὶ τὸ συνηθέ-
στερον κινεῖται" ὥσπερ γὰρ φύσις ἤδη τὸ ἔθος.

1 KO Bekk. 28 Bekk,

* This difficult passage, as it stands in Bekker’s text,
seems untranslatable. The smallest change which will give
a meaning to it is to read H instead of EH, which has the
authority of one ms., and to read F instead of E, which has
no ms. authority, but is the suggestion of Mr. W. Ὁ, Ross.
These alterations have been adopted. To assist the illustra-
tion the Greek letters have been transliterated as the first
eight of the English alphahet,

Ὁ It may be possible to travel from A to H, when it is

298

ON MEMORY AND RECOLLECTION, τι.

search will follow. For remembering really depends
upon the potential existence of the stimulating cause ;
and there is this also that, as has been said, it arises
from the man himself, and the stimuli which he has,
But he must seize hold of the starting-point. Vor
this reason some use loci for the purpose of recollect-
ing. The reason for this is that men pass rapidly
from one step to the next ; for instance from milk to
white, from white to air, from air to damp: after
which one recollects autumn, supposing that one is
trying to recollect that season. Generally speaking
the middle point seems to be a good point to start
from ; for one will recollect when one comes to this
point, if not before, or else one will not recollect from
any other, For instance,? suppose one were thinking
of a series, which may be represented by the letters
ABCDEFGH ; if one does not recall what is wanted
at I, yet one does at H ; (the reason for the failure at
E is that) from that point it is possible to travel in
either direction, that is either towards D or towards I,
Supposing one is seeking for either G or I, one will
recollect on arriving at C, if one wants G or I. If
not then on arrival at Αι Success is always achieved
in this way. Sometimes it is possible to recall what
we seek and sometimes not; the reason being that
it is possible to travel from the same starting-point in
more than one direction ; for instance fram C we may
go direct to I’ or only to 1).

If one is not moving along an old path, one tends
to change one’s movement to a more usual one ; for
eustom is second nature. We remember quickly on

not possible to travel from C to H, because, as is said nbove,
the essential to success is the seizing on the right point from
which to start.

299

ARISTOTLE

462 8 ᾿ a 7 3 lol \ > 7
διὸ ἃ πολλάκις ἐννοοῦμεν, ταχὺ ἀναμιμνησκόμεθα'

τ΄ Ἂ Γὰ / A é ? é δὲ a
40 ὥσπερ yap φύσει τόδε μετὰ τόδε ἐστίν, οὕτω Kal
ἐνεργείᾳ: τὸ δὲ πολλάκις φύσιν ποιεῖ, ἐπεὶ δ᾽
A ’
468 ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς φύσει γίνεται, καὶ παρὰ φύσιν καὶ
ἀπὸ τύχης, ἔτι μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς δι’ ἔθος, οἷς ἡ φύσις
a , a
ye μὴ ὁμοίως ὑπάρχει' ὥστε κινηθῆναι ἐνίοτε κἀκεῖ
καὶ ἄλλως, ἄλλως τε καὶ ὅταν ἀφέλκῃ ἐκεῖθεν
> / δ ~ \ ve ‘¢ 4
δαὐτόσε πῃ. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ὅταν δέῃ ὄνομα μνη-
μονεῦσαι, παρόμοιον μέν, εἰς δ᾽ ἐκεῖνο σολοικίζομεν.
τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι τοῦτον συμβαίνει τὸν
τρόπον.
: A
Td δὲ μέγιστον, γνωρίζειν δεῖ τὸν χρόνον, ἢ
, ft
μέτρῳ ἢ ἀορίστως. ἔστω δέ τι ᾧ κρίνει τὸν πλείω
‘ 3λ / UA OM ov εἶ / a A
καὶ ἐλάττω" εὔλογον δ᾽ ὥσπερ τὰ μεγέθη" νοεῖ yap
7 ‘\ ~ »
1ὸ τὰ μεγάλα καὶ πόρρω οὐ τῷ ἀποτείνειν ἐκεῖ τὴν
͵ »
διάνοιαν, ὥσπερ τὴν ὄψιν φασί τινες (καὶ γὰρ μὴ
»ν “
ὄντων ὁμοίως νοήσει), ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀνάλογον κινήσει"
ἔστι γὰρ ἐν αὐτῇ τὰ ὅμοια σχήματα καὶ κινήσεις.
, -“ ~ tal
τίνι οὖν διοίσει, ὅταν τὰ μείζω νοῇ,᾿ ὅτι ἐκεῖνα νοεῖ,
a) δ ἐλ / ἃ / i A > \ a ὔ Ὁ
ἢ τὰ ἐλάττω; πάντα γὰρ τὰ ἐντὸς ἐλάττω, ὥσπερ
13 3 A \ X 3 , wv 2M “ μὴ
ἀνάλογον καὶ τὰ ἐκτός. ἔστι δ᾽ ἴσως ὥσπερ καὶ
τοῖς εἴδεσιν ἀνάλογον λαβεῖν ἄλλο ἐν αὐτῷ, οὕτω
\ -
καὶ τοῖς ἀποστήμασιν. ὥσπερ οὖν εἰ τὴν ABBE
κινεῖται, ποιεῖ τὴν ΓΔ' ἀνάλογον γὰρ ἡ ΑΤ' καὶ
ἀφ ἢ A tas
ἡ TA. τί οὖν μᾶλλον τὴν TA ἢ τὴν ZH ποιεῖ;

2 yop ἢ ὅτι BL 2 4 Δ Bekk.
300

ON MEMORY AND RECOLLECTION, 11.

the lines on which our thought travels frequently ;
for as in nature one thing follows another, so also in
the exercise of a function ; and the repeated action
makes if natural. But since just as in purely natural
phenomena some things oceur contrary to nature,
and owing to chance, so still more in matters of habit,
to which the term “ natural ” does not belong in the
same sense ; so that in that region also things some-
times fall out otherwise, especially when something
tends to divert the mind from one direction, and turn
it in towards itself. This is why when one needs to
remember a name, one rernembers one like it, but
fails to get the one we want. Recollection then
oceurs in this way.

But the most important factor in recollection is the Time i an
time, cither exactly or vaguely, Let it be granted ur'en*
that one possesses a faculty by which to distinguish
lesser and greater time ; it is natural to suppose that
we can distinguish these as we distinguish magnitudes.
For the mind does not think of Jarge things at a
distance by stretching out to them, as some think that
vision operates (for the mind will think of them equally
easily if they are not there), but one thinks of them
by a mental impulse; for there are similar figures
and movements in the mind. How then, when the
mind thinks of bigger things, will it differ in thinking
of them from when it thinks of smaller things ? For
all things inside are smaller, and in a sense propor-
tionate to those outside. Perhaps, then, just as we
suppose that there is something in man corresponding
to figures, we may assume that there is something
similarly corresponding in distances. If, then, the
mind thinks of the ratio AB : BE, it knows CD ; for
AC and CD are in the same ratio as AB: BE. But

501

ARISTOTLE
452 b an © if 4 4 we 4a ¢ \
8. ἢ ὡς ἡ AT πρὸς τὴν AB ἔχει, οὕτως ἡ τὸ O
πρὸς τὴν Tt ἔχει. ταύτας οὖν ἅμα κινεῖται. ἂν δὲ
τὴν ZH βούληται νοῆσαι, τὴν μὲν BE ὁμοίως
νοεῖ, ἀντὶ δὲ τῶν OI τὰς KA νοεῖ. αὗται γὰρ
ἔχουσιν ὡς ΖΑ πρὸς ΒΑ.
Ὅταν οὖν ἅμα ἣ τε τοῦ πράγματος γίνηται
κίνησις καὶ ἡ τοῦ χρόνου, τότε τῇ μνήμῃ ἐνεργεῖ.
25. ἂν δ᾽ οἴηται μὴ ποιῶν, οἴεται μνημονεύειν: οὐθὲν
γὰρ κωλύει διαψευσθῆναί τινα καὶ δοκεῖν μνη-
μονεύειν μὴ μνημονεύοντα. ἐνεργοῦντα δὲ τῇ
μνήμῃ μὴ οἴεσθαι ἀλλὰ λανθάνειν μεμνημένον οὐκ
ἔστιν" τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν αὐτὸ τὸ μεμνῆσθαι. ἀλλ᾽ ἐὰν
ἡ τοῦ πράγματος γένηται χωρὶς τῆς τοῦ χρόνου ἢ
αὕτη ἐκείνης, οὐ μέμνηται.
Ἥ δὲ ~ / ὃ 42 ἡ οἱ, A ‘ /
80 € τοῦ χρόνου διττή ἐστιν: ὁτὲ μὲν γὰρ μέτρῳ
4582 οὐ μέμνηται αὐτό, οἷον ὅτι τρίτην ἡμέραν ὁδήποτε
ἐποίησεν, ὁτὲ δὲ καὶ μέτρῳ" ἀλλὰ μέμνηται καὶ ἐὰν
μὴ μέτρῳ. εἰώθασι δὲ λέγειν ὅτι μέμνηνται μέν,
πότε μέντοι οὐκ ἴσασιν, ὅταν τοῦ πότε μὴ γνωρί-
ζωσι τὸ ποσὸν μέτρῳ.
1M Bekk.
A “Tf this figure represents
A.’s train of thought his argu-
ment is as follows. If aman
thinks of the ratio AB: BE,
B Ε he can pass directly to the ratio
AC : CD, for by the figure
given he knows the ratio
AC: AB, which we may call
H: I. But to proceed to
AF:I'G he would first have
C .D to determine the ratio K: L,
that is the ratio FA; BA,

ον tet che oye ὩΣ \,. which he does not know, be-
F G cause it is “ outside.”

ON MEMORY AND RECOLLECTION, n.

why then doves thinking AB; BE. produce CD rather
than FG? Surely because AC has the same ratio to
AB as H tol, And so the impulses to these move-
ments are simultaneous. IPfthen he wants to think
FG, he thinks BE in the same way, but instead of
HI, he thinks KI; for this has the same ratio as
FA to ΒΑ.

When the impulse of the fact and that of time occur
simultaneously, then one actually remembers. But
if a man imagines that these movements oceur when
they do not, then he imagines that he remembers ;
for there is nothing to prevent a man from being
deceived about it, and from supposing that he re-
members when he does not. But when a man actually
remembers he cannot suppose that he does not, and
remember without being aware of it ; for recollection
involves conscivusness of it. But if the movement
producing the object takes place apart from the time
or the movement produces the time without the
object, one fails to remember.

But the movement producing the time is a double Lega
one; at times one remembers a fact without an exact scourge ᾿
time, for instance that one did so and so the day {χοῦ (ον
before yesterday, but sometimes one knows it with
an exact time ; but it is still an act of memory, even
if it does not connect with an exact time. Men are
accustomed to say that they remember an occurrence,
but that they do not remember when it occurred,
when they cannot recognize exact limits to the
time.

303

ARISTOTLE
458 a “9 ῖ ios > e oN \ 43
τι μὲν οὖν οὐχ of αὐτοὶ μνημονικοὶ καὶ ἀνα-
μνηστικοί, ἐν τοῖς πρότερον εἴρηται. διαφέρει δὲ
τοῦ μνημονεύειν τὸ ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι οὐ μόνον. κατὰ
5 τὸν χρόνον, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι τοῦ μὲν μνημονεύειν καὶ τῶν
ἄλλων ζῴων μετέχει πολλά, τοῦ δ᾽ ἀναμιμνήσκε-
σθαι οὐδὲν ὡς εἰπεῖν τῶν γνωριζομένων ζῴων, πλὴν
ἄνθρωπος. αἴτιον δ᾽ ὅτι τὸ ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαί ἐστιν
οἷον συλλογισμός τις’ ὅτι γὰρ πρότερον εἶδεν ἢ
ἤκουσεν ἢ τι τοιοῦτον ἔπαθε, συλλογίζεται ὁ ἀνα-
τὸ μιμνησκόμενος, καὶ ἔστιν οἷον ζήτησίς τις. τοῦτο
δ᾽ οἷς καὶ τὸ βουλευτικὸν ὑπάρχει, φύσει μόνοις
συμβέβηκεν" καὶ γὰρ τὸ βουλεύεσθαι συλλογιομός
τίς ἐστιν.

Ὅτι δ᾽ ἐστὲ σωματικόν τι τὸ πάθος καὶ ἡ ἀνά-
μνησις ζήτησις ἐν τοιούτῳ φαντάσματος, σημεῖον τὸ
παρενοχλεῖν ἐνίους, ἐπειδὰν μὴ δύνωνται ἀναμνη-

τὸ σθῆναι, καὶ πάνυ ἐπέχοντες τὴν διάνοιαν, καὶ οὐκέτ᾽
ἐπιχειροῦντας ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι οὐδὲν ἧττον, καὶ
μάλιστα τοὺς μελαγχολικούς" τούτους γὰρ φαντά-
σματα κινεῖ μάλιστα. αἴτιον δὲ τοῦ μὴ ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῖς
εἶναι τὸ ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι, ὅτι καθάπερ τοῖς βάλ-
λουσιν οὐκέτι ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῖς τὸ στῆσαι, οὕτω καὶ
0 ὁ ἀναμιμνησκόμενος καὶ θηρεύων σωματικόν τι
κινεῖ, ἐν ᾧ τὸ πάθος. μάλιστα δ᾽ ἐνοχλοῦνται οἷς
ἂν ὑγρότης τύχῃ ὑπάρχουσα περὶ τὸν αἰσθητικὸν
τόπον' οὐ γὰρ ῥᾳδίως παύεται κινηθεῖσα, ἕως ἂν
ἐπέλθῃ τὸ ζητούμενον καὶ εὐθυπορήσῃ ἡ κίνησις.
διὸ καὶ ὀργαὶ καὶ φόβοι, ὅταν τι κινήσωσιν, ἀντι-
45 κινούντων πάλιν τούτων οὐ καθίστανται, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ
τὸ αὐτὸ ἀντικινοῦσιν, καὶ ἔοικε τὸ πάθος τοῖς

804

ON MEMORY AND RECOLLECTION, u.

We have laid it down before that those who have
good memories are not the same as those who recall
quickly. Recollecting differs from micmory not merely
in the matter of time, but also because muany other
living creatures share in memory, but none of the
known so-called animals can recollect. exeept man.
This is because recollecting implies a process of
reasoning ; for when a man is recollecting he ycasons
that he has seen or heard or expericnecd something
of the sort before, and the process is a kind of seareh.
This power can only belong by nature to such animals
as have a power of deliberation ; and deliberation is
a process of reasoning.

But the fact that the experience is in some sense
bodily, and that recollection is the search for a mental
picture in a body, is proved by the annoyance which
some men show when they cannot remember, and
because they are none the less perturbed in mind even
when they have abanduned the attempt to recollect,
and especially those of morbid temperament ; for
these are specially moved by mental pictures. But
the reason why the recvllecting does not lie in their
power is, just as when men have thrown a stone they
cannot stop it, so also the man who is employed in
recollecting and search sets up a bodily movement in
which the effect takes place. And most disturbed are
those who have moisture in the region of their sense
perception ; for the movement initiated does not
readily stop, until it arrives at the object sought, and
the mind again travels on a straight course. For
this reason too outbursts of temper or fear, when they
have once produced an impulse, do not cease even
when the subjects of them set up counter movements,
but they themselves produce counter reaction. And

x 505

Memory and
revollection
further
distin
guished.

Kecollection
tins Duatity
reactions,

ARISTOTLE

458 a 7 Α , \ t ῳ ‘ /
OVOLAaGL καὶ μέλεσι και λόγοις, οταν διὰ στομᾶτος

80 γένηταί τι αὐτῶν σφόδρα' παυσαμένοις γὰρ καὶ οὐ
λ , 3. (Ὁ tr 48 4 λέ
βουλομένοις ἐπέρχεται πάλιν ᾷδειν ἢ λέγειν.
stan + ¢ 4 Κ᾿ , " . ie ,
Εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ οἱ τὰ ἄνω μείζω ἔχοντες καὶ οἱ νανώ-
45ab Ses ἀμνημονέστεροι τῶν ἐναντίων διὰ τὸ πολὺ
βάρος ἔχειν ἐπὶ τῷ αἰσθητικῷ, καὶ μήτ᾽ ἐξ ἀρχῆς
τὰς κινήσεις δύνασθαι ἐμμένειν ἀλλὰ διαλύεσθαι,
μήτ᾽ ἐν τῷ ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι ῥᾳδίως εὐθυπορεῖν.
6 of δὲ πάμπαν νέοι καὶ λίαν γέροντες ἀμνήμονες διὰ
A t δὰ \ ‘ 2 ig ς > +s Ἶ ,
τὴν κίνησιν' οἱ μὲν yap ἐν φθίσει, οἱ δ᾽ ἐν αὐξήσει
fal bee A y A / rs \ ,ὔ > ‘
πολλῇ εἰσίν: ἔτι δὲ τά ye παιδία καὶ νανώδη ἐστὶ
μέχρι πόρρω τῆς ἡλικίας.
Περὶ μὲν οὖν μνήμης καὶ τοῦ μνημονεύειν, τίς ἡ
φύσις αὐτῶν καὶ τίνι τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μνημονεύει τὰ
10 ζῷα, καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι, τί ἐστι καὶ
πῶς γίνεται καὶ διὰ τίν᾽ αἰτίαν, εἴρηται.

806

ON MEMORY AND RECOLLECTION, τε,

the saine experience occurs with names, tunes and
words, when once they have passed through the
mouth emphatically; for even though they cheek
them, and quite ayvainst their will, they sing or say
the same thing again and again.

Those who have specially large upper parts and
dwarfs have less good memories than their opposites,
because they carry a great weight on their organ of
pereeption, and the movements which begin from
the starting- point cannot keep to it, but str ay from it,
and do not easily travel in a straight course in their
recollecting. The very young and the very old have
inferior memories because they are in a state of
transition ; for the latter are ina state of rapid decay,
and the former in a state of rapid growth + small
children moreover are dwarfed, until they reach
mature age.

This concludes our account of memory and remem-
bering, describing its nature and that part of the soul
with which living creatures remember, Also what
recollecting is, and how it occurs, and for what reason.

307

Reasons for
good and
had
miemories,

ON SLEEP AND WAKING

INTRODUCTION

Arisrorie’s treatment of this subject is full of interest
for the modern reader. After some preliminary con-
siderations on the subject he decides that sleep is
really a physical phenomenon, in that it means that
the sense organs temporarily cease to function,
though he is careful to explain that it is not entirely
physical, as a body without a soul could not feel. He
is interested in the fact that in sleep it is not one or
more senses which cease to function but all of them,
and therefore decides that it is the ‘‘ common sense ”
which is affected.

He then turns to the physiological explanation of
the phenomenon we know as sleep. This subject is
obscure to-day. Physiologists are sure that somehow
the flow of blood to the nerve centres of the brain is
checked, and that in consequence these nerve centres
receive a reduced supply of oxygen. This shortage
of oxygen produces an anaesthesia. Further than
this modern physiology is not prepared to go, and
it is quite uncertain why or how the flow of blood to
the nerve centres of the brain is effected.

What is surprising about Aristotle’s physiology is
not that he knows so little but that he knows so
much. He is quite clear that sleep has some con-
nexion with the blood stream, and some of his state-
ments about the movement of the blood seem to

310

INTRODUCTION

foreshadow a theory of the circulation which was not
understood until Harvey's discoveries at the beginning
of the seventeenth century.

It is also most interesting to find that he regards
sleep as part of Nature’s admirable design to secure
the health of the body, and is true to his principle
that all natural functions are part of an ordered
scheme of things.

ΠΕΡῚ YINOY ΚΑΙ
ΕΓΡΗΓΟΡΣΕΩΣ

,, Περὶ δὲ ὕ ὕπνου καὶ ἐγρηγόρσεως σκεπτέον, τίνα
τε εν ὄντα, καὶ “πότερον ἴδια τ τῆς ψυχῆς ἢ ἢ τοῦ
σώματος ἣ κοινά, κἂν ἢ κοινά, τίνος μορίου τῆς
ψυχῆς 7 ἢ τοῦ σώματος" καὶ διὰ τίν᾽ αἰτίαν ὑπάρχει

in τοῖς ζῴοις: καὶ πότερον ἅπαντα κεκοινώνηκεν
αὐτῶν ἀμφοτέρων, ἢ τὰ μὲν ὕπνου τὰ δὲ θατέρου
μόνον, ἢ τὰ μὲν οὐδετέρου τὰ δ᾽ ἀμφοτέρων' πρὸς
δὲ τούτοις τί ἐστι τὸ ἐνύπνιον, καὶ διὰ τίν᾽ αἰτίαν
οἱ καθεύδοντες ὁτὲ μὲν ὀνειρώττουσιν ὁτὲ δ᾽ οὔ'
συμβαίνει μὲν ἀεὶ τοῖς καθεύδουσιν ἐνυπνιάζειν,
40 ἀλλ᾽ οὐ μνημονεύουσιν" καὶ εἰ τοῦτο γίνεται, διὰ
τίνα αἰτίαν γίνεται" καὶ πότερον ἐνδέχεται τὰ
μέλλοντα προορᾶν, ἢ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται καὶ τίνα τρόπον,
εἰ ἐνδέχεται: καὶ πότερον τὰ μέλλοντα ὑπ᾽ ἀνθρώ-
mou πὶ ἄσσεσθαι μόνον, ἢ καὶ ὧν τὸ δαιμόνιον ἔχει
τὴν αὐτίαν καὶ φύσει γίνεται ἢ ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου.
25 Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν τοῦτό γε φανερόν, ὅ ὅτι τῷ αὐτῷ
τοῦ ζῴου ἥ τε ἐγρήγορσις ὑπάρχει καὶ ὃ ὕπνος"
ἀντίκεινται, γάρ, καὶ αίνεται στέρησίς τις 6 ὕπνος
τῆς ἐγρηγόρσεως" ἀεὶ γὰρ τὰ ἐναντία καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν
ἄλλων καὶ ἐν τοῖς φυσικοῖς ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ δεκτικῷ
312

453 b

ON SLEEP AND WAKING

I. We have now to consider questions concern-
ing sleep and wakefulness. What are they? Are
they peculiar to the soul or to the body, or do
they belong to both? If they belong to both, to
which part of the soul or body do they belong? Why
are they characteristic of living creatures? Do all
living creatures share in both, or do some have sleep
only, and some wakefulness only, or do some have
neither and some both? Furthermore what is a
dream, and why do men when asleep sometimes
dream and sometimes not? Or do sleepers always
dream, but sometimes do not remember their dreams?
If the latter is true, why does it occur? Is it possible
or impossible to foresee the future? If it is possible,
in what way? Again, if it is possible, does it apply
to actions which man will do, or can it include those
done by a god, and those which occur in the ordinary
course of nature, or those which happen without
outside causation ?

To begin with, this is at any rate obvious, that
wakefulness and sleep belong to the same part of the
living creature; for they are contraries, and sleep
appears to be in a sense only a negation of wakeful-
ness; for contraries both in other cases and in
natural science evidently oceur in the same recipient,

313

Problems
a1 dine froin
thu subject.

Sicep and
wakefulness
are comple-
inentary.

453 b

4544

ARISTOTLE

φαίνεται γινόμενα καὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὄντα “πάθη, λέγω
δ᾽ οἷον ὑγίεια καὶ νόσος, καὶ κάλλος καὶ αἶσχος, καὶ
ἰσχὺς καὶ ἀσθένεια, καὶ ὄψις καὶ τυφλότης, καὶ
ἀκοὴ καὶ κωφότης. ἔτι δὲ καὶ ἐὶς τῶνδε δῆλον.
ᾧ γὰρ τὸν ἐγρηγορότα γνωρίζομεν, τούτῳ καὶ
τὸν ὑπνοῦντα- τὸν “γὰρ αἰσθανόμενον. ἐγρηγορέναι
νομίζομεν καὶ τὸν ἐγρηγορότα πάντα ἢ τῶν ἔξωθέν
τινος αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ τῶν ἐν αὑτῷ κινήσεων. εἰ

" τοίνυν τὸ ἐγρηγορέναι ἐν μηδενὶ ἄλλῳ ἐστὶν ἢ

τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι, δῆλον ὅ ὅτι ᾧπερ αἰσθάνεται, τούτῳ
καὶ ἐγρήγορε τὰ ἐγρηγορότα καὶ καθεύδει τὰ καθ-
εὐδοντα.

᾿Επεὶ δ᾽ οὔτε τῆς ψυχῆς ἴδιον τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι οὔτε
τοῦ σώματος (οὗ γὰρ ἡ δύναμις, τούτου καὶ ἡ
ἐνέργεια' ἡ δὲ λεγομένη αἴσθησις, cbs ἐνέργεια,
κίνησίς τις διὰ τοῦ σώματος. τῆς ψυχῆς cori),
φανερὸν ὡς οὔτε τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ πάθος ἴδιον, οὔτ᾽
ἄψυχον σῶμα δυνατὸν αἰσθάνεσθαι.

Διωρισμένων δὲ πρότερον ἐν ἑτέροις. περὶ τῶν
λεγομένων ὡς μορίων τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ τοῦ μὲν
θρεπτικοῦ χωρι ομένου τῶν ἄλλων ἐν τοῖς ἔχουσι
σώμασι, ζωήν, τῶν δ᾽ ἄλλων οὐδενὸς ἄνευ τούτου,
δῆλον ὡς ὅσα μὲν αὐξήσεως καὶ φθίσεως μετέχει
μόνον τῶν ζώντων, ὅτι τούτοις οὐχ ὑπάρχει ὕπνος
οὐδ᾽ ἐγρήγορσις, οἷον τοῖς φυτοῖς: οὐ γὰρ ἔχουσι τὸ
αἰσθητικὸν μόριον, οὔτ᾽ εἰ χωριστόν ἐστιν οὔτ᾽ εἰ
μὴ χωριστόν" τῇ γὰρ δυνάμει καὶ τῷ εἶναι χωριστόν
ἐστιν.

‘Op olws δὲ καὶ ὅτι οὐδέν ἐστιν ὃ ἀεὶ ἐγρήγορεν
ἢ ἀεὶ καθεύδει, ἀλλὰ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχει τῶν ζῴων

4 432 a 15, etc.
314

ON SLEEP AND WAKING, 1

and are affections of the same subject; such, L mean,
as health and disease, beauty and ugliness, strength
and weakness, sight and blindness, hearing and dleaf-
ness. And the same point is clear from the following
facts. We recognize the man awake by the same
signs as the man asleep; for we reckon that the man
who is conscious of sensation is awake, and that
every man who is awake is conscions cither of some
movement outside himself, or of one inside himself.
If then wakefulness cannot exist in any case apart
from sensation, it is clear that what is awake is so in
respect of ils consciousness, and what is aslecp is
asleep in respect of its consciousness,

But since sensation does not belong specifically
either to soul or body (for actuality belongs to that
part to which potentiality belongs ; but the sensation
in question, as an actuality, is a movement of the
soul through the vehicle of the body), it is clear
that the affection (sleep) is not peculiar to the soul,
while on the other hand a body without a soul could
not feel.

Elsewhere? we have previously classified the so-
called parts of the soul, the nutritive part being
separate from the others in those bodies which have
life, but none of the others existing without this. It
is therefore clear that those living creatures which
have no characteristics except growth and decay,
such as plants, cannot have either sleep or wakeful-
ness, For they do not possess the necessary per-
ceptive part, whether this is separable or inseparable ;
for this perceptive part is separable both potentially
and actually.

Similarly it is obvious that there is nothing which is
either awake or aslcep permanently, but both these

815

Both helong
to sunt and
bady,

454 a

454 ὃ

ARISTOTLE

i la A ta - ae Ν ΠΣ a 3
ἀμφότερα τὰ πάθη ταῦτα' οὔτε yap eb τί ἐστι
~ - >
ζῷον μὴ ἔχον αἴσθησιν, τοῦτ᾽ ἐνδέχεται οὔτε
, yo 5 7 " ,ὕ 5 \
καθεύδειν οὔτ᾽ eypynyopévas: ἄμφω γάρ ἐστι τὰ
πάθη ταῦτα περὶ αἴσθησιν τοῦ πρώτου αἰσθητικοῦ.
Ἴ 2 / \ Dt / , 2 \ ͵
οὐκ ἐνδέχεται δὲ οὐδὲ θάτερον τούτων ἀεὶ ὑπάρχειν
- 2 a | ed J Fé ,ὔ 7 AM > 7
τῷ αὐτῷ, οἷον ἀεί τι γένος ζῴων καθεύδειν ἢ ἀεί
τι ἐγρηγορέναι. ἔτι ὅσων ἐστί τι ἔργον κατὰ
Fa tia - β LAX A 7 - ὃ 4 /
φύσιν, ὅταν ὑπερβάλλῃ τὸν χρόνον ᾧ δύναται χρόνῳ
~ a ΝΥ ~
τι ποιεῖν, ἀνάγκη ἀδυνατεῖν, οἷον τὰ ὄμματα ὁρῶντα
καὶ παύεσθαι τοῦτο ποιοῦντα, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ χεῖρα
\ » - Ξ- bg ,ὔ vA > ὰ / >
καὶ ἄλλο πᾶν οὗ ἐστί τι ἔργον. εἰ δή τινός ἐστιν
Ὁ \ ~ ἌΝ
ἔργον τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, καὶ τοῦτο ἂν ὑπερβάλλῃ
7 ~
ὅσον ἦν χρόνον δυνάμενον αἰσθάνεσθαι συνεχῶς,
ἀδυνατήσει καὶ οὐκέτι τοῦτο ποιήσει, εἰ τοίνυν τὸ
ἐγρηγορέναι τούτῳ ὥρισται τῷ λελύσθαι τὴν
-. ΕἸ 3 ‘ 7
αἴσθησιν, τῶν δ᾽ ἐναντίων τὸ μὲν ἀνάγκη παρεῖναι
τὸ δ᾽ ot, τὸ δ᾽ ἐ ἵν Ὁ καθεύδειν ἐ ί
᾿ γρηγορέναι τῷ καθεύδειν ἐναντίον,
καὶ ἀναγκαῖον παντὶ θάτερον ὑπάρχειν, ἀναγκαῖον
ἂν εἴη καθεύδειν. εἰ οὖν τὸ τοιοῦτον πάθος ὕπνος,
“- 9. 9" A 3 , i ae . -ἰ 32
τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἀδυναμία δι᾿ ὑπερβολὴν τοῦ ἐγρηγο-
ρέναι, ἡ δὲ τοῦ ἐγρηγορέναι ὑπερβολὴ ὁτὲ μὲν
νοσώδης ὁτὲ δ᾽ ἄνευ νόσου γίνεται, ὥστε καὶ ἡ
3 Ys \ ὃ 4 ε 4 » > /
ἀδυναμία καὶ ἡ διάλυσις ὡσαύτως ἔσται, ἀνάγκη
a, 4 3 ‘ > ἢ ᾽ > a,
πᾶν τὸ ἐγρηγορὸς ἐνδέχεσθαι καθεύδειν: ἀδύνατον
A > \ > a - ᾿ A > + uA Σ κι
γὰρ ἀεὶ ἐνεργεῖν. ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδὲ καθεύδειν οὐδὲν
ἀεὶ ἐνδέχεται. 6 γὰρ ὕπνος τι τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ
᾿ t
μορίου ἐστίν, οἷον δεσμὸς καὶ ἀκινησία τις, ὥστ᾽
1 nbom, B. 2 τούτῳ om. By
316

ON SLEEP AND WAKING, 1

affections are Lhe properties of the same animals ;
for if there is any animal having no sense conscious-
ness, it cannot be eilher asleep or awake ; for both
these affections are concerned with the sensation of
the first sense perception. Nor can cither sleep or
wakefulness be a pennanent attribute of the same
animal: for instance no species of animal can be
permanently asleep or permanently awake. For in
the case of all the parts possessing any function,
when they have passed the time in which they are
able to perform their function, they must become im-
potent ; for instance the cyes seeing must also cease
to function, and similarly the hand, and any other
part which has a function. If then sensation is a
function of any part, and if this goes beyond the time
when it is capable of having continuous sensation, it
will become impotent, and cease to perform its
function. If then loss of consciousness marks the
limit of wakefulness, and if one of two opposites
must be present and the other not, and further if it is
admitted that wakefulness is the opposite of being
asleep, and if one of the two opposites must exist in
any given case, then sleep must be a necessity. If
sleep is an affection of such a kind, I mean if it is a
state of impotence due to excess of wakefulness, and
excess of wakefulness regularly occurs sometimes as
the result of disease, and sometimes when there is no
disease, so that impotence and failure of sensation
also sometimes are and sometimes are not due to
disease, everything which is awake must be capable
of sleep; for it cannot be permanently active.
Similarly nothing can be permanently asleep. Tor
sleep is characteristic of the sensitive part of us, a
kind of fetter, or immobility, whence it follows that

317

Neither
condition
can bes
permanent,

Sleep is
logically
NeCESHaT y.

ARISTOTLE

τ ὐὑ γῇ πᾶν τὸ καθεῦδον ἔχειν τὸ αἰσθητικὸν μό-
ριον. αἰσθητικὸν δὲ τὸ δυνατὸν αἰσθάνεσθαι κατ᾽
ἐνέργειαν: ἐνεργεῖν δὲ τῇ αἰσθήσει κυρίως καὶ
ἁπλῶς ἀδύνατον καθεῦδον ἅμα' διὸ ἀναγκαῖον
ὕπνον πάντα ἐγερτὸν εἶναι.

uv Τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα σχεδὸν πάντα δῆλα κοινωνοῦνθ᾽
ὕπνου, καὶ πλωτὰ καὶ πτηνὰ Kal meld: καὶ γὰρ τὰ
τῶν ἰχθύων γένη πάντα καὶ τὰ τῶν μαλακίων
ὦπται καθεύδοντα, καὶ τἄλλα πάνθ᾽ ὅσαπερ ἔχει
ὀφθαλμούς: καὶ γὰρ τὰ σκληρόφθαλμα φανερὰ καὶ
τὰ ἔντομα κοιμώμενα" βραχύυπνα δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα
» πάντα, διὸ καὶ λάθοι ἄν τινα πολλάκις πότερον
μετέχουσι τοῦ καθεύδειν ἢ οὔ. τῶν δ᾽ ὀστρακο-
δέρμων κατὰ μὲν τὴν αἴσθησιν οὐδέ πω γέγονε
φανερὸν εἰ καθεύδουσιν" εἰ δέ τῳ πιθανὸς ὃ λεχθεὶς
λόγος, τούτῳ πεισθήσεται.
Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ὕπνου κοινωνεῖ τὰ ζῷα πάντα,
2h φανερὸν ἐ ἐκ τούτων" τῷ γὰρ αἴσθησιν ἐ ἔχειν ὥρισται
τὸ ζῷον, τῆς δ᾽ αἰσθήσεως πρόπον τινὰ τὴν μὲν
ἀκινησίαν καὶ οἷον δεσμὸν τὸν ὕπνον εἶναί φαμεν,
τὴν δὲ λύσιν καὶ τὴν ἄνεσιν ἐγρήγορσιν. τῶν δὲ
φυτῶν οὐδὲν οἷόν τε κοινωνεῖν οὐδετέρου τούτων
τῶν παθημάτων. ἄνευ μὲν γὰρ αἰσθήσεως οὐχ
a0 ὑπάρχει οὔθ᾽ ὕπνος οὔτ᾽ ἐγρήγορσις" οἷς δ᾽ αἴσθησις
ὑπάρχει, καὶ τὸ λυπεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ χαίρειν" οἷς δὲ
ταῦτα, καὶ ἐπιθυμία. τοῖς δὲ φυτοῖς οὐδὲν ὑπάρχει
τούτων. σημεῖον δ᾽ ὅτι καὶ τὸ ἔργον τὸ αὑτοῦ

455 8 ποιεῖ τὸ θρεπτικὸν μόριον ἐν τῷ καθεύδειν μᾶλλον
7, ἐν τῷ ἐγρηγορέναι" τρέφεται. γὰρ καὶ αὐξάνεται
τότε μᾶλλον, ὡς οὐδὲν προσδεόμενα πρὸς ταῦτα
τῆς αἰσθήσεως.

818

ON SLEEP AND WAKING, τ.

everything which sleeps must possess this sensitive
part. But a sensitive part is that which is cap-
able of active sensation; Dut sense activity in a
complete and simple sense is impossible simultane-
ously with sleep ; so that sleep must be able to be
aroused.

Practically all other animals share in sleep, in the
sea, the air and on the land ; for all classes of fishes
and the mollusea as well have been observed asleep,
and all other animals which have eyes; for itis clear
that the hard-eyed animals and insects sleep 3 these
creatures only sleep for a short time, so that one might
often doubt whether they share in sleep or not. In
the case of the testacea no direct observation has
yet proved whether they sleep or not. But if the
foregoing argument appeals to anyone, he will be
convinced that they do.

Therefore that all animals share in sleep is obvious
from the following considerations. The animal
kingdom is defined by the possession of sensation,
but we say that sleep is characteristic of sensation,
a sort of immobility or fettering, and that the release
or removal of this is wakefulness. But none of the
plants can share in either of these affections, for
neither sleep nor wakefulness is possible without
sensation. But creatures possessing sensation also
are capable of grief and joy ; and those which have
these must also possess desire. But none of these
are possessed by plants. Evidence of this is afforded
by the fact that the nutritive faculty (in animals)
exercises its function more in sleep than in wakeful-
ness; for at that time it absorbs more nourishment
and grows more rapidly, because it does not require
consciousness for these two purposes.

319

Living
things
which sleep.

ARISTOTLE

455 a

TI. Διὰ τί δὲ καθεύδει καὶ ἐγρήγορε, καὶ διὰ
FY f
5 ποίαν τιν᾽ αἴσθησιν ἢ ποίας, εἰ διὰ πλείους, σκε-
πτέον. ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἔνια μὲν τῶν ζῴων ἔχει τὰς αἰσθήσεις
é a δ᾽ 2 μὲ "ἢ t ᾿», \ δ᾽ £ \ \
πάσας, ἔνια. δ᾽ ovic exet,' οἷον ὄψιν, τὴν δ᾽ ἀφὴν καὶ
~ τ Ld 4 -
τὴν γεῦσιν ἅπαντ᾽ ἔχει, πλὴν εἴ τι τῶν ζῴων ἀτελές
(εἴρηται δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐν τοῖς περὶ ψυχῆς),
207 > 2 \ € “A ε a " Η
ἀδύνατον δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἁπλῶς ὁποιανοῦν αἴσθησιν al-
10 σθάνεσθαι τὸ καθεῦδον ζῷον, φανερὸν ὅτι πᾶσιν
ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν ταὐτὸ πάθος ἐν τῷ καλουμένῳ
~ a , -
ὕπνῳ" εἰ γὰρ τῇ μὲν τῇ δὲ μή, ταύτῃ καθεῦδον
αἰσθήσεται, τοῦτο δ᾽ ἀδύνατον.
3 " ὃ᾽ δ Ψ θ᾽ « ,ὔ " θ \ f
Ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ὑπάρχει καθ᾽ ἑκάστην αἴσθησιν τὸ μέν
” \ ͵ ͵ wn iY a OM 1
τι ἴδιον τὸ δέ τι κοινόν, ἴδιον μὲν οἷον τῇ ὄψει τὸ
ς κ᾿ a 3 > “- A 3 , - > νΝ AY
τὸ ὁρᾶν, τῇ δ᾽ ἀκοῇ τὸ ἀκούειν, ταῖς δ᾽ ἄλλαις Kara
4 , ᾿ A
τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον' ἔστι δέ Tis καὶ κοινὴ δύναμις
a ae ‘ - -
ἀκολουθοῦσα πάσαις, ἣ καὶ ὅτι ὁρᾷ καὶ ἀκούει
ἰσθά αι" οὐ tp δὴ τῇ γε ὄψει ὁρᾷ ὅ ς α
αἰσθάνεται οὐ γὰρ δὴ τῇ γε ὄψει ὁρᾷ ὅτι ὁρᾷ.
καὶ κρίνει δὴ καὶ δύναται κρίνειν ὅτι ἕτερα τὰ
γλυκέα τῶν λευκῶν, οὔτε γεύσει οὔτε ὄψει οὔτ᾽
20 ἀμφοῖν, ἀλλά τινι κοινῷ μορίῳ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων
#
ἁπάντων. ἔστι μὲν yap μία αἴσθησις, καὶ τὸ
v4 3 / a ‘ 2 > la lol
κύριον αἰσθητήριον ev: τὸ δ᾽ εἶναι αἰσθήσει τοῦ
,
γένους ἑκάστου ἕτερον, οἷον ψόφου καὶ χρώματος.
τοῦτο δ᾽ ἅμα τῷ ἁπτικῷ μάλισθ᾽ ὑπάρχει" (τοῦτο
μὲν γὰρ χωρίζεται τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθητηρίων, τὰ δ᾽
45 ἄλλα τούτου ἀχώριστα. εἴρηται δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐν
τοῖς περὶ ψυχῆς θεωρήμασιν.) φανερὸν τοίνυν ὅτι

1 ἔχουσι Β. 3 ἀκούει καὶ Β.

& De An. 414 b 8.
820

ON SLEEP AND WAKING, 1.

Il. We must now tum to the question why a The purpose
creature sleeps or is awake, and owing to what sense δ δον:
or senses (if there be more than one). Sinee some
living creatures have all the senses and some have
not (for instance some have not sight), but all have
touch and taste, unless they are imperfect (a ques-
tion which has been discussed in the treatise On
the Soul*), and since it is impossible, strictly speak-
ing, for the sleeping animal to have any sensation at
all, it is evident that all are affected by the same
condition in the state known as sleep ; for if the con-
dition affects one sense and not another, then there
will be sensation with the latter sense while asleep,
and this is impossible.

But every sense has both a special function of ils Speci) and
own and one shared by other senses: the special gong
function for instance of sight is seeing, and of audition
hearing, and similarly with the other senses; but
there is also a common function which accompanies
them all, whereby one is conscious that one sces and
hears: for it is not by sight that one is aware that
one sees. And one judges and is capable of judging
that sweet is different from white; but this is not
by taste, nor by sight, nor by a combination of the
two, but by some part which is common to all the
sense organs; for there is one sensation, and one
paramount sense organ ; but the actual sense which
apprehends each class is differentiated, for instance
in the case of sound and colour. This is most con-
spicuous in the case of touch; (for this is separable
from the other sense organs, but the others are in-
separable from it. We have discussed this in our
considerations On the Soul). Jt is clear then
that wakefulness and sleep are an affection of this

Y 891

ARISTOTLE

464 8 v4 > \ a € 3 ra \ cf 9 \
τούτου ἐστὶ πάθος ἡ ἐγρήγορσις καὶ ὃ ὕπνος. διὸ

» Ed 7 - ra \ A lg 4 \ tf
Kal πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει τοῖς ζῴοις" καὶ yap ἡ adi μόνη
πᾶσιν. εἰ γὰρ τῷ πάσας τι πεπονθέναι τὰς αἰ-

,ὔ oF § th a " » 5
σθήσεις ἐγίνετο τὸ καθεύδειν, ἄτοπον εἰ αἷς οὔτ

80 ἀνάγκη οὔτε δυνατὸν τρόπον τινὰ ἐνεργεῖν ἅμα,
ταύτας ἀναγκαῖον ἀργεῖν ἅμα καὶ ἀκινητίζειν'
3 -
τοὐναντίον γὰρ εὐλογώτερον συνέβαινεν ἂν αὐταῖς
τὸ μὴ ἅμα ἠρεμεῖν. ὡς δὲ νῦν λέγομεν, εὐλόγως
ἔχει καὶ περὶ τούτων" τοῦ γὰρ κυρίου τῶν ἄλλων
πάντων αἰσθητηρίον καὶ πρὸς ὃ συντείνει τᾶλλα,
~ A
465 b πεπονθότος τι συμπάσχειν ἀναγκαῖον Kal τὰ λοιπὰ
* > κ᾿ >
πάντα, ἐκείνων δέ τινος ἀδυνατοῦντος οὐκ ἀνάγκη
τοῦτ᾽ ἀδυνατεῖν.
\ ? 2 Fa / 2 2. ~ ‘

Φανερὸν δ᾽ ἐκ πολλῶν ὅτι odk ἐν τῷ τὰς

3 , A “ a « iq
αἰσθήσεις ἀργεῖν καὶ μὴ χρῆσθαι αὐταῖς ὁ ὕπνος,

299 2 “- 4 4 > 4 \ 3 >
οὐδ᾽ ἐν τῷ μὴ δύνασθαι αἰσθάνεσθαι. Kal γὰρ ἐν

"ταῖς λιποψυχίαις τοιοῦτον συμβαίνει' ἀδυναμία
2 \
yap αἰσθήσεων ἡ λιποψυχία. γίνονται δὲ καὶ ἔκ-
νοιαΐ τινες τοιαῦται. ἔτι δ᾽ οἱ τὰς ἐν τῷ αὐχένι
φλέβας καταλαμβανόμενοι ἀναίσθητοι γίνονται.
iy ᾿ a / o
ἀλλ᾽ ὅταν ἡ ἀδυναμία τῆς χρήσεως μήτ᾽ ἐν τῷ
τυχόντι αἰσθητηρίῳ μήτε δι’ ἣν ἔτυχεν αἰτίαν,
10 ἀλλὰ καθάπερ εἴρηται νῦν, ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ ᾧ αἰ-
σθάνεται πάντων' ὅταν μὲν γὰρ τοῦτ᾽ ἀδυνατήσῃ,
ἀνάγκη καὶ τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις πᾶσιν ἀδυνατεῖν
αἰσθέσθαι" ὅταν δ᾽ ἐκείνων τι, οὐκ ἀνάγκη τούτῳ.
> a 3 ὙΠ , ‘ A Ὁ τ

Δι ἣν δ᾽ αἰτίαν συμβαίνει τὸ καθεύδειν, καὶ

alt 4 ¢ 3 é i 3 " 4 ‘
ποῖόν τι τὸ πάθος ἐστί, λεκτέον. (ἐπεὶ δὲ τρόποι

, = , A
16 πλείους τῆς αἰτίας Kal yap τὸ τίνος ἕνεκα, καὶ

322

ON SLEEP AND WAKING, n.

common sense. For this reason they are attributes
of all living creatures ; for touch alone is common 4o
all such creatures. Vor if sleep were due to an
affection of all the senses, it would be strange if those
senses which need not, or cannot act simultaneously
in any way, should necessarily be inoperative and
immobile simultaneously ; the direct opposite would
be more probable—that they should not all rest
simultancously, But the account we now give is a
rational explanation of them also. For when that
sense organ which is master of them all, and to which
all the rest contribute, is affected in any way, all the
others must be affected too, but it is not necessary
that when any one of them is impotent that this
master sense should also be impotent.

It is clear for many reasons that the essential
factor of sleep is not the fact that the senses are in-
operative and out of use, nor that it is impossible to
have any sensation. For this happens in fainting ;
for fainting is the impotence of the senses. Some
forms of derangement belong to the same class.
Again those who have the veins in the neck pressed
also become unconscious. But sleep is when the
incapacity for use oceurs not in any chance sense
organ, nor through any accidental cause, but, as we
have just explained, when it happens to the first
sense faculty by which one perceives all things ;
when this becomes impotent, it must clearly be im-
possible to receive impressions from any of the sense
organs ; but when any other of the sense faculties
suffers impotence it need not apply to this one.

Now we have to consider the cause of sleep, and
what sort of affection it is. (But there are many
sorts of cause—the final cause, the cause in the sense

323

Sleap 15

an affeetion
of the
common
sonar,”

The cass
of sleep.

455 b

456 a

ARISTOTLE

ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως, καὶ τὴν ὕλην. καὶ τὸν
λόγον αὕτιον εἶναί φαμενὴ πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἐπειδὴ
λέγομεν τὴν φ φύσιν ἕνεκά του ποιεῖν, τοῦτο δ᾽ ἀγα-
θόν τι, τὴν δ᾽ ἀνάπαυσιν παντὶ τῷ πεφυκότι κινεῖ-
σθαι, μὴ δυναμένῳ δ᾽ ἀεὶ καὶ συνεχῶς κινεῖσθαι
μεθ᾽ ἡδονῆς ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι καὶ ὠφέλιμον, τῷ δ᾽
ὕπνῳ αὐτῇ τῇ ἀληθείᾳ: προσάπτουσι τὴν μεταφορὰν
ταύτην ὡς ἀναπαύσει ὄντι" ὥστε σωτηρίας ἕνεκα

‘Tay ζῴων ὑπάρχει. ἡ δ᾽ ἐγρήγορσις τέλος" τὸ γὰρ

αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν πᾶσι τέλος οἷς ὑπάρχει
θάτερον αὐτῶν" βέλτιστα γὰρ ταῦτα, τὸ δὲ τέλος
βέλτιστον. ὥστε ἀναγκαῖον ἑκάστῳ τῶν ζῴων
ὑπάρχειν τὸν ὕπνον. “λέγω δ᾽ ἐξ ὑποθέσεως τὴν
ἀνάγκην, ὅτι εἰ ζῷον ἔ ἔσται ἔχον τὴν αὑτοῦ φύσιν,
ἐξ ἀνάγκης τιν᾽ ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ δεῖ, καὶ τούτων
ὑπαρχόντων ἕτερα ὑπάρχειν.

Ἔτι δὲ ποίας κινήσεως καὶ πράξεως ἐν τοῖς
σώμασι γιγνομένης συμβαίνει τό τε ἐγρηγορέναι
καὶ τὸ καθεύδειν τοῖς ζῴοις, μετὰ ταῦτα λεκτέον.
τοῖς μὲν οὖν ἄλλοις ζῴοις καθάπερ τοῖς ἐναίμοις
ὑποληπτέον εἶναι τὰ αἴτια τοῦ πάθους, ἢ ταὐτὰ ἢ
τὰ ἀνάλογον, τοῖς δ᾽ ἐναίμοις ἅπερ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις"
ὥστ᾽ ἐκ τούτων πάντα θεωρητέον.

Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἡ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἀ ἀρχὴ γίνεται ἀπὸ
τοῦ αὐτοῦ έρους τοῖς ζῴοις ἀφ᾽ οὗπερ καὶ ἡ τῆς
κινήσεως, διώρισται πρότερον ἐν ἑτέροις. αὕτη δ᾽
ἐστὶ τριῶν διωρισμένων τόπων 6 μέσος κεφαλῆς
καὶ τῆς κάτω κοιλίας. τοῖς μὲν οὖν ἐναίμοις τοῦτ᾽
ἐστὶ τὸ περὶ τὴν καρδίαν μέρος: πάντα γὰρ τὰ

1 δ αὐτὴν τὴν ἀλήθειαν B.

'@ The three positions are the head, the heart and the
stomach. Cf. De Part. An. 656 b δ.

324

ON SLEEP AND WAKING, πὶ.

of the origin of the movement, the material cause
and the formal cause.) livst of all then, when we say
that nature makes a thing with an end in view, and
this end is some good, and that to everything which
naturally moves, but cannot move always and con-
tinuously, rest must be combined with pleasure and
be beneficial, we are applying a metaphor to sleep
which contains the real truth, when we call it rest ;
for it exists for the sake of the preservation of the
living creature. But the state of wakefulness is its
end ; for perception and thinking are the proper end
of all creatures which have cither of these capacities ;
for they are the highest good, and the end is the
highest good. So that sleep is essential to every
kind of living creature. I use the word essential on
the assumption that if a living creature is to realize
its own nature certain characteristics must belong
to it essentially, and if these do belong to it others
will do so also.

Next we have to say what kind of movement and The nature
action it is which takes place in the hody when sleep Gian ale
and wakefulness occur in animals. We must assume ess.
that the reasons of the affection in other animals are
the same as, or analogous to, those operative in
animals having blood, and the same in men as in
these ; the whole speculation will depend on this
assumption.

In another place it has been laid down that the
first principle of sensation arises from the same part
among living creatures as the first principle of move-
ment. It lies in one of three definite positions
between the head and the lower part of the stomach.*
In the cases of animals with blood this is the region
about the heart ; for all animals having blood possess

825

456 ἃ

ARISTOTLE

ἔναιμα καρδίαν ἔχει, καὶ ἡ ἀρχὴ THs κινήσεως Kat
τῆς αἰσθήσεως τῆς κυρίας ἐντεῦθέν ἐστιν. τῆς μὲν
οὖν κινήσεως φανερὸν ὅτι καὶ ἡ τοῦ πνεύματος
ἀρχὴ καὶ ὅλως ἡ τῆς καταψύξεώς ἐστιν ἐνταῦθα,
καὶ τὸ ἀναπνεῖν τε καὶ τὸ ὑγρῷ καταψύχεσθαι πρός
γε σωτηρίαν τοῦ ἐν τούτῳ τῷ μορίῳ θερμοῦ ἡ
φύσις πεπόρικεν. ῥηθήσεται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς ὕστερον
καθ᾽ αὑτήν. τοῖς δ᾽ ἀναίμοις καὶ τοῖς ἐντόμοις καὶ
μὴ δεχομένοις πνεῦμα ἐν τῷ ἀνάλογον τὸ σύμφυτον
πνεῦμα ἀναφυσώμενον καὶ συνιζάνον φαίνεται,
δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο ἐπὶ τῶν ὁλοπτέρων, οἷον σφηκῶν
καὶ μελισσῶν, καὶ ἐν ταῖς μυίαις καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα.
ἐπεὶ δὲ κινεῖν μέν τι ἢ ποιεῖν ἄνευ ἰσχύος ἀδύνατον,
ἰσχὺν δὲ ποιεῖ ἡ τοῦ πνεύματος κάθεξις, τοῖς μὲν
εἰσφερομένοις ἡ θύραθεν, τοῖς δὲ μὴ ἀναπνέουσιν
ἡ σύμφυτος. διὸ καὶ βομβοῦντα φαίνεται τὰ πτε-
ρωτά, ὅταν κινῆται, τῇ τρίψει τοῦ πνεύματος
προσπίπτοντος πρὸς τὸ ὑπόζωμα τῶν ὁλοπτέρων.
κινεῖται δὲ πᾶν αἰσθήσεώς τινος γινομένης, ἢ οἱ-
κείας ἢ ἀλλοτρίας, ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ αἰσθητηρίῳ. εἰ
δ᾽ ἐστὶν ὁ ὕπνος καὶ ἡ ἐγρήγορσις πάθη τοῦ μορίου
τούτου, ἐν ᾧ μὲν τόπῳ καὶ ἐν ᾧ μορίῳ πρώτῳ
γίνεται ὁ ὕπνος καὶ ἡ ἐγρήγορσις, φανερόν.

Κινοῦνται δ᾽ ἔνιοι καθεύδοντες καὶ ποιοῦσι πολλὰ
ἐγρηγορικά, οὐ μέντοι ἄνευ φαντάσματος καὶ αἰ-
σθήσεώς τινος: τὸ γὰρ ἐνύπνιόν ἐστιν αἴσθημα
τρόπον τινά. λεκτέον δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ὕστερον.
διότι δὲ τὰ μὲν ἐνύπνια μνημονεύουσιν ἐγερθέντες,
326

ON SLEEP AND WAKING, nu.

a heart, and the first principle of movement and
master sensation lies there. In the case of movement
it is clear that the first principle of breathing, and
generally speaking of cooling, is in the heart, and
that nature has supplied both breathing and the
power of cooling by moisture with a view to the pre-
servation of the heat in that part. We shall discuss
this in detail later on. In the case of bloodless
animals, insects and those which do not breathe, the
breath inherent in them is scen to rise and subside
in the part which corresponds to the heart in other
animals. This is obvious in the case of the insects
with undivided wings, such as wasps and bees, and
among flies, and similar creatures. But it is im-
possible to make any movement, or do any action,
without strength, and the holding of the breath
produces strength (breath from the outside in the
case of animals which inhale, and implanted within
in the case of those which do not). ‘This is evidently
the reason why winged creatures buzz when they
move, when the air impinges with a rubbing move-
ment on the diaphragm of the whole-winged insects.
When any movement takes place sensation occurs,
either its own or anothey’s, in the first sense organ.
But if sleep and wakefulness are affections of this
part of the body, it is clear in what place, and in
what part of the body sleep and wakefulness first
occur.

Some people move when they are asleep, and
perform the actions of wakefulness, but not without
some mental image and some consciousness ; for a
dream is in a way a form of sensation. We must dis-
cuss this subject later. Why men remember their
dreams after they have been awakened, and yet fail

327

TDreams
in sleep.

ARISTOTLE
156 ἃ A 32 3 x 4 Lt ¢ >
τὰς δ᾽ ἐγρηγορικὰς πράξεις οὐ μνημονεύουσιν, ἐν
τοῖς προβληματικοῖς εἴρηται.
ow ΠῚ, ᾿᾿Ὀχόμενοι, δὲ τῶν εἰρημένων ἐστὶν ἐπελθεῖν
τίνων γινομένων καὶ πόθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τοῦ πάθους
γίγνεται, τοῦ τ’ ἐγρηγορέναι καὶ τοῦ καθεύδειν.
φανερὸν δὴ ὅτι ἐπεὶ ἀναγκαῖον τῷ ζῴῳ, ὅταν
αἴσθησιν ἔχῃ, τότε πρῶτον τροφήν τε λαμβάνειν καὶ
αὔξησιν, τροφὴ δ᾽ ἐστὶ πᾶσιν ἡ ἐσχάτη τοῖς μὲν
as ἐναίμοις ἡ τοῦ αἵματος φύσις τοῖς δ᾽ ἀναίμοις τὸ
456 » ἀνάλογον, τόπος δὲ τοῦ αἵματος αἱ φλέβες, τούτων
δ᾽ ἀρχὴ ἡ καρδία: φανερὸν δὲ τὸ λεχθὲν ex τῶν
ἀνατομῶν. τῆς μὲν οὖν θύραθεν τροφῆς εἰσιούσης
εἰς τοὺς δεκτικοὺς τόπους γίνεται ἡ ἀναθυμίασις εἰς
" τὰς φλέβας, ἐκεῖ δὲ μεταβάλλουσα ἐξαιματοῦται
καὶ πορεύεται ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχήν. εἴρηται δὲ περὶ
τούτων ἐν τοῖς περὶ τροφῆς" νῦν δ᾽ ἀναληπτέον
ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν τούτου χάριν, ὅπως τὰς ἀρχὰς τῆς
κινήσεως θεωρήσωμεν, καὶ τί πάσχοντος τοῦ
μορίου τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ συμβαίνει ἡ ἐγρήγορσις καὶ
ὁ ὕπνος. οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ὁ ὕπνος ἡτισοῦν ἀδυναμία
τὸ τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ, καθάπερ εἴρηται: καὶ γὰρ ἔκνοια
καὶ πνιγμός τις καὶ λιποψυχία ποιεῖ τὴν τοιαύτην
ἀδυναμίαν. ἤδη δὲ γεγένηταί τισι καὶ φαντασία
λιποψυχήσασιν ἰσχυρῶς. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν ἔχει τινὰ
ἀπορίαν: εἰ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται καταδαρθεῖν τὸν λιπο-
16 ψυχήσαντα, ἐνδέχοιτ᾽ ἂν ἐνύπνιον εἶναι καὶ τὸ
φάντασμα. πολλὰ δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἃ λέγουσιν οἱ σφόδρα
λιποψυχήσαντες καὶ δόξαντες τεθνάναι" περὶ ὧν τὸν
αὐτὸν λόγον ὑποληπτέον εἶναι πάντων.
᾿Αλλὰ γὰρ ὥσπερ εἴπομεν, οὐκ ἔστιν ὁ ὕπνος
ἀδυναμία πᾶσα τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ, ἀλλ’ ἐκ τῆς περὶ
τὴν τροφὴν ἀναθυμιάσεως γίνεται τὸ πάθος τοῦτο'
828

ON SLEEP AND WAKING, n.—in.

to remember actions done in the waking state, has
been discussed in our treatise on Problems,

ΠῚ. Next in order we must discuss certain happen-
ings, and whence the beginning of the affection known
as waking and slecping takes its rise, It is clear that
the living creature absorbs food, and grows when it is
necessary, when it has sensation. The nature of the
blood is the final cause of nourishment in animals that
have blood, and whatever correspunds to it in blood-
less animals. The situation of the blood is the veins,
and the founl is the heart, This is clear from the
study of anatomy. When food enters from without
into the place designed to receive it, an evaporation
takes place into the veins, and changing there be-
comes blood and flows out again and returns to its
source, This question has been discussed in the
treatise on Food. Now we must resume the
question with a view to considering the first principle
of the inovement, and in what way the sensitive part
is affected, when wakefulness and sleep occur. For
sleep cannot be defined as any impotence of the
sensitive faculty, as has been said; for such impotence
is produced by unconsciousness, throttling and faint-
ness. Now even those in a dead faint may have some
mental picture present. This then involves a diffi-
culty; if it were possible that the man in a faint
could be said to be asleep, the mental picture might
be called a dream. Again, those in a dead faint,
even when they are thought to be dead, say many
things; and the same explanation, one would sup-
pose, applies to them all.

But as we have said, slecp is not every impotence
of the sensitive faculty, but the one that arises from
the evaporation due to food ; for that which is vapor-

920

The phyateal
oyplauation
uf steap.

How food
aeta,

ARISTOTLE
456

50 ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ τὸ ἀναθυμιώμενον μέχρι του ὠθεῖ-
σθαι, εἶτ᾽ ἀντιστρέφειν καὶ μεταβάλλειν καθάπερ
εὔριπον. τὸ δὲ θερμὸν ἑκάστου τῶν ζῴων πρὸς τὸ
ἄνω πέφυκε φέρεσθαι" ὅταν γ᾽ ἐν τοῖς ἄνω τόποις
γένηται, ἀθρόον πάλιν ἀντιστρέφει. καὶ καταφέρεται.
26 διὸ μάλιστα γίνονται ὕπνοι ἀπὸ τῆς τροφῆς" ἀθρόον
γὰρ πολὺ τό τε ὑγρὸν καὶ τὸ σωματῶδες ἀνα-
φέρεται. ἱστάμενον μὲν οὖν βαρύνει καὶ ποιεῖ
νυστάζειν' ὅταν δὲ ῥέψῃ κάτω καὶ ἀντιστρέψαν
ἀπώσῃ τὸ θερμόν, τότε γίνεται ὁ ὕπνος καὶ τὸ ζῶον
καθεύδει. σημεῖον δὲ τούτων καὶ τὰ ὑπνωτικά'
0 πάντα γὰρ καρηβαρίαν ποιεῖ, καὶ τὰ ποτὰ καὶ
τὰ βρωτά, μήκων, μανδραγόρας, οἶνος, alpar. καὶ
καταφερόμενοι καὶ νυστάζοντες τοῦτο δοκοῦσι
πάσχειν, καὶ ἀδυνατοῦσιν αἴρειν τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ
τὰ “βλέφαρα. καὶ μετὰ τὰ σῖτα μάλιστα τοιοῦτος
ὁ ὕπνος" πολλὴ γὰρ ἡ ἀπὸ τῶν σιτίων ἀναθυμίασις.
a5 ἔτι δ᾽ ἐκ κόπων ἐνίων" ὁ μὲν γὰρ κόπος συντη-
κτικόν, τὸ δὲ σύντηγμα γίνεται ὥσπερ τροφὴ ἄ-
4518 TeTTOS, ἂν μὴ ψυχρὸν a καὶ νόσοι δέ reves ταὐτὸ
τοῦτο ποιοῦσιν, ὅσαι ἀπὸ “περιττώματος ὑγροῦ καὶ
θερμοῦ, οἷον συμβαίνει τοῖς πυρέττουσι καὶ ἐν τοῖς
ληθάργοις. ἔτι δ᾽ ἡ πρώτη ἡλικία" τὰ γὰρ παιδία
5 καθεύδει σφόδρα διὰ τὸ τὴν τροφὴν ἄνω φέρεσθαι
πᾶσαν. σημεῖον δὲ τὸ ὑπερβάλλειν τὸ μέγεθος τῶν
ἄνω πρὸς τὰ κάτω κατὰ τὴν πρώτην ἡλικίαν, διὰ
τὸ ἐπὶ ταῦτα γίνεσθαι τὴν αὔξησιν. διὰ ταύτην δὲ
τὴν αἰτίαν καὶ ἐπιληπτικὰ γίνεται" ὅμοιον γὰρ ὁ
ὕπνος ἐπιλήψει, καὶ ἔστι τρόπον τινὰ ὁ ὕπνος
10 ἐπίληψις. διὸ καὶ συμβαίνει πολλοῖς ἡ ἀρχὴ τούτου
τοῦ πάθους καθεύδουσιν, καὶ καθεύδοντες μὲν
ἁλίσκονται, ἐγρηγορότες δ᾽ οὔ ὅταν γὰρ πολὺ

330

ΟΝ SLEEP AND WAKING, 11.

ized must be ped on to a point, and then turn
back, and change like water in a narrow channel.
But in every animal the heat tends to rise ; when it
reaches the upper parts, it collects, reverses its dirce-
tion and is carried down. So sleepiness mostly occurs
after food. Vor then both liquid and solid are col-
lected in greatest quantity and carried up. During
the time that it is stationary it is heavy and makes
one nod: when the balance is shifted downwards,
and reversing direction it drives out the heat, then
sleep occurs, and the living creature sleeps. Nar-
coties prove this ; for they all produce a heavy head,
both liquid and te such as poppy, mandragora,
wine and darnel. When men are heavy and “nod,
they seem to suffer this affection, and cannot, raise
their heads or eyelids. Sleep of this kind occurs most
often after food ; for the vapour arising from food is
considerable. But it sometimes arises from futigue ;
for fatigue produces solution, and the solution is
so to speak undigested, unless it is cold, Certain
diseases produce the same result, such as arise from
an excess of moisture and heat, as is the case with
the feverish and comatose. The same thing is true
of early childhoad ; for children sleep a great deal,
because all the food is borne upwards. The preater
size of the upper parts in comparison with the lower
in early youth proves this, and is due to the fact that
growth is greatest in the upward direction. It is
for this reason too that epilepsy occurs; for sleep
like epilepsy seizes one, and in a sense sleep is a
seizure, Consequently in many cases epilepsy begins
in sleep, and there are men who are seized with it
when asleep, but not when awake. For the breath

331

ARISTOTLE

457 a ,ὔ 4 - ΒΩ ~ 4 A
φέρηται τὸ πνεῦμα ἄνω, καταβαῖνον πάλιν τὰς

φλέβας ὀγκοῖ, καὶ συνθλίβει τὸν πόρον δι’ οὗ ἡ
ἀναπνοὴ γίνεται. διὸ τοῖς παιδίοις οὐ συμφέρουσιν
- \ 3}

15 οἱ οἶνοι, οὐδὲ ταῖς τίτθαις (διαφέρει γὰρ ἴσως οὐδὲν
αὐτὰ πίνει" ἢ τὰς τύτθας), ἀλλὰ δεῖ πίνειν ὑδαρῆ
καὶ ὀλίγον: πνευματῶδες γὰρ ὁ οἶνος, καὶ τούτου

- ¢ 7 “ Ν so» ͵ a -
μᾶλλον ὁ μέλας. οὕτω δὲ τὰ ἄνω πλήρη τῆς τροφῆς
τοῖς παιδίοις, ὥστε πέντε μηνῶν οὐδὲ στρέφουσι τὸν
αὐχένα: ὥσπερ γὰρ τοῖς σφόδρα μεθύουσιν, ὑγρότης
2 / , εκ A a? \ i

"0 ἀναφέρεται πολλή. εὔλογον δὲ τοῦτ᾽ εἷναι τὸ πάθος
αἴτιον καὶ τοῦ ἠρεμεῖν ἐν ταῖς μήτραις τὰ ἔμβρυα

A. π᾿ " 4. o A , ε 3 /
τὸ πρῶτον. καὶ τὸ ὅλον δὲ φίλυπνοι ot ἀδηλό-
φλεβοι καὶ οἱ νανώδεις καὶ vi μεγαλοκέφαλοι" τῶν

\ \ ς Fd ὔ a 3 Ἴ ἢ a
μὲν yap αἱ φλέβες areval, ὥστ᾽ οὐ pddiov διαρρεῖν

2 κατιὸν τὸ ὑγρόν, τοῖς δὲ νανώδεσι καὶ μεγαλοκεφά-

ς ” ε A \ a > , € \
Rots ἡ ἄνω ὁρμὴ πολλὴ καὶ ἀναθυμίασις. οἱ δὲ

᾿ > ¢ ῃ >” PS “ὦ
φλεβώδεις οὐχ ὑπνωτικοὶ δι᾿ εὔροιαν τῶν φλεβῶν,
μ᾿ , LAA {0 yw £ I 299 ¢
ἂν μή te ἄλλο πάθος ἔχωσιν ὑπεναντίον. οὐδ᾽ of

μελαγχολικοί: κατέψυκται yap 6 εἴσω τόπος, ὥστ᾽
οὐ γίνεται πλῆθος αὐτοῖς ἀναθυμιάσεως. διὰ τοῦτο

80 γὰρ καὶ βρωτικοὶ σκληροὶ ὄντες" ὥσπερ γὰρ οὐδὲν
ἀπολελαυκότα διάκειται τὰ σώματα αὐτοῖς. ἡ δὲ
μέλαινα χολὴ φύσει ψυχρὰ οὖσα καὶ τὸν θρεπτικὸν
τόπον ψυχρὸν ποιεῖ καὶ τἄλλα μόρια, ὅπου ἂν
ὑπάρχῃ δυνάμει τὸ τοιοῦτον περίττωμα.

41νυ ὥστε φανερὸν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι ὁ ὕπνος

ἐστὶ σύνοδός τις τοῦ θερμοῦ εἴσω καὶ ἀντιπερέ-

Ἂ Ἄ, 4 ? 4 ze δ 1

στασις φυσικὴ διὰ τὴν εἰρημένην αἰτίαν. διὸ πολλὴ

ἡ κίνησις τοῦ ὑπνοῦντος, ὅθεν δ᾽ ἐκλείπει, κατα-
332

ON SLEEP AND WAKING, m.

when it has passed upwards strongly, then again
descends, and swells the veins and chokes the passage
through which respiration passes. This is why wine
is not good for infants, nor for wet nurses (perhaps it
makes no difference whether the infants or their
nurses drink it}, but they should drink watery things,
aud not in large quantities ; for wine is windy and
the darker wine most markedly so. The upper parts
of infants are so full of food that for five months they
do not even bend their necks ; for as in the ease af
the very drunk, much moisture is carried upwards.
Probably this is why the embryo lies quiet in the
womb at first. Generally speaking, those with in-
visible veins, dwarfs, and those with big heads are
most addicted to sleep ; for their veins are narrow,
so that the moisture in its descent eannut easily flaw
through, and with dwarfs and the big-headed the
upward movement and the rising vapour are con-
siderable. But those with marked veins are not
much given to sleep owing to the easy flow in the
veins, unless of course they have any counteracting
malady. Nor are the melancholic inclined to sleep
much ; for the region within is chilled, so that there
is not much rising vapour in their case. For this
reason also they are inclined to eat much though they
are spare ; for their condition of body is such as not
to profit by their food. Black bile also being by
nature cold makes the nutritive and other parts cold,
wherever there is potentially an excess of this kind.
So that it is obvious from what has been said that
sleep is in a sense a mecting-place of the internal
heat, and a natural reaction of the parts for the reason
we have given. Therefore the movement of the
sleeper is considerable. But when the heat fails he

388

Hoat as
a factor.

ARISTOTLE
457b ἵ \ ἢ , \ ͵
ψύχεται, καὶ διὰ ψύξιν καταπίπτει τὰ βλέφαρα.
υ καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄνω κατέψυκται καὶ τὰ ἔξω, τὰ δ᾽ ἐντὸς

καὶ τὰ κάτω θερμά, οἷον τὰ περὶ τοὺς πόδας καὶ
τὰ εἴσω.

Καίτοι τις ἀπορήσειεν ἄν, ὅτι μετὰ τὰ σιτία
ἰσχυρότατος ὁ ὕπνος γώεται, καὶ ἔστιν ὑπνωτικὰ
οἶνος καὶ ἄλλα θερμότητας ἔχοντα τοιαύτας. ἔστι

10 δ᾽ οὐκ εὔλογον" τὸν μὲν ὕπνον εἶναι κατάψυξιν, τὰ
δ᾽ αἴτια τοῦ καθεύδειν θερμά. πότερον οὖν τοῦτο
συμβαίνει ὅτι ὥσπερ ἡ κοιλία κενὴ μὲν οὖσα θερμή
ear’, ἡ δὲ πλήρωσις αὐτὴν καταψύχει διὰ τὴν
κίνησιν, οὕτω καὶ οἱ ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ πόροι καὶ τόποι
καταψύχονται ἀναφερομένης τῆς ἀναθυμιάσεως; ἢ

ιὸ ὥσπερ τοῖς προσχεομένοις τὸ θερμὸν ἐξαίφνης
φρίκη γίνεται, κἀκεῖ ἀνιόντος τοῦ θερμοῦ ἀθροι-
ζόμενον τὸ ψυχρὸν καταψύχει, καὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν
θερμὸν ποιεῖ ἐξαδυνατεῖν καὶ ὑποχωρεῖν; ἔτι δὲ
πολλῆς ἐμπιπτούσης τροφῆς, ἣν ἀνάγει τὸ θερμόν,
ὥσπερ τὸ πῦρ ἐπιτιθεμένων τῶν ξύλων, κατα-
ψύχεται, ἕως ἂν καταπεφθῇ.

0. Είνεται yap 6 ὕπνος, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, τοῦ σωμα-
τώδους ἀναφερομένου ὑπὸ τοῦ θερμοῦ διὰ τῶν φλε-
βῶν πρὸς τὴν κεφαλήν. ὅταν δὲ μηκέτι δύνηται,
ἀλλὰ τῷ πλήθει ὑπερβάλλῃ τὸ ἀναχθέν, πάλιν ἀνταπ-
θεῖται καὶ κάτω ῥεῖ. διὸ καταπίπτουσί τε ὑπο-

80 σπωμένου τοῦ θερμοῦ τοῦ ἀνάγοντος οἱ ἄνθρωποι
(μόνον γὰρ ὀρθὸν τῶν ζῴων), καὶ ἐπιπεσὸν μὲν
ἔκνοιαν ποιεῖ, ὕστερον δὲ φαντασίαν. ἢ αἱ μὲν νῦν
λεγόμεναι λύσεις ἐνδεχόμεναι μέν εἰσι τοῦ γίνεσθαι
τὴν κατάψυξιν" οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ κύριός γ᾽ ἐστὶν ὃ τόπος
ὁ περὶ τὸν ἐγκέφαλον, ὥσπερ ἐν ἄλλοις εἴρηται.

80 πάντων δ᾽ ἐοτὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι ψυχρότατον 6
334

ON SLEEP AND WAKING, nr.

grows cold, and owing to this chilling his eyelids fall.
The parts above and outside grow cold, but the parts
below and within grow hot, such as the parts about
the feet and those inside the body.

Yet one might sce some difficulty in the fact that
sleep becomes deepest after food, and that. wine and
other things which are naturally heating tend to
produce sleep. It does not seem logical that sleep
should be a chilling, while the causes of sleep are hot.
Is it possible that just as the stomach is hot when
empty, but the filling of it chills it because of the
movement, so also the passages and region of the
head grow cold when the vapour arises? Or is it
similar to the condition of those over whom hot
water is poured, who first of all shiver; so in this
case as the heat rises the accumulated cold chills it,
and makes what is naturally hot impotent and with-
draw? But when much food is introduced which the
heat draws up, just like fire when logs are put on it,
it is chilled until it is digested.

For sleep comes, as has been said, when the bodily
part is carried upwards by the heat through the veins
to the head. But when this is no longer possible,
but that which is carried upwards becomes excessive
in amount, it is moved in the contrary direction and
Hows downwards, And so when the heat, which is
the agent of rising, is withdrawn men fall down (for
they alone of living creatures are erect), and the
falling down produces loss of consciousness, and after-
wards imagination. Or perhaps the suggested solu-
tions are possible accounts of the chilling; but all
the same the region about the brain has the mastery,
as has been said in another connexion. But the
brain is the coldest of all parts of the body, and, in

335

A dimcuity
in this
explanation.

Vanous
suyestions.

ARISTOTLE
487 Ὁ
ἐγκέφαλος, τοῖς δὲ μὴ ἔχουσι τὸ ἀνάλογον, τούτῳ
μόριον. ὥσπερ οὖι τὸ ἀπατμίζον ὑγρὸν ὑπὸ τῆς
τοῦ ἡλίου ϑερμότητος, 6 ὅταν ἔλθῃ εἰς τὸν ἄνω τόπον,
διὰ τὴν ψυχρότητα αὐτοῦ καταψύχεται καὶ συστὰν
458 καταφέρεται. γενόμενον. πάλιν ὕδωρ, οὕτως ἐν τῇ
ἀναφορᾷ τοῦ θερμοῦ τῇ πρὸς τὸν ἐγκέφαλον ἡ ἡ μὲν
περιττωματικὴ ἀναθυμίασις εἰς φλέγμα συνέρχεται
(διὸ καὶ οἵ κατάρροι φαίνονται γιγνόμενοι ἐκ τῆς
υ κεφαλῆς), ἡ δὲ τρόφιμος καὶ μὴ νοσώδης κατα-
έρεται συνισταμένη καὶ καταψύχει τὸ θερμόν.
πρὸς δὲ τὸ καταψύχεσθαι καὶ μὴ δέχεσθαι ῥᾳδίως
τὴν ἀναθυμίασιν συμβάλλεται καὶ ἡ λεπτότης καὶ
ἡ orevorns τῶν περὶ τὸν “ἐγκέφαλον φλεβῶν. τῆς
μὲν οὖν καταψύξεως τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὲν αἰτιον, καίπερ

Ἰὸ τῆς ἀναθυμιάσεως ὑπερβαλλούσης τῇ θερμότητι.
᾿Εγείρεται δ᾽, ὅταν πεφθῇ καὶ κρατήσῃ ἢ συν-
εωσμένη θερμότης ἐν ὀλίγῳ πολλὴ ἐκ τοῦ περι-
εστῶτος, καὶ διακριθῇ τό τε σωματωδέστρον αἷμα
καὶ τὸ καθαρώτατον. ἔστι δὲ λεπτότατον μὲν αἷμα
καὶ καθαρώτατον τὸ ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ, παχύτατον δὲ
τᾷ καὶ θολερώτατον τὸ ἐν τοῖς κάτω μέρεσιν. παντὸς
δὲ τοῦ αἵματος ἀρχή, ὥσπερ εἴρηται καὶ ἐνταῦθα καὶ
ἐν ἄλλοις, ἡ καρδία. τῶν δ᾽ ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ ἑκατέρας
τῆς θαλάμης κοινὴ ἡ “μέση: ἐκείνων δ᾽ ἑκατέρα
δέχεται ἐξ ἑκατέρας τῆς φλεβός, τῆς τε μεγάλης
καλουμένης καὶ τῆς doprijs: ev δὲ τῇ μέσῃ γίνεται
80 ἡ διάκρισις. ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν διορίζειν περὶ τούτων
ἑτέρων ἐστὶ λόγων. οἰκειότερον. διὰ δὲ τὸ γίνεσθαι
ἀδιακριτώτερον τὸ αἷμα μετὰ τὴν τῆς τροφῆς
προσφορὰν ὁ ὕπνος γίνεται, ἕως ἂν διακριθῇ
τοῦ αἵματος τὸ μὲν καθαρώτερον εἰς τὰ ἄνω,
τὸ δὲ θολερώτερον εἰς τὰ κάτω: ὅταν δὲ τοῦτο

980

ON SLEEP AND WAKING, ut.

those which have none, whatever part corresponds
to the brain. Just as that which exhales water
under the heat of the sun, when it reaches the upper
region chills because of its coldness, and after con-
densing becomes water again, and is carried down,
so in the rising of heat to the brain, the excessive
rise of vapour collects into phlegm (and so colds seem
to arise from the head), and the healthy and not
detrimental evaporation is collected and carried
down and chills the hot. The lightness and narrow-
ness of lhe veins about the brain contribute to the
chilling process and the reluctance to receive the
rising vapour easily. This is the cause of the chilling,
although the rising vapour is excessively hot.
Awakening oceurs when digestion is complete 5 the Awakening.
heat previously collected in large quantity in a small
space from its environment becomes more powerful
and the more corporcal is separated from the pure
blood. The blood in the head is the lightest and
purest, that in the lower parts of the body is thickest
and most dense. But the fount of all blood, as has
been said in this treatise and in others, is the heart ;
and of the parts of the heart the middle connects with
each ventricle ; for each of them receives blood from
each vein, that which is called the “ great vein” and
the aorta ; and the separation happens in the middle.
A more exact definition about these things is more
proper to another subject. But sleep oceurs because
the blood is not so divided after the absorption of
food, until the purer part of the blood is divided in
the upper parts, and the thicker into the lower ;
a 337

ARISTOTLE

5
oe συμβῇ, ἐγείρονται ἀπολυθέντα τοῦ ἐκ τῆς τροφῆς
βάρους.

Ld μὲν οὖν τὸ αἴτιον τοῦ καθεύδειν, εἴρηται, ὅτι ἡ
ὑπὸ τοῦ σωματώδους τοῦ ἀναφερομένου ὑπὸ τοῦ
συμφύτου θερμοῦ ἀντιπερίστασις ἀθρόως ἐπὶ τὸ
πρῶτον αἰσθητήριον' καὶ τί ἐστιν ὁ ὕπνος, ὅτι τοῦ
πρώτου αἰσθητηρίου κατάληψις πρὸς τὸ μὴ δύνα-

0 σθαι ἐνεργεῖν, ἐξ ἀνάγκης μὲν γινόμενος (οὐ γὰρ
ἐνδέχεται ζῷον εἶναι μὴ συμβαινόντων τῶν ἀπ-
ἐργαζομένων αὐτό), ἕνεκα δὲ σωτηρίας" σώζει γὰρ
ἡ ἀνάπαυσις.

338

ON SLEEP AND WAKING, m.

when this happens the parts awake, because they are
separated from the heaviness of food.

We have thus explained the reason of sleep, that snamary.
it is the reaction by the bodily part which is carried
upwards by its natural heat to the first sense organ ;
as for what sleep is we have shown that it is a
paralysis of the first sense organ to prevent it from
functioning, and is a necessary process (for the
animal could not exist unless something was present
to fulfil its nature), that is for its preservation ; for
rest preserves it.

339

ON DREAMS

INTRODUCTION

Tus subject is nearly as obscure to us as it was to
Aristotle. In the present treatise the handling of
the subject is full of interest, and contains some
suggestions of real value. Aristotle first decides that
our dreams are nat directly due to perception, for by
hypothesis our senses are all asleep. Yet he feels
that they must have some connexion with perception,
and that they imply the same sort of “ imagination ”
as we employ in memory. He finds them analogous
to the phenomenon we know as “ persistence of
vision,’ whereby we can still see an image (or seem
to do so) which has actually passed from our sight.
So he regards dreams as a kind of persistence of sense
impressions received while awake. Their distortion
he thinks similar to the distortion caused by rough
water to a visual image.

343

ΠΕΡῚ ENTINIQN

I. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα περὶ ἐνυπνίων" ζητητέον, καὶ

4680 πρῶτον τίνι τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς φαίνεται, καὶ πότερον

τοῦ νοητικοῦ τὸ πάθος ἐστὶ τοῦτο ἢ τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ"
τούτοις γὰρ μόνοις τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν γνωρίζομέν τι.

Εἰ δὲ χρῆσις ὄψεως ὅρασις καὶ ἀκοῆς τὸ ἀκούειν

καὶ ὅλως αἰσθήσεως τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, κοινὰ δ᾽ ἐστὶ

» τῶν αἰσθήσεων οἷον σχῆμα καὶ μέγεθος καὶ κίνησις

καὶ τᾶλλα τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἴδια δ᾽ οἷον χρῶμα ψόφος

χυμός, ἀδυνατεῖ δὲ πάντα μύοντα καὶ καθεύδοντα

458 a

tom ς , δὲ , + A λ ~ onA “ 7
ὁρᾶν, ὁμοίως δὲ Kal ἐπὶ καὶ λοιπῶν, δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ
αἰσθανόμεθα οὐδὲν ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις. οὐκ ἄρα γε τῇ
>? ᾿ς -- ὅς ἃ ᾽ if
αἰσθήσει τὸ ἐνύπνιον αἰσθανόμεθα.
10 ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τῇ δόξῃ. οὐ γὰρ μόνον τὸ προσιόν
» No > A * \ BD]
φαμεν ἄνθρωπον ἢ ἵππον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ λευκὸν ἢ
΄ κα ς ‘ » > ta OA ba) 4
καλόν' ὧν ἡ δόξα ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως οὐδὲν ἂν φήσειεν,
uo? 2 ~ ᾿» ~ 2 \ “a ω
οὔτ᾽ ἀληθῶς οὔτε ψευδῶς. ἐν δὲ τοῖς ὕπνοις
a ~ -
συμβαίνει τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦτο ποιεῖν" ὁμοίως γὰρ ὅτι
15 ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὅτι λευκὸς ὁ προσιὼν δοκοῦμεν ὁρᾶν.
Ε “
ἔτι παρὰ τὸ ἐνύπνιον ἐννοοῦμεν ἄλλο τι, καθάπερ
1 ἐνυπνίον B.

344

ON DREAMS

I, Now our inquiry is concerned with dreams, and
in the first place to what faculty of the soul they
belong, and whether the affection belongs to the
thinking or to the fecling part; for it is only by one
of these faculties within us that we can attain know-
ledge.

Now if the employment of vision is seeing, and of
hearing audition, and of feeling generally is sensa-
tion, and if again the perception of some things such
as form, size, movement and other such things is
shared by the senses, while others such as colour,
sound and taste belong to special senses ; if again
everything that has its eyes shut and is asleep is
incapable of seeing, and similarly with the other
senses, it is clear that we have no perception in
dreams at all. Therefore we do not see our dreams
by perception.

Nor is it by opinion. For we do not merely say
that the thing approaching is a man or a horse, but
also that it is white or handsome ; but on these
points opinion could not pronounce, either truly or
falsely, without perception. Yet the soul does these
things i in sleep ; for we seem to see that the approach-
ing object is a man, and also thal he is white. More-
over in a dream we have some other concept, just as

845

br Sentog
is not
perception,

nor opinion,

408 b

ἢ

Bit

469 ἃ

ARISTOTLE

ἐν τῷ ἐγρηγορέναι αἰσθανόμενοί re περὶ οὗ yap
> / # ‘ é La a
αἰσθανόμεθα, πολλάκις Kat διανοούμεθά τι. οὕτω
καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις παρὰ τὰ φαντάσματα ἐνίοτε
» > ~ ᾽ > ~ "
ἄλλα ἐννοοῦμεν, φανείη δ᾽ ἄν τῳ τοῦτο, εἴ τις προσ-
ἔχοι τὸν νοῦν καὶ πειρῷτο μνημονεύειν ἀναστάς.
ἤδη δέ τινες καὶ ἑωράκασιν ἐνύπνια τοιαῦτα οἷον
οἱ δοκοῦντες κατὰ τὸ μνημονικὸν παράγγελμα
7 A z Ul \ ) a
τίθεσθαι τὰ προβαλλόμενα' συμβαίνει yap αὐτοῖς
,ὔ ” A ‘ ; ier ὁ 4 ‘
πολλάκις ἄλλο τι παρὰ TO ἐνύπνιον τίθεσθαι πρὸ
ὀμμάτων εἰς τὸν τόπον φάντασμα. ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι
οὔτε ἐνύπνιον πᾶν τὸ ἐν ὕπνῳ φάντασμα, καὶ ὅτι
Δ > ~ ~ ; 4
ὃ ἐννοοῦμεν τῇ δόξῃ δοξάζομεν.
Δῆλον δὲ περὶ τούτων ἁπάντων τό γε τοσοῦτον,
ὅτι τῷ αὐτῷ ᾧ καὶ ἐγρηγορότες ἐν ταῖς νόσοις
al? al a“
ἀπατωμεθα, ὅτι τοῦτ᾽ αὐτὸ καὶ ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ ποιεῖ
\ δ ‘ ς ,ὔ \ \ We - £
τὸ πάθος. καὶ ὑγιαίνουσι δὲ Kal εἰδόσιν ὅμως ὁ
a ~ 2
ἥλιος ποδιαῖος εἶναι δοκεῖ. ἀλλ᾽ εἴτε δὴ ταὐτὸν
εἴθ᾽ ἕτερον τὸ φανταστικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τὸ
αἰσθητικόν, οὐδὲν ἧττον οὐ γίνεται ἄνευ τοῦ ὁρᾶν
καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαί τι' τὸ γὰρ παρορᾶν καὶ παρ-
ακούειν ὁρῶντος ἀληθές τι καὶ ἀκούοντος, οὐ μέν-
τοι τοῦτο ὃ οἴεται. ἐν δὲ τῷ ὕπνῳ ὑπόκειται μη-
\ tow» > 3 4 . 4 3 Ν᾿»
δὲν ὁρᾶν μηδ᾽ ἀκούειν μηδ᾽ ὅλως αἰσθάνεσθαι. dp
Ri s \ δὲ © am: ἐλ θέ. s δὲ δὲ ;
οὖν τὸ μὲν μηδὲν ὁρᾶν ἀληθές, τὸ δὲ μηδὲν πάσχειν
4 uw 3 3 , 2 2 bs ΤᾺ ἣ᾿ ‘A
τὴν αἴσθησιν οὐκ ἀληθές, ἀλλ᾽ ἐνδέχεται Kal τὴν
uw f a ‘ a > 4 a
ὄψιν πάσχειν τι Kal τὰς ἄλλας αἰσθήσεις, ἕκαστον
ἤ
δὲ τούτων ὥσπερ ἐγρηγορότος προσβάλλει μέν
~ 2
πως τῇ αἰσθήσει, οὐχ οὕτω δὲ ὥσπερ ἐγρηγορότος"
346

ON DREAMS, 1

if we perecived something while awake ; for we often
have some thoughts about what we perceive. And
so in sleep we sometimes have other thoughts beyond
the mental pictures. This will become obvious to
anyone if he reflects on it, and tries to remember his
dream when he has awakened. Indeed some men
have seen dreams of such a kind, for instance, those
who scem to arrange what is put forward according to
some principle of memorizing ; it often happens that
these put some mental picture before their eyes
beyond the dream itself. [Ὁ is then clear that a
dream does not consist entirely of a mental picture
seen in sleep. but that we also form opinions as to
what we think.

On the whole question this much at any rate is
clear, that we are deceived precisely in the same part
in which we are deceived in i]]Iness when awake ; that
it is this part which causes the experience in sleep
also, The sun appears to measure a foot across to
men who are in health, and know its real measure-
ment. But whether the part of the soul which con-
structs mental] pictures is the same as the part. which
perceives them or not, in any case it does not occur
without some vision and perception ; for to see and
hear incorrectly is the property of one who secs and
hears something real, but not what he thinks. But
in sleep it is an axiom that one sees nothing, nor does
one hear, nor has one any perception at all. Then
‘ seeing nothing ” is true. but that the senses experi-
ence nothing is not true, but it is possible that the
sight and the other senses do experience something,
but that each of them contributes to the sensation as
they do in the case of a man awake, but not in the
same way as when a man is awake. And in the one

347

Yet, soma
form of
percepr
tion 148
necessary.

ARISTOTLE
459 a , a ee | 4 ε 7 is a “a ‘ ς ra
καὶ ὁτὲ μὲν. ἡ δόξα λέγει ὅτι ψεῦδος τὸ ὁρώμενον,
ὥσπερ ἐγρηγορόσιν, ὁτὲ δὲ κατέχεται καὶ ἀκο-
λουθεῖ τῷ φαντάσματι.

Ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἔστι τοῦ δοξάζοντος οὐδὲ τοῦ
διανοουμένου τὸ πάθος τοῦτο ὃ καλοῦμεν ἐνυπνιά-
10 ζειν φανερόν. ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ τοῦ αἰσθανομένου ἁπλῶς"
δρᾶν γὰρ ἂν ἦν καὶ ἀκούειν ἁπλῶς. ἀλλὰ πῶς

?
δὴ καὶ τίνα τρόπον, ἐπισκεπτέον. ὑποικείσθω δ᾽,
ὅπερ ἐστὶ καὶ φανερόν, ὅτι τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ τὸ

é » a - “ 3 A ¥ δ
πάθος, εἴπερ καὶ ὁ ὕπνος" οὐ γὰρ ἄλλῳ μέν τινι

~ f e , ecw ” \ i ὕὔ
τῶν ζῴων ὑπάρχει ὁ ὕπνος, ἄλλῳ δὲ τὸ ἐνυπνιάζειν͵,
ἀλλὰ τῷ αὐτῷ. ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ φαντασίας ἐν τοῖς
περὶ ψυχῆς εἴρηται, καὶ ἔστι μὲν τὸ αὐτὸ τῷ

~ >
αἰσθητικῷ τὸ φανταστικόν, τὸ δ᾽ εἶναι φανταστι-
κῷ καὶ αἰσθητικῷ ἕτερον, ἔστε δὲ φαντασία ἡ
ὑπὸ τῆς κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν αἰσθήσεως γινομένη κίνησις,
τὸ δ᾽ ἐνύπνιον φάντασμά τι φαίνεται εἷναι (τὸ γὰρ
80 ἐν ὕπνῳ φάντασμα ἐνύπνιον oe εἴθ᾽ ἁπλῶς
εἴτε τρόπον τινὰ γινόμενον), φανερὸν ὅτι τοῦ

αἰσθητικοῦ μέν ἐστι τὸ ἐνυπυϊάξειν, τούτου δ᾽ ἡ

τὸ φανταστικόν.

͵ 3 " " A eg \ ~ “ >

Il, Τί δ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ ἐνύπνιον καὶ πῶς γίνεται, ἐκ

τῶν περὶ τὸν ὕπνον συμβαινόντων μάλιστ᾽ ἂν

25 θεωρήσαιμεν. τὰ “γὰρ αἰσθητὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον

αἰσθητήριον ἡμῖν ἐμποιοῦσιν αἴσθησιν, καὶ τὸ

γινόμενον ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν πάθος οὐ μόνον ἐνυπάρχει ἐν

τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις ἐνεργουσῶν τῶν αἰσθήσεων, ἀλλὰ
καὶ ἀπελθουσῶν.

; ‘ A ᾿ς > a Z \

Παραπλήσιον γὰρ τὸ πάθος ἐπί re τούτων καὶ

we
on

® De 4, 499 a1.
348

ON DREAMS, τ.-- πὶ,

case opinion states that what is secn is false, as
happens with those awake, in the other opinion is
fettered, and follows the mental picture.

Now it is clear that the experience which we call
dreaming is not proper to the part of us which is
forming an opinion, nor to the part which thinks.
Nor does it entirely belong to the feeling part; for
in that case a man (in a dream) would merely see and
hear. But we must consider how and in what way
this comes about, Let us first lay down what is quite
abvious, that it is an experience of the sensitive
faculty just as sleep is ; for we do not find that sleep
is the characteristic of one living creature and dream-
ing of another, but both are found in the same animal.
But when we discussed imagination in the treatise
On. the Soul,* it was agreed that the faculty form-
ing mental pictures was the same as the sensitive
faculty, but that the imaginative and sensitive were
different in essence. Imagination was agreed to be
a movement produced by perception in a state of
activity, and the dream scems to be some sort of
mental picture (for we call a mental picture appearing
in sleep a dream, either simply so, or at any rate in
some sense) ; it is clear that dreaming belongs to the
sensitive faculty and is related to it in the same way
as imagination.

11. What a dream is and how it originates, we can
best study from the circumstances which attend sleep.
For sensible objects produce sensation in us according
to each sense organ, and the affection produced by
them not only exists in the sense organs while the
senses are in active operation, but continues after
these have gone.

The affection in these cases seems to be similar to

349

{t is closely
connected
with
mnagini-
tlon.

ARISTOTLE

459 0 ON - , aw > \ κ᾿ 2 a
ἐπι τῶι φερομένων εοικεν εἰναὺ. καὶ yap €T7l Tuy

~ + é
40 φερομένων τοῦ κινήσαντος οὐκέτι θιγγάνοντος
- ~ , x
κινεῖται" τὸ yap κινῆσαν ἐκίνησεν ἀέρα τινά, καὶ
a « ῃ -
πάλιν οὗτος κινούμενος ἕτερον. καὶ τοῦτον δὴ
~ a“ \
τὸν τρόπον, ἕως ἂν στῇ, ποιεῖται τὴν κίνησιν καὶ
4695 ἐν ἀέρι καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὑγροῖς.
- n ral >
ὋὉμοίως δ᾽ ὑπολαβεῖν τοῦτο δεῖ καὶ én’ ἀλ-
λοιώσεως" τὸ γὰρ θερμανθὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ θερμοῦ τὸ
πλησίον θερμαίνει, καὶ τοῦτο διαδίδωσιν ἕως τῆς
ἀρχῆς, ὥστε καὶ ἐν ᾧ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἐπειδή ἐστιν
Σ é / < 3 2. # ” 2 Ὁ
ὁ ἀλλοίωσίς τις ἡ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν αἴσθησις, ἀνάγκη
- / >
τοῦτο συμβαίνειν. διὸ τὸ πάθος ἐστὶν οὐ μόνον
: ᾽ θ ‘ n~ 3 θ , Ἰλλὰ \ >
ἐν αἰσθανομένοις τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν
1 > \ > -
πεπαυμένοις, καὶ ἐν βάθει καὶ ἐπιπολῆς. φανερὸν
“ ,
δ᾽ ὅταν συνεχῶς αἰσθανώμεθά τι" μεταφερόντων
A δ " > a \ a t ]
yap τὴν αἴσθησιν ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ πάθος, οἷον ἐκ
~ ¢ ᾿ rod
10 τοῦ ἡλίου εἰς τὸ σκότος" συμβαίνει yap μηδὲν ὁρᾶν
διὰ τὴν ἔτι ὑποῦσαν κίνησιν ἐν τοῖς ὄμμασιν ὑπὸ
τοῦ φωτός. κἂν πρὸς ἕν χρῶμα πολὺν χρόνον
, a ΗΠ a , “- ,
βλέψωμεν ἢ λευκὸν ἢ χλωρόν, τοιοῦτον φαίνεται
313 Ψ a A ye / 3, \
ἐφ᾽ ὅπερ ἂν τὴν ὄψιν μεταβάλωμεν. κἂν πρὸς
τὸν ἥλιον βλέψαντες ἢ ἄλλο τι λαμπρὸν μύσωμεν,
, a
ιὸ παρατηρήσασι φαίνεται κατ᾽ εὐθυωρίαν, ἢ συμ-
βαίνει τὴν ὄψιν ὁρᾶν, πρῶτον μὲν τοιοῦτον τὴν
͵ a
χρόαν, εἶτα μεταβάλλει εἰς φοινικοῦν κἄπειτα
“- ͵
πορφυροῦν, ἕως ἂν εἰς τὴν μέλαιναν ἔλθῃ χρόαν
4 - =
καὶ ἀφανισθῇ. καὶ αἱ ἀπὸ τῶν κινουμένων δὲ
? ~ ~
μεταβάλλουσιν, οἷον ἀπὸ τῶν ποταμῶν, μάλιστα
350

ON DREAMS, 11.

that observable in projectiles. For in the case of the A

mechanical

latter movement continues after the cause of the jnpnise

movement has eeased to touch them ; for the initial p

roduces ar

effeet which

cause of the movement imparts motion to a portion continues

of the air which, being moved, again moves another

after the
original

portion. This is the way in which the initial cause of impulse ins

movements continues to produce it both in air and in
liquids, until the moving objects come to a standstill.
One can suppose that something similar takes place

vensed.

in change of state as well; for that which is heated so too

by the hot in turn heats that which is near it, and this δ

hands on the succession until it reaches the beginning
again. So in the case of sensation, since sensation in
active operation is a kind of change of state, this must
also happen. Consequently this affection exists not
merely in the sense organs while they are feeling, but
also when they have ceased to do so, both deep down
and onthe surface. ‘This is clear when we are engaged
in continuous perception ; for even when we change a
our sensation the affection persists; for instance,
when we turn from sunlight to darkness ; the result
is that we see nothing because the movement pro-
duced in our eyes by the light still persists. Again
if we look for a long time at one colour—say white or
green—any object to which we shift our gaze ap-
pears to be that colour. And if, after looking at the
sun or some other bright object, we shut our eyes,
then, if we watch carefully, we shall still see it in
the same straight line as we saw it before, first of
all with its own proper colour, then it will change to
red, and this to purple, until it fades to black and
disappears. The samc persistence of vision occurs
when we turn from moving objects—for instance
with rivers, and this is most conspicuous when the

351

ith heat

1d light.

ARISTOTLE

a δ᾽ ἀπὸ τῶν τάχιστα ῥεόντων: φαίνεται γὰρ τὰ
ἠρεμοῦντα κινούμενα. γίνονται δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν
μεγάλων ψόφων δύσκωφοι καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἰσχυρῶν
ὀσμῶν δύσοσμοι, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ὁμοίων. ταῦτά, γε

δὴ φανερῶς συμβαίνει τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον.
Ὅτι δὲ ταχὺ τὰ αἰσθητήρια καὶ μικρᾶς διαφορᾶς
2 αἰσθάνεται, σημεῖον τὸ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐνόπτρων γινό-
μενον" περὲ οὗ καὶ αὐτοῦ ἐπιστήσας σκέψαιτό τις
ἂν καὶ ἀπορήσειεν. ἅμα δ᾽ ἐξ αὐτοῦ δῆλον ὅτι
ὥσπερ καὶ 1, ὄψις πάσχει, οὕτω καὶ ποιεῖ τι, ἐν
γὰρ τοῖς ἐνόπτροις τοῖς σφόδρα καθαροῖς, ὅταν
τῶν καταμηνίων ταῖς γυναιξὶ γινομένων ἐμ-
80 βλέψωσιν εἰς τὸ κάτοπτρον, γίνεται τὸ ἐπιπολῆς
τοῦ ἐνόπτρου οἷον νεφέλη αἱματώδης" κἂν μὲν
καινὸν ἦ τὸ κάτοπτρον, οὐ ῥάδιον ἐκμάξαι τὴν
τοιαύτην κηλῖδα, ἐὰν δὲ παλαιόν, ῥᾷον. αἴτιον δ᾽,
480 ἃ ὥσπερ εἴπομεν, ὅτι οὐ μόνον πάσχει τι ἡ ὄψις
ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀέρος, ἀλλὰ καὶ ποιεῖ τι καὶ κινεῖ, ὥσπερ
καὶ τὰ λαμπρά' καὶ yap | ἡ ὄψις τῶν λαμπρῶν καὶ
ἐχόντων χρῶμα. τὰ μὲν οὖν ὄμματα εὐλόγως,
ὁ ὅταν ἦ τὰ καταμ ἥνια, διάκειται, ὥσπερ καὶ ἕτερον
μέρος ὁτιοῦν" καὶ γὰρ “ύσει τυγχάνουσι φλεβώ-
δεις ὄντες. διὸ γινομένων τῶν καταμηνίων διὰ
ταραχὴν καὶ φλεγμασίαν αἱματικὴν ἡμῖν μὲν ἡ ἐν
τοῖς ὄμμασι διαφορὰ ἄδηλος, ἔνεστι δέ (ἡ γὰρ
αὐτὴ φύσις σπέρματος καὶ καταμηνίων), ὁ δ᾽ ἀὴρ
10 κινεῖται ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν, καὶ τὸν ἐπὶ τῶν κατόπτρων
ἀέρα συνεχῇ ὄντα ποιόν τινα ποιεῖ καὶ τοιοῦτον
οἷον αὐτὸς πάσχει: ὁ δὲ τοῦ κατόπτρου τὴν ἐπι-
φάνειαν. ὥσπερ δὲ τῶν ἱματίων τὰ μάλιστα
καθαρὰ τάχιστα κηλιδοῦται' τὸ γὰρ καθαρὸν ἀκρι-
βῶς δηλοῖ ὅ τι ἂν δέξηται, καὶ μάλιστα τὰς ἐλα-

352

ON DREAMS, 11.

objects move rapidly ; for then objects really at rest
appear to be moving. So men become deafencd hy
loud noises and lose their sense of smell for strong
seents and so on. This obviously happens in the
way described.

We can prove that the sense organs have quick
perception of even small differences from what occurs
with mirrors ; a subject upon which one might tind
considerable difficulty, if one considered it by itself.
But it is quite clear that, just as vision is affected by
an object, so vision produces an effect on an object.
Nam clarissimorum speculorum facies, cum feminae
mienstruis affectae in speculum introspiciant, quasi
nubes sanguinea videtur: si quidem uovum est
speculum, macula difficilis est deletu, sin autem vetus,
facilis ; propterea quod, utpote diximus, non modo
oculi aere afficiuntur, sed etiam ipsi aera aliquomodo
afficiunt et movent, sicut res claras ; oculi enim clara
et quae colorem habent vident. Nee mirandum est
oculos, cum menstrua incidant, ita affectos esse, ut
alteram partem ; ii enim natura sunt venosi. Ergo,
cum menstrua incidant feminis, oculi, scilicet turbati
et inflammati, fiunt mutati (menstrua enim eandem
habent naturam quam conceptio) quanquain nobis
viris non apparet; qui quidem et commovent et
affciunt si quid acris circum speculum continetur,
quod ipsum similem habet naturam ; et. aer ita afficit
speculi faciem. Sie etiam vestes mundissimac celer-
rime maculantur ; tabulae enim rasae facillime im-

aA 353

Vision
affects the
object seun,

480 4
τῇ

480 b

ARISTOTLE

᾿ i is δὲ λ \ ὃ \ \ A Xr -
χίστας κινήσεις. ὁ δὲ χαλκὸς διὰ μὲν τὸ λεῖος
εἶναι ὁποιασοῦν ἁφῆς μάλιστα αἰσθάνεται (δεῖ δὲ
νοῆσαι οἷον τρίψιν οὖσαν τὴν τοῦ ἀέρος ἁφὴν καὶ
ὥσπερ ἔκμαξιν καὶ ἀνάπλυσιν), διὰ δὲ τὸ καθαρὸν
ἔκδηλος γίνεται ὁπηλικηοῦν οὖσα. τοῦ δὲ μὴ
ἐξιέναι ταχέως ἐκ τῶν καινῶν κατόπτρων αἴτιον
τὸ καθαρὸν εἶναι καὶ λεῖον: διαδύεται γὰρ διὰ
τῶν τοιούτων καὶ εἰς βάθος καὶ πάντῃ, διὰ μὲν
τὸ καθαρὸν εἰς βάθος, διὰ δὲ τὸ λεῖον πάντῃ. ἐν
δὲ τοῖς παλαιοῖς οὐκ ἐμμένει, ὅτι οὐχ ὁμοίως
εἰσδύεται ἡ κηλὶς ἀλλ’ ἐπιπολαιότερον. ὅτι μὲν
οὖν καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν μικρῶν διαφορῶν γίνεται κίνησις,
καὶ ὅτι ταχεῖα ἡ αἴσθησις, ἔτι δὲ ὅτι οὐ μόνον
πάσχει ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀντιποιεῖ τὸ τῶν χρωμάτων
αἰσθητήριον, φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ
τοῖς εἰρημένοις καὶ τὰ περὶ τοὺς οἴνους καὶ τὴν
μυρεψίαν συμβαίνοντα. τό τε γὰρ παρασκευασθὲν
ἔλαιον ταχέως λαμβάνει τὰς τῶν πλησίον ὀσμάς,
καὶ οἱ obvor τὸ αὐτὸ τοῦτο mdayovaw: od γὰρ
μόνον τῶν ἐμβαλλομένων ἢ ὑποκιρναμένων, ἀλλὰ
καὶ τῶν πλησίον τοῖς ἀγγείοις τιθεμένων ἢ πεφυ-
κότων ἀναλαμβάνουσι τὰς ὀσμάς.

Πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς σκέψιν ὑποκείσθω ἕν μέν,
ὅπερ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων φανερόν, ὅτι καὶ ἀπελθόντος
τοῦ θύραθεν αἰσθητοῦ ἐμμένει τὰ αἰσθήματα
αἰσθητὰ ὄντα, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ὅτι ῥᾳδίως ἀπατώ-

εθα περὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὄντες,
ἄλλοι δ᾽ ἐν ἄλλοις, οἷον ὁ δειλὸς ἐν φόβῳ, ὁ δ᾽
ἐρωτικὸς ἐν ἔρωτι, ὥστε δοκεῖν ἀπὸ μικρᾶς ὁμοιό-
τητος τὸν μὲν τοὺς πολεμίους ὁρᾶν, τὸν δὲ τὸν
ἐρώμενον. καὶ ταῦτα ὅσῳ ἂν ἐμπαθέστερος iD
τοσούτῳ ἀπ᾽ ἐλάσσονος ὁμοιότητος φαίνεται. τὸν
354

ON DREAMS, 11.

primuntur signa etiam minula. Sed aes, quia leve
est, si quis quam minihne tangit, afficitur (aer autem,
ul ita dicam, Lcrere, detergere, lavare videtur), ct
quia mundum est, non est incertum quo modo tactum
sit, Etenim, quod speculum mundum est ct leve, non
celeriter evanescit species ; percolavit enim penitus,
quia mundum est speculum, et passim diffusa est, quia
leve. At in veteribus non persiat, quia macula non
penitus diffusa est, sed solum in summo speculo restat.
All this proves first that movement is produced by
minule differences, secondly that perception is very
rapid, and thirdly that the sense organ which per-
ceives colours is not only affected by colours, but also
in tum affects them. This conclusion is further
supported by what occurs with wines and with the
preparation of perfumes. For oil which has been
prepared quickly takes on the scent of what is near
it, and wines are affected in the same way ; for they
acquire the smell not merely of what is put into them,
and mixed in small quantities with them, but even of
that which is placed, or lies in vessels near by.

To return to the starting-point of our inquiry, one
fact, which is clear from what we have said, may be
laid down—that the object of sense still remains
perceptible even after the external object perceived
has gone, and moreover that we arc easily deceived
about our perceptions while we have them, some in
some circumstances and others in others ; for instance
the coward in his fear, the lover in his love, so that
even by a very faint resemblance the coward thinks
that he sees his enemy, and the lover the object of his
love ; and in proportion as he is more affected. so
his imagination is stimulated by a more remote

355

Persistence
of vision as
an explana
tion of
dreains.

ARISTOTLE

460 b ay 4 ᾿ Woes. a an ss a ’
auToOV δὲ τρόπον και εν οργαις καὶ ἐν πάσαις €7TL-

, Ἵ 4 a / A “
τὸ θυμίαις εὐαπάτητοι γίνονται πάντες, καὶ μᾶλλον
ὅσῳ ἂν μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν ὦσιν. διὸ καὶ τοῖς
πυρέττουσιν ἐνίοτε φαίνεται ζῷα ἐν τοῖς τοίχοις
ἀπὸ μικρᾶς ὁμοιότητος τῶν γραμμῶν συντιθεμέ-
νων. καὶ ταῦτ᾽ ἐνίοτε συνεπιτείνει τοῖς πάθεσιν
ω ῳ > oN \ ᾿ , , \
οὕτως ὥστ᾽ ἐὰν μὲν μὴ σφόδρα κάμνωσι, μὴ
τὸ λανθάνειν ὅτι ψεῦδος, ἐὰν δὲ μεῖζον ἢ τὸ πάθος,
καὶ κινεῖσθαι πρὸς αὐτά. altiov δὲ τοῦ συμβαίνειν
ταῦτα τὸ μὴ Κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν κρίνειν τό
- \ t
τε κύριον Kal ᾧ τὰ φαντάσματα γίνεται. τούτου
δὲ σημεῖον ὅτι φαίνεται μὲν ὁ ἥλιος ποδιαῖος,
> , \ Fd Lia / \ \
ἀντίφησι δὲ πολλάκις ἕτερόν τι πρὸς THY φαντα-
2% σίαν. καὶ τῇ ἐπαλλάξει τῶν δακτύλων τὸ ἕν δύο
ta > eed Nu , , \
φαίνεται, ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως οὔ φαμεν δύο' κυριωτέρα γὰρ
- ἐπ [ y ; 3 € ers / a
τῆς ἁφῆς ἡ ὄψις. εἰ δ᾽ ἦν ἡ addy μόνη, κἂν
? , A a 4 ~ ‘ ~ ᾿»
ἐκρίνομεν τὸ ἕν δύο. τοῦ δὲ διεψεῦσθαι αἴτιον
ὅτι οὐ μόνον τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ κινουμένου φαίνεται
£ , 3 A a ~ > £ i >
ἁδήποτε, ἀλλὰ Kat τῆς αἰσθήσεως κινουμένης ad-
ὃ τῆς, ἐὰν ὡσαύτως κινῆται ὥσπερ καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ
a > ~ a a
αἰσθητοῦ! λέγω δ᾽ οἷον ἡ γῆ δοκεῖ τοῖς πλέουσι
tal ta -“ Ψ ς Σ a
κινεῖσθαι κινουμένης THs ὄψεως ὑπ᾽ ἄλλου.
4 4 ‘
IIL. Ἔκ δὴ τούτων φανερὸν ὅτι οὐ μόνον ἐγρηγορό-
/ ~
των αἱ κινήσεις at ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθημάτων γινόμεναι
80 τῶν τε θύραθεν καὶ τῶν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος ἐνυπαρχου-
~ 3 A ἅτὺ tA A ͵ “- Lal a
σῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅταν γένηται τὸ πάθος τοῦτο ὃ καλεῖ-
Yj \ a if , eae
ται ὕπνος, καὶ μᾶλλον τότε φαίνονται. μεθ᾽ ἡμέραν
4811 μὲν γὰρ ἐκκρούονται ἐνεργουσῶν τῶν αἰσθήσεων
356

ON DREAMS, π.-- πτ.

resemblance, ὅπ the same way in tenaper and in all
forms of desire all are casily deecived, and the more
casily, the more they are under the influcnee in ques-
tion. So men in fever think that they see aniuals on
the walls trom the slight resemblance of ἢ πὸ joined
to cach other. Sometimes the effect on the emotions
is such that, if they are not very ill, they are aware
that the impression is false, but, if the malady grows
worse, they are moved to believe in what they see.
The reason that this occurs is that the controlling
power does not judge these things by the same
faculty as that by which sense images occur. ‘This is
proved by the fact that the sun appears to incasure a
foot across, but there is some other power which
contradicts this impression. So again when the
fingers are crossed one object (bel ween them) appears
to be two, but. yet we deny that there are two ; for
sight has more authority than touch. But if touch
were the only criterion, we should judge the one as
two. The cause of this deception is that objects of
any kind may appear to us, not only when the object
of sense supplies the stimulus, but also when the sense
is stimulated by itself, provided that it is stimulated
in the same way as by an object of sense; I mean
for instance that to those who are sailing past it the
land seems to move, though really the eye is being
moved by another cause.

ΠῚ. It is evident from the foregoing that move-
ments arising from the senses, both those which are
stimulated from without and those which have their
origin within the body, occur not only when we are
awake, but also when the affection we call sleep
supervenes, and even more at that time. In the day-
time these movements are eclipsed when the senses

357

Explena-
tions by
analogy.

4618

ARISTOTLE

καὶ τῆς διανοίας, καὶ ἀφανίζονται ὥσπερ παρὰ
πολὺ πῦρ ἔλαττον καὶ λῦπαι καὶ ἡδοναὶ μικραὶ
παρὰ μεγάλας, παυσαμένων. δ᾽ ἐπιπολάζει καὶ τὰ
μικρά" νύκτωρ δὲ δι᾽ ἀργίαν τῶν κατὰ μόριον
αἰσθήσεων καὶ ἀδυναμίαν τοῦ ἐνεργεῖν, διὰ τὸ ἐκ
τῶν ἔξω εἰς τὸ ἐντὸς γίνεσθαι τὴν τοῦ θερμοῦ
παλίρροιαν, ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς αἰσθήσεως κατα-
φέρονται καὶ pigs φανεραὶ καθισταμένης τῆς
ταραχῆς. δεῖ ὑπολαβεῖν ὥσπερ τὰς μικρὰς
δίνας τὰς ἐν τοῖς ποταμοῖς γινομένας, οὕτω τὴν
κίνησιν ἑκάστην γίνεσθαι συνεχῶς, πολλάκις μὲν
ὁμοίως, πολλάκις δὲ διαλυομένας εἰς ἄλλα σχήματα
διὰ τὴν ἀντίκρουσιν. διὸ καὶ μετὰ τὴν τροφὴν
καὶ πάμπαν νέοις οὖσιν, οἷον τοῖς παιδίοις, οὐ
γίνεται ἐνύπνια" πολλὴ γὰρ ἡ κίνησις διὰ τὴν ἀπὸ
τῆς τροφῆς θερμότητα. ὥστε καθάπερ ἐν ὑγρῷ,
i ἐὰν σφόδρα κινῇ τις, ὁτὲ μὲν οὐδὲν φαίνεται
“Belov ὁτὲ" δὲ φαίνεται μὲν διεστραμμένον δὲ
πάμπαν, ὥστε φαίνεσθαι ἀλλοῖον ἢ οἷόν ἐστιν,
ἠρεμήσαντος δὲ καθαρὰ καὶ φανερά, οὕτω καὶ ἐν
τῷ καθεύδειν τὰ φαντάσματα καὶ αἱ ὑπόλοιποι
κινήσεις, αἱ συμβαίνουσαι ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθημάτων
ὁτὲ μὲν ὑπὸ μείζονος οὔσης τῆς εἰρημένης κινήσεως
ἀφανίζονται πάμπαν, ὁτὲ δὲ τεταραγμέναι αἶνον-
ται αἱ ὄψεις καὶ τερατώδεις καὶ οὐκ ἐρρωμένα τὰ
ἐνύπνια, οἷον τοῖς μελαγχολικοῖς καὶ πυρέττουσι
καὶ οἰνωμένοις" πάντα γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάθη πνεὺυ-
ματώδη ὄντα πολλὴν ποιεῖ κίνησιν καὶ ταραχήν.
καθισταμένου δὲ καὶ διακρινομένου τοῦ αἵματος
ἐν τοῖς ἐναίμοις, σωζομένη τῶν αἰσθημάτων ἡ
κίνησις ἀφ' ἑκάστου τῶν αἰσθητηρίων ἐρρωμένα
τε ποιεῖ τὰ ἐνύπνια, καὶ φαίνεσθαί τι καὶ δοκεῖν
358

ON DREAMS, πὶ.

and the mind are active, and are obscured just in the
same way as a smaller fire is obscured by a greater,
and small pains and pleasures by great; but when
these movements have ceased even the small ones
come to the surface ; but at night, because the senses
are individually at yest. and cannot function, owing to
the flow of heat reversing direction and passing from
the outside to the inside. they reach the point where
sensation begins and becomes noticeable, as the bustle
subsides. One may suppose that they are like the
eddies which are seen in rivers, cach movement taking
place continuously, often with unchanging pattern,
but often again dividing into other shapes owing to
some obstruction. For this reason after food and in
the very young such as infants there are no dreams ;
for the movement is considerable owing to the heat
arising from food; so in water if one disturbs it
violently, sometimes no image appears, and some-
times it appears but is entirely distorted, so that it
seems quite different from what it really is, but, when
the water is still, it is clear cut and plain; so also in
sleep, some of the visions and other movements that
arise from the senses are altogether obscured owing
to the greater movement we have mentioned before,
and sometimes the visions appear confused and
monstrous, and the dreams seem not substantial, as
occurs with the melancholic, the feverish and the intoxi-
cated ; for all these affections, being due to breath-
ing, produce much movement and confusion. In the
animals that have blood, when the blood is steady and
divided into its elements, the movement of the senses
derived from each of the sense organs makes the
dreams substantial, and the sleeper imagines that he

359

ARISTOTLE

401 4 A 4 A 3 A a » 7 ῷδ: αι
διὰ μὲν τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ὄψεως καταφερόμενα ὁρᾶν,

διὰ δὲ τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀκοῆς ἀκούειν. ὁμοιοτρόπως
80 δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθητηρίων: τῷ μὲν γὰρ
ἐκεῖθεν ἀφικνεῖσθαι τὴν κίνησιν πρὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν
4610 καὶ ἐγρηγορὼς δοκεῖ ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀκούειν καὶ αἰσθά-
\ A Ay εἾ cua ᾽ν -" o
νεσθαι, καὶ διὰ τὸ THY ὄψιν ἐνίοτε κινεῖσθαι δοκεῖν
Ἵ ͵ ε - tA \ -“ A ς A ᾿
οὐ κινουμένην δρᾶν φαμέν, καὶ τῷ τὴν ἁφὴν δύο
2 ᾿ Ἵ ͵7 A « ὃ ᾿ς ὃ a ὅλ
κινήσεις εἰσαγγέλλειν τὸ ἕν δύο δοκεῖν. ὅλως
Σ εἶ 2 > ς rd > 7 ,ὔ 4 9 ν ΑΝ
γὰρ τὸ ἀφ᾽ ἑκάστης αἰσθήσεώς φησιν ἡ ἀρχή, ἐὰν
5 μὴ ἑτέρα κυριωτέρα ἀντιφῇ. φαίνεται μὲν οὖν
/ ~ \ i] 4 \ ᾽ 3 2
πάντως, δοκεῖ δὲ οὐ πάντως τὸ φαινόμενον, ἀλλ
ἐὰν τὸ ἐπικρῖνον κατέχηται ἢ μὴ κινῆται τὴν
2 , , σ > " cia " >
οἰκείαν κίνησιν. ὥσπερ δ᾽ εἴπομεν ὅτι ἄλλοι δι
ἄλλο πάθος εὐαπάτητοι, οὕτως 6 καθεύδων διὰ
τὸν ὕπνον καὶ τὸ κινεῖσθαι τὰ αἰσθητήρια καὶ
μὺ \ , \ A wv ω
10 τἄλλα τὰ συμβαίνοντα περὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν, ὥστε
τὸ μικρὰν ἔχον ὁμοιότητα φαίνεται ἐκεῖνο. ὅταν
γὰρ καθεύδῃ, κατιόντος τοῦ πλείστου αἵματος ἐπὶ
τὴν ἀρχὴν συγκατέρχονται αἱ ἐνοῦσαι κινήσεις, αἱ
4 - ε 4 3 ie! « > Mv .
μὲν δυνάμει αἱ δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ. οὕτω δ᾽ ἔχουσιν ὥστε
2 ~ 14 " {' Ψ Γὴ 2 3 “~ €
ἐν τῇ κινήσει τῃδὲ ἧδε ἐπιπολάσει ἐξ αὐτοῦ ἡ
1s κίνησις, ἂν δ᾽ αὕτη φθαρῇ, ἥδε. καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλας
δ᾽ ἔχουσιν ὥσπερ οἱ πεπλασμένοι βάτραχοι οἱ
3 , ? ~ τ a lod ε la Ud
avidvres ἐν τῷ ὕδατι τηκομένου τοῦ ἁλός. οὕτως
ἔνεισι δυνάμει, ἀνειμένου δὲ τοῦ κωλύοντος ἐνερ-
“- ᾿ ,ὔ ~ ~
yotow: καὶ λυόμεναι ἐν ὀλίγῳ τῷ λοιπῷ αἵματι
ral > A > ~
τῷ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις κινοῦνται, ἔχουσαι ὅὁμοιό-
360

ON DREAMS, tt.

really sees what. is carried down by the sense of vision,
and that he hears what is carried down hy the sense of
hearing. The same is true of the other sense organs.
Even in the waking state a man’s impression that he
sees, hears or ΓΑΕ is duc to the fact. that the move-
ment passes from there to the starting-point ; and
because the vision seems at times to be stimulated,
though really it is uot, we say that we sec, and one
appears to be two, because the sense of touch reports
two stimuli. For, speaking generally, the controlling
power atlirms the report given by each sense, unless
another power still more authoritative contradicts it.
In every case the sense impression is there, but the
sense impression does not in every case seem Lrue,

but only when the judging faculty is subordinated,

and is not oving with its proper movement. But
just as we have said that some are liable to be de-
ceived by one affection and others by another, so the
sleeper is liable to be deceived owing lo his sleep, and
to the fact that the sense organs and the other things
which are connected with sensation are stimulated so
that an image which has only a remote resemblance

seems to be the object itself. For when a man is
asleep, most of the blood sinks to its sourec, and the
movements residing in it, some potential and some
actual, travel with it. They are in such a condition,
that in this movement one will detach itself and rise
to the surface, and if this is destroyed another will
do so. Their relation to each other is similar to that
of artificial frogs, which rise to the surface of the
water, as the salt is dissolved. They thus exist
potentially, but only function actually when the
preventing cause is removed ; and travelling in the
little blood which remains in “the sense organs they

361

ARISTOTLE

461 ἢ Ἔ 5 2 ᾿ 8 "
Βὸ τῆτα ὥσπερ τὰ ἐν τοῖς νέφεσιν, ἃ παρεικάζουσιν

3 Ψ A Ψ / ,
ἀνθρώποις καὶ κενταύροις ταχέως μεταβάλλοντα.
τούτων δὲ ἕκαστόν ἐστιν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ὑπόλειμμα
τοῦ ἐν τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ αἰσθήματος: καὶ ἀπελθόντος
τοῦ αἰσθήματος τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἔνεστι, καὶ ἀληθὲς
Ν = r >
εἰπεῖν ὅτι τοιοῦτον οἷον Κορίσκος, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ Kopi-
a ΕἸ 2 , 3 ” = , 4
Δ σκος. ὅτε δ᾽ ἠσθάνετο, οὐκ ἔλεγε Kopicxov τὸ
- \ - -
κύριον καὶ τὸ ἐπικρῖνον, ἀλλὰ διὰ τοῦτο ἐκεῖνον
Κορίσκον" τὸν ἀληθινόν. οὗ δὴ καὶ αἰσθανόμενον
λέγει τοῦτο, ἐὰν μὴ παντελῶς κατέχηται ὑπὸ τοῦ
~ a
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ὑπὸ τῶν κινήσεων τῶν ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις. καὶ
a ,

30 δοκεῖ τὸ ὅμοιον αὐτὸ εἶναι ἀληθές. καὶ τοσαύτη
τοῦ ὕπνου ἡ δύναμις ὥστε ποιεῖν τοῦτο λανθάνειν.
a » " 7 ς / £
ὥσπερ οὖν eb τινα λανθάνοι ὑποβαλλόμενος ὁ

»“ 2 Ἂς *~
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καὶ δόξει εἶναι δύο τὸ ἕν, ἂν δὲ μὴ λανθάνῃ,
~ Δ “
φανεῖται μὲν οὐ δόξει δέ, οὕτω καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις,
aN \ J 4 Ὁ ΄Φ " ~ Lf
ἐὰν μὲν αἰσθάνηται ὅτι καθεύδει, Kat τοῦ πάθους
ἐν ᾧ ἡ αἴσθησις τοῦ ὑπνωτικοῦ, φαίνεται μέν,
λέ δέ 2 > αι ὦ 7 ‘ K ,

8 λέγει δέ τι ἐν αὐτῷ ὅτι φαίνεται μὲν Κορίσκος,
οὐκ ἔστι δὲ Κορίσκος (πολλάκις γὰρ καθεύδοντος
λέγει τι ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ὅτι ἐνύπνιον τὸ φαινόμενον)"
ἐὰν δὲ λανθάνῃ ὅτι καθεύδει, οὐδὲν ἀντίφησι τῇ
φαντασίᾳ.

Ὅτι δ᾽ ἀληθῆ λέγομεν καὶ εἰσὶ κινήσεις φαντα-
στικαὶ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις, δῆλον, ἐάν τις προσ-

10 έχων πειρᾶται μνημονεύειν ἃ πάσχομεν καταφερό-

4 \
μενοί τε καὶ ἐγειρόμενοι: ἐνίοτε yap τὰ φαινόμενα
362

ON DREAMS, mr.

move, having resemblance in the same way as clouds,
which at times are like men, and then with a rapid
change are like centaurs. Tach of these, as has been
said, is what is left of the actual impression 5 though
the real impression has gone, this still remains, and
it is true to say that it is for instance like Coriscus,
though it is not Coriseus. When perception was
actually taking place the controlling and discriminat-
ing sense did nol declare it Claviscus, but by this con-
trolling sense said that the genuine Coriscus was that
man yonder. That which when actually perceiving
it declared to be this, unless entirely controlled by
the blood, it now calls it when not actually perceiving
it, being stirred by the movements which exist in the
sense organs. And so what resembles it seems to be
the genuine thing. And the power of sleep is such
that it makes one unaware of this. If a man is un-
aware that a finger is being pressed below his eye,
one will not merely scem two, but will carry convic-
tion that it is so, whereas, if he is not unaware, one
will still appear two, but will not carry conviction that
itis so. Just in the same way in sleep, if a man is
aware that he is asleep, and ‘of the condition of a
sleeping man’s perception, the appearance is there,
but he says within himself that there is the appear-
ance of Coriscus, but it is not re ally Coriscus (for
often when a man is asleep he says somewhere in
his soul that what appears to him is a dream) ; but if
he is unaware that he is asleep there is nothing to
contradict the mental picture.

It becomes quite clear that our account is true, and
that there are imaginative stimuli in the sense organs,
if one tries to remember how we are affected when
dropping off to sleep and waking up ; for sometimes

363

Residual
images iu
the sense
organs.

462 0

τὸ
a

462 ὃ

ARISTOTLE

᾿ la
εἴδωλα καθεύδοντι φωράσει ἐγειρόμενος κινήσεις
οὔσας ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητηρίοις" ἐνίοις γὰρ τῶν νεωτέ-
\ ͵ ὃ λέ LY / τς
ρων καὶ mapa διαβλέπουσιν, ἐὰν ἢ σκότος, φαί-
μὲ A , ω > > 14
νεται εἴδωλα πολλὰ κινούμενα, ὥστ᾽ ἐγκαλύπτεσθαι
πολλάκις φοβουμένους.
Ἔκ δὴ τούτων ἁπάντων δεῖ συλλογίσασθαι ὅτι
\ ;
ἐστὶ τὸ ἐνύπνιον φάντασμα μέν τι καὶ ἐν ὕπνῳ"
4 \ Ν ,ὔ a ᾽ » 8. of:
τὰ γὰρ ἄρτι λεχθέντα εἴδωλα οὐϊς ἔστιν ἐνύπνια,
οὐδ᾽ εἴ τι ἄλλο λελυμένων τῶν αἰσθήσεων φαίνεται"
οὐδὲ τὸ ἐν ὕπνῳ φάντασμα πᾶν. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ
(Aes , \ > , i \ / \
ἐνίοις συμβαίνει καὶ αἰσθάνεσθαί πῃ καὶ ψόφων καὶ
fal ἢ n ~
φωτὸς καὶ χυμοῦ Kal ἁφῆς, ἀσθενικῶς μέντοι
> ~
καὶ οἷον πόρρωθεν: ἤδη yap ἐν τῷ καθεύδειν
€ / Δ > / eer ~ “-᾿ ͵
ὑποβλέποντες, ὃ ἠρέμα ἑώρων φῶς τοῦ λύχνου
>
καθεύδοντες, ὡς ᾧοντο, ἐπεγερθέντες εὐθὺς ἐγνώ-
- /
pioav τὸ τοῦ λύχνου ov, Kal ἀλεκτρυόνων Kal
κυνῶν φωνὴν ἠρέμα ἀκούοντες ἐγερθέντες σαφῶς
Ne
ἐγνώρισαν. ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ ἀποκρίνονται ἐρωτώμενοι"
ἐνδέχεται γὰρ τοῦ ἐγρηγορέναι καὶ καθεύδειν ἁπλῶς
, ἐν ἃ ,ὕ ἣν ΣΥΝ, -
θατέρου ὑπάρχοντος θάτερόν πῃ ὑπάρχειν. ὧν
’ A 2 , 7 9.3 μὲ \ 2 ~ 4
οὐδὲν ἐνύπνιον φατέον. οὐδ᾽ ὅσαι δὴ ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ
, a
γίνονται ἀληθεῖς vow παρὰ τὰ φαντάσματα.
ἀλλὰ τὸ φάντασμα τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς κινήσεως τῶν
αἰσθημάτων, ὅταν ἐν τῷ καθεύδειν 7, ἧ καθεύδει,
τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν ἐνύπνιον.
"Ἤδη δέ τισι συμβέβηκεν ὥστε μηδὲν ἐνύπνιον
4
ἑωρακέναι κατὰ τὸν βίον. σπάνιον μὲν οὖν τὸ
τοιοῦτόν ἐστι, συμβαΐνει δ᾽ ὅμως. καὶ τοῖς μὲν
ao fa ιν ἊΣ 3 ~ ;
ὅλως διετέλεσεν, ἐνίοις δὲ καὶ προελθοῦσι πόρρω
861:
§

ON DREAMS, τὴ.

images which appear to one when asleep one will
on waking detect to be movements in the sense
organs ; for to some young people even when their
eyes are wide open, if it is day k, many images secin
to move, so that they often cover their heads in
frieht.

One must conclude from all this that a dream is one
form of mental image, which occurs in sleep : for the
images just referrecl to are not dreams, nor any other
image which appears when the senses are relaxed ;
nor is every mental picture occurring in slecp a
dream. For in the first place some have a certain
perception of sounds, and light, and flavour, aad
touch, but faintly and, as it were, from a distance
for seeing vaguely in their sleep the light of the k amp,
as they supposed, which they saw but faintly. they
instantly recognize when fairly awake to be re ally the
light of the lamp. and similarly hearing faintly the
cocks crowing, or the dogs barking, they reeounize
them definitely when fully awake. Some (sleepers)
again even answer when they are asked a question ;
for it is quite possible, in the case of being awake and
asleep, that when one is prescnt the other is also in
a certain sense. But none of these things can be
called a dream. Nor can those real thoughts which
oceur in sleep in connexion with mental pictures,
But the mental picture which arises from the move-
ment of the senses when once is asleep, in so far as this
condition exists, is a dream.

But it has been the lot of some that they have never
scen a dream throughout their life. Such a condition
is uncommon, but nevertheless it occurs. With some
the condition lasts all through their lives, but with
others dreams come to them when they are fur ad-

365

Dreaimea anid
true

erception
in sleep,

Dreamers.

ARISTOTLE

462 b
THs ἡλικίας ἐ ἐγένετο, πρότερον οὐδὲν ἐ ἐνύπνιον éwpa-

κόσιν. τὸ δ᾽ αἴτιον τοῦ μὴ γίνεσθαι παραπλήσιόν
τι δεῖ νομίζειν, ὅτι οὐδὲ μετὰ τὴν τροφὴν καθ-
δυπνώσασιν οὐδὲ τοῖς παιδίοις γίνεται ἐνύπνιον"
ὅσοις γὰρ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον συνέστηκεν ἡ φύσις
ὥστε πολλὴν προσπίπτειν ἀναθυμίασιν πρὸς τὸν
ἄνω τόπον, ἢ πάλιν καταφερομένη ποιεῖ πλῆθος
κινήσεως, εὐλόγως τούτοις οὐδὲν φαίνεται φάν-
τασμα. προϊούσης δὲ τῆς ἡλικίας οὐδὲν ἄτοπον

10 φανῆναι ἐνύπνιον" μεταβολῆς γάρ Tivos γενομένης
7 καθ᾽ ἡλικίαν 7 ἢ κατὰ πάθος ἀναγκαῖον συμβῆναι
τὴν ἐναντίωσιν ταύτην.

866

ON DREAMS, τη,

vanced in life, never having secn one before, One
must suppose that the reason of ils not occurring is
the same as that which aceounts for dreams not
appearing to those who sleep after food, nor to chil-
dren. For those whose nature is so constituted that
much upward evaporation takes place, which when it
descends again produces a considerable movement,
naturally see no mental picture. But it is not sur-
prising that dreams appear as their age advances ;
for an opposite reaction must occur when a change
takes place due to either age or illness.

367

ON PROPHECY IN SLEEP

INTRODUCTION

THe most astonishing thing about this short treatise
is the purely modern scientific attitude which Avis-
totle adopts. All antiquity regarded dreams as
analogous to dermoniae possession, and therefore to
be treated with reverence, and to a great extent
worthy of trust. Aristotle prefaces his tract by
suggesting that it-is wrong either to reject or credul-
ously accept the statement that. dreams are of divine
origin. He dismisses the majority of dreams as
mere coincidences, and in this sense, outside causa-
tion ; but he clearly thinks that there is a residue
which is capable of explanation, but only by a skilled
interpreter.

371

482 ἢ

ΠΕΡῚ ΤῊΣ KAO’ YITNON
MANTIKHS

1. Περὶ δὲ τῆς μαντικῆς τῆς ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις γινο-
μένης καὶ λεγομένης συμβαίνειν a ἀπὸ τῶν ἐνυπνίων,
οὔτε καταφρονῆσαι ῥάδιον οὔτε πεισθῆναι. τὸ μὲν
γὰρ πάντας ἢ πολλοὺς ὑπολαμβάνειν ἔχειν τι
σημειῶδες τὰ ἐνύπνια παρέχεται πίστιν ὡς ἐξ
ἐμπειρίας λεγόμενον, καὶ τὸ περὶ ἐνίων εἶναι τὴν
μαντικὴν ἐν τοῖς ἐνυπνίοις. οὐκ ἄπιστον" ἔχει γάρ
τινα, λόγον, διὸ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἐνυπνίων
ὁμοίως ἄν τις οἰηθείη. τὸ δὲ μηδεμίαν αἰτίαν
εὔλογον ὁρᾶν, καθ᾽ ἣν ἂν ψίνοιτο, τοῦτο διαπιστεῖν
ποιεῖ" τὸ τε γὰρ θεὸν εἶναι τὸν πέμποντα, πρὸς
τῇ ἄλλῃ ἀλογίᾳ, καὶ τὸ μὴ τοῖς βελτίστοις καὶ

ρονιμωτάτοις ἀλλὰ τοῖς τυχοῦσι πέμπειν ἄτοπον.
ἀφαιρεθείσης δὲ τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ αἰτίας οὐδεμία
τῶν ἄλλων εὔλογος εἶναι φαίνεται αἰτία" τὸ γὰρ
περὶ τῶν ἐφ᾽ ᾿Ἡρακλείαις “στήλαις ἢ τῶν ἐν
Βορυσθένει προορᾶν τινάς, ὑπὲρ τὴν ἡμετέραν εἶναι
δόξειεν ἂν σύνεσιν εὑρεῖν τούτων τὴν ἀρχήν."
᾿Ανάγκη δ᾽ οὖν τὰ ἐνύπνια ἢ αἴτια εἶναι 7 σημεῖα
τῶν γιγνομένων ἢ συμπτώματα, ἢ πάντα ἢ ἔνια
τούτων ἢ ἕν μόνον. λέγω δ᾽ αἴτιον μὲν οἷον τὴν
372

ON PROPHECY IN SLEEP

I. As for propheey which takes place in sleep and The
which is said to arise from dreams, il is not a simple ee
matter either te be contemptuous, or to be con Wann ts
vineed, ‘he fact that all, or at least many, suppose %o
that dreams have a siynificance inclines one to be-
lieve, as the opinion is quoted as the result of ex-
perience, nor is it incredible that on some subjects
there should be divination in dreams 3 for it has some
show of reason, and therefore one might suppose it
true of other dreams as well, But the fact that one
can see no reasonable cause why it should be so,
makes one distrust it; the idea that it is God who
sends it, apart from its improbability on other
grounds, is strange, especially as it does not come to
the best and wisest, but to any chance persons. But,
if we dismiss the theory that it comes from God,
there seems no other probable explanation left ; for
it seems beyond our understanding to find any
reason why anyone should foresee things occurring
at the Pillars of Heracles or on the Borysthenes.

Dreams must however be either the causes or Are they
signs of events which occur, or else coincidences, nee
either all these, or some, or one only. By the word Guonees?

378

ARISTOTLE

102} / ~ 2 , \ “ ‘ \ ? ~
“0 σελήνην του ἐκλείπειν τον» ἥλιον Καὶ τὸν Κοπον TOU

πυρετοῦ, σημεῖον δὲ τῆς ἐκλείψεως τὸ τὸν ἀστέρα
εἰσελθεῖν, τὴν δὲ τραχύτητα τῆς γλώττης τοῦ
πυρέττειν, σύμπτωμα δὲ τὸ βαδίζοντος ἐκλείπειν
4888 τὸν ἥλιον: οὔτε γὰρ σημεῖον τοῦ ἐκλείπειν τοῦτ᾽
ἐστὶν οὔτ᾽ αἴτιον, οὔθ᾽ ἡ ἔκλειψις τοῦ βαδίζειν.
διὸ τῶν συμπτωμάτων οὐδὲν οὔτ᾽ ἀεὶ γίνεται οὔθ᾽
ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ. ἄρ᾽ οὖν ἐστὶ τῶν ἐνυπνίων τὰ
μὲν αἴτια, τὰ δὲ σημεῖα, οἷον τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα
s συμβαινόντων; λέγουσι γοῦν καὶ τῶν ἰατρῶν οἱ
χαρίεντες ὅτι δεῖ σφόδρα προσέχειν τοῖς ἐνυπιίοις"
εὔλογον δ᾽ οὕτως ὑπολαβεῖν καὶ τοῖς μὴ τεχιυίύταις
μέν, σκοπουμένοις δέ τι καὶ φιλοσοφοῦσιν.
Ai γὰρ μεθ᾽ ἡμέραν γινόμεναι κινήσεις, ἂν μὴ
σφόδρα μεγάλαι dow καὶ ἰσχυραί, λανθάνουσι παρὰ
ιυ μείζους τὰς ἐγρηγορικὰς κινήσεις. ἐν δὲ τῷ
καθεύδειν τοὐναντίον: καὶ γὰρ αἱ μικραὶ μεγάλαι
δοκοῦσιν εἶναι. δῆλον δ᾽ ἐπὶ τῶν συμβαινόντων
κατὰ τοὺς ὕπνους πολλάκις" οἴονται γὰρ κεραυνοῦ-
σθαι καὶ βροντᾶσθαι μικρῶν ἤχων ἐν τοῖς ὠσὶ
γινομένων, καὶ μέλιτος καὶ γλυκέων χυμῶν ἀπο-
ιὸ Aavew ἀκαριαίου φλέγματος καταρρέοντος, καὶ
βαδίζειν διὰ πυρὸς καὶ θερμαίνεσθαι σφόδρα μικρᾶς
θερμασίας περί τινα μέρη “γιγνομένης. ἐπεγειρο-
μένοις δὲ ταῦτα φανερὰ τοῦτον ἔχοντα τὸν τρόπον.
ὥστ᾽ ἐπεὶ μικραὶ πάντων αἱ ἀρχαί, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ
τῶν νόσων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων παθημάτων τῶν ἐν τοῖς
20 σώμασι μελλόντων γίνεσθαι. φανερὸν οὖν ὅτι
ταῦτα ἀναγκαῖον ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις εἶναι καταφανῆ
μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τῷ ἐγρηγορέναι.

374

ON PROPHECY IN ΘΓ ΠΡ,

cause TL mean in the sense in whieh the moon is the
cause of an eclipse of the sun, or fatigue is the cause
of fever; the faet that a star enlers our vision 1 call
significant of the eclipse; the roughness of the
tongue is significant of fever, but the fact that some-
one is walking when the sun is eclipsed is a coinci-
dence, For this is neither the cause of, nor significant
of the eclipse. any more than the eclipse is ihe cause
or significant of a man walking, So no coincidence
occurs invariably or even commonly. Is il true then
that some dreams are causes and others significant—
of what happens in the bedy for instanee ? Even
accomplished physicians say that close attention
should be paid to dreams ; and it is natural for those
to suppose so, who are not skilled, but who are in-
quirers and lovers of truth,

Impulses occurring in the daytime, if they are not
very great and powerful, pass unnoticed because of
greater waking impulses. But in the time of sleep
the opposite takes place; for then small impulses
scem to be great. This is clear from what often
happens in sleep ; men think that it is lightning and
thundering, when there are only faint echoes in their
ears, and that they are enjoying honey and sweet
flavours, when only a drop of phlegm is slipping down
(their throats), and that they are walking through fire
and are tremendously hot, when there is only a
slight heating about certain parts. The true nature
of these becomes obvious when they wake up.
Since the beginnings of all things are small, obviously
the beginnings of diseases and other distempers,
which are about to visit the body, must also be
small. These then must be more evident in the
sleeping than in the waking state.

375

)istortion
hy dreams.

463 ἃ

463 b

ARISTOTLIS

᾿Αλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἔνιά ye τῶν καθ᾽ ὕπνον davra-
σμάτων αἴτια εἶναι τῶν οἰκείων ἑκάστῳ πράξεων ov
ἄλογον’ ὥσπερ γὰρ μέλλοντες πράττειν καὶ ἐν ταῖς
πράξεσιν ὄντες ἢ πεπραχότες πολλάκις εὐθυονειρίᾳ
τούτοις σύνεσμεν καὶ πράττομεν (αἴτιον δ᾽ ὅτι προ-
ωὡδοποιημένη τυγχάνει ἡ κίνησις ἀπὸ τῶν pel?
ἡμέραν ἀρχῶν), οὕτω πάλιν ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τὰς καθ᾽
ὕπνον κινήσεις πολλάκις ἀρχὴν εἶναι τῶν pel?
ἡμέραν πράξεων διὰ τὸ προωδοποιῆσθαι πάλιν καὶ
τούτων τὴν διάνοιαν ἐν τοῖς φαντάσμασι τοῖς
νυκτερινοῖς. οὕτω μὲν οὖν ἐνδέχεται τῶν ἐνυπνίων
ἔνια καὶ σημεῖα καὶ αἴτια εἶναι.

Τὰ δὲ πολλὰ συμπτώμασιν ἔοικε, μάλιστα δὲ τά
τε ὑπερβατὰ πάντα καὶ ὧν μὴ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἡ ἀρχὴ
οἷον. περὶ ναυμαχίας καὶ τῶν πόρρω συμβαινόντων
ἐστίν: περὶ γὰρ τούτων τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἔχειν
εἰκὸς οἷον ὅταν μεμνημένῳ τινὶ περί τινος τύχῃ
τοῦτο γινόμενον" τί γὰρ κωλύει καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὕπνοις
οὕτως; μᾶλλον δ᾽ εἰκὸς πολλὰ τοιαῦτα συμβαίνειν.
ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδὲ τὸ μνησθῆναι περὶ τοῦδε σημεῖον
οὐδ᾽ αἴτιον τοῦ παραγενέσθαι αὐτόν, οὕτως οὐδ᾽
ἐκεῖ τοῦ ἀποβῆναι τὸ ἐνύπνιον τῷ ἰδόντι οὔτε
σημεῖον οὔτ᾽ αἴτιον, ἀλλὰ σύμπτωμα. διὸ καὶ
πολλὰ τῶν ἐνυπνίων οὐκ ἀποβαίνει: τὰ γὰρ συμ-
πτώματα οὔτ᾽ ἀεὶ οὔθ᾽ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ γίνεται.

Il. “Ὅλως δ᾽ ἐπεὶ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ὀνειρώτ-
re. τινά, θεόπεμπτα μὲν οὐκ ἂν εἴη τὰ ἐνύπνια,
οὐδὲ γέγονε τούτου χάριν, δαιμόνια μέντοι" ἡ γὰρ
φύσις δαιμονία, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ θεία. σημεῖον δέ' πάνυ

1 ἀλλὰ BY
376

ON PROPHECY IN SLEEP, 1.—u.

Again it is not unreasouable to Suppose that some
of the mental pietures which appear in sleep are the
causes of the actions associated wilh them ; for just
when you are going to act, or are engaged in some
action, or have already completed it. vou are often
connected with this act and perform it in a vivid
dream (the reason being that the impulse arising
fram the first cause in the daytime has paved the
way for it), so conversely impulses in sleep inust often
be the first cause of actions in the daytime, because
the way has been paved for the intention to do these
actions in dreams at night. In this way then it is
possible for some dreams to be both siguifieant and
causes.

But most of them resemble coincidences, especially
those which are extravagant, and which cannot ini-
tiate any action, but deal for instance with naval
battles and far-off events; in these cases it seems
likely that the process is much the same, as when a
man renembers a thing by chance and it occurs, Is
there anything to prevent this occurring in sleep?
On the contrary, probably many dreams of this kind
occur. Just as recollection was neither significant
nor the cause of a man’s : appearing, so in our case the
fact of the dream appearing to the man who saw it
was neither significant, nor the cause, but only a
coincidence. Consequently not many results come
from dreams ; for coincidences do not oceur invari-
ably or even generally.

II. Generally speaking, seeing that some of the
lower animals also dream, dreams cannot be sent by
God, nor is this the cause of their appearance, but
they are miraculous ; for human nature is miraculous,
though it is not divine. There is proof of this; for

377

They may
cause
action,

Some
dreams are
certiuly co-
incidences.

Normally
dreams are
uot of
divine
origin,

463

ARISTOTLE

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is
4

ὥσπερ γὰρ καὶ λέγεται ‘ ἂν πολλὰ βάλλῃς, ἀλλοτ᾽
ἀλλοῖον βαλεῖς ᾿᾿ καὶ ἐπὶ τούτων τοῦτο συμβαίνει.

Ὅτι δ᾽ οὐκ ἀποβαίνει πολλὰ τῶν ἐνυπνίων, οὐδὲν
ἄτοπον" οὐδὲ γὰρ τῶν ἐν τοῖς σώμασι σημείων καὶ
τῶν οὐρανίων, οἷον τὰ τῶν ὑδάτων καὶ τὰ τῶν
πνευμάτων" ἂν γὰρ ἄλλη κυριωτέρα ταύτης συμβῇ
κίνησις, ἀφ᾽ ἧς μελλούσης ἐγένετο τὸ σημεῖον, οὐ
γίνεται. καὶ πολλὰ βουλευθέντα καλῶς τῶν πραχ-
θῆναι δεόντων διελύθη δι᾿ ἄλλας κυριωτέρας ἀρχάς.
ὅλως γὰρ οὐ πᾶν γίνεται τὸ μελλῆσαν, οὐδὲ ταὐτὸ

80 τὸ ἐσόμενον καὶ τὸ μέλλον: ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως ἀρχάς τε

464

λεκτέον εἶναι, ad’ dv οὐκ ἐπετελέσθη, καὶ σημεῖα
πέφυκε ταῦτα τινῶν οὐ γενομένων.

4 Περὶ δὲ τῶν μὴ τοιαύτας ἐχόντων ἀρχὰς ἐνυπνίων
olas εἴπομεν, ἀλλ᾽ ὑπερορίας ἢ τοῖς χρόνοις ἢ τοῖς
τόποις ἢ τοῖς μεγέθεσιν, ἢ τούτων μὲν μηδέν, μὴ
μέντοι γε ἐν αὑτοῖς ἐχόντων τὰς ἀρχὰς τῶν ἰδόντων
τὰ ἐνύπνιον, εἰ μὴ γίεται τὸ προορᾶν ἀπὸ συμπτώ-

5 ματος, τοιόνδ᾽ ἂν εἴη μᾶλλον ἢ ὥσπερ λέγει Δη-
μόκριτος εἴδωλα καὶ ἀπορροίας αἰτιώμενος. ὥσπερ
γὰρ ὅταν κινήσῃ τι τὸ ὕδωρ ἢ τὸν ἀέρα, τοῦθ᾽
ἕτερον ἐκίνησε, καὶ παυσαμένου ἐκείνου συμβαίνει

1 ἄρτια μερίξοντες Β.
378

ON PROPHECY IN SLIZEP, πὶ.

some inferior men have prophetic and vivid dreams,
so they cannot be sent by God; but men whose
nature is garrulous or melancholic see all kinds of
visions ; because they respond often to any kind of
stimulus, they chance upon visions similar to these,
lighting upon them in the same way as some men
playing odd and even, for as the saying goes: If you
cast a die many times you will be sure to cast
differently at some tine. In the case we are dis-
cussing the same thing happens.

But it is in no way surprising that no results follow Semetimes
many dreams ; for they do not always follow bodily Ha
and heavenly symptoms, as we see in the case of rain
and wind; for if another impulse supervenes more
powerful than that from which in the future the
symptoms arise, there is no result from it. Many
things that require doing, though excellently planned,
fail owing to more powerful causes. Speaking quite
generally not all probabilities occur, nor is that which
shall be the same as that which is likely to be ; but
all the same we must call these beginnings from
which no result ensues, and there are genuine
symptoms of some things which do not happen.

But dreams which have not beginnings of the kind Why dreams
we have described, but are outside possibility either mane
in time, or place, or size, or they may be none of intelligence.
these but yet of the kind, the beginnings of which
those who see the dream cannot control, unless the
prediction is purely a coincidence, such drearas seem
to have the following explanation rather than that
given by Democritus, who attributes them to images
and emanations. When anything stirs water or air,
this in its turn causes movement, and when the first
impulse has ceased, a similar movement still con-

879

ARISTOTLE

484 ἃ Ν 7 , “ἢ 4 4 ~

τὴν τοιαύτην κίνησιν προϊέναι μέχρι τινός, τοῦ

κινήσαντος οὐ παρόντος, οὕτως οὐδὲν κωλύει

10 κίνησίν τινα καὶ αἴσθησιν ἀφικνεῖσθαι πρὸς τὰς
ψυχὰς τὰς ἐνυπνιαζούσας, ἀφ᾽ ὧν ἐκεῖνος τὰ εἴδωλα
ποιεῖ καὶ τὰς ἀπορροίας, καὶ ὅπῃ δὴ ἔ ἔτυχεν ἀφικνου-
μένας μᾶλλον αἰσθητὰς εἶναι νύκτωρ διὰ τὸ μεθ᾽
ἡμέραν φερομένας διαλύεσθαι μᾶλλον (ἀταραχω-

15 δέστερος γὰρ 6 ἀὴρ τῆς νυκτὸς διὰ τὸ νηνεμωτέρας
εἶναι τὰς νύκτας), καὶ ἐν τῷ σώματι. ποιεῖν αἴσθησιν
διὰ τὸν ὕπνον, διὰ τὸ καὶ τῶν μικρῶν κινήσεων τῶν
ἐντὸς αἰσθάνεσθαι καθεύδοντας μᾶλλον ἢ ἐγρηγο-
ρότας. αὗται δ᾽ αἱ κινήσεις φαντάσματα ποιοῦσιν,
ἐξ ὧν προορῶσι τὰ μέλλοντα περὶ τῶν τοιούτων.

0 Καὶ διὰ ταῦτα συμβαίνει τὸ πάθος τοῦτο τοῖς
τυχοῦσι καὶ οὐ τοῖς φρονιμωτάτοις. μεθ᾽ ἡμέραν
τε γὰρ ἐγίνετ᾽ ἂν καὶ τοῖς σοφοῖς, εἰ θεὸς ἣν ὃ
πέμπων" οὕτω δ᾽ εἰκὸς “τοὺς τυχόντας προορᾶν' ἡ
γὰρ διάνοια τῶν τοιούτων οὐ φροντιστικὴ ἀλλ᾽
ὥσπερ ἔρημος καὶ κενὴ πάντων, καὶ κινηθεῖσα κατὰ
τὸ κινοῦν ἄγεται.

» Καὶ τοῦ ἐνίους τῶν ἐκστατικῶν προορᾶν αἴτιον
ὅτι αἱ οἰκεῖαι κινήσεις οὐκ ἐνοχλοῦσιν ἀλλ᾽ ἀπορ-
ραπίζονται- τῶν ξενικῶν οὖν μάλιστα αἰσθάνονται.
τὸ δέ Twas edOvoveipovs εἶναι καὶ τὸ τοὺς γνωρί-
μους περὶ τῶν γνωρίμων μάλιστα προορᾶν συμβαί-
νει διὰ τὸ μάλιστα τοὺς “γνωρίμους ὑπὲρ ἀλλήλων

80 φροντίζειν" ὥσπερ γὰρ πόρρω ὄντων μάλιοτα! γνω-
ρίζουσι καὶ αἰσθάνονται, οὕτω Kal τῶν κινήσεων:
αἱ γὰρ τῶν γνωρίμων γνωριμώτεραι κινήσεις. οἱ
δὲ μελαγχολικοὶ διὰ τὸ σφόδρα, ὥσπερ βάλλοντες

1 χάχιστα Ὦ.
380

ON PROPHECY IN SLEFP, τι.

tinues up to a point, though the first impulse is over ;
just in the same way there is nothing ta prevent some
movement and perception coming to souls that are
asleep, from which Democritus constructs his images
and emanations, and however it happens ihey are
more easily perceived by night, because in the day-
time they are apt to be borne aw ay and dissipated
(for the air is less disturbed at night because the
nights are calmer), and they cause sensation in the
body owing to sleep, because men are more conscious
of small internal movements when asleep than when
awake. But these impulses produce mental pic-
tures, from which men predict what will happen
about such things. ‘This is why this affection occurs
more readily to “ordini wy men, and not to those who
are specially intelligent. If it were God that sent
them they would appear by day also, and to the wise ;
but, as it is, it is natural that ordinary men should
foresee ; for the minds of such men are not given
to deep thought, but are empty and vacant of
all thoughts, and when once stimulated follow the
impulse.

The reason why some whose minds are unstable
foresee, is that their own mental impulses do not
occlude others, but are driven off by them. So they
are most sensitive to outside impulses. Tor some
cases of vivid dreams there are special explanations ;
for instance when men have visions about their
friends, it is because those who are great friends
think a good deal about each other : for just as they
perceive and recognize each other most often at a
distance, so it acts with impulses ; for the impulses
of well-known friends are themselves more well
known. ‘The melancholic, because of their inteuse

581

Some
dreams have
special
causes,

ARISTOTLE

464 b πόρρωθεν, εὔστοχοί εἰσιν. καὶ διὰ τὸ μεταβλητικὸν
ταχὺ τὸ ἐχόμενον φαντάζεται αὐτοῖς" ὥσπερ γὰρ
τὰ Φιλαιγίδου ποιήματα καὶ ot ἐμμανεῖς ἐχόμενα
τοῦ ὁμοίου λέγουσι, καὶ διανοοῦνται, οἷον ᾿Αφῴρ οδί-
την, καὶ οὕτω συνείρουσιν εἰς τὸ πρόσω. ἔτι δὲ διὰ

"τὴν σφοδρότητα οὐκ ἐκκρούεται αὐτῶν ἡ κίνησις
ὑφ᾽ ἑτέρας κινήσεως.
εχνικώτατος δ᾽ ἐστὶ κριτὴς ἐνυπνίων ὅστις
δύναται τὰς ὁμοιότητας θεωρεῖν: τὰς γὰρ εὐθυ-
ονειρίας κρίνειν παντός ἐστιν. λέγω δὲ τὰς ὁμοιό-
τήτας, ὅτι παραπλήσια συμβαίνει τὰ φαντάσματα τοῖς
wo ἐν τοῖς ὕδασιν εἰδώλοις, καθάπερ καὶ πρότερον
εἴπομεν. ἐκεῖ δέ, ἂν πολλὴ γίνηται ἡ κίνησις,
οὐδὲν ὁμοία γίνεται ἡ ἔμφασις καὶ τὰ εἴδωλα τοῖς
ἀληθινοῖς. δεινὸς δὴ τὰς ἐμφάσεις κρίνειν εἴη ἂν
ὁ δυνάμενος ταχὺ διαισθάνεσθαι καὶ συνορᾶν τὰ
διαπεφορημένα καὶ διεστραμμένα τῶν εἰδώλων, ὅ ὅτι
15 ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπου ἢ ἵππου ἣ ὁτουδήποτε. κἀκεῖ δὴ
ὁμοίως τι δύναται τὸ ἐνύπνιον τοῦτο' 7 γὰρ κίνησις
ἐκκόπτει τὴν εὐθυονειρίαν. τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ὕπνος
καὶ ἐνύπνιον, καὶ διὰ τίν᾽ αἰτίαν ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν
γίνεται, ἔτι δὲ περὶ τῆς ἐϊς τῶν ἐνυπνίων μαντικῆς
εἴρηταν.

382

ON PROPHECY IN ΒΕ ΒΡ, τιν

feelings, are (to use a metaphor) good at aiming, as
if they were shooting from a distanec, And because
of their liability to change, the next picture in the
series comes rapidly before them ; just as even the
insane recite and con over the poems of Philacgidas,
such as the Aphrodite, because the ideas are all
associated , so the melancholic pursue a series, Also
owing to their intense fecling the one impulse is not
violently displaced by another.

But the most skilful judye of dreams is the man special
who possesses the ability to detect likenesses + for Mi eay
anyone can judge the vivid dream. By likenesses I ‘oexpiny
mean that the mental pictures are like reflections in “"""™
water, as we have said before. Uf there is much
movement, the reflection is not like the original, nor
the image like the real. Now the man would be
indeed a clever interpreter of dreams who could
quickly discriminate, and make these seattered and
distorted images into a complete picture of a man,
say, or a horse or any other object. Now the
dream has a somewhat’ similar power ; for move-
ment destroys the vivid dream. We haye then
explained what sleep and dreams ave, why each of
them occurs and also about prophecy from dreams,

383

ON LENGTH AND
SHORTNESS OF LIFE

INTRODUCTION

Aristorte here attempts to decide what factors
contribute to short and long life in the animal and
plant. He is concerned with the normal life only.
quite apart from short life due either to disease or
accident.

He first determines a number of conditions which
do not affect the question, such as climate, size and
so on, and then appears to conclude that the deter-
mining factors are warmth and moisture. It docs
not seem to have occurred to him that as a general
rule the longer an organie structure takes to develop,
the longer it survives without decay.

In the latter part of this treatise a similar principle
is applied. Youth and life are naturally associated
with warmth, old uge and death with cold. Aristotle
therefore concludes that warmth and cold are the
causes of the respective states.

There is not very much in this essay to help the
modern reader, but it will be noticed that the treat-
ment is almost entirely physiological ; the philo-
sophical side of these questions is neglected.

387

ΠΕΡῚ ΜΑΚΡΟΒΙΟΤΗΤΟΣ
ΚΑΙ ΒΡΑΧΥΒΙΟΤΗΤΟΣ

μὸν I. Περὶ δὲ τοῦ τὰ μὲν εἶναι μακρόβια τῶν ζῴων
29 τὰ δὲ βραχύβια, καὶ περὶ ζωῆς ὅλως μήκους καὶ
ραχύτητος ἐπισκεπτέον τὰς αἰτίας. ἀρχὴ δὲ τῆς
σκέψεως ἀναγκαία πρῶτον ἐκ τοῦ διαπορῆσαι περὶ
αὐτῶν. οὐ γάρ ἐστι δῆλον πότερον ἕτερον ἢ τὸ
αὐτὸ αἴτιον πᾶσι τοῖς ζῴοις καὶ φυτοῖς τοῦ τὰ μὲν
"5 εἶναι μακρόβια τὰ δὲ βραχύβια- καὶ γὰρ τῶν φυτῶν
τὰ μὲν ἐπέτειον τὰ δὲ πολυχρόνιον ἔχει τὴν ζωήν.
ἔτι δὲ πότερον ταὐτὰ μακρόβια καὶ τὴν φύσιν
ὑγιεινὰ τῶν φύσει συνεστώτων, ἢ κεχώρισται καὶ
τὸ βραχύβιον καὶ τὸ νοσῶδες, ἢ κατ᾽ ἐνίας μὲν
νόσους ἐπαλλάττει τὰ νοσώδη τὴν φύσιν σώματα
80 τοῖς βραχυβίοις, κατ᾽ ἐνίας δ᾽ οὐδὲν κωλύει νοσώ-
εἰς εἶναι μακροβίους ὄντας.

Περὶ μὲν οὖν ὕπνου καὶ ἐγρηγόρσεως εἴρηται
πρότερον, περὶ δὲ ζωῆς καὶ θανάτου λεκτέον
ὕστερον, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ νόσου καὶ ὑγιείας,

485 a ὅσον ἐπιβάλλει τῇ φυσικῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ: νῦν δὲ περὶ
τῆς αἰτίας τοῦ τὰ μὲν εἶναι μακρόβια τὰ δὲ βραχύ-
βια, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, θεωρητέον. ἔστι
δ᾽ ἔχοντα τὴν διαφορὰν ταύτην ὅλα τε πρὸς ὅλα

388

ON LENGTH AND SHORTNESS
OF LIFE

I. Our task is now to consider the reasons why some Connesion
living creatures are long-lived and others short-lived, He eae
and generally to inquire into length and shortness of !onsevity.
life. The necessary starting-point of our inquiry is
the difficulties that arise on the subject. For it is not
clear whether the reason why some animals and
plants are long-lived, aud others short-lived, is the
same in all cases or different. For some plants last
only for one ycar, while others live for a long time.
Secondly, are longevity and good health the same
thing in the case of all natural structures, or are short
life and disease unconnected, or again in some diseases
do disease and short life go together, while in others
there is nothing to prevent the diseased from being
also long-lived ?

We have previously discussed sleep and the waking Generic and
state, and later on we must speak of life and death, ee
and similarly of disease and health, as far as they
contribute to physical philosophy. But our present
inquiry is concerned with the reasons why some
living things live long, and some are short-lived. Now
different genera exhibit differences, and also we find

389

ARISTOTLE

465 a
γένη, καὶ τῶν ὑφ᾽ ἕν εἶδος ἕτερα πρὸς ἕτερα. λέγω

5 δὲ κατὰ γένος μὲν διαφέρειν οἷον ἄνθρωπον πρὸς
ἵππον (μακροβιώτερον γὰρ τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων γένος
ἢ τὸ τῶν ἵππων), κατ᾽ εἶδος δ᾽ ἄνθρωπον πρὸς

4
ἄνθρωπον: εἰσὶ yap καὶ ἄνθρωποι οἱ μὲν μακρόβιοι
¢ A , oe > ¢ 7 , ὃ ~
οἱ δὲ βραχύβιοι ἕτεροι καθ᾽ ἑτέρους τόπους διεστῶ-
τες" τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς θερμοῖς τῶν ἐθνῶν paxpo-
, Ἂ >? > a cal 7

10 βιώτερα, τὰ δ᾽ ἐν τοῖς ψυχροῖς βραχυβιώτερα.
καὶ τῶν» τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τόπον οἰκούντων διαφέρουσιν
ε ͵ ἊΝ , A > Fa \ /
ὁμοίως τινὲς ταύτην πρὸς ἀλλήλους τὴν διαφοράν.

II, Δεῖ δὴ λαβεῖν τί τὸ εὔφθαρτον ἐν τοῖς φύσει
“" \ a \ ‘
συνεστῶσι καὶ τί τὸ οὐκ εὔφθαρτον. πῦρ yap καὶ

6 ὕδωρ καὶ τὰ τούτοις συγγενῆ, οὐκ ἔχοντα τὴν
αὐτὴν δύναμιν, τυγχάνει γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς

ΝΜ 3 , ῳ + »“ "» La 2
αἴτια ἀλλήλοις, ὥστε Kal τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον ἐκ
, lal a
τούτων ὄντα Kal συνεστῶτα μετέχειν τῆς τούτων
, ᾽ν σ 4 ψ > “ > 2
φύσεως εὔλογον, ὅσα μὴ συνθέσει ex πολλῶν ἐστίν,
οἷον οἰκία. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων ἕτερος λόγος"
ok 4 Ν 4 a ~ a

40 εἰσὶ yap ἴδιαι φθοραὶ πολλοῖς τῶν ὄντων, οἷον
ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ ὑγιείᾳ καὶ νόσῳ" ταῦτα γὰρ φθείρεται
καὶ μὴ φθειρομένων τῶν δεκτικῶν ἀλλὰ σωζομένων,
οἷον ἀγνοίας μὲν φθορὰ ἀνάμνησις καὶ μάθησις,
3 4 4 ta " > 4 \ \
ἐπιστήμης δὲ λήθη καὶ ἀπάτη. κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς

85 δ᾽ ἀκολουθοῦσι τοῖς φυσικοῖς αἱ τῶν ἄλλων φθοραί:
φθειρομένων γὰρ τῶν ζῴων φθείρεται καὶ ἡ ἐπι-
στήμη καὶ ἡ ὑγίεια ἡ ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις.

" -
Διὸ καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς συλλογίσαιτ᾽ ἄν τις ἐκ τού-
> , > ἡ ἢ é 3 3. δ᾿ ? 7 2
Tw εἰ γάρ ἐστι μὴ φύσει ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ ἐπιστήμη ἐν
ψυχῇ, οὕτω καὶ ψυχὴ ἐν σώματι, εἴη ἄν τις αὐτῆς
800

ON LENGTH OF LITE, 1—n.

differences between individuals included under one
species. By differences in genus J] mean for instanee
between inan to horse (for the genus man is longer-
lived than the genus horse), and ‘by specific difference
I mean between man and man; for some men are
long-lived, and some short-lived, varying in different
places ; for races living in hot countries live longer
than those in cold countries. Some also living in the
same place exhibit the same differences among them-
selves.

II. We must of course consider why among
natural objects one is easily destroyed and another is
not. Τὸν fire, water and other elements akin to them,
but not having the same power, are mutually the
cause of each other’s birth and destruction, so that it
is only natural that anything proceeding fram or
composed of these elements should share in a like
character, except for those things which are composed
of many elements, such as a house. With regard to
all other things it is a different question ; for many
existing things such as knowledge and health have
their own peculiar sources of destruction ; for these
can be destroyed even when what contains them is
not destroyed, but continues to exist: for instance
learning and recollection destroy ignorance, and
forgetfulness and deception destroy knowledge. But
the fact that ihe destruction of other things follows
the destruction of natural objects is only accidental,
for when living creatures are destroyed, the know-
ledge and health that is in them are destroyed also.

Vrom these facts one might come to some conelu-
sion about the soul, for if the soul is not by its own
nature contained in a body, but only in the way in
which knowledge is contained in the soul, it might be

391

The sourees
of destrue-
tlon,

Souland
body.

ἠδ a
80

465 b

ARISTOTLE

καὶ ἄλλη φθορὰ παρὰ τὴν φθορὰν ἣν φθείρεται
φθειρομένου τοῦ σώματος. ὥστ᾽ ἐπεὶ οὐ φαίνεται
τοιαύτη οὖσα, ἄλλως ἂν ἔχοι πρὸς τὴν τοῦ σώματος
κοινωνίαν.

Ill. Ἴσως δ᾽ ἀν τις ἀπορήσειεν εὐλόγως, dp’
ἔστιν οὗ ἄφθαρτον ἔσται τὸ φθαρτόν, οἷον τὸ πῦρ
ἄνω, οὗ μή ἐστι τὸ ἐναντίον. φθείρεται γὰρ τὰ
μὲν ὑπάρχοντα τοῖς ἐναντίοις κατὰ συμβεβηκός,

~ ’ - ,ὔ 3 -- Ν 3 ᾿ ὃ >
τῷ ἐκεῖνα φθείρεσθαι" ἀναιρεῖται yap τἀναντία ὑπ

ἀλλήλων: κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δ᾽ οὐθὲν τῶν ἐν ταῖς
4
οὐσίαις ἐναντίων φθείρεται, διὰ τὸ μηθενὸς ὑπο-
a \ ῳ >
κειμένου κατηγορεῖσθαι τὴν οὐσίαν. ὥσθ᾽ ᾧ μή
ἐστιν ἐναντίον καὶ ὅπου μή ἐστιν, ἀδύνατον ἂν εἴη
- ‘ “A
φθαρῆναι' τί γὰρ ἔσται τὸ φθεροῦν, εἴπερ ὑπ᾽ ἐν-
/ ,ὔ
αντίων μὲν φθείρεσθαι συμβαίνει μόνων, τοῦτο δὲ
Ye 7 ao ἌΣ a n mn es
μὴ ὑπάρχει, ἢ ὅλως ἢ ἐνταῦθα; ἢ τοῦτο TH μὲν
ἀληθές ἐστι τῇ δ᾽ οὔ: ἀδύνατον γὰρ τῷ ὕλην ἔχοντι
δες 7 YAP OTOH VATE 8X OUT.
μὴ ὑπάρχειν πως τὸ ἐναντίον. πάντῃ μὲν yap
3 tal A i ” ‘ 3 A 2 Ἐ ~ ?
ἐνεῖναι τὸ θερμὸν ἢ τὸ εὐθὺ ἐνδέχεται, πᾶν δ᾽ εἶναι
> tA a A a ? Loa / " ‘ ‘
ἀδύνατον ἢ θερμὸν ἢ εὐθὺ ἢ λευκόν: ἔσται γὰρ τὰ
πάθη κεχωρισμένα. εἰ οὖν, ὅταν ἅμα ἧ τὸ ποιη-
τικὸν καὶ τὸ παθητικόν, ἀεὶ τὸ μὲν ποιεῖ τὸ δὲ
ra 3 ᾽ Ἂν; , Ψ \ +
πάσχει, ἀδύνατον μὴ μεταβάλλειν. ἔτι καὶ εἰ
ἀνάγκη περίττωμα ποιεῖν, τὸ δὲ περίττωμα ἐν-
, 3 3 , ἢ 32." ε , \ 2:
avriov: ἐξ ἐναντίου γὰρ ἀεὶ ἡ μεταβολή, τὸ δὲ
περίττωμα ὑπόλειμμα τοῦ προτέρου. εἰ δὲ πᾶν
> 7 \ 3 tf 2 , nN bd ΩΣ »
ἐξελαύνει τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ἐναντίον, κἂν ἐνταῦθ᾽ d-
392

ON LENGTH OF LIFE, τπ.-- απ,

liable to some other form af destruction beyond that
which overtakes it when the body is damaged. Since
this is evidently not the case, the association of the
soul with the bady cannot be like that of knowledge
within the soul,

III. A question may here be raised whether there
is any place in which the destructible is not destroyed,
as is the case with fire in the upper regions, where no
opposite exists. Por attribuLes belonging to opposites
are destroyed only incidentally, because the opposites
in question are destroyed ; for opposites are removed
by cach other ; but none of the opposiles which exist
in substances is destroyed incidentally, because sub-
stance cannot be an attribute of any subject. It
would therefore be impossible for anything to be
destroyed which has no opposite, or where its apposite
does not exist. For what would there be to destroy
it, if things can only be destroyed by their opposites,
and if such an opposite does not exist either at all, or
at that particular place? Perhaps this statement is
partly true and partly untrue ; for everything which
possesses matter must have an opposite in some sense.
Qualities such as heat or straightness may exist in any
substance, but no substance can consist solely of heat,
straightness or whiteness ; for in that case affections
could exist in isolation. If then, whenever what acts
and what is acted upon exist together, one acts and
the other is acted upon, it is impossible that there
should be no change. Further if it is necessary that
a surplus should be produced, then this surplus is an
opposite ; for all change is produced by an opposite,
and the surplus is what is left over from the former
state. If then all active opposites are driven out,
there we should have indestructibility, But yet this

908

In inde-
alrictibility
impossible

ARISTOTLE

465 b a Ww a 2, 2 > [ἢ ἢ a /
φθαρτον ἂν εἴη. ἢ ov, ἀλλ᾽ ὑπὸ τοῦ περιέχοντος

φθείρεται.

Hi μὲν οὖν ἱκανόν, de τῶν εἰρημένων' εἰ δὲ μή,
ὑποθέσθαι δεῖ ὅτι ἔνεστί τι ἐνεργείᾳ ἐναντίον, καὶ
περίττωμα γίνεται. διὸ ἡ ἐλάττων φλὸξ κατακάε-
ται ὑπὸ τῆς πολλῆς κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ὅτι ἡ τροφὴ

55. ἣν ἐκείνη ἐν πολλῷ χρόνῳ ἀναλίσκει τὸν καπνόν,
ταύτην ἡ πολλὴ φλὸξ ταχύ. διὸ πάντα ἀεὶ ἐν
κινήσει ἐστί, καὶ γίνεται ἢ φθείρεται. τὸ δὲ περι-
éyov ἢ συμπράττει ἢ ἀντιπράττει. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο
μετατιθέμενα πολυχρονιώτερα μὲν γίνεται καὶ
ὀλιγοχρονιώτερα τῆς φύσεως, ἀΐδια δ᾽ οὐδαμοῦ,

80 ὅσοις ἐναντία ἐστίν" εὐθὺς γὰρ ἡ ὕλη τὸ ἐναντίον
ἔχει. ὥστ᾽ εἰ μὲν τοῦ ποῦ, κατὰ τόπον μεταβάλλει,
εἰ δὲ τοῦ ποσοῦ, κατ᾽ αὔξησιν καὶ φθίσιν: εἰ δὲ
πάθους, ἀλλοιοῦται.

4660 IV. Ἔστι δ᾽ οὔτε τὰ μέγιστα ἀφθαρτότερα
(ὕππος γὰρ ἀνθρώπου βραχυβιώτερον) οὔτε τὰ
μικρά (ἐπέτεια γὰρ τὰ πολλὰ τῶν ἐντόμων) οὔτε
τὰ φυτὰ ὅλως τῶν ζῴων (ἐπέτεια γὰρ ἔνια τῶν

5 φυτῶν) οὔτε τὰ ἔναιμα (μέλιττα γὰρ πολυχρονιώ-
τερον ἐνίων ἐναίμων) οὔτε τὰ ἄναιμα (τὰ γὰρ
μαλάκια ἐπέτεια μέν, ἄναιμα δέ) οὔτε τὰ ἐν τῇ γῇ
(καὶ γὰρ φυτὰ ἐπέτειά ἐστι καὶ ζῷα πεζά) οὔτε
τὰ ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ (καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖ βραχύβια καὶ τὰ
ὀστρακηρὰ καὶ τὰ μαλάκια). ὅλως δὲ τὰ μακρο-

10 βιώτατα ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς ἐστίν, οἷον 6 φοῖνιξ' εἶτ᾽
394

ON LENGTH OF LIFE, πα.-ταν,

would not be the case ; it would be destroyed by its
own envelope.

If we have argued the point sufficiently, then it
may stand according to what we have said; but if
not, one must assume that there is some active
opposite, and that a surplus arises. So ihe lesser
flame is consumed by the greater incidentally, because
the nourishmeni—namely the smoke—which the
lesser flame exhausts after a long time, is exhausted
rapidly by the greater. Su everything is in a state
of movement, and is either being born, or is being
destroyed. Its envelope either works with it or
against it. Changing as everything does for this
reason, things may be longer or shorter lived than
their own nature allows, but in no case can they be
everlasting, if they have opposites ; for their matter
at once has an opposite. So that if there is an
opposite in position, the change is one of locality, if
of quantity, the change ἢ takes: place by growth and
decay ; if the opposite is an affection, a change of
state results,

IV. Large things as a class are not less liable to
destruction (for a horse does not live as long as a man),
nor are smal] things (for most of the insects only live
a year), nor the plants as a whole less than the animals
(for some plants are annuals), nor those having blood
(for the bee lives longer than some full-blooded
animals), nor the bloodless (for the mollusca, which
are bloodless, only live for a year), nor land creatures
(for there are plants and land animals which only live
for a year), nor marine creatures (for in the sea the
testacea and mollusca are both short-lived). Gener-
ally speaking the longest lived are to be found among
plants, e.g. the date-palm; secondly, longevity is

395

Nothing
ean Inst
for ever.

How far is
longevity

dependent
on size?

ARISTOTLE

486 a 3 a > é Z ~ w > a > ᾽
ἐν τοῖς ἐναίμοις ζῴοις μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τοῖς ἀναίμοις,

43 a a woo aL 2s φ ‘
καὶ ἐν τοῖς πεζοῖς ἢ ἐν τοῖς ἐνύδροις. ὥστε καὶ
a ͵ ~
συνδυασθέντων ἐν τοῖς ἐναίμοις καὶ πεζοῖς τὰ
- \
μακροβιώτατα τῶν ζῴων ἐστίν, οἷον ἄνθρωπος καὶ
? ¥- 3 tL " \ i ς ΒΕ" \ +
ἐλέφας. καὶ δὴ καὶ τὰ μείζω ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ
εἰπεῖν τῶν ἐλαττόνων μακροβιώτερα' καὶ γὰρ καὶ
τοῖς ἄλλοις συμβέβηκε τοῖς μακροβιωτάτοις μέγε-
θος, ὥσπερ καὶ τοῖς εἰρημένοις.
ν Ty δ᾽ ι ΒΥ, ΕἾ 4 ε 7 > 50,
. Τὴν δ᾽ αἰτίαν περὶ τούτων ἁπάντων ἐντεῦθεν
” , a Ν - La ‘ af
ἄν τις θεωρήσειεν. δεῖ γὰρ λαβεῖν ὅτι τὸ ζῷόν
> a ~
ἐστι φύσει ὑγρὸν καὶ θερμόν, καὶ τὸ ζῆν τοιοῦτον,
- \
τὸ δὲ γῆρας ψυχρὸν καὶ ξηρόν, καὶ τὸ τεθνηκός"
φαίνεται γὰρ οὕτως. ὕλη δὲ τῶν σωμάτων τοῖς
~ ‘
οὖσι ταῦτα, TO θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρόν, καὶ τὸ ξηρὸν
καὶ τὸ ὑγρόν. ἀνάγκη τοίνυν γηράσκοντα ξηραί-
νεσθαι. διὸ δεῖ μὴ εὐξήραντον εἶναι τὸ ὑγρόν. καὶ
διὰ τοῦτο τὰ λιπαρὰ ἄσηπτα. αἴτιον δ᾽ ὅτι ἀέρος"
ε a> ON ‘ μὴ ~ fol ? > ,ἷ rs
25 6 δ᾽ ἀὴρ πρὸς τἄλλα wip: πῦρ δ᾽ οὐ γίνεται σαπρόν.
9Q? ἧ τ 3 ,ὔ ~ ‘ ς , ? ͵ὔ Ν
οὐδ᾽ αὖ ὀλίγον δεῖ εἶναι τὸ ὑγρόν" εὐξήραντον γὰρ
ay \ 9Ὰ 7 ‘ x A é Η ~ 4
καὶ τὸ ὀλίγον. διὸ Kat τὰ μεγάλα καὶ ζῷα καὶ
φυτὰ ὡς ὅλως εἰπεῖν μακροβιώτερα, καθάπερ
3 4 , wa A i i 4
ἐλέχθη πρότερον: εὔλογον yap τὰ μείζω πλέον
ἔχειν ὑγρόν. οὐ μόνον δὲ διὰ τοῦτο μακροβιώτερα"

30 δύο yap τὰ αἴτια, τό τε ποσὸν καὶ TO ποιόν, ὥστε
δεῖ μὴ μόνον πλῆθος εἶναι ὑγροῦ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο καὶ
θερμόν, ἵνα μήτε εὔπηκτον μήτε εὐξήραντον 7.
καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἄνθρωπος μακρόβιον μᾶλλον ἐνίων
μειζόνων: μαικροβιώτερα γὰρ τὰ λειπόμενα τῷ

4660 πλήθει τοῦ ὑγροῦ, ἐὰν πλείονι λόγῳ ὑπερέχῃ κατὰ
396

ON LENGTH OF LIVE, w.—v.

commoner among the animals with blood than among
those without, and among land animals rather than
water animals. Coupling together the two qualities
of having blood and living on land, the longest lived
of all creatures are the man and the elephant, Speak-
ing generally the larger animals are longer lived than
the smaller. Tor size will be found to belong to the
other very long-lived creatures as it does to the two
we have mentioned.

V. One might suggest reasons for all these facts as
follows. One must admit that the living creature is
naturally moist and warm, and that life too is of this
nature, whereas old age is cold and dry, and so is a
dead body. This is obvious. Now the matter of
which bodies are composed among the living consists
of hot and cold, dry and moist. But as they grow
old they must dry up. So the moist must not be

‘easily dried. For this reason oily things are less
liable to decay. The reason for this is that they
contain aiy; and air bears the same relation to the
other elements as fire does : and fire is not liable to
decay. Nor must the moisture exist in small quan-
tity ; for a small quantity is easily dried. For this
reason the large creatures—both animals and plants
—are generally speaking longer lived, as has been
said above ; for the larger animal naturally contains
more moisture. But this is not the only reason for
their greater longevity ; there are two causes, quan-
tity and quality, so that the moisture must not only
be present in quantity, but this must also be hot, in
order that it may not easily be either frozen or dried.
This is why man is longer lived than some larger
creatures 3 for those creatures with a smaller quantity
of moisture will be longer lived if their excess in

397

Heat and
moiskture
uk factors
fin the

problem.

486 b

ARISTOTLE

τὸ ποιὸν ἢ λείπεται κατὰ TO ποσόν. ἔστι δ᾽ ἐνίοις
μὲν τὸ θερμὸν τὸ λιπαρόν, ὃ ἅμα ποιεῖ τό τε μὴ
εὐξήραντον καὶ τὸ μὴ εὐψυιςτον: ἐνίοις δ᾽ ἄλλον
» Ld
ἔχει χυμόν.

"Tire δεῖ τὸ μέλλον εἶναι μὴ εὔφθαρτον μὴ περιτ-
τωματικὸν. εἶναι. ἀναιρεῖ γὰρ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἢ νόσῳ
ἢ φύσει" ἐναντία δ᾽ ἡ τοῦ περιττώματος δύναμις
καὶ φθαρτικὴ ἡ μὲν τῆς φύσεως ἡ δὲ μορίου. διὸ
τὰ ὀχευτικὰ καὶ πολύσπερμα γηράσκει ταχύ' τὸ
γὰρ σπέρμα περίττωμα, καὶ ἔτι ξηραίνει ἀπιόν.
καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἡμίονος μακροβιώτερος ἵππου καὶ
ὄνου, ἐξ ὧν ἐγένετο, καὶ τὰ θήλεα τῶν ἀρρένων,
ἐὰν ὀχευτικὰ ἣ τὰ ἄρρενα: διὸ οἱ στρουθοὶ οἱ ἄρρενες
βραχυβιώτεροι. τῶν θηλειῶν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὅσα
πονητικὰ τῶν ἀρρένων, καὶ διὰ τὸν πόνον γηράσκει
μᾶλλον' ξηραίνει γὰρ ὁ πόνος, τὸ δὲ γῆρας ξηρόν
ἐστιν. φύσει δὲ καὶ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πᾶν εἰπεῖν τὰ ἄρρενα
τῶν θηλειῶν “μακροβιώτερα: αἴτιον δ᾽ ὅτι θερμό-
τερον ζῷον τὸ ἄρρεν ἐστὶ τοῦ θήλεος. τὰ δ᾽ αὐτὰ
ἐν τοῖς ἀλεεινοῖς μακροβιώτερά ἐστιν ἢ ἐν τοῖς
ψυχροῖς τόποις, διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν αἰτίαν δι’ ἥνπερ τὰ
μείζω. καὶ μάλιστ᾽ ἐπίδηλον τὸ μέγεθος τῶν τὴν
φύσιν ψυχρῶν ζῴων: διὸ οἵ τ’ ὄφεις καὶ αἱ σαῦραι
καὶ τὰ φολιδωτὰ μεγάλα ἐν τοῖς θερμοῖς τόποις,
καὶ ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ τῇ ἐρυθρᾷ, τὰ ὀστρακόδερμα' τῆς
τε γὰρ αὐξήσεως ἡ θερμὴ ὑγρότης αἰτία καὶ τῆς
ζωῆ ς. ἐν δὲ τοῖς ψυχροῖς τόποις ὑδατωδέστερον τὸ
ὑγρὸν τὸ ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις ἐστίν: διὸ εὔπηκτον, ὥστε
τὰ μὲν οὐ γίνεται ὅλως τῶν ζῴων τῶν ὀλιγαίμων ἢ
ἀναίμων ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τὴν ἄρκτον τόποις (οὔτε τὰ
πεζὰ ἐν τῇ γῇ οὔτε τὰ ἔνυδρα ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ), τὰ

398

ON LENGTH OL LIFT, v.

quality is greater than their defect in quantity. In
some again the heat is of a fatty nature, which makes
it neither so easily dried nur so easily hlied 3 and in
others again it has some other flavour.

Moreover that which is intended to resist destruc-
tion must net have wreat waste products. For this
produces death either by disease or by nature ; for
the power of such waste products is destructive some-
times of the natural ies at other times of part of it.
For this reason animals that are salacious and have
much seed age quickly ; for the seed is a waste
product, and when it goes dryness ensues. ‘This is
why the mule is longer lived than the horse and the
ass, from which it is born, and the female generally
is longer lived than the male, if the male is salacious ;
so also the male sparrow lives a shorter time than the
female. Further this is true of all males that work
hard, and grow old more rapidly because of their
toil; for toil produces dryness, and old age is dry.
But naturally, speaking quite generally, “the male
lives longer than the female ; the reason being that
the male is a warmer creature than the female.
Animals too are longer lived in hot countries than in
cold, for the same reason as that which makes the
larger animals longer lived. The size of animals
which are naturally cold is quite obvious ; so snakes,
lizards, and animals with horny scales are large in hot
countries, and so with the crustacea in the Red Sea:
for a warm moisture is the cause of growth as well as
of life. Butin cold countries the moisture in animals
is more watery ; consequently it cangeals easily, so
that in the northern climes either the animals of little
or no blood do not occur at all (neither the animals
with feet on land, nor water creatures in the sea), or

399

Waste
piodacts

466 b

467 ἃ

1ὅ

ARISTOTLE

δὲ γίνεται μέν, ἐλάττω δὲ καὶ βραχυβιώτερα'
ἀφαιρεῖται γὰρ ὁ πάγος τὴν αὔξησιν.

Τροφὴν δὲ μὴ λαμβάνοντα καὶ τὰ pura καὶ τὰ
ζῷα φθείρονται" συντήκει “γὰρ αὐτὰ ἑαυτά’ ὥσπερ
γὰρ ἡ πολλὴ φλὸξ κατακαίει καὶ φθείρει τὴν ὀλίγην
τῷ τὴν τροφὴν ἀναλίσκειν, οὕτω τὸ φυσικὸν θερμὸν

~ 4 > ͵ \ a 5 τ

τὸ πρῶτον πεπτικὸν ἀναλίσκει τὴν ὕλην ἐν ἡ ἐστίν.
τὰ δ᾽ ἔνυδρα τῶν πεζῶν ἧττον μακρόβια οὐχ ὅτι
¢ δ ¢ ~ > > ῳ Γ᾿ , \ δὲ ~
ὑγρὰ ἁπλῶς, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι ὑδατώδη: τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον
ὑγρὸν εὔφθαρτον, ὅτι ψυχρὸν καὶ εὔπηκτον. καὶ
τὸ ἄναιμον διὰ τὸ αὐτό, ἐὰν μὴ μεγέθει ἀπαμύνη-
ται: οὔτε γὰρ λίπος οὔτε γλυκὺ ἔχει. ἐν γὰρ ζῴῳ
τὸ “λιπαρὸν γλυκύ: διὸ αἱ μέλιτται μακροβιώτεραι
ἑτέρων μειζόνων. ζῴων.

VI. Ἔν δὲ τοῖς φυτοῖς ἐστὶ τὰ μακροβιώτατα,
καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι ἧττον

>
ὑδατώδη, ὥστ᾽ οὐκ εὔπηκτα' εἶτ᾽ ἔχει λιπαρότητα
καὶ γλισχρότητα, καὶ ξηρὰ καὶ γεώδη ὄντα ὅμως
οὐκ εὐξήραντον ἔχει τὸ ὑγρόν. περὶ δὲ τοῦ πολυ-

, > Δ ~ δέ ὃ / ὃ a A ral A
χρόνιον εἶναι τὴν τῶν δένδρων φύσιν δεῖ λαβεῖν τὴν
αἰτίαν’ ἔχει γὰρ ἰδίαν πρὸς τὰ ζῷα, πλὴν πρὸς τὰ
ἔντομα. νέα γὰρ ἀεὶ τὰ φυτὰ γίνεται' διὸ πολυ-
χρόνια. ἀεὶ γὰρ ἕτεροι οἱ πτόρθοι, οἱ δὲ γηρά-

Δ ςε»ὔ « ’ 9 > 2 a 3 >
σκουσιν. Kat ai ῥίζαι ὁμοίως. ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ dua, ἀλλ
ς᾽ Χ * / A La " ε a 3 ,ὕ
ὁτὲ μὲν μόνον τὸ στέλεχος καὶ οἱ κλάδοι ἀπώλοντο,
μ᾿ Ἄ 4 Ψ > @ a ec
ἕτεροι δὲ παρεφύησαν" ὅταν δ᾽ οὕτως ὦσιν, al ῥίζαι
ἄλλαι ἐκ τοῦ ὑπάρχοντος γίνονται, καὶ οὕτως ἀεὶ
διατελεῖ τὸ μὲν φθειρόμενον τὸ δὲ γινόμενον" διὸ
καὶ μακρόβια. ἔοικε δὲ τὰ φυτὰ τοῖς ἐντόμοις,
ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρότερον' διαιρούμενα γὰρ ζῇ, καὶ

400

ΟΝ LENGTH OF LIVE, v.—v1.

if they do occur they are smaller and shorter lived ;
for the frost checks their growth,

Both plants and animals die if they do not receive
nourishment τ for they consume themselves ¢ for just
as a great flame burns up and destroys the small
flane by exhausting what fecds it. so the naturally
warm, the prine cause of digestion, exhausts the
matter in which it resides. Water animals are less
long-lived than land animals, not merely because they
are moist, but because they are watery τ this kind of
moisture is casily destroyed, because it is cold and
easily congealed, lor the same reason the bloodless
is easily destroyed, unless it is protected by its size ;
for it has neither fat nor sweetness. For in the living
creature the fat is sweet; for this reason bees are
longer lived than other larger animals.

VI. Among plants there are some very long-lived,
even more so than among animals, first because they
are less watery, so that the moisture is not readily
congealed ; secondly they have oiliness and viscosity,
and though dry and earthy, yet have a moisture which
is not easily dried. But it is our business to discover
the reason of the longevity of the trees: in relation
to living things, except the insects, they have a reason
peculiar to themselves, For plants are always being
reborn; that is why they last so Jong. For some
branches are always new, while others grow old. The
same is true of their roots. This does not happen at
once, but at times the trunk and branches alone are
destroyed, and others yrow up beside them; when
this is so other roots grow from the existing ones, and
so the tree continues, part dying and part being born ;
hence their long life. But the plants resemble the
insects as has been said above; for they live even

2D 401

Longevity
in plants.

ARISTOTLE
487 ἃ
4 ᾿ 4 cA ε coe "ἢ Σ»ν /
29 δύο καὶ πολλὰ γίνεται ἐξ ἑνός. τὰ δ᾽ ἔντομα μέχρι
ἐν τοῦ ζῆν ἦλθ Adv δ᾽ οὐ δύ j i
μὲν τοῦ ζῆν ἦλθεν, πολὺν δ᾽ od δύναται ypovov' οὐ
γὰρ ἔχει ὄργανα, οὐδὲ δύναται ποιεῖν αὐτὰ ἡ ἀρχὴ
ἡ ἐν ἑκάστῳ. ἡ δ᾽ ἐν τῷ φυτῷ δύναται" πανταχῇ
A ” A ε΄ A λὸ ὃ é ὃ \ 3 4
yap ἔχει καὶ ῥίζαν καὶ καυλὸν δυνάμει. διὸ ἀπὸ
ταύτης ἀεὶ προέρχεται τὸ μὲν νέον τὸ δὲ γηράσκον,
25 μικρόν τι διαφέροντα τῷ εἶναι μακρόβια, οὕτως
ὥσπερ τὰ ἀποφυτευόμενα. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τῇ ἀπο-
φυτείᾳ τρόπον τινὰ dain ἄν τις ταῦτα συμβαίνειν"
μόριον γάρ τι τὸ ἀποφυτευθέν. ἐν μὲν οὖν τῇ
ἀποφυτείᾳ χωριζομένων συμβαίνει τοῦτο, ἐκεῖ δὲ
“ “ > 4
διὰ τοῦ συνεχοῦς. αἴτιον δ᾽ ὅτι ἐνυπάρχει πάντῃ ἡ
> ~
90 ἀρχὴ δυνάμει ἐνοῦσα.
, N + yoo A , ‘ x
Συμβαίνει δὲ ταὐτὸ ἐπί τε τῶν ζῴων καὶ φυτῶν,
- Mt "
ἔν τε γὰρ τοῖς ζῴοις τὰ ἄρρενα μακροβιώτερα ὡς
ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ' τούτων δὲ τὰ ἄνω μείζω ἢ τὰ κάτω
“- \ -
(νανωδέστερον γὰρ τοῦ θήλεος τὸ ἄρρεν), ἐν δὲ τῷ
‘ \ \ ~ } \
ἄνω τὸ θερμόν, καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν ἐν τῷ κάτω" καὶ τῶν
4610 φυτῶν τὰ κεφαλοβαρῆ μακροβιώτερα. τοιαῦτα δὲ
τὰ μὴ ἐπέτεια ἀλλὰ Sevdpwdn τὸ γὰρ ἄνω τοῦ
~ \ \ < τῇ : 7 Ν 3 3 i 2.1
φυτοῦ καὶ κεφαλὴ ἡ ῥίζα ἐστί, τὰ δ᾽ ἐπέτεια ἐπὶ
τὸ κάτω καὶ τὸν καρπὸν λαμβάνει τὴν αὔξησιν.
ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτου καὶ καθ᾽ αὑτὰ ἐν τοῖς περὶ
~ ?, “~ ΕἾ \ - ay "
" φυτῶν διορισθήσεται" νῦν δὲ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων
2» \ Ν f / ~ ᾿
εἴρηται τὸ αἴτιον περί τε μεγέθους ζωῆς καὶ βραχυ-
βιότητος. λοιπὸν δ᾽ ἡμῖν θεωρῆσαι περί τε νεότη-
Tos καὶ γήρως καὶ ζωῆς καὶ θανάτου’ τούτων γὰρ
διορισθέντων τέλος ἂν ἡ περὶ τῶν ζῴων ἔχοι
μέθοδος.

« This treatise is lost.

402

ON LENGTH OF LIFE, vr.

when divided, and two or more are born from one.
But the insects (ze. when divided) continue to live,
but they cannot do so for long ; for they have not. the
necessary organs, nor can the vital principle in cach
section supply them. Butin the plantit can; for the
plant possesses potential root and stalk in every part of
it. Consequently there is always proceeding from it
part which is young and part which is growing old. dif-
fering but little in length of life, just like slips that are
taken from it. For one might. say that this happens
in a sense in the taking of slips ; for the slip is part of
the plant. Butin the taking of slips the phenomenon
occurs when they are separated, but in the other
case there is continuity. The reason is that the vital
principle exists potentially in every part of the plant.

The same thing occurs both in animals and in
plants. Tor in animals the males are longer lived as
a general rule; in their case the upper parts are
larger than the lower (for the male is more dwarflike
than the female), but the warmth resides in the upper
parts, and the coldness in the lower; and among
plants those with the heaviest heads are the longer
lived. Of such a nature are those plants which are
not annual, but are like trees ; for the root is really
the upper part of the plant and the head, but annuals
grow downwards and towards the seed. We shall
discuss this matter further, as a separate subject in
our treatise on plants*; but now as far as animals are
concerned we have discussed the reason for their
length of life and its short duration. It remains for
us to discuss youth and age, life and death; for
when our examination of these subjects is complete,
our whole inquiry about living creatures will have
reached its end.

408

ON YOUTH AND OLD AGE
ON LIFE AND DEATH

INTRODUCTION

TueEseE two titles are conventionally atlached 1o the
succecding treatise, but it is by no means certain
that they are right. It is quite possible that Aris-
totle designed a special essay on Youth and Age,
which he never wrote, or alternatively that he wrote
such an essay which is lost, and that the present work
is on Life and Death only.

Aristotle is here dealing only with natural death,
and he finds that life and death depend only upon
heat, or more strictly upon the alternate heating and
cooling required to preserve the correct temperature.
Thus this treatise leads naturally to that On Breath-
ing, which performs, according to Aristotle, a most
important function in the preservation of tem-
perature.

The whole of this work is somewhat remote from
the standpoint of to-day, and will hardly be of much
help to the modern reader,

407

ΠΕΡῚ NEOTHTO® KAI ΓΉΡΩΣ
ΠΕΡῚ ΖΩΗΣ ΚΑΙ ΘΑΝΑΤΟΥ͂

467 b \ εἶ , ay 4 \ \ π᾿
w ἴ, Περὶ δὲ νεότητος καὶ γήρως καὶ περὶ ζωῆς
καὶ θανάτου λεικτέον νῦν' ἅμα δὲ καὶ περὶ ἀναπνοῆς
ἀναγκαῖον ἴσως τὰς αἰτίας εἰπεῖν" ἐνίοις yap τῶν
ζῴων διὰ τοῦτο συμβαίνει τὸ ζῆν καὶ τὸ μὴ ζῆν.
ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ ψυχῆς ἐν ἑτέροις διώριοται, καὶ δῆλον
ὅτι οὐχ οἷόν τ' εἶναι σῶμα τὴν οὐσίαν αὐτῆς, ἀλλ᾽
ὅμως ὅτι γ᾽ ἔν τινι τοῦ σώματος ὑπάρχει μορίῳ,
φανερόν, καὶ ἐν τούτῳ τινὶ τῶν ἐχόντων δύναμιν ἐν
τοῖς μορίοις. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα τῆς ψυχῆς ἢ μόρια
ἢ δυνάμεις, ὁποτέρως ποτὲ δεῖ καλεῖν, ἀφείσθω
τὰ viv: ὅσα δὲ ζῷα λέγεται καὶ ζῆν, ἐν μὲν τοῖς
20 ἀμφοτέρων τούτων τετυχηκόσι (λέγω δ᾽ ἀμφοτέρων
τοῦ τε ζῷον εἶναι καὶ τοῦ ζῆν) ἀνάγκη ταὐτὸν εἶναι
καὶ ἕν μόριον καθ᾽ 6 τε ζῇ καὶ καθ᾽ ὃ προσ-
ayopevopev αὐτὸ ζῷον. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ζῷον ἡ ζῷον,
ἀδύνατον μὴ ζῆν: ἢ δὲ ζῇ, ταύτῃ ζῷον ὑπάρχειν
οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον: τὰ γὰρ φυτὰ ζῇ μέν, οὐκ ἔχει δ᾽
αἴσθησιν, τῷ δ᾽ αἰσθάνεσθαι τὸ ζῷον πρὸς τὸ μὴ
ζῷον διορίζομεν.

᾿Αριθμῷ μὲν οὖν ἀναγκαῖον ἕν εἶναι καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ
τοῦτο τὸ μόριον, τῷ δ᾽ εἶναι πλείω καὶ ἕτερα" οὐ
408

~
oy

τε

ON YOUTH AND OLD AGE
ON LIFE AND DEATH

I. We must now discuss youth and old age, life Tho
and death, At the same time we shall also have to (Sete!
describe the reasons for breathing ; for in the case sensation.
of some animals this constitutes the difference be-
tween living and not living. But in another treatise
we have laid down definitions about the soul, and it is
quite clear that its essence cannot be corporeal, and
yet it is equally clear that it resides in some part of
a body and that this part is among those which have
control. We may now neglect the rest of the parts
or functions of the soul, whichever we prefer to call
them ; what we call animals and living, in the case of
those to which both terms are applicable (by both
I mean animal and living) must have one and the
same part in virtue of which the creature lives, and
we callit an animal. For the animal, in so far as it is
such, cannot fail to live, but it need not be an animal
because it lives: for plants live, but have no sensation,
but it is by sensation that we differentiate the animal
from. that which is not animal.

Speaking numerically this part must be one and
the same thing, but in essence more than one and
having differences ; for the fact of being an animal

409

ARISTOTLE

407 b : ὰ

γὰρ ταὐτὸ τὸ ζῴῳ τε εἶναι καὶ τὸ ζῆν. ἐπεὶ οὖν

τῶν ἰδίων αἰσθητηρίων ἕ ἕν τι κοινόν ἐστιν αἰσθητή-

ριον, εἰς ὃ τὰς κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν αἰσθήσεις ἀ ἀναγκαῖον

80 ἀπαντᾶν, τοῦτο δ᾽ ἂν εἴη μέσον τοῦ πρόσθεν καλου-

μένου καὶ ὄπισθεν (ἔμπροσθεν μὲν γὰρ λέγεται ἐφ᾽

ὅ ἐστιν ἡμῖν ἡ αἴσθησις, ὄπισθεν δὲ τὸ ἀντι-

κείμενον), ἐ ἔτι δὲ διῃρημένου τοῦ σώματος τῶν μὲν

ζώντων πάντων τῷ τ΄ ἄνω καὶ κάτω (πάντα γὰρ

ἔχει τὸ ἄνω καὶ τὸ κάτω, ὥστε καὶ τὰ φυτά) ),

468 8 δῆλον ὅτι τὴν θρεπτικὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχοι ἂν ἐν μέσῳ

τούτων" καθ᾽ ὃ μὲν γὰρ εἰσέρχεται μόριον ἡ τροφή,

ἄνω καλοῦμεν, πρὸς αὐτὸ βλέποντες ἀλλ’ οὐ πρὸς

τὸ περιέχον ὅλον, κάτω δὲ καθ᾽ ὃ τὸ περίττωμα

ἀφίησι τὸ πρῶτον. ἔχει δ᾽ ἐναντίως τοῖς φυτοῖς

5 τοῦτο καὶ τοῖς ζῴοις: τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀνθρώπῳ διὰ τὴν

ὀρθότητα “μάλιστα ὑπάρχει τοῦτο τῶν ζῴων, τὸ

ἔχειν τὸ ἄνω μόριον πρὸς τὸ τοῦ “παντὸς ἄνω, τοῖς

δ᾽ ἄλλοις μεταξύ' τοῖς δὲ φυτοῖς a ἀκινήτοις οὖσι καὶ

λαμβάνουσιν ἐ ἐκ τῆς γῆς τὴν τροφὴν a ἀναγκαῖον. ἀεὶ

10 κάτω τοῦτ᾽ ἔχειν τὸ μόριον. ἀνάλογον γάρ εἰσιν

αἱ ῥίζαι τοῖς φυτοῖς καὶ τὸ καλούμενον. στόμα τοῖς

ζῴοις, δι᾽ οὗ τὴν τροφὴν τὰ μὲν ἐκ τῆς γῆς λαμ-
βάνει, τὰ δὲ δι᾿ αὑτῶν.

il. Τριῶν. δὲ μερῶν ὄντων εἰς ἃ διαιρεῖται πάντα

τὰ τέλεια τῶν ζῴων, ἑ ἑνὸς μὲν i δέχεται τὴν τροφήν,

15 ἑνὸς δ᾽ ἧ͵ τὸ περίττωμα προΐεται, τρίτου δὲ τοῦ

μέσου τούτων, τοῦτο ἐν μὲν τοῖς μεγίστοις τῶν

ζῴων καλεῖται στῆθος, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸ ἀνά-

λογον. διήρθρωται δὲ μᾶλλον ἕ ἑτέροις ἑτέρων. ὅσα

δ᾽ αὐτῶν ἐστὶ πορευτικά, πρόσκειται καὶ μόρια τὰ

2 Presumably A. means parasitic plants such as mistletoe.
410

ON YOUTH AND OLD AGM, ΤΟ, τ..--ι,

is not the same thing as living. Since then there is
one common sense organ of all the individual sense
organs, in which the senses when actualized must
meet, this must lie in between the part called
‘‘ before ” and that called “ behind.” (By “ before ”’
I mean that to which sensation leads, and by “ be-
hind” its opposite.) Moreover the bodies of all Tue _
living creatures being divided into “ upper” and πο 5
“lower ” (for they all have upper and lower parts like the soul.
plants), it is clear that it has the nutritive principle
in between the two; the part by which food enters
we call the upper part, looking at it by itself, and not
considering it in relation to the surrounding universe,
but we call the lower part that by which the waste
product leaves. This is in a different position in
plants and animals; because of his erect position
man of all living creatures has this characteristic most
conspicuously, that his upper part is also upper in
relation to the whole universe, but in other animals it
is midway ; but plants, as they are immovable and
take their food from the soil, always have this part
below. For the roots in plants correspond to what is
called the mouth in animals; the part, that is, by
which some absorb their food from the earth, and
others from each other.*

Ii. There are three parts into which all the perfect The
* animals are divided, the first part by which they ab- ἀπ συ ο
sorb food, the second by which the waste products are body.
evacuated, and the third between the other two.
This latter part is called the chest among the largest
of living creatures, and hy some comparable name
among others : but in some it is more specialized than
in others. Those animals which have the power of
locomotion have in addition parts designed for that

411

ARISTOTLE

468 ἃ ‘ é 4 ε ia \ “- ΨΜ
πρὸς ταύτην τὴν ὑπηρεσίαν, οἷς τὸ πᾶν οἴσουσι
20 κύτος, σκέλη τε καὶ πόδες καὶ τὰ τούτοις ἔχοντα
τὴν αὐτὴν δύναμιν. ἀλλ᾽ ἥ γε τῆς θρεπτικῆς ἀ ἀρχὴ
ψυχῆς ἐν τῷ μέσῳ τῶν τριῶν μορίων καὶ κατὰ τὴν
αἴσθησιν οὖσα φαίνεται καὶ κατὰ τὸν λόγον" πολλὰ
γὰρ τῶν ζῴων ἀφαιρουμένου ἑκατέρου τῶν μορίων,
τῆς τε καλουμένης κεφαλῆς, καὶ τοῦ δεκτιικοῦ τῆς
25 τροφῆς, ζῇ μεθ᾽ οὗπερ ἂν ἢ τὸ μέσον. δῆλον δ᾽
ἐπὶ τῶν ἐντόμων, οἷον σφηκῶν τε καὶ μελιττῶν,
τοῦτο συμβαῖνον" καὶ τῶν μὴ ἐντόμων δὲ πολλὰ
διαιρούμενα, δύναται ζῆν διὰ τὸ θρεπτικόν. τὸ δὲ
τοιοῦτον μόριον ἐνεργείᾳ μὲν ἔχει ἕν, δυνάμει δὲ
πλείω" τὸν αὐτὸν γὰρ συνέστηκε τοῖς φυτοῖς τρό-
80 πον" καὶ γὰρ τὰ υτὰ διαιρούμενα ζῇ χωρίς, καὶ
γίνεται πολλὰ ἀπὸ μιᾶς ἀρχῆς δένδρα. δι’ ἣν δ᾽
αἰτίαν τὰ μὲν οὐ δύναται διαιρούμενα ζῆν, τὰ δ'
468 b ἀποφυτεύεται τῶν φυτῶν, ἕτερος ἔσται λόγος.
ἀλλ᾽ ὁμοίως ἔχει κατά γε τοῦτο τά τε φυτὰ καὶ τὸ
τῶν ἐντόμων γένος. ἀνάγκη δὲ καὶ τὴν θρεπτικὴν
ψυχὴν ἐνεργείᾳ μὲν ἐν τοῖς ἔχουσιν εἶναι μίαν,
δυνάμει δὲ πλείους. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὴν αἰσθητικὴν
5 ἀρχήν' φαίνεται γὰρ ἔχοντα αἴσθησιν τὰ διαιρού-
eva αὐτῶν. ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ σώζεσθαι τὴν φύσιν,
τὰ μὲν φυτὰ δύναται, ταῦτα δ᾽ οὐ δύναται διὰ τὸ
μὴ ἔχειν ὄργανα πρὸς σωτηρίαν, ἐνδεᾶ τ᾽ εἶναι τὰ
μὲν τοῦ ληψομένου τὰ δὲ τοῦ δεξομένου τὴν τροφήν,
τὰ δ᾽ ἄλλων τε καὶ τούτων ἀμφοτέρων. ἐοίκασι
wyap τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ζῴων πολλοῖς ζῴοις συμ-
πεφυκόσιν: τὰ δ᾽ ἄριστα συνεστηκότα τοῦτ᾽ οὐ
πάσχει τῶν ζῴων διὰ τὸ εἶναι τὴν φύσιν αὐτῶν ὡς
ἐνδέχεται “μάλιστα μίαν. διὸ καὶ “μικρὰν αἴσθησιν
ἔνια ποιεῖ διαιρούμενα τῶν μορίων, ὅτι ἔχει τι

412

ON YOUTH AND OLD AGE, ETC., πὶ.

service, whereby they van carry the whole trunk ;
these are legs and feet, and parts which perform the
same functions as these. Bul the seat of the nuotri-
tive faculty of the soul resides in the middle of the
three parts, as is evident from sensation, and is in
itself reasonable. Jor many living creatures, when
one of the other two parts is lost, that is to say what.
are called respectively the head and the food re-
ceptacle, contrive to live with the part which is in
the middle. This clearly happens with such inseets
as wasps and bees; and many animals which are not
insects can live when divided by means of their
nutritive part. A part of this kind is actually one,
but potentially more ; for its composition is similar
to that of plants; for plants when divided can live
apart, and many trees can arise from one starting-
point. The reason why some cannot Jive when
divided, and other plants can be grown from slips,
will be the subject of another discussion. But in this
regard plants and the class of insects are alike. So
also the nutritive soul must be actually one in those
who possess it, but potentially more than one. And
the same is true of the sensitive first principle ; for
the divided parts do seem to have sensation, But in
respect of the preservation of their nature, plants can
continue to exist, but insects cannot, because they
have not the organs necessary to preservation, and
are lacking, sometimes in what is to seize and some-
times in what is to receive food, and some others again
in both. Animals of this kind are like many
creatures joined in one; but the best constructed
animals do not suffer from this because their nature
is one in so far as it can be. Some divided parts show
but little sensitive power because they have some

413

ARISTOTLE

46
°° ψυχικὸν πάθος" χωριζομένων γὰρ τῶν σπλάγχνων
τό ποιεῖται κίνησιν, οἷον καὶ αἱ χελῶναι τῆς καρδίας
ἀφῃρημένης
III. "Tee δὲ: ἐπὶ ἰξ τῶν φυτῶν δῆλον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν
ζῴων, τῶν μὲν φυτῶν τήν τ᾽ ἐκ τῶν σπερμάτων
γένεσιν ἐπισκοποῦσι καὶ τὰς ἐμφυτείας τε καὶ τὰς
ἀποφυτείας. ἢ τε γὰρ τῶν σπερμάτων γένεσις
20 συμβαίνει πᾶσιν ἐκ τοῦ μέσου" διθύρων γὰρ ὄντων
πάντων, ἢ συμπέφυκεν ἔχεται, καὶ τὸ μέσον ἐστὶν
ἑκατέρου τῶν μορίων' ἐντεῦθεν γὰρ ὅ τε καυλὸς ἐκ-
φύεται καὶ ἡ ῥίζα τῶν φυομένων, ἡ 8 ἀρχὴ τὸ
μέσον αὐτῶν ἐστίν. ἔν τε ταῖς ἐμφυτείαις καὶ ταῖς
ἀποφυτείαις μάλιστα͵ τοῦτο συμβαίνει περὶ τοὺς
25 ὄζους" ἔστι γὰρ ἀρχή τις ὁ ὄζος τοῦ κλάδου, ἅμα
δὲ καὶ μέσον, ὥστε ἣ τοῦτο ἀφαιροῦσιν ἣ ἢ εἰς τοῦτο
ἐμβάλλουσιν, Ὁ ἵνα ἢ ὁ κλάδος 7, at ῥίζαι ἐκ τούτων
γίνωνται, ὡς οὔσης τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐκ τοῦ μέσου καυλοῦ
καὶ ῥίζης.
Καὶ τῶν ζῴων τῶν ἐναίμων ἡ καρδία γίνεται
πρῶτον. τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον ἐξ ὧν ἐν τοῖς ἐνδεχομένοις
80 ἔτι γιγνομένοις, ἰδεῖν τεθεωρήκαμεν. ὥστε καὶ ἐν
τοῖς ἀναίμοις ἀναγκαῖον τὸ ἀνάλογον τῇ καρδίᾳ
γίνεσθαι πρῶτον. ἡ δὲ καρδία ὅ ὅτι ἐστὶν a ἀρχὴ τῶν
φλεβῶν, ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰ μέρη τῶν ζῴων εἴρηται
4600 πρότερον' καὶ ὅτι τὸ αἷμα τοῖς ἐναίμοις ἐστὶ τελευ-
ταία τροφή, ἐξ οὗ γίνεται τὰ μόρια. φανερὸν
τοίνυν ὅτι μίαν μέν τινα ἐργασίαν ἡ τοῦ στόματος
λειτουργεῖ δύναμις, ἑτέραν δ᾽ ἡ τῆς κοιλίας περὶ
5 τὴν τροφήν. ἡ δὲ καρδία κυριωτάτη, καὶ τὸ τέλος
ἐπιτίθησιν. ὥστ᾽ ἀνάγκη καὶ τῆς αἰσθητικῆς καὶ
τῆς θρεπτικῆς ψυχῆς ἐ ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναι
τοῖς ἐναίμοις" τὰ γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων μορίων ἔργα περὶ
414

ON YOUTH AND OLD AGE, ETC., m—ut.

affection of the soul; for they show movement when
their entrails are separated, as tortoises do if their
heart is removed.

ΠῚ, It is moreover quite clear in the case of plants Grarting
and animuls, if we study the origin of plants from seed plane
and grafting and slip-taking. [or their growth from
seed always begins from the middle : for as all seeds
have two cells, growth begins at the point where they
join, and the part in between belongs to both the
cells ; from this part springs both the stem and the
root of the plant, but the source of them is in the
middle. In grafting and slip-cuttiny this occurs most
about the eyes; for the eye is the source of the
branch, and is also in the middle, so that they either
cut this off, or they graft at this point, in order that
the branch or the root may spring from that point,
as the origin of both stem and root begins in the
middle.

Of the animals with blood the heart appears first. avimals,
This is evident from those which we have examined,
whose birth can be watched. So also what corres-
ponds to the heart in bloodless animals must be
born first. We have stated previously in our treatise
On the Parts of Animals that the heart is the source
of the veins; and that, in animals with blood, the
blood is the ultimate source of nourishment, from
which the parts are developed. Now it is clear that
the mouth performs one funclion and the stomach
another in respect of food. But the heart is the
supreme power, and contributes the final step. So
that, in animals having blood, the source of the sensi-
tive and nutritive soul must lie in the heart; for the
functions of the other parts in respect of food are for

4 De Part, An, iii. 665 b 15,
415

ARISTOTLE
46a ς
τὴν τροφὴν τοῦ ταύτης ἔργου χάρι» ἐστί: δεῖ γὰρ τὸ
κύριον πρὸς τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα διατελεῖν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐν τοῖς
10 τούτου ἕνεκα, οἷοι" ἰατρὸς πρὸς τὴν ὑγίειαν. ἀλλὰ
μὴν τό γε κύριον τῶν αἰσθήσεων ἐν “ταύτῃ τοῖς
ἐναίμοις πᾶσιν' ἐν τούτῳ γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὸ
πάντων τῶν αἰσθητηρίων κοινὸν αἰσθητήριον. δύο
δὲ φανερῶς ἐνταῦθα συντεινούσας ὁρῶμεν, τήν. τε
γεῦσιν. καὶ τὴν ἁφήν, ὦ ὥστε καὶ τὰς ἄλλας a ἀναγκαῖον"
ιὸ ἐν τούτῳ μὲν γὰρ τοῖς ἄλλοις αἰσθητηρίοις ἐν-
δέχεται ποιεῖσθαι τὴν κίνησιν, ταῦτα δ᾽ οὐδὲν συν-
τείνει πρὸς τὸν ἄνω τόπον. χωρὶς δὲ τούτων, εἰ
τὸ ζῆν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ μορίῳ πᾶσίν ἐστι, δῆλον ὅ ὅτι καὶ
τὴν uae ἀρχὴν ἀναγκαῖον" ἡ μὲν γὰρ ζῷον,
ταύτῃ καὶ ζῆν φαμέν, ἦ δ᾽ αἰσθητικόν, ταύτῃ τὸ
20 σῶμα ζῷον εἶναι λέγομεν. διὰ τί δ᾽ αἱ μὲν τῶν
αἰσθήσεων φανερῶς συντείνουσι πρὸς τὴν καρδίαν,
αἱ δ᾽ εἰσὶν ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ (διὸ καὶ δοκεῖ τισὶν αἰ-
σθάνεσθαι τὰ ζῷα διὰ τὸν ἐγκεφαλον) , τὸ αἴτιον
τούτων ἐν ἑτέροις. εἴρηται χωρίς. κατὰ μὲν οὖν τὰ
φαινόμενα δῆλον ἐ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι ἐν τούτῳ τε
2 Kal ἐν τῷ μέσῳ τοῦ σώματος τῶν τριῶν μορίων a
τε τῆς αἰσθητικῆς ἀρχὴ ψυχῆς ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ τῆς
αὐξητιιςῆς καὶ τῆς θρεπτικῆς.
IV. Κατὰ δὲ τὸν λόγον, ὅτι τὴν φύσιν ὁρῶμεν
ἐν πᾶσιν ἐκ τῶν δυνατῶν ποιοῦσαν τὸ κάλλιστον.
80 ἐν τῷ μέσῳ. δὲ τῆς οὐσίας τῆς ἀρχῆς οὔσης ἑκατέρας :
μάλιστα μὲν ἀποτελεῖ τῶν μορίων ἑκάτερον τὸ
αὑτοῦ ἔργον, τό τε κατεργαζόμενον τὴν ἐσχάτην
τροφὴν καὶ τὸ δεκτικόν' πρὸς ἑκατέρῳ γὰρ αὐτῶν
οὕτως ἔσται, καὶ ἔστιν ἡ τοῦ τοιούτου μέση χώρα

4690 ἄρχοντος χώρα. ἔτι τὸ χρώμενον καὶ ᾧ χρῆται,
“ἢ Part, cin. 656 b ὅ.

416

ON YOUTH AND OLD AGE, ETC., m1.—1v.

the sake of the heart's function ; for the controling
part must lie in what achteves the final aim, not in
parts which are subordinate to ihat aim, Hike a
physician’s relation to health, Moreover the eon-
trolling power over the senses lies in the heart in all
animals having blood; for in it must lie that sense
organ which shares the impressions of all the other
sense organs, We can see two that clearly centre
in the comman sense organ, taste and touch, so that
all the others must do so too; for in this sense organ
iL is possible for an impulse to be produced in the
other sense organs, and these do uot reach to the
upper part. Apart from this, if life in all creatures
lies in this part, it must evidently be the source of
sensation ; for we say that anything is alive in so far
as itis a living creature, butin so far as it is sensitive
we say that it is an animal. Why some of the senses
evidently reach out to the heart, and others ave in
the head (in consequence of which some suppose that
animals feel because of their brain), the reason for
this has been given separately elsewhere." Judging
by appearances it is clear from what we have said
that the source of the sensitive, growing and nutritive
soul lies here; that is, in the middle of the three parts
of the body.

IV. Judging however by pure reason, it is evident
that we see in every case nature produce what is the
noblest possible from the available material. As each
of the two sources lies in the middle of the whole,
each will best perform its own functions, both that
which accomplishes the last stage of food, and that
which receives it ; this will apply to both cases, and
the mid-region of such a fuculty will be the region of
control. But we must differentiate that which em-

IB ALT

ARISTOTLE

469 b tal ἔς a x A 2? ¢ nn
δεῖ διαφέρειν. ὥσπερ δὲ τὴν δύναμιν, οὕτως ἂν

ἐνδέχοιτο καὶ τὸν τρόπον, ὥσπερ οἵ τ᾽ αὐλοὶ καὶ
τὸ κινοῦν τοὺς αὐλούς, ἡ χείρ. εἴπερ οὖν τὸ ζῷον
υ ὥρισται τῷ τὴν αἰσθητικὴν ἔχειν ψυχήν, τοῖς μὲν
ἐναίμοις ἀναγικαῖον ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ ταύτην ἔχειν τὴν
ἀρχήν, τοῖς δ᾽ ἀναίμοις ἐν τῷ ἀνάλογον μορίῳ.

Πάντα δὲ τὰ μόρια καὶ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα τῶν ζῴων
ἔχει τινὰ σύμφυτον θερμότητα φυσικήν" διὸ ζῶντα
μὲν φαίνεται θερμά, τελευτῶντα δὲ καὶ στερισκό-

10 peva τοῦ ζῆν τοὐναντίον. ἀναγκαῖον δὴ ταύτης
τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς θερμότητος ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ τοῖς ἐν-
αἰμοις εἶναι, τοῖς δ᾽ ἀναίμοις ἐν τῷ ἀνάλογον" ἐρ-
γάζεται γὰρ καὶ πέττει τῷ φυσικῷ θερμῷ τὴν
τροφὴν πάντα, μάλιστα δὲ τὸ κυριώτατον. διὸ
τῶν μὲν ἄλλων μορίων ψυχομένων ὑπομένει τὸ
ζῆν, τοῦ δ᾽ ἐν ταύτῃ φθείρεται πάμπαν, διὰ τὸ

tiv ἀρχὴν ἐντεῦθεν τῆς θερμότητος ἠρτῆσθαι
πᾶσι, καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ὥσπερ ἐμπεπυρευμένης ἐν
τοῖς μορίοις τούτοις, τῶν μὲν ἀναίμων ἐν τῷ
ἀνάλογον, ἐν δὲ τῇ καρδίᾳ τῶν ἐναίμων. ἀνάγκη
τοίνυν ἅμα τό τε ζῆν ὑπάρχειν καὶ τὴν τοῦ θερμοῦ
τούτου σωτηρίαν, καὶ τὸν καλούμενον θάνατον εἶναι

0 τὴν τούτου φθοράν.

V. ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν πυρός γε δύο ὁρῶμεν φθοράς,
pdpavely τε καὶ σβέσιν. καλοῦμεν δὲ τὴν μὲν
ὑφ᾽ αὐτοῦ pdpavow, τὴν δ᾽ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐναντίων

᾽ 4 \ ta ᾿ ἢ 4 [4 ,,
σβέσιν, τὴν μὲν γήρᾳ, τὴν δὲ βίαιον. συμβαίνει
δ᾽ ἀμφοτέρας διὰ ταὐτὸ γίνεσθαι τὰς φθοράς’ ὑπο-

886 λευιπούσης γὰρ τῆς τροφῆς, οὐ δυναμένου λαμ-
βάνειν τοῦ θερμοῦ τὴν τροφήν, φθορὰ γίνεται τοῦ

418

ON YOUTH AND OLD AGE, ETC., 1v.—v.

ploys from that which it employs. It should be
possible to do this in terns of its function, just as we
distinguish flutes and what causes the movement in
flutes, that is the hand. Sinee then the animal is
defined by the possession of a sensitive soul, in
animals with bluod this source must be in the heart,
and in bloodless animals in some part corresponding
to it.

Now all parts and indeed the whole body of living
creatures contain within them some natural heat :
so when alive they are fell to be warm, but when dead
and deprived of life the opposite of this. Now the
source of this warmth must lie in the heart in animals
with blood, and in the bloodless in some corresponding
put; for everything carries on its function and
digests food by means of its natural heat, and this is
most true of the part with most control. So when
other parts get chilled life remains, but when the
region of the heart gets cold, the whole body is
destroyed, because the principle of all parts depends
entirely on the heat therein, and the soul in these
parts is so to speak fired, in animals with blood in the
heart, and in the bloodless in what corresponds to the
heart. Thus life must depend on the conservation
of this heat, and what we know as death is the
destruction of this heat.

V. Now we know two ways in which fire is de-
stroyed—by dying out and by extinguishing. By
dying out we mean a decay arising from itself, and
by an extinguishing a decay caused by opposites :
one is death by old age and the other by violence.
But both these forms of destruction arise from the
same cause; for in both cases fire dies from the
failure of what feeds it, that is when it cannot get

419

Function of
the heart,

Destruction
of heat.

ARISTOTLE

469 b
πυρός. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐναντίον παῦον τὴν πέψιν

κωλύει τρέφεσθαι: ὁτὲ δὲ μαραίνεσθαι συμβαίνει,
πλείονος ἀθροιζομένου θερμοῦ διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀναπνεῖν
μηδὲ καταψύχεσθαι" ταχὺ γὰρ καὶ οὕτω κατανα-
80 λίσκει τὴν τροφὴν πολὺ συναθροιζόμενον τὸ θερμόν,
καὶ φθάνει καταναλίσκον πρὶν ἐπιστῆναι τὴν ἄνα-
θυμ ἔασιν. διόπερ οὐ μόνον μαραίνεται τὸ ἔλαττον
παρὰ τὸ πλεῖον πῦρ, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὴ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν ἡ
4108 τοῦ λύχνου φλὸξ ἐλαθεμάνη πλείονι φλογὶ κατα-
κάεται, καθάπερ ὁτιοῦν ἄλλο τῶν καυστῶν. αἴτιον
δ᾽ ὅτι τὴν μὲν οὖσαν ἐν τῇ φλογὶ τροφὴν φθάνει
λαμβάνουσα. ἡ μείζων φλὸξ πρὶν ἐπελθεῖν ἑτέραν,
τὸ δὲ πῦρ ἀεὶ διατελεῖ γινόμενον καὶ ῥέον ὥσπερ

ὃ ποταμός, ἀλλὰ λανθάνει διὰ τὸ τάχος.

Δῆλον τοίνυν ὡς εἴπερ δεῖ σώζεσθαι τὸ θερμόν
(τοῦτο δ᾽ ἀναγκαῖον, εἴπερ μέλλει ζῆν), δεῖ γίνεσθαί
τινα τοῦ θερμοῦ τοῦ ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ κατάψυξιν. παρά-
δειγμα δὲ τούτου λαβεῖν ἔστι τὸ συμβαῖνον ἐπὶ
τῶν καταπνιγομένων, ἀνθράκων" ἂν μὲν γὰρ ὦσι-

10 περιπεπωμασμένοι τῷ καλουμένῳ πνιγεῖ συνεχῶς,
ἀποσβέννυνται ταχέως: av δὲ παρ᾽ ἄλληλά τις
ποιῇ πυκνὰ τὴν ἀφαίρεσιν καὶ τὴν ἐπίθεσιν, μένουσι
πεπυρωμένοι πολὺν χρόνον. ἡ δ᾽ ἔγκρυψις σώζει
τὸ wip: οὔτε γὰρ ἀποπνεῖν κωλύεται διὰ μανότητα
τῆς τέφρας, ἀντιφράττει τε τῷ πέριξ ἀέρι πρὸς τὸ

1 μὴ σβεννύναι τῷ πλήθει τῆς ἐνυπαρχούσης αὐτῷ
θερμότητος. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τῆς αἰτίας ταύτης,
ὅτι τὸ ἐναντίον συμβαίνει τῷ ἐγκρυπτομένῳ καὶ
καταπνιγομένῳ πυρί (τὸ μὲν “γὰρ μαραίνεται, τὸ
δὲ διαμένει πλείω χρόνον), εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς προ-

βλήμασιν.

120

ON YOUTH AND OLD AGE, KTC., v.

food for the heat. ‘The opposite (extinguishing)
prevents ihe fire from being fed by checking its
assimilation ; but when it dies out. it is because too
much heat is collected and is duc to the facet that
there is neither breathing nor cooling ; for in this
case the great heat collected quickly uses up the
food, and finishes expending it before the vapour
rises. Consequently not only does the smaller fire
fade out in the presence of a greater one, but the
flame of the lamp, when placed in a larger one, is
burned up entirely by itself, just like any other com-
bustible. The reason is that the greater fame seizes
the food available in the flame before the other can
get to it, and the fire continues to grow and How like
a river, but its speed is so great that il. is nol noticed,
Lt is obvious therefore that if the heat is te be pre-
served (and it must be if the creature is to continue
to live) there must be some cooling down of the
initial heat. We can find an illustration of this in
what occurs when coals are damped down. For if
they are covered continuously with a lid, which we
call a choke, they are very soon quenched ; but if
one alternately puts on and takes off the lid many
times, they remain alight for a long time. Vor the
masking of a fire preserves it ; for the air is not pre-
vented from getting to it owing to the porous nature
of the ashes, and it protects it from the surrounding
air, so that it is not extinguished by the quantity
of heat enclosed in it. But we have discussed in
the Problems? the reason why the contrary effect
occurs in a masked and in a choked fire (that is the
latter is quenched, while the former lasts a long
time).
% ‘The passage in question is not extant,
421

ARISTOTLE

470 ἃ

VI. ᾿Επεὶ δὲ πᾶν ζῷον exes ψυχήν, αὐτὸ δ᾽ οὐκ
20 ἄνευ φυσικῆς ὑπάρχει θερμότητος, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν,
τοῖς μὲν φυτοῖς ἡ διὰ τῆς τροφῆς καὶ τοῦ περι-
έχοντος ἱκανὴ γίνεται βοήθεια πρὸς τὴν τοῦ φυσικοῦ
θερμοῦ σωτηρίαν. καὶ γὰρ ἡ τροφὴ ποιεῖ κατά-
ψυξιν εἰσιοῦσα, καθάπερ καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τὸ
πρῶτον προσενεγκαμένοις. αἱ δὲ νηστεῖαι θερ-
0 μαίνουσι καὶ δίψας ποιοῦσιν: ἀκίνητος γὰρ ὧν ὁ
ἀὴρ ἀεὶ θερμαίνεται, τῆς δὲ τροφῆς εἰσιούσης
καταψύχει κινούμενος, ἕως ἂν λάβῃ τὴν πέψιν.
ἐὰν δὲ 7 τὸ περιέχον ὑπερβάλλῃ ψυχρότητι διὰ
τὴν ὥραν, ἰσχυρῶν γινομένων πάγων, ἐξαυαίνεται,
ἢ τοῦ θέρους ἰσχυρὰ συμβαίνῃ καύματα καὶ μὴ
8. δύνηται τὸ σπώμενον ἐκ τῆς γῆς ὑγρὸν κατα-
ψύχει, φθείρεται μαραινόμενον τὸ θερμόν, καὶ
λέγεται σφακελίζειν καὶ ἀστρόβλητα γίνεσθαι τὰ
δένδρα περὶ τοὺς καιροὺς τούτους. διὸ καὶ γένη
τινὰ λίθων ταῖς ῥίζαις ὑποβάλλουσι καὶ ὕδωρ ἐν
470 b ἀγγείοις, ὅπως αἱ ῥίζαι ψύχωνται τῶν φυτῶν.
τῶν δὲ ζῴων ἐπεὶ τὰ μέν ἐστιν ἔνυδρα τὰ δ᾽ ἐν
τῷ ἀέρι ποιεῖται τὴν δίαυταν, ἐκ τούτων καὶ διὰ
τούτων πορίζεται τὴν κατάψυξιν, τὰ μὲν τῷ ὕδατι
5 τὰ δὲ τῷ ἀέρι. τίνα δὲ τρόπον καὶ πῶς, λεκτέον,

ἐπιστήσασι τὸν λόγον μᾶλλον.

422

ON YOUTH AND OLD AGI, ETC., νὰν

VI. But since every living creature has a soul, and
no living creature exists without containing watural
heat, as we have said, the assistance which plants ect
through food and their environment is sufficient for the

preservation of their natural heat. For the entry of

food causes a cooling. just as it does in man when he
first. adinits it; but fasting causes heat and thirst ; for
the aiv when it is motionless always grows hot. but,
moving as it docs when food enters it, it beeomes cool,
unlilitis digested. Ef the environment is excessively
cold owing to the season of the year, when hard
frosts occur, the plant withers ; if on the other hand
the summer heat comes and, as the moisture is
drawn out. of the ground, there ean be no cooling, it
dies because the heat wastes away. and plants at such
seasons are said to be blighted and suu-struck, Mor
this reason men put some kinds of stones under the
roots and water in flower pots. that the roots of the
plants may be cooled. But in the ease of animals,
since some live in water and others spend their lives
in air, they achieve the cooling from and by these
elements—some that is by water and some by air.
In what manner and how this occurs can only be
described after a closer study of the subject.

4.23

Jleat and
cooling ve
living

Ty AAt ures,

ON RESPIRATION

INTRODUCTION

In this account of breathing Aristotle is far more the
physiologist than the philosopher, and for this very
reason his conclusions are of comparatively small
value to us. The science of biochemistry was not
born in the days of Aristotle, and without it any
account of the physiology of breathing must of neces-
sity be almost valucless to-day.

427

ΠΕΡῚ ΑΝΑΠΝΟΗΣ

0b 7 Περὶ γὰρ ἀναπνοῆς ὀλίγοι μέν Twes τῶν

πρότερον φυσικῶν εἰρήκασιν' τίνος μέντοι χάριν
ὑπάρχει τοῖς ζῴοις, οἱ μὲν οὐδὲν ἀπεφήναντο, οἱ
δὲ εἰρήκασι μέν, οὐ καλῶς δ᾽ εἰρήκασιν. ἀλλ᾽ ἀπειρο-

τὸ τέρως τῶν συμβαινόντων. ἔτι δὲ πάντα τὰ ξῷά
φασιν ἀναπνεῖν" τοῦτο δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθές, oor
ἀναγκαῖον περὶ τούτων πρῶτον ἐπελθεῖν, ὅ ὅπως μὴ
δοκῶμεν ἀπόντων κενὴν κατηγορεῖν.

Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ὅσα πλεύμονα ἔχει τῶν ζῴων,
ἀναπνεῖ πάντα, φανερόν. ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτων αὐτῶν
ὅσα μὲν ἄναιμον ἔχει τὸν πλεύμονα καὶ σομφόν,

15 ἧττον δέονται τῆς ἀναπνοῆς" διὸ πολὺν χρόνον ἐν
τοῖς ὕδασι δύνανται διαμένειν παρὰ τὴν τοῦ σώ-
ματος ἰσχύν. τὸν δὲ πλεύμονα σομφὸν ἐ ἔχει πάντα
τὰ Φοτοκοῦντα, οἷον τὸ τῶν βατράχων γένος. ἔτι
δὲ αἱ ἐμύδες TE καὶ χελῶναι πολὺν ρόνον μένουσιν

20 ἐν τοῖς ὑγροῖς" ὁ γὰρ πλεύμων ὀλίγην ἔχει θερ-
μότητα" ὀλίγαιμον γὰρ ἔχουσιν αὐτόν" ἐμφυσώ-
μενος οὖν αὐτὸς τῇ κινήσει καταψύχει καὶ ποιεῖ
διαμένειν, πολὺν χρόνον. ἐὰν μέντοι βιάζηταί τις
λίαν κατέχων πολὺν ,Χρόνον, ἀποπνίγονται πάντα"
οὐδὲν γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων δέχεται τὸ ὕδωρ ὥσπερ
οἱ ἰχθῦς. τὰ δ᾽ ἔναιμον ἔχοντα τὸν πλεύμονα
428

ON RESPIRATION

I. A few natural philosophers have dealt with the animals
question of breathing ; some of them have offered no ie tng
explanation why this phenomenon occurs in living
creatures; others have discussed it without much
insight, and with insufficient experiment on the facts.
Again they say that all living creatures breathe ; but
this is not true. We must then first approach this
question, so that we may not be thought to be passing
a baseless censure on men who are not there to defend
themselves.

It is of course quite obvious that all living creatures
with lungs breathe. Furthermore animals which
have a bloodless or spongy lung, need breathing less
than the others; this is why they can remain in
water a long time for their bodily strength. All
oviparous animals have a porous lung, such as the
genus frog. Again both the fresh-water and sea
tortoise live in water for a long time; for the lung
contains but little heat, for it contains but little
blood; being inflated by its movement cooling is
rapid, and the animal is thus able to remain under
water for along time, But if one forces it by holding
it down too long, an animal of this kind is drowned ;
for none of these animals can absorb water like the
fish. All animals which have a Jung containing blood

429

ARISTOTLE

410b
26 πάντα μᾶλλον δεῖται τῆς ἀναπνοῆς διὰ τὸ πλῆθος

τῆς θερμότητος" τῶν δ᾽ ἄλλων ὅσα μὴ ἔχει πλεύ-
μονα, οὐδὲν ἀναπνεῖ.
II. Δημόκριτος μὲν οὖν ὁ ᾿Αβδηρίτης καί τινες
ἄλλοι τῶν περὶ ἀναπνοῆς εἰρηκότων οὐδὲν περὶ
80 τῶν ἄλλων διωρίκασι͵ ζῴων, ἐοίκασι μέντοι λέγειν
ὡς πάντων ἀναπνεόντων’ ᾿Αναξαγόρας δὲ καὶ
Διογένης, πάντα φάσκοντες ἀναπνεῖν, περὶ τῶν
ἰχθύων καὶ τῶν ,ὀστρείων λέγουσι τίνα τρόπον
ἀναπνέουσιν. καί φησιν ᾿Αναξαγόρας μέν, ὅταν
Anta ἀφῶσι τὸ ὕδωρ διὰ τῶν βραγχίων, τὸν ἐν τῷ
στόματι ᾿γίνομενον ἀέρα ἕλκοντας ἀναπνεῖν τοὺς
ἰχθῦς: οὐ γὰρ εἶναι κενὸν οὐδέν" Διογένης δ᾽ ὅταν
ἀφῶσι τὸ ὕδωρ διὰ τῶν βραγχίων, ἐκ τοῦ περὶ
τὸ στόμα “περιεστῶτος ὕδατος ἕλκειν τῷ κενῷ τῷ
δ ἐν τῷ στόματι τὸν ἀέρα, ὡς ἐνόντος ἐν τῷ ὕδατι
ἀέρος. ταῦτα 8 ἐστὶν ἀδύνατα. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ
τὸ ἥμισυ τοῦ πράγματος ἀφαιροῦσι, διὰ τὸ τὸ
κοινὸν ἐπὶ θατέρου λέγεσθαι μόνον. “ἀναπνοὴ γὰρ
καλεῖται, ταύτης δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐκπνοή ἐστι τὸ δ᾽
εἰσπνοή" περὶ ἧς οὐθὲν λέγουσι, τίνα τρόπον
10 ἐκπνέουσι τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ζῴων. οὐδ᾽ ἐνδέχεται
αὐτοῖς εἰπεῖν: ὅταν γὰρ ἀναπνεύσωσι, ταύτῃ i)
ἀνέπνευσαν πάλιν δεῖ ἐκπνεῖν, καὶ τοῦτο ποιεῖν
ἀεὶ παραλλάξ, ὥστε ουμβαίνει ἅμα δέχεσθαι τὸ
ὕδωρ κατὰ τὸ στόμα καὶ ἐκπνεῖν. ἀνάγκη δ᾽
ἀπαντῶντα ἐμποδίζειν θάτερον θατέρῳ. εἶτα ὅ ὅταν
16 ἀφῶσι τὸ ὕδωρ, τότε ἐκπνέουσι κατὰ τὸ στόμα ἢ
κατὰ τὰ βράγχια, ὥστε συμβαίνει ἅμα ἐκπνεῖν
καὶ ἀναπνεῖν" τότε γάρ φασιν αὐτὸ ἀναπνεῖν. ἅμα
δ᾽ ἀναπνεῖν καὶ ἐκπνεῖν ἀδύνατον. ὥστ᾽ εἰ ἀνάγκη

480

ON RESPIRATION, ι1.---ἶτι,

require more breathing because of their quantity of
heat ; but the other creatures which have no lung do
not breathe at all.

11. Democritus of Abdéra and certain others who
have discussed breathing have not differentiated
between living animals, but appear to speak as
if they all breathed; Anaxagoras and Diogenes,
asserting that all creatures breathe, deseribe the
method by which fishes and oysters breathe. Anax-
agoras says that fishes breathe by drawing up the air
in the mouth, when they discharge water through
their gills; for a vacuum cannot exist; Diogenes
says that by means of the vacuum in the mouth they
breathe by drawing the air from the water surround-
ing the mouth, whenever they let out water through
the gills, because there is air in the water. But this
is impossible. First of all they leave out half the
facts, by assigning to one side only what is common
to both. For what is called breathing includes both
breathing out and breathing in. But of the former
they make no mention; how, that is, such animals
breathe out. Nor can they explain it; for when
animals breathe in, they must breathe out again in
the same way as they breathe in, and must perform
these functions alternately, so that they would have
to receive water into the mouth and breathe out at

“the same time. The one operation must clearly
meet and obstruct the other. Again, when they
discharge the water, they are at the same time
breathing out by the mouth or by the gills, so that
they must exhale and inhale at the same time; for
they say that this is the time at which they inhale,
But it is impossible to inhale and exhale at the same
time. The conclusion would then follow that, if

431

Breathing
In fishes,

ARISTOTLE

471
‘ \ 2 , 2 A τ 3 a 2 ᾿ \
TA QVATIVEOVTG εἰζπνειν καὶ εἰσῆνειν, ἐκπνεῖν δὲ μὴ

ἐνδέχεται μηδὲν αὐτῶν, φανερὸν ὡς οὐδ᾽ ἀναπνεῖ
αὐτῶν οὐδέν.

9 III, "Ἔτι δὲ τὸ φάναι τὸν ἀέρα ἕλκειν ἐκ τοῦ
στόματος ἢ ἐκ τοῦ ὕδατος διὰ τοῦ στόματος
ἀδύνατον’ οὐ γὰρ ἔχουσιν ἀρτηρίαν διὰ τὸ πλεύ-
μονα μὴ ἔχειν, ἀλλ᾽ εὐθὺς ἡ κοιλία πρὸς τῷ
στόματί ἐστιν, ὥστ᾽ ἀναγκαῖον τῇ κοιλίᾳ ἕλκειν,
τοῦτο δὲ κἂν τἄλλα ἐποίει ζῷα" νῦν δὲ οὐ ποιοῦσιν.

86 κἂν ἐκεῖνα δ᾽ ἔξω τοῦ ὑγροῦ ὄντα ἐπιδήλως ἂν
αὐτὸ ἐποίει" φαίνεται δ᾽ οὐ ποιοῦντ᾽ αὐτό. ἔτι
πάντων τῶν ἀναπνεόντων καὶ ἑλκόντων τὸ πνεῦμα
ὁρῶμεν γινομένην κίνησίν τινα τοῦ μορίου τοῦ
ἕλκοντος, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἰχθύων οὐ συμβαῖνον' οὐδὲν
γὰρ φαίνονται κινοῦντες τῶν περὶ τὴν κοιλίαν,

80 ἀλλ᾽ ἢ τὰ βράγχια μόνον, καὶ ἐν τῷ ὑγρῷ καὶ εἰς
τὸ ξηρὸν ἐκπεσόντες, ὅταν σπαίρωσιν. ἔτι ὅταν

ann ἀποθνήσκῃ πνιγόμενα ἐν τοῖς ὑγροῖς πάντα τὰ ἀνα-
πνέοντα, γίνονται πομφόλυγες τοῦ πνεύματος ἐξ-
ἰόντος βιαίως, οἷον ἐάν τις βιάζηται χελώνας 7
βατράχους ἤ τι ἄλλο τῶν τοιούτων γενῶν" ἐπὶ
δὲ τῶν ἰχθύων οὐ συμβαίνει πειρωμένοις πάντα

δ τρόπον, ὡς οὐκ ἐχόντων πνεῦμα θύραθεν οὐθέν. ὃν
τε τρόπον λέγουσι γίνεσθαι τὴν ἀναπνοὴν αὐτοῖς,
ἐνδέχεται καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις οὖσιν ἐν τῷ ὑγρῷ
συμβαίνειν’: εἰ γὰρ καὶ οἱ ἰχθύες ἕλκουσιν ἐκ τοῦ
πέριξ ὕδατος τῷ στόματι, διὰ τί τοῦτο οὐκ ἂν
ποιοῖμεν καὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ τἄλλα ζῷα; καὶ

τὸ τὸν ἐκ τοῦ στόματος δ᾽ ἂν ἕλκοιμεν ὁμοίως τοῖς
ἰχθύσιν. ὥστ᾽ εἴπερ κἀκεῖνα ἦν δυνατά, καὶ ταῦτ᾽
ἂν iid ἐπεὶ δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστι, δῆλον ὡς οὐδ᾽ ἐπ᾿ ἐκείνων
ἐστίν, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις διὰ τίν᾽ αἰτίαν ἐν τῷ ἀέρι
432

ON RESPIRATION, τι.--τῖσι,

breathing creatures must both exhale and inhale, and
they cammot exhale at all, none of them can breathe
at all.

III, Again to say that they draw in air from the
mouth, or from the water by way of the mouth is
impossible ; for they have no windpipe because they
have no lung, but the stomach is close up to the
mouth, so that it would have to draw in the air by
the stomach. In that case other living creatures
would do the same thing; but’as a matter of fact
they do not. Those also which live out of water
would evidently do it too; but it is clear that they
do not. Again, in the case of all creatures which
breathe and draw breath, we see that there is some
moyement of the part which draws, but this does not
happen with fishes ; for no movement can be seen
of the parts about the stomach, but only the gills
move, both in water, and when they are thrown out
on to land, so long as they breathe. Again when all
breathing animals die of drowning in water, bubbles
of air violently expelled rise; for instance if one
holds down by force tortoises, or frogs, or any other
such species ; but it does not happen in the case of
fishes, however much we try, as they do not draw
any breath from outside. But the method by which
they explain animals’ breathing might also apply
to men in water; for if fish draw air from the
surrounding water by the mouth, why should not we
men and all other living creatures do the same thing ἢ
Then we should draw the air from the mouth just like
the fishes. Ifthe one were possible, so also would
the other be ; but since it is not true in the one case,
it is clear that it is not true in the other either. In
addition to this why do fishes die in the air, and are

QP 433

The

physiology
of the fish.

ARISTOTLE

4115 > , ἥν ta 2 i a
ἀποθνήσκουσι καὶ φαίνονται ἀσπαρίζοντα ὥσπερ

τὰ πνιγόμενα, εἴπερ ἀναπνέουσιν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ
uu τροφῆς γε ἐνδείᾳ τοῦτο πάσχουσιν. ἣν γὰρ λέγει
Διογένης αἰτίαν, εὐήθης" φησὶ γὰρ ὅτι τὸν ἀέρα
πολὺν ἕλκουσι λίαν ἐν τῷ ἀέρι, ἐν δὲ τῷ ὕδατι
μέτριον, καὶ διὰ τοῦτ᾽ ἀποθνήσκειν. καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ
τῶν πεζῶν ἔδει δυνατὸν εἶναι τοῦτο συμβαίνειν"
νῦν δ᾽ οὐδὲν τῷ σφόδρα ἀναπνεῦσαι ἀποπνίγεται
20 πεζὸν ζῷον. ἔτι δ᾽ εἰ πάντα ἀναπνεῖ, δῆλον ὅτι
καὶ τὰ ἔντομα τῶν ζῴων ἀναπνεῖ" φαίνεγαι δ᾽
αὐτῶν πολλὰ διατεμνόμενα ζῆν, οὐ μόνον εἰς δύο
μέρη ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰς πλείω, οἷον αἱ καλούμεναι σκολό-
πενδραι" ἃ πῶς ἢ τίνι ἐνδέχεται ἀναπνεῖν; αἵτιον
δὲ μάλιστα τοῦ μὴ λέγεσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν καλῶς
a 76 τε τῶν μορίων ἀπείρους εἶναι τῶν ἐντός, καὶ
μὴ λαμβάνειν ἕνεκά τινος τὴν φύσιν πάντα ποιεῖν'
ζητοῦντες γὰρ τίνος ἕνεκα ἡ ἀναπνοὴ τοῖς ζῴοις
ὑπάρχει, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μορίων τοῦτ᾽ ἐπισκοποῦντες,
οἷον ἐπὶ βραγχίων καὶ πλεύμονος, εὗρον ἂν θᾶττον
τὴν αἰτίαν.
80 IV. Δημόκριτος δ᾽ ὅτι μὲν ἐκ τῆς ἀναπνοῆς
συμβαΐνει τι τοῖς ἀναπνέουσι λέγει, φάσκων κωλύειν
ama ἐκθλίβεσθαι τὴν ψυχήν: οὐ μέντοι ὡς τούτου γ᾽
ἕνεκα ποιήσασαν τοῦτο τὴν φύσιν οὐθὲν εἴρηκεν"
ὅλως γὰρ ὥσπερ καὶ of ἄλλοι φυσικοί, καὶ οὗτος
οὐθὲν ἅπτεται τῆς τοιαύτης αἰτίας. λέγει δ᾽ ὡς
ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ θερμὸν ταὐτὸν τὰ πρῶτα σχήματα
ὁ τῶν σφαιροειδῶν. συγκρινομένων οὖν αὐτῶν ὑπὸ
τοῦ περιέχοντος ἐκθλίβοντος, βοήθειαν γίνεσθαι
τὴν ἀναπνοήν φησιν. ἐν γὰρ τῷ ἀέρι πολὺν

484

ON RESPIRATION, mi.—1v.

seen tu gasp convulsively as if they were choking, if
they can breathe? For their symptoms are not due
to lack of food. The explanation which Diogenes
gives is childish ; he says that in the air they absorb
too much of the air, but in the water only a moderate
quantity, and that this is why they die. But in that
case it ought to be possible for it to happen with land
creatures, but in point of fact no land animal has ever
been choked by breathing in too much. Again if
every living creature breathes in air, it is obvious that
insects as well as other animals should breathe ; but
many of them seem to continue living even when
severed, not merely into two parts but into more, for
instance the so-called centipedes; how and with
what organ can they breathe? The reason why men
have given a false account of them is that they have
never examined their internal anatomy, and have not
considered the end in view that nature has in all
creation ; for if they had inquired why breathing is
characteristic of animals, and had considered the
question in the light of their parts, for instance the
gills and lungs, they would have discovered the reason
more easily.

IV. Democritus states that among animals that why do
breathe there is a result of their breathing, and 2°Y tiving
alleges that it prevents the soul from being crushed breathe?
out ; but he nowhere says that this is why nature has Refutatton
invented breathing; for generally speaking, like ofDem>
other natural philosophers, he never reckons upon any
reason of this kind. But he does identify the soul
with the heat,regarding both as first forms of spherical
particles. So he contends that when these particles
are being crushed by the surrounding air, which is
pressing them out, breathing intervenes to help them.

435

ARISTOTLE

ATR a > A Lf b ~ 7 a λ a Σ ~ ~
ἀριθμὸν εἶναι τῶν τοιούτων ἃ καλεῖ ἐκεῖνος νοῦν

A fa 2 i εὴ ι > / “~
και ψυχήν' αναπνέονῖος οὖν καὶ εἰισίοντος TOU
ἀέρος συνεισιόντα ταῦτα, καὶ ἀνείργοντα τὴν

, 2 y 2 on 2 Ὡς ? 5

10 θλίψιν, κωλύειν τὴν ἐνοῦσαν ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις διιέναι
ψυχήν. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐν τῷ ἀναπνεῖν καὶ ἐκπνεῖν
εἶναι τὸ ζῆν καὶ τὸ ἀποθνήσκειν" ὅταν γὰρ κρατῇ
τὸ περιέχον συνθλῖβον, καὶ μηκέτι θύραθεν εἰσιὸν

\ -
δύνηται ἀνείργειν, μὴ δυναμένου ἀναπνεῖν, τότε
, 4 ΄ a iA Ay λ
συμβαίνειν τὸν θάνατον τοῖς ζῴοις εἶναι γὰρ τὸν
2 ς a
is θάνατον τὴν τῶν τοιούτων σχημάτων ἐκ τοῦ
> a an

σώματος ἔξοδον ἐκ τῆς τοῦ περιέχοντος ἐκθλίψεως.
τὴν δ᾽ αἰτίαν διὰ τί ποτε πᾶσι μὲν ἀναγκαῖον

> - Ἴ [ Lg ” 3 \ ‘ ,
ἀποθανεῖν, οὐ μέντοι ὅτε ἔτυχεν ἀλλὰ κατὰ φύσιν
μὲν γήρᾳ, βίᾳ δὲ παρὰ φύσιν, οὐθὲν δεδήλωκεν.

“- \ ς

kairo. ἐχρῆν, ἐπεὶ ὁτὲ μὲν φαίνεται τοῦτο γινό-
eo. > , / \ W " i

20 μενον, ὁτὲ δ᾽ οὐ φαίνεται, πότερον τὸ αἴτιον ἔξωθέν

lon > ~
ἐστιν ἢ ἐντός. οὐ λέγει δὲ οὐδὲ περὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς

a a "
τοῦ ἀναπνεῖν τί τὸ alriov, πότερον ἔσωθεν ἢ
ἔξωθεν" οὐ γὰρ δὴ ὁ θύραθεν νοῦς τηρεῖ τὴν βοή-
θειαν, ἀλλ᾽’ ἔσωθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς ἀναπνοῆς γίνεται
καὶ τῆς κινήσεως, οὐχ ὡς βιαζομένου τοῦ περι-

a5 ἔχοντος. ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἅμα τὸ περιέχον συν-
θλίβειν καὶ εἰσιὸν διαστέλλειν. ἃ μὲν οὖν εἴρηκε

. >
καὶ ὥς, σχεδὸν τἀῦτ᾽ ἐστίν.
i a >.

Εἰ δὲ Set νομίζειν ἀληθῆ εἶναι τὰ πρότερον λεχ-
θέντα καὶ μὴ πάντα τὰ ζῷα ἀναπνεῖν, οὐ περὶ
παντὸς θανάτου τὴν αἰτίαν ὑποληπτέον εἰρῆσθαι
ταύτην, ἀλλὰ μόνον ἐπὶ τῶν ἀναπνεόντων. οὐ

so μὴν οὐδ᾽ ἀπὶ τούτων καλῶς. δῆλον δ᾽ ἐκ τῶν
436

ΟΝ ΒΕΒΡΙΒΑΤΙΟΝ, τν.

For in the air are a large number of these particles,
which he calls mind and soul ; so that when breathing
takes place and the air enters, these enter too and
check the crushing, preventing the soul which is in
the animal from passing out. For this reason upon
breathing in and breathing out depend life and death ;
for when the surrounding air by its crushing action
wins the mastery, and nothing entering from the
outside can check it, as breathing is impossible, death
then comes to living creatures ; for he considers that
death is the passing out of such forms from the body
owing to the pressure of the surrounding air. But
the reason why all living creatures must die at some
time, though not at any particular time, but either
naturally by old age or unnaturally by violence, he
has nowhere explained. And yet he should have
explained it, since sometimes it can be seen happen-
ing and sometimes not, whether the cause is external
or internal. He does not even say of the origin of
breathing, what its cause is, nor whether it begins
from the outside or the inside. As a matter of fact
the mind does not watch from the outside for the
time to help, but the origin of breathing and of all
movement comes from inside, and not by pressure
from thesurrounding air. Itisimprobable thatthe sur-
rounding air causes compression and by entering causes
expansion at the same time. For what he has said,
and his way of explaining it, almost amounts to this.

But if we are to believe what has been said before
—-that not all living creatures breathe—one must
suppose that this cannot be alleged as the cause of
death in every case, but only in the case of breathing
animals. It is not quite a satisfactory explanation
even in their case. This is clear from the facts and

437

ARISTOTLE

472 8 7 4
συμβαινόντων καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ὧν ἔχομεν πάντες

πεῖραν. ἐν γὰρ ταῖς ἀλέαις θερμαινόμενοι μᾶλλον
καὶ τῆς ἀναπνοῆς μᾶλλον δεόμεθα καὶ πυκνότερον
ἀναπνέομεν πάντες" ὅταν δὲ τὸ πέριξ ἢ) ψυχρὸν
καὶ συνάγῃ καὶ συμπηγνύῃ τὸ σῶμα, κατέχειν
6 συμβαίνει τὸ πνεῦμα. καίτοι τότ᾽ ἐχρῆν τὸν
amb θύραθεν εἰσιόντα κωλύειν τὴν σύνθλιψιν. viv
δὲ γίνεται τοὐναντίον' ὅταν γὰρ πολὺ λίαν ἀθροισθῇ
τὸ θερμὸν μὴ ἐκπνεόντων, τότε δέονται τῆς
ἀναπνοῆς" ἀναγκαῖον δ᾽ εἰσπνεύσαντας ἀναπνεῖν.
ἀλεάζοντες δὲ πολλάκις ἀναπνέουσιν, ὡς dva-
ὁ ψύξεως χάριν ἀναπνέοντες, ὅτε τὸ λεγόμενον ποιεῖ
πῦρ ἐπὶ πῦρ.

V. Ἢ δ᾽ ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ γεγραμμένη περίωσις
περί τε τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων οὐδὲν διώρικε τίνα
τρόπον αὐτοῖς ἡ τοῦ θερμοῦ γίνεται σωτηρία, πότε-
ρον τὸν αὐτὸν ἢ δι’ ἄλλην τινὰ αἰτίαν" εἰ μὲν γὰρ

10 μόνοις τὸ τῆς ἀναπνοῆς ὑπάρχει τοῖς πεζοῖς, λε-
κτέον τὴν αἰτίαν τοῦ μόνοις" εἰ δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις,
ὃ δὲ τρόπος ἄλλος, καὶ περὶ τούτου διοριστέον,
εἴπερ δυνατὸν ἀναπνεῖν πᾶσιν.

Ἔτι δὲ καὶ πλασματώδης ὁ τρόπος τῆς αἰτίας.
ἐξιόντος γὰρ ἔξω τοῦ θερμοῦ διὰ τοῦ στόματος,
τὸν περιέχοντα ὠθούμενον ἀέρα φερόμενον ἐμ-

1s πίπτειν εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον φησὶ διὰ μανῶν οὐσῶν
τῶν σαρκῶν, ὅθεν τὸ ἐντὸς ἐξήει θερμόν, διὰ τὸ
μηδὲν εἶναι κενὸν ἀντιπεριισταμένων ἀλλήλοις"
θερμανθέντα δὲ πάλιν ἐξιέναι κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν
τόπον, καὶ περιωθεῖν εἴσω διὰ τοῦ στόματος τὸν
ἀέρα τὸν ἐκπίπτοντα θερμόν' καὶ τοῦτο δὴ δια-

488

ON RESPIRATION, 1v.—v.

from experiences of a kind with which we are all
familiar. Yor in high temperatures the hotter we
get the more we have to breathe, and with all of us
the breath comes faster ; but when the surrounding
atmosphere is cold, which contracts and freezes the
body, it checks the breath. And yet on the assump-
tion made the air entering from the outside ought to
prevent this pressure. But in point of fact the exact
opposite oceurs ; for when excessive heat is collected
by not exhaling, then men need to breathe ; and
they can only breathe by inhaling. But when they
are hot they breathe rapidly, and they do so in order
to get cool, but this according to Democritus’s theory
would be adding fire to fire.

V. The account givenin the Zimaeus¢ of the “ push-
ing round ” of the air does not explain in the case of
animals other than land animals why this conserva-
tion of heat occurs in them, nor whether it is for the
same reason or for some other ; for if breathing occurs
only in land animals, we have to explain why only in
them ; but if it does occur with the rest, but its mode
of action is different, then we must be definite on this
point, whether it is possible for all living creatures to
breathe.

Moreover this kind of cause is really fictitious. For,
upon this theory, when the heat passes out through
the mouth, the surrounding air is pushed on and falls

Plato's
account of
breathing.
Refutation.

into the actual place from which the internal heat has -

passed out “ through the flesh which is porous,” one
substance replacing another because a vacuum is
impossible ; when the air has grown hot it passes out
again through the same place as before, and pushesthe
hot air, which falls out, round again through the mouth;

4 Tim, 79 6.
439

ARISTOTLE

4725
20 τελεῖν ἀεὶ ποιοῦντας, ἀναπνέοντάς τε καὶ ἐκπνέον-

τας. “συμβαίνει δὲ τοῖς οὕτως οἰομένοις πρότερον
τὴν ἐκπνοὴν γίνεσθαι τῆς εἰσπνοῆς. ἔστι δὲ
τοὐναντίον. σημεῖον δέ' γίνεται μὲν γὰρ ἀλλήλοις
ταῦτα παρ᾽ ἄλληλα, τελευτῶντες δὲ ἐκπνέουσιν,
ὥστ᾽ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὴν ἀρχὴν εἰσπνοήν.
"Ere δὲ τὸ τίνος ἕνεκα ταῦθ᾽ ὑπάρχει τοῖς ζῴοις
26 (λέγω δὲ τὸ ἀναπνεῖν καὶ τὸ ἐκπνεῖν) οὐθὲν
εἰρήκασιν οἱ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον λέγοντες, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς
περὶ συμπτώματός τινος ἀποφαίνονται μόνον.
καίτοι γε κύρια ταῦθ᾽ ὁρῶμεν τοῦ ζῆν. καὶ τελευτᾶν"
ὅταν γὰρ ἀναπνεῖν μὴ δύνωνται, τότε συμβαίνει
γίνεσθαι τὴν φθορὰν τοῖς ἀναπνέουσιν. ἔτι δὲ
80 ἄτοπον τὸ τὴν μὲν τοῦ θερμοῦ διὰ τοῦ στόματος
ἔξοδον καὶ πάλιν εἴσοδον μὴ λανθάνειν ἡμᾶς, τὴν
δ᾽ εἰς τὸν θώρακα τοῦ πνεύματος εἴσοδον καὶ
πάλιν θερμανθέντος ἔξοδον. λανθάνειν. ἄτοπον δὲ
καὶ τοῦ θερμοῦ τὴν ἀναπνοὴν εἴσοδον εἶναι, φαίνε-
ται γὰρ τοὐναντίον" τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐκπνεόμενον εἶναι
88 θερμόν, τὸ δ᾽ εἰσπνεόμενον ψυχρόν. ὅταν δὲ θερμὸν
μ“ ἀσθμαίνοντες ἀναπνέουσιν" een γὰρ τὸ μὴ κατα-
ὕχειν ἱκανῶς τὸ εἰσιὸν πολλάκις τὸ πνεῦμα συμ-
βαίνει σπᾶν.
VI. ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ : τροφῆς γε χάριν ὑποληπτέον
γίνεσθαι. τὴν ἀναπνοήν, ὡς τρεφομένου τῷ πνεύ-
5 ματι τοῦ ἐντὸς πυρός, καὶ ἀναπνέοντος μὲν ὥσπερ
ἐπὶ πῦρ ὑπέκκαυμα ὑποβάλλεσθαι, τραφέντος δὲ
τοῦ πυρὸς γίνεσθαι τὴν ἐκπνοήν. ταὐτὰ yap
ἐροῦμεν πάλιν καὶ πρὸς τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἅπερ
πρὸς τοὺς ἔμπροσθεν" καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων
ζῴων ἐχρῆν τοῦτο συμβαίνειν ἢ τὸ ἀνάλογον
τὸ τούτῳ' πάντα γὰρ ἔχει θερμότητα ζωτικήν. ἔπειτα
᾿440

ON RESPIRATION, v.—v1.

and this we continue to do perpetually, inhaling and
exhaling. But those who believe this must think that
exhalation comes before inhalation. But the opposite
is the truth. And here is the proof; these actions
take place alternately, but the last thing men do is
to exhale, so that inhalation must be the first action.

Again those who talk in this way have never ex-
plained why this happens in living creatures (I mean
inhalation and exhalation), but their account suggests
that it is a mere accident. And yet we see that it
controls life and death; for when the breathing
creatures can no longer breathe, then destruction
comes to them. Again, it is remarkable that we
should be conscious of the successive exit and entrance
of heat through the mouth, but unconscious of the
entry of the breath into the chest, and its subsequent
exit when it is hot. It is strange if inhalation is the
entrance of the hot. For the opposite seems true ;
what is exhaled seems to be hot and what is inhaled
cool. For when it is hot men breathe hard; for,
because the entering breath does not cool sufficiently,
one draws it in often,

VI. Nor can we suppose that breathing is for the Is breathing
sake of nourishment, on the suppésition that the eee
internal heat is nourished by breath, and that breath-
ing is supplying fuel to the fire, and that exhalation
takes place when the fire is sufficiently fed. For we
shall make the same reply to this argument that we
made to the previous ones; for this or something
analogous to it should have occurred in the case of
the other animals ; for all of them have life-giving

441

ARISTOTLE

473 a " A ᾿ ‘ i > ~ , t
καὶ τὸ γίνεσθαι τὸ θερμὸν ἐκ τοῦ πνεύματος τίνα

χρὴ τρόπον λέγειν, πλασματῶδες ὄν; μᾶλλον γὰρ
ἐκ τῆς τροφῆς τοῦτο γινόμενον ὁρῶμεν. συμ-
βαίνει τε κατὰ ταὐτὸ δέχεσθαι τὴν τροφὴν καὶ τὸ
περίττωμα ἀφιέναι: τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὐχ
ὁρῶμεν γινόμενον.
τὸ VII. Λέγει δὲ περὶ ἀναπνοῆς καὶ ᾿Εμπεδοκλῆς,
οὐ μέντοι τίνος γ᾽ ἕνεκα, οὐδὲ περὶ πάντων τῶν
ζῴων οὐδὲν ποιεῖ δῆλον, εἴτε ἀναπνέουσιν εἴτε
μή.. καὶ περὶ τῆς διὰ τῶν μυκτήρων ἀναπνοῆς
λέγων οἴεται καὶ περὶ τῆς κυρίας λέγειν ἀνα-
πνοῆς. ἔστι γὰρ καὶ διὰ τῆς ἀρτηρίας ἐκ τῶν
"0 στηθῶν ἡ ἀναπνοή, καὶ ἡ διὰ τῶν μυκτήρων'
αὐτοῖς δὲ χωρὶς ἐκείνης οὐκ ἔστιν ἀναπνεῦσαι τοῖς
μυκτῆρσιν. καὶ τῆς μὲν διὰ τῶν μυκτήρων γινο-
μένης ἀναπνοῆς στερισκόμενα τὰ ζῷα οὐδὲν πά-
σχουσι, τῆς δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἀρτηρίαν ἀποθνήσκουσιν.
καταχρῆται γὰρ ἡ φύσις ἐν παρέργῳ τῇ διὰ τῶν
2 μυκτήρων ἀναπνοῇ πρὸς τὴν ὄσφρησιν ἐν ἐνίοις
τῶν ζῴων" διόπερ ὀσφρήσεως μὲν οχεδὸν μετέχει
πάντα τὰ ζῷᾳ, ἔστι δ᾽ οὐ πᾶσι τὸ αὐτὸ αἰσθητή-
418 ν ριον. εἴρηται δὲ περὶ αὐτῶν ἐν ἑτέροις σαφέστερον.
. Γίνεσθαι δέ φησι τὴν ἀναπνοὴν καὶ ἐκπνοὴν διὰ
τὸ φλέβας εἶναί τινας, ἐν αἷς ἔνεστι μὲν αἷμα, οὐ
μέντοι πλήρεις εἰσὶν αἵματος, ἔχουσι δὲ πόρους
εἰς τὸν ἔξω ἀέρα, τῶν μὲν τοῦ σώματος μορίων
seAdrrous, τῶν δὲ. τοῦ ἀέρος μείζους" διὸ τοῦ
αἵματος πεφυκότος κινεῖσθαι ἄνω καὶ κάτω, κάτω
μὲν φερομένου εἰαρεῖν τὸν ἀέρα καὶ γίνεσθαι
ἀναπνοήν, ἄνω δ᾽ ἰόντος ἐκπίπτειν θύραζε καὶ
geese Τὴν Sans παρεικάζων τὸ συμβαῖνον
Ταῖς Κλεψύδραις.,. ~~ ὶ ᾿
442

ON RESPIRATION, vi.—vit.

heat. Again, this arising of heat from the breath,
being fictitious, how can we explain it? For we see
that this arises far more from food. It would follow
that the animal would receive nourishment, and dis-
charge waste product in the same way ; and this does
not seem to be true in other cases.

VII. Empedocles also discusses breathing, but not
its purpose, nor does he clear up the question as
applied to all living creatures, whether they breathe
or not. Also when he speaks of breathing through
the nostrils, he thinks that he is speaking of breathing
in its proper sense, But, besides Lhe breathing
through the Προ ΠΡ, there is also breathing from the
chest through the windpipe ; without the latter no
breathing through the nostrils would be possible.
Again animals deprived of breathing through the
nostrils do not seem to suffer for it, but when they
lose their breathing through the windpipe they die.
Nature employs this breathing through the nostrils
for a wey purpose in some animals—for smell-
ing; this is why nearly all animals share a sense of
smell, but they have not all the same sense organ. A
more detailed account of this is given in other works.®

But Empedocles says that inhalation and exhala-
tion occur because there are certain veins, which
contain some blood but are not full of blood, but have
openings to the air outside, smaller than-the parts of
the body, but large enough for air ; because it is the
nature of blood to move up and down, when it is
carried down the air flows in and constitutes breath-
ing, but, when it rises, the air is driven out, and exhala-
tion takes place, comparing it with what happens in
water-clocks. ;

τα Of, De Anil, 491 ἃ 10, De Sens. 443 a 4, 444 b 1-18. -
44.3

Empedocles
on breath
ing.

473 Ὁ

474 8

ARISTOTLE

ὧδε δ᾽ ἀναπνεῖ πάντα καὶ ἐκπνεῖ. πᾶσι λίφαιμοι
σαρκῶν σύριγγες πύματον κατὰ σῶμα τέτανται,
καί σφιν ἐπὶ στομίοις πυκναῖς τέτρηνται ἄλοξιν
ῥινῶν ἔσχατα τέρθρα διαμπερές, ὥστε φόνον μέν
κεύθειν, αἰθέρι δ᾽ εὐπορίην διόδοισι τετμῆσθαι.
ἔνθεν ἔπειθ᾽ ὁπόταν μὲν ἀπαϊΐξῃ τέρεν αἷμα,
αἰθὴρ παφλάζων καταβήσεται οἴδματι μάργῳ,
εὖτε δ᾽ ἀναθρώσκει, πάλιν ἐκπνεῖ, ὥσπερ ὅταν
παῖς
κλεψύδρην παίζησι δι᾿ εὐπετέος χαλκοῖο.
εὖτε μὲν αὐλοῦ πορθμὸν ἐπ᾽ εὐειδεῖ χερὶ θεῖσα
εἰς ὕδατος βάπτῃσι τέρεν δέμας ἀργυφέοιο,
οὐ τότ᾽ ἐς ἄγγος δ᾽ ὄμβρος ἐσέρχεται, ἀλλά μιν
:
εἴργει
ἀέρος ὄγκος ἔσωθε πεσὼν ἐπὶ τρήματα πυκνά,
εἰσόκ᾽ ἀποστεγάσῃ πυνικὸν ῥόον' αὐτὰρ ἔπειτα
πνεύματος ἐλλείποντος ἐσέρχεται αὔξιμον ὕδωρ.
ὡς δ᾽ αὕτως 66° ὕδωρ μὲν ἔχει κατὰ βένθεα
χαλκοῦ
πορθμοῦ χωσθέντος βροτέῳ χροὶ ἠδὲ πόροιο,
αἰθὴρ δ' ἐκτὸς ἔσω λελιημένος ὄμβρον ἐρύκει
didi πύλας ἰσθμοῖο δυσηχέος, ἄκρα κρατύνων,
εἰσόκε χειρὶ μεθῇ" τότε δ᾽ αὖ πάλιν, ἔμπαλιν ἣ
πρίν,
πνεύματος euminrovros ὑπεκθέει αὔξιμον ὕδωρ.
ὡς δ᾽ αὕτως τέρεν αἷμα κλαδασσόμενον διὰ γυίων
ὁππότε μὲν παλίνορσον ἐπαΐξειε μυχόνδε,
αἰθέρος εὐθὺς ῥεῦμα κατέρχεται οἴδματι θῦον,
εὖτε δ' ἀναθρώσκῃ, πάλιν ἐκπνεῖ ἶσον ὀπίσσω.

4 a a3 ~
Λέγει μὲν οὖν ταῦτα περὶ τοῦ ἀναπνεῖν, ἀναπνεῖ

δ᾽ a ww \ ~ 3 i ᾿ -
» ὥσπερ εἴπομεν, τὰ φανερῶς ἀναπνέοντα διὰ τῆς
444

ON RESPIRATION, vis.

“Thus all things breathe in and out. All men
have bloodless pipes of flesh stretching throughout the
body, and these are pierced at their ends with many
passages right through the ends of the nostrils, such
that the blood is covered in them, but they give an
easy passage to the air. Now whenever the gentle
blood retreats, the rushing air will descend with
raging tide, but when the blood leaps up again, the
air again blows out, just as when a maid plays with
a water-clock of gleaming bronze. When placing a
shapely finger on the channel of the tube she dips the
delicate body into water silver white, not then does
the stream flow into the vessel, but the press of the
air from within falling on the crowded holes checks it,
until she sets free the rapid stream. Then the air
gives way and the swelling water enters. So in the
same way, when the water lies in the depths of the
bronze vessel, the passage and channel being blocked
by the human hand, the air outside craving entrance
keeps the water back about the gates of the resound-
ing channel, holding fast its extremities, until the
maid lets go with the hand; then again, in the
opposite way, as the air rushes in, the swelling water
flows out. In just this way the gentle blood coursing
through the limbs, whenever it retreats back again
to its recesses, at once a stream of air flows in with a
rush, but when the blood leaps again the air flows
back again as before.”’

This is what Empedocles has to say about breath-
ing, but, as we have said, creatures whose breathing
can be seen, breathe through the windpipe, and also

44.

Refutation
of Empe-
docles,

474.0

80᾽

4714 Ὁ

ARISTOTLE

ἀρτηρίας, διά τε τοῦ στόματος ἅμα καὶ διὰ τῶν
μυκτήρων. ὥστ᾽ εἰ μὲν περὶ ταύτης λέγει τῆς
ἀναπνοῆς, ἀναγκαῖον ξητεῖν πῶς ἐφαρμόσει é
εἰρημένος λόγος τῆς αἰτίας" φαίνεται γὰ todvay-
τίον συμβαῖνον. ἄραντες μὲν γὰρ τὸν τόπον,
καθάπερ τὰς φύσας ἐν τοῖς χαλκείοις, ἀ ἀναπνέουσιν'
αἴρειν δὲ τὸ θερμὸν εὔλογον, ἔχειν δὲ τὸ αἷμα τὴν
τοῦ θερμοῦ χώραν" συνιζάνοντες δὲ καὶ καταπνί-
γοντες, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖ τὰς φύσας, ἐκπνέουσιν. πλὴν
ἐκεῖ μὲν οὐ κατὰ ταὐτὸν εἰσδέχονταί τε τὸν ἀέρα
καὶ πάλιν ἐξιᾶσιν, οἱ δ᾽ ἀναπνέοντες κατὰ ταὐτόν.
εἰ δὲ περὶ τῆς κατὰ τοὺς “μυκτῆρας λέγει μόνης.
πολὺ διημάρτηκεν" οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἀναπνοὴ μυκτήρων
ἴδιος, ἀλλὰ παρὰ τὸν αὐλῶνα τὸν περὶ τὸν γαρ-
γαρεῶνα, i) τὸ ἔσχατον τοῦ ἐν τῷ στόματι οὐρανοῦ,
συντετρημένων τῶν μυκτήρων χωρεῖ τὸ μὲν tary
τοῦ πνεύματος, τὸ δὲ διὰ τοῦ στόματος, ὁμοίως
εἰσιόν τε καὶ ἐξιόν. τὰ μὲν οὖν παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων
εἰρημένα περὲ τοῦ ἀναπνεῖν τοιαύτας καὶ τοσαύτας
ἔχει δυσχερείας.

VIII. Ἐπεὶ δὲ εἴρηται πρότερον ὅτι τὸ ζῆν καὶ
ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς ἕξις μετὰ θερμότητός τινός ἐστιν"
οὐδὲ γὰρ ἡ πέψις, δι᾿ ἧς ἡ τροφὴ γίνεται. τοῖς
ξῴοις, our’ ἄνευ ψυχῆς οὔτ᾽ ἄνευ θερμότητός € ἐστιν".
πυρὶ γὰρ ἐργάζεται πάντα. διόπερ ἐν ᾧ πρώτῳ
τόπῳ τοῦ σώματος καὶ ἐν ᾧ πρώτῳ τοῦ τόπου
τούτου μὸρίῳ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀναγκαῖον. εἶναι τὴν
τοιαύτην, ἐνταῦθα καὶ τὴν πρώτην τὴν θρεπτικὴν
ψυχὴν ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν. οὗτος δ᾽ ἐστὶν ὁ
μέσος “τόπος τοῦ τε δεχομένου τὴν τροφὴν καὶ
Kad” ὃν ἀφίησι τὸ περίττωμα. τοῖς «μὲν οὖν
ἀναίμοις ἀνώνυμον, τοῖς δ᾽ ἐναίμοις ἡ καρδία
446

ON RESPIRATION, vit.—vu1.

through the mouth and through the nostrils. So that,
if he is talking of breathing in this sense, he must
consider how what he has said of the cause will
fit in; for it is clear that just the opposite happens.
When men breathe they raise the region (the chest),
just like the bellows in a forge; it is quite natural
for heat to raise it, and the blood occupies the place
of heat; but when they are settling it down and
cutting it off, as in the other case with the bellows,
they exhale, But in the other case they do not
admit and expel the air in the same way, but those
who breathe do. But if he is speaking of breathing
by the nostrils only, he is guilty of a grave error. For
breathing is not peculiar to the nostrils, but the
breath in this region also travels by the channel about
the uvula, where the roof of the mouth ends, and,
as the nostrils are perforated, part of the breath
travels by this channel, and part by the mouth, both
when entering and when going out. The accounts
given of breathing by the other philosophers present
many difficulties of this kind.

VIII. We have said before that life and the con-
dition of the soul depend to some extent upon heat ;
for digestion by which means animals assimilate their
food cannot take place apart from the soul and heat ;
for all this work is done by heat. Therefore in that
region of the body which is first, and in the first
part of that region in which this principle must exist,
there the primary nutritive soul must exist. This is
the region midway between that which receives the
food and that which discharges the waste product.
It has no name in the bloodless animals, but in animals

447

Aristotle's
views.
Bodily heat.

ARISTOTLE
474 Ὁ
τοῦτο τὸ μόριόν ἐστιν. ἡ τροφὴ μὲν γὰρ ἐξ ἧς

5 ἤδη γίνεται τὰ μόρια τοῖς ζῴοις, ἡ τοῦ αἵματος
φύσις ἐστίν, τοῦ δ᾽ αἵματος καὶ τῶν φλεβῶν τὴν
αὐτὴν ἀρχὴν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι. θατέρου γὰρ ἕνεκα
θάτερόν ἐστιν, ὡς ἀγγεῖον. καὶ δεκτικόν. ἀρχὴ δὲ
τῶν φλεβῶν. ἡ καρδία τοῖς ἐναίμοις" οὐ γὰρ διὰ
ταύτης, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκ ταύτης ἠρτημέναι πᾶσαι τυγχά-
νουσιν. δῆλον δ᾽ ἡμῖν τοῦτο ἐκ τῶν ἀνατομῶν.

10 Τὰς μὲν οὖν ἄλλας δυνάμεις τῆς ψυχῆς ἀδύνατον
ὑπάρχειν ἄνευ τῆς θρεπτικῆς (δι᾿ ἣν δ᾽ αἰτίαν,
εἴρηται πρότερον ἐν τοῖς περὶ ψυχῆς), ταύτην δ᾽
ἄνευ τοῦ φυσικοῦ πυρός" ἐν τούτῳ γὰρ ἡ φύσις
ἐμπεπύρευκεν αὐτήν. φθορὰ δὲ πυρός, ὥσπερ
εἴρηται «πρότερον, σβέσις καὶ μάρανσις. σβέσις

τό μὲν ἡ ὑπὸ τῶν ἐναντίων: διόπερ ἀθρόον τε ὑπὸ

ς τοῦ περιέχοντος ψυχρότητος, καὶ θᾶττον ὅτι

Hi yee διασπώμενον. αὕτη μὲν οὖν ἡ φθορὰ
βίαιος ὁμοίως ἐπὶ τῶν ca Kal τῶν ἀψύχων
ἐστίν' καὶ γὰρ ὀργάνοις διαιρουμένου τοῦ ζῴου,

εὐ καὶ πηγνυμένου διὰ ψύχους ὑπερβολήν, ἀποθνή-

3 σκοῦσιν. ἡ δὲ μάρανσις διὰ πλῆθος θερμότητος"
καὶ γὰρ ἂν ὑπερβάλλῃ τὸ πέριξ θερμόν, καὶ τροφὴν
ἐὰν μὴ Aap Bavg, φθείρεται τὸ πυρούμενον, οὐ
ψυχόμενον ἀλλὰ μαραινόμενον. ὥστ᾽ ἀνάγκη γίνε-
σθαι κατάψυξιν, εἰ μέλλει τεύξεσθαι σωτηρίας"
τοῦτο γὰρ βοηθεῖ “πρὸς ταύτην τὴν φθοράν.

% IX. ᾿Επεὶ δὲ τῶν ζῴων τὰ μὲν ἔνυδρα, τὰ δ᾽
ἐν τῇ γῇ ποιεῖται τὴν tar, ιβήν, τούτων τοῖς μὲν
μικροῖς πάμπαν καὶ τοῖς ἀναίμοις ἡ γινομένη ἐκ
τοῦ πε ιέχοντος ἢ ὕδατος ἢ ἀέρος ψύξις ἱκανὴ
πρὸς τ οήθειαν τῆς φθορᾶς ταύτης" μικρὸν γὰρ
ἔχοντα τὸ θερμὸν μικρᾶς δέονται τῆς βοηθείας.

448

ON RESPIRATION, vin.—ix.

with blood this part is the heart. The nature of the
bloodsupplies the food from which the parts in animals
grow, But the source of the blood and the veins
must be the same; for the one exists for the sake of
the other, as its vessel and receiver. But in the
animals with blood the heart is the source of the veins;
for not merely do the veins go through the heart, but
they actually proceed from it. This of course is
proved by dissection.

The other functions of the soul cannot exist without
the nutritive (the reason for this has been discussed
in my work On the Soul),* nor can that exist without
natural heat. For it is in this that nature has fired
it. But the destruction of fire, as has been said
before, is due to either quenching or dying out.
Quenching is due to opposites ; thus it is quenched
by the coldness of the surrounding air, even when it
is a mass of flame, and even more quickly when
scattered. Now this violent extinction takes place
equally in creatures with and without soul ; for when
the living creature is dissected by instruments, and is
frozen by excess of cold, it dies. But withering is due
to excess of heat; for if the surrounding heat is
excessive, unless it receives food, the burning object
dics, not: because it grows cold, but by dying out. So
then, if it is to survive, a cooling must take place ;
for this protects it against destruction in this way.

IX. But since some living creatures spend their
lives in water, and others on land, in the case of those
which are bloodless and very small the cooling due to
the surrounding envelope—whether water or air—is
sufficient to protect them against destruction of this
kind; for as they contain little heat they need but

« De An, 411} 18, 413 b 1.
24a 449

Breathing
and life.

ARISTOTLE
474 b ᾿ Η 4 Ry , δ a> 3 FA

80 διὸ καὶ βραχύβια σχεδὸν πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτ᾽ ἐστίν'
ἐπ᾿ ἀμφότερα γὰρ μικρᾶς ὄντα τυγχάνει ῥοπῆς.
φίδη ὅσα δὲ μακροβιώτερα τῶν ἐντόμων (ἄναιμα γάρ
ἐστι πάντα τὰ ἔντομα), τούτοις ὑπὸ τὸ διάζωμα
διέσχισται, ὅπως διὰ λεπτοτέρου ὄντος τοῦ ὑμένος
ψύχηται" μᾶλλον γὰρ ὄντα θερμὰ πλείονος δεῖται
τῆς καταψύξεως, οἷον αἱ μέλιτται (τῶν γὰρ μελιτ-
ὁ τῶν ἔνιαι ζῶσι καὶ ἑπτὰ ἔτη) καὶ τἄλλα δὲ ὅσα
βομβεῖ, οἷον σφῆκες καὶ μηλολόνθαι καὶ τέττιγες.
καὶ γὰρ τὸν ψόφον ποιοῦσι πνεύματι, οἷον ἀσθμαί-
νοντα" ἐν αὐτῷ γὰρ τῷ ὑποζώματι, τῷ ἐμφύτῳ
πνεύματι αἴροντι καὶ συνίζοντι, συμβαίνει πρὸς
10 τὸν ὑμένα γίνεσθαι τρίψιν' κινοῦσι γὰρ τὸν τόπον
τοῦτον, ὥσπερ τὰ ἀναπνέοντα ἔξωθεν τῷ πλεύμονι
καὶ οἱ ἰχθύες τοῖς βραγχίοις. παραπλήσιον γὰρ
συμβαίνει κἂν εἴ τίς τινα τῶν ἀναπνεόντων πνίγοι,
τὸ στόμα κατασχών" καὶ ydp ταῦτα ποιήσει τῷ
πλεύμονι τὴν ἄρσιν ταύτην. ἀλλὰ τούτοις μὲν
τὸ οὐχ ἱκανὴν ἡ τοιαύτη ποιεῖ κίνησις κατάψυξιν,
ἐκείνοις δ᾽ ἱκανήν. καὶ τῇ τρίψει τῇ πρὸς τὸν
ὑμένα ποιοῦσι τὸν βόμβον, ὥσπερ λέγομεν, οἷον
διὰ τῶν καλάμων τῶν τετρυπημένων τὰ παιδία,
ὅταν ἐπιθῶσιν ὑμένα λεπτόν. διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ
τῶν τεττίγων οἱ ἄδοντες ἄδουσιν: θερμότεροι γάρ
80 εἰσι, καὶ ἔσχισται αὐτοῖς ὑπὸ τὸ ὑπόζωμα’ τοῖς

δὲ μὴ ᾷδουσι τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν ἄσχιστον.

Kat τῶν ἐναίμων δὲ καὶ πλεύμονα ἐχόντων,
ὀλίγαιμον δ᾽ ἐχόντων καὶ σομφόν, ἔνια διὰ τοῦτο
πολὺν χρόνον δύνανται ἀπνευστὶ ζῆν, ὅτι ὁ πλεύμων
ἄρσιν ἔχει πολλήν, ὀλίγον ἔχων τὸ αἷμα καὶ τὸ

80 ὑγρόν" ἡ γὰρ οἰκεία κίνησις ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον

450

ON RESPIRATION, 1x.

little protection. For this reason nearly all creatures
of this kind are short-lived ; for they have but little
margin in either direction. But all the insects that
are long-lived (for all insects are bloodless) have a
division under the mid-region, so that the membrane
there being thinner they may be cooled ; for being
more hot by nature they need more cooling ; such
insects as bees (for some bees live as long as seven
years), and all the buzzing animals such as wasps and
cockchafers and cicalas. For they produce the buzz-
ing sound by breath, as though they were breathing
hard; for in the mid-region itself, as the breath
residing therein rises and falls, a rubbing takes place
against the membrane ; for they move this region,
just as those animals which draw their breath from
the outside do with the lung, and fishes with their

ills. It is similar to what would happen if one
throttled one of the breathing animals, by pinching
its mouth ; for this will produce a rise in the lungs.
But for the breathing animals such movement does
not produce sufficient cooling, but it is enough for the
others, They produce the buzzing by rubbing against
the membrane, as we say, just as boys do through
recds pierced with holes, when they have put a thin
membrane over them. This is how those of the
cicalas which chirrup do so, for they are warmer
creatures, and have a division under the midriff; but
in those which do not sing there is no division.

Of those animals which have both blood and lung,
but whose lung has little blood and is porous, some can
for this reason live for a long time without breathing,
because the lung is capable of considerable expansion,
having but little blood and moisture; for its own
movement is sufficient to keep it cool for a long time.

451

ARISTOTLE

475 a
διαρκεῖ καταψύχουσα, τέλος δ᾽ οὐ δύναται, ἀλλ᾽

ἀποπνίγεται μὴ ἀναπνεύσαντα, καθάπερ εἴρηται
καὶ πρότερον: τῆς yap μαράνσεως ἡ διὰ τὸ “μὴ
ψύχεσθαι φθορὰ καλεῖται πνίξις, καὶ τὰ οὕτω
φθειρόμενα ἀποπνίγεσθαί αμεν.

“Ore δ᾽ οὐκ ἀναπνεῖ τὰ ἔντομα τῶν ζῴων, εἴρη-

80 ταὶ μὲν καὶ πρότερον, φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν
μικρῶν ἐστὶ ζῴων, οἷον μυιῶν καὶ μελιττῶν: ἐν

45} γὰρ τοῖς ὑγροῖς πολὺν χρόνον ἀνανήχεται, ἂν μὴ
λίαν ἢ θερμὸν 7 ἢ ψυχρόν. καίτοι τὰ μικρὰν ἔχοντα
ύναμιν πυκνότερον ζητεῖ ἀναπνεῖν. ἀλλὰ φθεί-
ρεται ταῦτα καὶ λέγεται ἀποπνίγεσθαι πληρου-
μέν s τῆς κοιλίας καὶ φθειρομένου τοῦ ἐν τῷ

5 ὑπο ὦματι θερμοῦ" διὸ καὶ ἐν τῇ τέφρᾳ χρονυ-
σθέντα ἀ ἀνίσταται. καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷ ὑγρῷ δὲ ζώντων
ὅσα ἄναιμα, πλείω χρόνον ζῇ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι τῶν ἐναί-
μων καὶ δεχομένων τὴν θάλατταν, οἷον τῶν ἐχθύων'
διὰ γὰρ τὸ ὀλέγον ἔχειν τὸ θερμὸν ὁ ἀὴρ ἱκανός
ἐστιν ἐπὶ πολὺν χρόνον. καταψύχειν, οἷον τοῖς τέ

10 μαλακοστράκοις καὶ “τοῖς πολύποσιν. οὐ μὴν εἰς
τέλος ye διαρκεῖ πρὸς τὸ ζῆν, διὰ τὸ ὀλιγόθερμα
εἶναι, ἐπεὶ καὶ τῶν ἰχθύων οἱ πολλοὶ ζῶσιν ἐν τῇ
γῇ. ἀκινητίζοντες μέντοι, καὶ εὑρίσκονται ὀρυτ-
τόμενοι. ὅσα γὰρ ἢ μηδ᾽ ὅλως ἔχει πλεύμονα ἢ
ἄναιμον, ἐλαττονάκις δεῖται καταψύξεως.

τ Χ. Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἀναίμων, ὅτι τοῖς μὲν ὃ
περιέχων ἀὴρ τοῖς δὲ τὸ ὑγρὸν βοηθεῖ 2 πρὸς τὴν
ζωήν, εἴρηται" τοῖς δ᾽ ἐναίμοις καὶ τοῖς ἔχουσι
καρδίαν, ὅσα “μὲν ἔχει πλεύμονα, πάντα δέχεται
τὸν ἀέρα καὶ τὴν κατάψυξιν ποιεῖται διὰ τοῦ
ἀναπνεῖν καὶ ἐκπνεῖν. ἔχει δὲ πλεύμονα τά τε

39 ζῳοτοκοῦντα ἐν αὑτοῖς καὶ μὴ θύραζε μόνον (τὰ

4.52

ON RESPIRATION, 1x.—x.

But at last it is unable to go on, and is choked through
not br eathing. as has been said before. The destruc-
tion which is due to withering owing to lack of cooling
is called choking, and we say that animals which die
in this way are choked.

We have stated before that among living creatures
insects do not breathe, and this is evident in the case
of the small ones, such as flies and bees ; for they can
swim in water for a long time, if it is neither too hot
nor too cold. Yet those animals which have but
little strength try to breathe more frequently. But
these are destroyed and are said to be choked, when
the belly is filled and the heat in the midriff is
exhausted. Yor the same reason they revive if they
are put for some time in ashes. Of all the animals
which live in water the bloodless ones can live in the
air for a longer time than the animals which have
blood and admit the water like fishes; for because
they contain only a small quantity of heat, the air
can keep them cool for a considerable time, as with
the soft-shelled creatures and the cuttlefish. It does
not enable thern to live permanently thus because
they contain but little heat, since most of the fishes
live also in the earth, though they cannot move and
ave found by digging. For those which have either no
lung, or a lung without blood, require cooling less often,

X. We have stated that in the case of the bloodless
animals the surrounding air in some cases, and the Breathing
water in others, are aids to life; but in the case of (any
animals with blood and those having a heart, all that animals.
have lungs admit the air and achieve cooling by
breathing in and out, All viviparous animals have
lungs—if that is they are viviparous internally and

3 ὑγροῦ B. .
458

ARISTOTLE

ἕω γὰρ σελάχη ζῳοτοκεῖ μέν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐν αὑτοῖς) καὶ
τῶν φοτοκούντων τά τε πτερυγωτά, οἷον ὄρνιθες,
καὶ τὰ φολιδωτά, οἷον χελῶναι καὶ σαῦραι καὶ
ὄφεις. ἐκεῖνα μὲν οὖν ἔναιμον, τούτων δὲ τὰ
a πλεῖστα τὸν πλεύμονα ἔχει σομφόν. διὸ καὶ τῇ
ἀναπνοῇ χρῆται μανότερον, ὥσπερ εἴρηται καὶ
πρότερον.
| Χρῆται δὲ πάντα καὶ ὅσα διατρίβει καὶ ποιεῖται
τὸν βίον ἐν τοῖς ὕδασιν, οἷον τὸ τῶν ὕδρων γένος
καὶ βατράχων καὶ κροκοδείλων καὶ ἑμύδων καὶ
χελῶναι αἵ τε θαλάττιαι καὶ αἱ χερσαῖαι καὶ
80 φῶκαι" ταῦτα γὰρ πάντα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ τίκτει
ἐν τῷ ξηρῷ, καὶ καθεύδει ἢ ἐν τῷ ξηρῷ, ἢ ἐν τῷ
“ἴθι ὑγρῷ ὑπερέχοντα τὸ στόμα διὰ τὴν ἀναπνοήν.
ὅσα δὲ βράγχια ἔχει, πάντα καταψύχεται δεχόμενα
τὸ ὕδωρ' ἔχει δὲ βράγχια τὸ τῶν καλουμένων σε-
λαχῶν γένος καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπόδων. ἄποδες δ᾽
οἱ ἰχθύες πάντες" καὶ γὰρ ἃ ἔχει, καθ᾽ ὁμοιότητα
ὃ τῶν πτερυγίων λέγουσιν. τῶν δὲ πόδας ἐχόντων
ἕν ἔχει βράγχιον μόνον τῶν τεθεωρημένων 6 καλού-
μένος κορδύλος. ἅμα δὲ πλεύμονα καὶ βράγχια
οὐδὲν ὦπταί mw ἔχον. αὕτιον δ᾽ ὅτι ὁ μὲν πλεύμων
τῆς ὑπὸ τοῦ πνεύματος καταψύξεως ἕνεκέν ἐστιν
(ἔοικε δὲ καὶ τοὔνομα εἰληφέναι ὃ πνεύμων διὰ
19 τὴν τοῦ πνεύματος ὑποδοχήν), τὰ δὲ βράγχια πρὸς
τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ ὕδατος κατάψυξιν" ἕν δ᾽ ἐφ᾽ ἕν ὄργανον
χρήσιμον, καὶ to, κατάψυξις ἱκανὴ πᾶσιν. "ὥστ᾽
ἐπεὶ μάτην οὐδὲν ὁρῶμεν ποιοῦσαν τὴν φύσιν, δυοῖν
δ᾽ ὄντοιν θάτερον ἂν Fv μάτην, διὰ τοῦτο τὰ μὲν
15 ἔχει βράγχια τὰ δὲ πνεύμονα, ἄμφω δ᾽ οὐδέν.
᾿ ΧΙ, ᾿Επεὶ δὲ πρὸς μὲν τὸ εἶναι τροφῆς δεῖται
τῶν ζῴων ἕκαστον, πρὸς δὲ τὴν σωτηρίαν τῆς
454.

ON RESPIRATION, x.—x1.

not externally (for the shark tribe is viviparous, but
not in themselves) and among the oviparous the
winged creatures such as birds, and the scaly creatures
such as tortoises, lizards and snakes. Both these
classes have lungs containing blood, but in the latter
class the lung is usually porous. Consequently they
breathe less often, as has been said before.

But all animals -which live and have their being in Aquatic
water breathe, such as the genera watersnake, frog, aay
crocodile, freshwater tortoise, and both sea and land
tortoises and seals. All these bring forth their young
on dry land, and either sleep on dry land, or in water
with their mouth above the surface for breathing.
But those that have gills are all cooled by admitting
water ; the tribe of so-called sharks and other legless
beasts all have gills. All the fishes are legless ; and
what they have in the place of feet get their name
(πτερύγιον) from their similarity to wings (πτέρυξ), Of
animals with feet one only has gills so far as we have
observed, the water newt. But so far no creature
has been observed with both lungs and gills. The
reason is that the lung exists for the purpose of cool-
ing the breath (its name—rvetpwr—seems due to
its being a receptacle for breath—rveipa) ; but the
gills assist cooling by water ; one organ avails for one
purpose, and one cooling is enough for all. Since,
then, we know that nature does nothing in vain, and
that if there were two organs for the purpose one-
would be useless, for this reason some creatures have
gills and some lungs, but none of them have both.

XI. But since every animal requires food for its The mouth

existence, and cooling for its preservation, nature uses {ouble_

1 ἔχουσιν 15.
ASS

ARISTOTLE
476 a

καταψύξεως, τῷ αὐτῷ ὀργάνῳ χρῆται πρὸς ἄμφω
ταῦτα ἡ φύσις, ᾿καθάπερ ἐνίοις τῇ γλώττῃ πρός τε
20 τοὺς χυμοὺς καὶ πρὸς rye ερμήηνείαν, οὕτω τοῖς
ἔχουσι τὸν πλεύμονα τῷ καλουμένῳ στόματι πρός
τε τὴν τῆς τροφῆς ἐργασίαν. καὶ τὴν ἐκπνοὴν καὶ
τὴν ἀναπνοήν. τοῖς δὲ μὴ ἔχουσι πνεύμονα μηδ᾽
ἀναπνέουσι τὸ μὲν στόμα πρὸς τὴν ἐργασίαν τῆς
τροφῆς, πρὸς δὲ τὴν κατάψυξιν τοῖς δεομένοις
26 καταψύξεως ἡ τῶν βραγχίων ὑ ὑπάρχει φύσις. πῶς
μὲν οὖν ἡ τῶν εἰρημένων ὀργάνων δύναμις ποιεῖ
τὴν κατάψυξιν, ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν. πρὸς δὲ τὸ τὴν
τροφὴν μὴ διακωλύειν παραπλησέως τοῖς τ᾽ ἀνα-
πνέουσι συμβαίνει καὶ “Τοῖς δεχομένοις τὸ ὑγρόν'
οὔτε γὰρ ἀναπνέοντες ἅμα καταδέχονται τὴν τρο-
80 pay εἰ δὲ μή, συμβαίνει πνίγεσθαι παρεισιούσης
. τῆς ,τροφῆς ἢ τῆς ὑγρᾶς ἢ τῆς ξηρᾶς ἐπὶ τὸν
πνεύμονα, διὰ τῆς ἀρτηρίας" πρότερον. γὰρ κεῖται
ἡ ἀρτηρία τοῦ οἰσοφάγου, δι᾿ οὗ ἡ τροφὴ πορεύεται
εἰς τὴν καλουμένην κοιλίαν. τοῖς μὲν οὖν τετράποσι
καὶ ἐναίμοις ἔχει ἡ ἀρτηρία οἷον πῶμα τὴν ἐπι-
476 bh γλωττίδα" τοῖς δ᾽ ὄρνισι καὶ τῶν τετραπόδων τοῖς
φοτόκοις οὐκ ἔπεστιν, ἀλλὰ τῇ συναγωγῇ τὸ αὐτὸ
ποιοῦσιν' δεχόμενα γὰρ τὴν τροφὴν τὰ μὲν συνάγει,
τὰ δ᾽ ἐπιτίθησι τὴν ἐπιγλωττίδα. προελθούσης δὲ
τὰ μὲν ἐπαίρει, τὰ δὲ διοίγει καὶ καταδέχεται τὰ
5 πνεῦμα πρὸς τὴν κατάψυξιν. τὰ δ᾽ ἔχοντα βράγχια,
ἀφέντα διὰ τούτων τὸ ὑγρόν, διὰ τοῦ στόματος
καταδέχεται τὴν τροφήν' ἀρτηρίαν μὲν γὰρ οὐκ
ἔχουσιν, ὥστε ταύτῃ μὲν οὐθὲν ἂν βλάπτοιντο ὑπὸ
τῆς τοῦ ὑγροῦ παρεμπτώσεως, ἀλλ᾽ εἰς τὴν κοιλίαν
10 εἰσιόντος. διὸ ταχεῖαν ποιεῖται τὴν ἄφεσιν καὶ
τὴν λῆψιν τῆς τροφῆς, καὶ τοὺς ὀδόντας ὀξεῖς

456

ON RESPIRATION, x1.

the same organ for both these purposes ; just in the purpose h

same way some animals use the tongue both to,
appreciate flavours and for interpretation, so those
animals which have a lung use what is called the
mouth both for the work of nourishment and for
breathing in and out. But, in those which have no
lungs and do not breathe, the mouth is used for the
work of nourishment, while the gills can supply
naturally the cooling to those which need it. We
shall explain later on how the function of the organs
mentioned supplicscooling. But, to prevent hindrance
to food supply, much the same thing happens to
creatures that breathe and to those which admit
moisture ; for they do not admit food at the time of
breathing ; if they did, they would inevitably be
choked by the food, whether dry or wet, entering
through aie windpipe into the lung ; for the windpipe
lies in front of the oesophagus, through which the
food passes into what we call the belly. In the four-
footed animals with blood the windpipe has a kind of
lid called the epiglottis ; ; but birds and four-footed
beasts which are oviparous have not this lid, but they
achieve the same result by contraction of the wind-
pipe; for when receiving food the latter class con-
tracts the windpipe, the former closes the epiglottis.
But, as the food continues on its way, the latter class
expands the windpipe again, the former opens the
epiglottis and admits breath for the purpose of cool-
ing. But those which have gills, discharging water
through them, receive food through the mouth ; for
they have no windpipe, so that they cannot suffer
harm from the water falling i into it, but only from its
entering the stomach, For this reason they make
the discharge and the reception of food rapidly, and

457

breathing

nimuals,

ARISTOTLE

476 b

ἔχουσι, καὶ καρχαρόδοντες σχεδὸν πάντες εἰσίν'

οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται λεαίνειν τὴν τροφήν.
XII. Περὶ δὲ τὰ κητώδη τῶν ἐνύδρων ἀπορήσειεν
ἂν τις, ἔχει δὲ κἀκεῖνα κατὰ λόγον, οἷον περί τε
16 τοὺς δελφῖνας καὶ τὰς φαλαίνας, καὶ τῶν ἀλλων
ὅσα ἔχει τὸν καλούμενον αὐλόν. ταῦτα γὰρ ἄποδα
μέν ἐστιν, ἔχοντα δὲ πνεύμονα δέχεται τὴν θάλατ-
ταν. αἴτιον δὲ τούτου τὸ νῦν εἰρημένον" οὐ γὰρ
καταψύξεως ἕνεκεν δέχεται τὸ ὑγρόν. τοῦτο μὲν
γὰρ γίνεται αὐτοῖς ἀναπνέουσιν: ἔχουσι γὰρ πλεύ-
80 μονα. διὸ καὶ καθεύδουσιν ὑπερέχοντα τὸ στόμα,
καὶ ῥέγχουσιν ot γε δελφῖνες. ἔτι δὲ κἂν ληφθῶσι
τοῖς δικτύοις, ταχὺ ἀποπνίγονται διὰ τὸ μὴ ἀνα-
πνεῖν" καὶ ἐπιπολάζοντα φαίνεται τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐπὶ
τῆς θαλάττης διὰ τὴν ἀναπνοήν. ἀλλ᾽ ἐπειδὴ
ἀναγκαῖον ποιεῖσθαι τὴν τροφὴν ἐ ἐν ὑγρῷ, ἀναγκαῖον
25 δεχόμενα τὸ ὑγρὸν ἀφιέναι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτ᾽ ἔχουσι
πάντα τὸν αὐλόν" δεξάμενα γὰρ τὸ ὕδωρ, ὥσπερ
οἱ ἰχθύες κατὰ τὰ βράγχια, ταῦτα κατὰ τὸν αὐλόν,
ἀνασπᾷ τὸ ὕδωρ. σημεῖον δὲ καὶ ἡ θέσις τοῦ
αὐλοῦ" πρὸς οὐθὲν γὰρ περαίνει τῶν ἐναίμων, ἀλλὰ
80 πρὸ τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου τὴν θέσιν ἔχει, καὶ ἀφίησι τὸ
ὕδωρ. διὰ ταὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο δέχεται καὶ τὰ μα-
λάκια τὸ ὕδωρ καὶ τὰ μαλακόστρακα, λέγω δ᾽
οἷον τοὺς καλουμένους “καράβους καὶ τοὺς καρ-
κίνους. καταψύξεως μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν οὐδὲν τυγ-
χάνει δεόμενον' ὀλιγόθερμον γάρ “ἐστι καὶ ἄναιμον
4718 ἕκαστον αὐτῶν, ὥσθ᾽ ἱκανῶς καταψύχεται ὑπὸ τοῦ
περιέχοντος ὑγροῦ: ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν προφήν, ὁ ὅπως μὴ
ἅμα δεχομένοις εἰσρέῃ τὸ ὑγρόν. τὰ μὲν οὖν
μαλακόστρακα, οἷον οἵ τε καρκίνοι καὶ οἱ κάραβοι,
παρὰ τὰ δασέα ἀφιᾶσι τὸ ὕδωρ διὰ τῶν ἐπιπτυγ-

458

ON RESPIRATION, x1.—xm.

they have sharp teeth, set like a saw in most cases ;
for it is impossible for them to chew their food.

XII. A difficulty might arise over the cetaceans
among water animals, but they too have a logical
explanation, such creatures I mean as dolphins and
whales, and all other creatures which have what is
called a blowhole. For these have no feet, but have
lungs, and yet admit the water. But the reason of
this is the one already given; for they do not admit
the moisture for the purpose of cooling. This cooling
takes place when they breathe, for they have lungs.
This is why they sleep with their mouths above
water, and the dolphins at any rate snore. Again, if
they are caught in nets, they are quickly choked
because they cannot breathe ; and such creatures
float on the surface of the water for the purpose of
breathing. But since they have to do their feeding
in water, they have to admit the water and then dis-
charge it, and this is why they all have a blowhole ;
for after having admitted the water they expel it
again through the blowhole, just as fishes do through
the gills. The position of the blowhole proves this ;
_ for it leads to none of the parts with blood, but is
situated in front of the brain, and discharges the
water. For exactly the same reason the cephalopoda
and crustacea admit water-—I mean such creatures as
the crayfish and the crab. For none of these happens
to need cooling; for each of these species is of low
temperature and bloodless, so that it is sufficiently
cooled by the surrounding water ; but the purpose of
the blowhole in this case is for feeding, that the water
may not flow in at the moment that they are absorb-
ing food. The ecrustacea, such as crabs and crayfish,
discharge the water through the folds by the hairy

459

The hlow-
hole in
whales, ete.

ARISTOTLE

477 ἃ
A i
ὃ μάτων, σηπίαι δὲ καὶ πολύποδες διὰ τοῦ κοίλου

τοῦ ὑπὲρ τῆς καλουμένης κεφαλῆς. γέγραπται δὲ

περὶ αὐτῶν δι’ ἀκριβείας μᾶλλον ἐν ταῖς περὶ τῶν

ζῴων ἱστορίαις. περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ δέχεσθαι τὸ

ὑγρόν, εἴρηται ὅτι συμβαίνει διὰ κατάψυξιν καὶ

διὰ τὸ δεῖν δέχεσθαι τὴν τροφὴν ἐκ τοῦ ὑγροῦ τὰ
1 τὴν φύσιν ὄντα τῶν ζῴων ἐνυδρα.

XIII. Tlept δὲ τῆς καταψύξεως, τίνα γίνεται
τρόπον τοῖς τ᾽ ἀναπνέουσι καὶ τοῖς ἔχουσι βράγχια,
μετὰ ταῦτα λεκτέον. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἀναπνέουσιν ὅσα
πνεύμονα τῶν ζῴων ἔχουσι, πρότερον εἴρηται. διὰ

15 τί δὲ τοῦτο τὸ μόριον ἔχουσιν ἔνια, καὶ διὰ τί τὰ
ἔχοντα δεῦται τῆς ἀναπνοῆς, αἴτιον τοῦ μὲν ἔχειν
ὅτι τὰ τιμιώτερα τῶν ζῴων πλείονος τετύχηκε
θερμότητος" ἅμα γὰρ ἀνάγκη καὶ ψυχῆς τετυχη-
κέναι τιμιωτέρα" τιμιώτερα γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῆς
φύσεως τῆς τῶν φυτῶν. διὸ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα

20 ἔναιμον ἔχοντα τὸν πνεύμονα καὶ θερμὸν μείζονά
τε τοῖς μεγέθεσι, καὶ τό γε καθαρωτάτῳ καὶ πλεί-
στῳ κεχρημένον αἵματι τῶν ζῴων ὀρθότατόν ἐστιν
ὁ ἄνθρωπος, καὶ τὸ ἄνω πρὸς τὸ τοῦ ὅλου ἄνω ἔχει
μόνον διὰ τὸ τοιοῦτον ἔχειν τοῦτο τὸ μόριον. ὥστε
τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τούτῳ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις θετέον αἴτιον

2% αὐτό, καθάπερ ὁτιοῦν ἄλλο τῶν μορίων. ἔχει μὲν
οὖν ἕνεκα τούτου. τὴν δ᾽ ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ τῆς
κινήσεως αἰτίαν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα νομίζειν συνεστά-
vat ζῷα, καθάπερ καὶ μὴ τοιαῦτα πολλὰ συνέστη-
κεν" τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐκ γῆς πλείονος γέγονεν, οἷον τὸ
τῶν φυτῶν γένος, τὰ δ᾽ ἐξ ὕδατος, οἷον τὸ τῶν

80 ἐνύδρων" τῶν δὲ πτηνῶν καὶ πεζῶν τὰ μὲν ἐξ ἀέρος

460

ON RESPIRATION, xtr.—xitr.

parts, but the cuttlefish and polypus through the
hollow above the so-called head. I have given a
more exact account of these in my Inquiry into
Animals.* Concerning the admission of water, then,
it has been explained that it is for the purpose of
cooling, and because those creatures which naturally
live in water must derive their food from the water.
XIII. Next we must explain how this cooling takes
place in creatures which breathe and in those which
have gills. We have already stated that all living
creatures that have lungs breathe. But two ques-
tions remain: why some creatures have the organ,
and why those that have it need breathing; the
reason they possess it is that animals higher in the
scale of creation have more heat; for they must at
the same time have a more advanced life; they have,
for instance, a life more advanced than the plants.
So the animals which have a lung with the mast blood
and heat are greater in size, and that whose blood is
purest and in the greatest quantity of all living
creatures is the most erect. that is to say man; “up ”
in his case corresponds to “‘ up ”’ in the whole universe
just because he possesses this organ. So that the
reason for its existence both in this and in other
animals must be assumed, just as in the case of any
other parts. It possesses it for this reason. One is
bound to suppose that it is by necessity, and for the
sake of motion that such creatures are so made, just
as there are many that are not so made; for some
are made from a larger proportion of earth, such as
the genus of plants, and others from water, such as
the water animals; but of the winged and land
animals some are made from air and some from

& Hist, An, 523 a 80, ete.
461

The
connexion
between
breathing
and cooling,

ATT a

417 ἢ

ARISTOTLE

τὰ δ᾽ ἐκ πυρός. ἕκαστα δ᾽ ἐν rots οἰκείοις τόποις
ἔχει τὴν τάξιν αὐτῶν.

XIV. ᾿Εμπεδοκλῆς δ᾽ οὐ καλῶς τοῦτ᾽ εἴρηκε,
φάσκων τὰ θερμότατα καὶ πῦρ ἔχοντα πλεῖστον
τῶν ζῴων ἔνυδρα εἶναι, φεύγοντα τὴν ὑπερβολὴν
τῆς ἐν τῇ φύσει θερμότητος, ὅπως ἐπειδὴ τοῦ
ψυχροῦ καὶ τοῦ ὑγροῦ ἐλλείπει, κατὰ τὸν τόπον
ἀνασώζηται ἐναντία ὄντα" θερμὸν γὰρ εἶναι τὸ
: ov ἧττον τοῦ ἀέρος. ὅλως μὲν οὖν ἄτοπον πῶς

ἐνδέχεται γενόμενον ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ἐν τῷ ξηρῷ
μεταβάλλειν τὸν τόπον εἰς τὸ ὑγρόν" σ σχεδὸν γ'
καὶ ἄποδα τὰ πλεῖστα αὐτῶν ἐστίν. ὁ δὲ τὴν ἐξ
ἀρχῆς αὐτῶν σύστασιν λέγων γενέσθαι μὲν ἐν τῷ
ξηρῷ φησί, φεύγοντα δ᾽ ἐλθεῖν εἰς τὸ ὑγρόν. ἔτι
δ᾽ οὐδὲ! φαίνεται θερμότερα ὄντα τῶν πεζῶν" τὰ
μὲν γὰρ ἄναιμα πάμπαν, τὰ δ᾽ ὀλίγαιμα αὐτῶν
ἐστίν.

JAMA ποῖα μὲν δεῖ λέγειν θερμὰ καὶ ψυχρά, καθ'
αὑτὰ τὴν ἐπίσκεψιν εἴληφεν" περὶ δ᾽ ἧς αἰτίας
εἴρηκεν ᾿Εμπεδοκλῆς, τῇ μὲν ἔχει τὸ ζητούμενον
λόγον, οὐ μὴν 6 γε φησὶν ἐ ἐκεῖνος ἀληθές. τῶν μὲν
γὰρ ἕξεων σοὺς" τὰς ὑπερβολὰς ἐ ἔχοντας οἱ ἐναντίοι
τόποι καὶ ὧραι σώζουσιν, ἡ ἡ δὲ φύσις ἐ ἐν τοῖς οἰκείοις
σώζεται μάλιστα τόποις. οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὸν ἣ θ᾽ ὕλη
τῶν ζῴων. ἐξ ἧς ἐστὶν ἕκαστον, καὶ αἱ ἕξεις καὶ
διαθέσεις αὐτῆς. λέγω δ᾽ οἷον εἴ. τι ἐκ κηροῦ
συστήσδειεν ἡ φύσις, οὐκ ἂν ἐν θερμῷ θεῖσα δι-
ἔσωσεν, οὐδ᾽ εἴ τι ἐκ κρυστάλλου. ἐφθάρη γὰρ ἂν
ταχὺ διὰ τοὐναντίον" τήκει γὰρ. τὸ θερμὸν τὸ ὑπὸ
τοῦ ἐναντίου συστάν. οὐδ᾽ εἴ τι ἐξ ἁλὸς ἢ νίτρου
συνέστησεν, οὐκ ἂν εἰς ὑγρὸν φέρουσα κατέθηκεν'

1 οὔτε Β,.. ες τοὺς om. Β,
4862

ON RESPIRATION, x111.—x1Vv.

fire. Tach has its system in its appropriate
element.

XIV. Empedocles is mistaken in saying that for
the most part the creatures containing heat. or fire
live in the water, thereby escaping the excess of heat
that lies in their nature, in order that, since they are
short of coolness and liquid, they may be saved by
their habitat being of an opposite nature ; for liquid
is less hot than air. Generally speaking it seems
unnatural that each animal born in the dry should
change its habitat to the wet ; for most of them have
no feet. But he, describing their structure from the
beginning, says that they are born on dry land, but
that they escape from it and reach the water. Further
it is clear that they are not warmer than the land
animals; for some of them are altogether bloodless,
and others have only a little blood.

He has examined in detail which of them are
entitled to be called hot and which cold; but as for
what Empedocles has said about the cause, in one
way his explanation is reasonable, but yet he does
not tell the real truth of the matter. For it is opposite
places and seasons which preserve them in so far as
they have excess of either condition, but their nature
is best preserved in their own places ; for the matter
from which each species is made is not the same thing
as its habits and disposition. What I mean is this:
if nature were to make anything out of wax, she
would not preserve it by placing it in a hot atmo-
sphere, nor if she had made a thing out of ice; for it
would be rapidly destroyed by its opposite ; for heat
destroys that which is constructed from its opposite.
Nor if she had made a thing out of salt and nitre
would she have taken it and placed it.in water ;, for

463

Empedocles
on water
analy,

Bmpedoeles
refuted,

417b

478 ἃ

ARISTOTLE

φθείρει γὰρ τὰ ὑπὸ θερμοῦ καὶ ξηροῦ συστάντα τὸ
ὑγρόν. εἰ οὖν ὕλη πᾶσι τοῖς σώμασι. τὸ ὑγρὸν καὶ
τὸ ξηρόν, εὐλόγως τὰ μὲν ἐξ ὑγροῦ καὶ οἱ υχροῦ
συστάντα ἐν ὑγροῖς ἐστί, καὶ εἰ ψυχρά, ἔσται ἐν
ψυχρῷ, τὰ δ᾽ ἐκ ξηροῦ ἐν ξηρῷ. διὰ τοῦτο τὰ
δένδρα οὐκ ἐν ὕδατι φύεται, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τῇ γῇ. καίτοι
τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγου ἐστὶν εἰς τὸ ὕδωρ, διὰ τὸ εἶναι
αὐτὰ ὑπέρξηρα, ὥσπερ τὰ ὑπέρπυρά φησιν ἐ ἐκεῖνος"
οὐ γὰρ διὰ τὸ ψυχρὸν ἦλθεν εἰς αὐτό, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι
ὑγρόν.

Αἱ μὲν οὖν φύσεις τῆς ὕλης, ἐν οἵἴῳωπερ τόπῳ
εἰσί, τοιαῦται οὖσαι τυγχάνουσιν, αἱ μὲν ἐν ὕδατι
ὑγραί, αἱ δ᾽ ἐν τῇ γῇ ξηραί, αἱ δ᾽ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι θερ-
μαί. αἱ μέντοι ἕξεις αἱ μὲν ὑπερβάλλουσαι θερ-
μότητι ἐν ψυχρῷ, αἱ δὲ τῇ ψυχρότητι ἐν θερμῷ
τιθέμεναι. σώζονται μᾶλλον' ἐπανισοῖ γὰρ εἰς τὸ
μέτριον ὁ τόπος τὴν τῆς ἕξεως, ὑπερβολήν. τοῦτο
μὲν οὖν δεῖ ζητεῖν ἐ ἐν τοῖς οἰκείοις τόποις ἑκάστης
ὕλης, καὶ κατὰ τὰς μεταβολὰς “τῆς κοινῆς ὥρας"
τὰς μὲν γὰρ ἕξεις ἐνδέχεται τοῖς τόποις ἐναντίας
εἶναι, τὴν δ᾽ ὕλην ἀδύνατον. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐ διὰ
θερμότητα τῆς φύσεως τὰ μὲν ἔνυδρα τὰ δὲ πεζὰ
τῶν ζῴων ἐστί, καθάπερ ᾿Εμπεδοκλῆς φησίν,
τοσαῦτ᾽ εἰρήσθω, καὶ διότι τὰ μὲν οὐκ ἔχει πνεύ-
μονα τὰ δὲ ἔχει.

XV. Διὰ τί δὲ τὰ ἔχοντα δέχεται τὸν ἀέρα καὶ
ἀναπνέουσι, καὶ μάλιστ᾽ αὐτῶν ὅσα ,ἔχουσιν ἔν-
αιμον, αἴτιον τοῦ μὲν ἀναπνεῖν ὁ πνεύμων σομφὸς
ὧν καὶ συρίγγων πλήρης. καὶ ἐναιμότατον δὴ
μάλιστα τοῦτο τὸ μόριον τῶν καλουμένων »πλάγ-
χνων. ὅσα. δὴ ἔχει ἔναιμον αὐτό, ταχείας μὲν
δεῖται τῆς καταψύξεως διὰ τὸ μικρὰν εἶναι τὴν
464

ON RESPIRATION, xty.—xv.

water destroys that which is made by heat and dry-
ness. If then the matter of which all bodies are
composed consists of wet and dry, naturally that
which is made of wet and cold lives in water and, if it
is cold, will live in the cold, but what is made of the
dry will live in the dry. For this reason trees do not
grow in water, but in the earth. Yet on the same
theory he would assign them to the water because
they are too dry, just as he says of the too fiery. On
this theory they would enter water not because it is
cold, but because it is wet.

The nature of matter is similar to that in which it
lives ; in water live wet things, in earth dry, and in
air hot. But as for their conditions those that are
excessively hot thrive best in the cold, and those that
are excessively cold in the warm; for their environ-
ment best neutralizes the excess of their condition.
They must seek this in the places appropriate to each
matter, and in accordance with the changes in the
ordinary seasons ; for states can be contrary to the
place in which they live, but matter never. We have,
then, proved sufficiently that it is not because of their
natural heat that the water and land creatures are
such as Empedocles says, and why some have lungs
and some have not.

XV. The reason why those that have lungs admit
the air and breathe, and particularly those which
have a lung with blood, is that the lung is porous and
full of tubes. And this part is more full of blood than
any other of the so-called internal organs, All
creatures that have this part full of blood need rapid
cooling, because the possible variation of the fire in

Qu 465

The
function of
the lung.

ARISTOTLE

4788 .
ῥοπὴν τοῦ ψυχικοῦ πυρός, εἴσω δ᾽ εἰσιέναι διὰ

παντὸς διὰ τὸ πλῆθος τοῦ αἵματος καὶ τῆς θερ-
μότητος. ταῦτα δ᾽ ἀμφότερα ὁ μὲν ἀὴρ δύναται
ῥᾳδίως ποιεῖν διὰ “γὰρ τὸ λεπτὴν ἔχειν τὴν φύσιν
20 διὰ παντός τε καὶ ταχέως διαδυόμενος διαψύχει:
τὸ δ᾽ ὕδωρ τοὐναντίον. καὶ διότι δὴ μάλιστ᾽
ἀναπνέουσι τὰ ἔχοντα τὸν πνεύμονα ἔναιμον, ἐκ
τούτων δῆλον' τό τε γὰρ θερμότερον πλείονος δεῖται
τῆς καταψύξεως, ἅμα δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς
θερμότητος τῆς ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ πορεύεται τὸ πνεῦμα
2 ῥᾳδίως.

XVI. “Ov δὲ τρόπον ἡ καρδία τὴν σύντρησιν ἔχει
πρὸς τὸν πλεύμονα, δεῖ θεωρεῖν ἔκ τε τῶν ἀνα-
τεμνομένων καὶ τῶν ἱστοριῶν τῶν περὲ τὰ ζῷα γε-
γραμμένων. καταψύξεως μὲν οὖν ὅλως ἡ τῶν ζῴων

80 δεῦται φύσις διὰ τὴν ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐμπύ-
ρώσιν. ταύτην δὲ ποιεῖται διὰ τῆς ἀναπνοῆς, ὅσα
μὴ μόνον ἔχουσι καρδίαν ἀλλὰ καὶ πνεύμονα τῶν
ζῴων. τὰ δὲ καρδίαν μὲν ἔχοντα, πνεύμονα δὲ μή,
καθάπερ, οἱ ἰχθύες διὰ τὸ ἔνυδρον αὐτῶν τὴν φύσιν
εἶναι, τῷ ὕδατι ποιοῦνται τὴν κατάψυξιν διὰ τῶν

85 βραγχίων. ὡς δ᾽ ἡ θέσις ἔχει τῆς καρδίας πρὸς

“νυ τὰ βράγχια, πρὸς μὲν τὴν ὄψιν exc τῶν ἀνατομῶν
δεῖ θεωρεῖν, πρὸς δ᾽ ἀκρίβειαν ἐκ τῶν ἱστοριῶν"
ὡς δ᾽ ἐν κεφαλαίοις εἰπεῖν καὶ νῦν, ἔχει τόνδε: τὸν
τρόπον. δόξειε μὲν γὰρ ἂν οὐχ ὡσαύτως ἔχειν
τὴν θέσιν ἡ καρδία, τοῖς τε πεζοῖς τῶν ζῴων καὶ

5 τοῖς ἰχθύσιν, ἔ ἔχει δ᾽ ὡσαύτως. ἧ γὰρ νεύουσι τὰς
κεφαλάς, ἐνταῦθ᾽ ἡ κα δία τὸ ὀξὺ ἔχει. ἐπεὶ δὲ
οὐχ ὡσαύτως αἱ rege. ab νεύουσι τοῖς τε πεζοῖς
τῶν ζῴων καὶ τοῖς poate πρὸς τὸ στόμα ἡ καρδία
τὸ ὀξὺ ἔχει. τείνει δ᾽ ἐξ ἄκρου τῆς καρδίας αὐλὸς
466

ON RESPIRATION, χν.---χνι.

the soul is small, and the cooling air must pass through-
out because of the quantity of blood and heat. But
the air can easily fulfil both these functions ; for,
because its nature is so rarefied, it can pass through
the whole system rapidly and cool it. But water is
just the opposite. From thisit is obvious why animals
which have blood in the lung breathe most ; for the
warmer creature requires more cooling, and at the
same time the air passes easily to the source of heat,
which lies in the heart.

XVI. The way in which the heart is connected connexion
with the lung can be seen by dissection, and by my between,
discussion of the subject in the [History of Animals.” lung.
Speaking generally, the nature of animals requires
cooling owing to the fiery nature of the soul which
exists in the heart. It achieves this cooling by
breathing in the case of animals which have a lung
as wellas a heart. But those which have a heart but
no lung, such as the fishes, because their natural
habitat is in water, achieve this cooling by water
through the gills. The position of the heart relative
to the gills can be seen with the naked eye by dis-
section, and can be understood with accuracy from
my History®; but to summarize the matter at the
moment, this is the method. One might suppose
that the position of the heart is different in land
animals and in fishes, but actually it is exactly similar.
For the apex of the heart points in the direction in
which they turn their heads. But since the heads of
land animals and fishes do not turn in the same direc-
tion, the heart has its apex directed towards the
mouth, Now from the extremity of the heart a tube

& Hist. An. 496 αὶ etc., 511 b ete,
> Hist, An, 507 b 3.

467

ARISTOTLE

_ φλεβονευρώδης εἰς τὸ μέσον, ἦ συνάπτουσιν ἀλλή-
τὸ λοις πάντα τὰ βράγχια. μέγιστος μὲν οὖν οὗτός
ἐστιν, ἔνθεν δὲ καὶ ἔνθεν τῆς καρδίας καὶ ἕτεροι
τείνουσιν εἰς ἄκρον ἑκάστου τῶν βραγχίων, δι’ ὧν
ἡ κατάψυξις γίνεται πρὸς τὴν καρδίαν, διαυλωνί-
ζοντος ἀεὶ τοῦ ὕδατος διὰ τῶν βραγχίων. ὡσαύτως
δὲ τοῖς ἀναπνέουσιν 6 θώραξ ἄνω καὶ κάτω κινεῖται
16 πολλάκις δεχομένων τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ ἐξιέντων, ὡς
τὰ βράγχια τοῖς ἰχθύσιν, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἀναπνέοντα ἐν
ὀλίγῳ ἀέρι καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ ἀποπνίγονται" ταχέως γὰρ
ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν γίνεται θερμόν: θερμαίνει γὰρ ἡ
τοῦ αἵματος θίξις ἑκάτερον. θερμὸν δ᾽ ὃν τὸ αἷμα
κωλύει τὴν κατάψυξιν: καὶ μὴ δυναμένων κινεῖν
30 τῶν μὲν ἀναπνεόντων τὸν πνεύμονα τῶν δ᾽ ἐνύδρων
τὰ βράγχια διὰ πάθος ἢ διὰ γῆρας, τότε συμβαΐνειν
τὴν τελευτήν.
XVII. Ἔστι μὲν οὖν πᾶσι τοῖς ζῴοις κοινὸν
, \ ᾽ © \ / a
γένεσις καὶ θάνατος, οἱ δὲ τρόποι διαφέρουσι τῷ
εἴδει" οὐ γὰρ ἀδιάφορος ἡ ἡ φθορά, ἀλλ᾽ ἔχει τι κου-
avov. θάνατος δ᾽ ἐστὶν ὁ μὲν βίαιος ὃ δὲ κατὰ
φύσιν, βίαιος μὲν ὅταν ἡ ἀρχὴ ἔξωθεν ἢ, κατὰ
φύσιν δ᾽ ὅταν ἐν αὐτῷ. καὶ a τοῦ μορίου σύστασις
᾿ς ἐξ ἀρχῆς τοιαύτη, ἀλλὰ μὴ ἐπίκτητόν τι πάθος.
τοῖς μὲν οὖν φυτοῖς αὔανσις, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ξῴοις
καλεῖται τοῦτο γῆρας. ἔστι δὲ θάνατος καὶ ἡ
a0 φθορὰ πᾶσιν ὁμοίως τοῖς μὴ ἀτελέσιν' τούτοις δὲ
παρομοίως μέν, ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον. ἀτελῆ δὲ λέγω
οἷον τά τε φὰ καὶ τὰ σπέρματα τῶν φυτῶν, ὅσα
ἄρριζα. πᾶσι μὲν οὖν ἡ φθορὰ γίνεται διὰ θερμοῦ
Twos ἔκλειψιν, τοῖς δὲ τελείοις, ἐν ᾧ τῆς οὐσίας

468

ON RESPIRATION, χνι.---χνπι.

consisting of veins and nerves runs to a point at the
centre, at which all the gills connect. ‘This tube is
very large, and from different parts of the heart other
tubes run to the extremity of each of the gills, through
which the cooling process reaches the heart, the
water passing through a narrow channel through the
gills. In the same way in the breathing animals the
chest moves up and down, as they admit and expel
the breath, acting in the same way as the gills in
fishes. So the breathing animals are suffocated if the
air is small in quantity and remains the same ; for in
either case it quickly becomes hot ; for in both cases
the contact with the blood heats it. The blood being
hot checks the cooling ; supposing that the breathing
animals cannot move the lung, or the water animals
the gills, owing to disease or old age, then death
supervenes.

XVII. Birth and death are common characteristics Natural and
of all living creatures, but the manner in which they Wnatual
occur differs with the species ; for their destruction :
does exhibit differences, although all have an element
incommon. Death may be alice violent or natural,
violent when its origin is external, natural when it
originates in the creature itself. In the latter case
the structure of the animal involved this end from the
beginning, and it was no extraneous disease. This
phenomenon is called withering in plants, and in
animals old age. Death and destruction is the
common fate of all animais alike which are not im-
perfect ; the latter have a similar end but in another
way. By imperfect I mean, for instance, eggs and
the seeds of plants, those at least which have no roots.
In all cases destruction occurs owing to a failure of
heat, but in the perfect animal the failure lies in that

ABQ

ARISTOTLE
4B b

ἀρχή. αὕτη δ᾽ ἐστίν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρότερον,

ἫΝ

80 ἐν ὦ τό τε ἄνω καὶ τὸ κάτω συνάπτει, τοῖς μὲν
φυτοῖς μέσον βλαστοῦ καὶ ῥίζης, τῶν δὲ ζῴων τοῖς
4198 μὲν ἐναίμοις ἡ καρδία, τοῖς δ᾽ ἀναίμοις τὸ ἀνά-
λογον. τούτων δ᾽ ἔνια δυνάμει πολλὰς ἀρχὰς
ἔχουσιν, οὐ μέντοι γε ἐνεργείᾳ. διὸ καὶ τῶν ἐν-
τόμων ἔνια διαιρούμενα ζῶσι, καὶ τῶν ἐναίμων ὅσα
ὕ μὴ ζωτικὰ λίαν εἰσί, πολὺν χρόνον ζῶσιν ἐξῃρη-
μένης τῆς καρδίας, οἷον αἱ χελῶναι καὶ κινοῦνται
τοῖς ποσίν, ἐπόντων τῶν χελωνίων, διὰ τὸ
συγκεῖσθαι τὴν φύσιν αὐτῶν εὖ, παραπλησίως δὲ

a 2 /
τοῖς ἐντόμοις.

Ἢ δ᾽ ἀρχὴ τῆς ζωῆς ἐκλείπει τοῖς ἔχουσιν, ὅταν
μὴ καταψύχηται τὸ θερμὸν τὸ κοινωνοῦν αὐτῆς.

10 καθάπερ γὰρ εἴρηται πολλάκις, συντήκεται αὐτὸ
ὑφ᾽ αὑτοῦ. ὅταν οὖν τοῖς μὲν ὁ πλεύμων a δὲ
τὰ βράγχια σκληρύνηται, διὰ χρόνου μῆκος. αὐ-
νομένων τοῖς μὲν τῶν βραγχίων τοῖς δὲ τοῦ es
μονος, καὶ γινομένων γεηρῶν, οὐ δύναται ταῦτα τὰ
μόρια, κινεῖν οὐδ᾽ αἴρειν καὶ συνάγειν. τέλος δὲ

16 γινομένης ἐπιτάφεως καταμαραΐνεται τὸ πῦρ.

Διὸ καὶ "μερῶν παθημάτων ἐπιγινομένων ἐν τῷ
γήρᾳ ταχέως τελευτῶσιν" διὰ γὰρ τὸ ὀλίγον εἶναι
τὸ θερμόν, ἅτε τοῦ πλείστου διαπεπνευκότος ἐν τῷ
πλήθει τῆς ζωῆς, ἥτις ἂν ἐπίτασις γένηται τοῦ
μορίου, ταχέως ἀποσβέννυται" ὦ ὥσπερ γὰρ ἀκαριαίας

20 καὶ μικρᾶς ἐν αὐτῷ φλογὸς ἐνούσης διὰ μικρὰν
κίνησιν ἀποσβέννυται. διὸ καὶ ἄλυπός ἐστιν ὁ ἐν
τῷ γήρᾳ θάνατος" οὐδενὸς γὰρ βιαίου πάθους αὐτοῖς
συμβαίνοντος τελευτῶσιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἀναίσθητος ἡ τῆς
ψυχῆς ἀπόλυσις γίνεται παντελῶς. καὶ τῶν νοση-
μάτων ὅσα ποιοῦσι τὸν πνεύμονα σκληρὸν ἢ φύ-
4ὸ

ON RESPIRATION, xvir.

part which is the source of their being, This, as has
been said before, lies at the point at which the upper
and lower parts meet, in plants between the shoot and
the root, and in animals with blood in the heart, and
in bloodless animals in whatever corresponds to it.
Some of these creatures have potentially many
sources, but not actually. This is why some of the
insects continue to live when divided, and those
animals with blood which have not naturally much
hold on life, live for a considerable time, when the
heart is removed ; such as tortoises, whose feet move
so long as their shells are on, because their nature is
of a low order of construction, as is true also of the
insects.

The source of life fails its possessors when the heat
that belongs to it is not cooled. Tor, as has been said
several times, it is wasted away by itself. When,
then, in some animals the lung, and in others the gills,
grow hard, the gills in the one case and the lung in
the other drying through length of time and becoming
earthy, these parts cannot move, nor expand, nor
contract, But at last the limit of strain is reached
and the fire dies out.

Consequently in old age they die rapidly, even
when small ailments attack them; for because the
heat in them is very small, as in their long life most of
it has been breathed away, any strain taking place in
the part quickly extinguishes it. It is extinguished,
just as if the flame within was very feeble and small.
For this reason death in old age is painless ; for old
men die without the occurrence of any violent disease,
and the release of the soul occurs imperceptibly. But
the diseases which cause hardening of the lung by

ATL

ARISTOTLE
419 0 Ξ
95 μασιν ἢ περιττώμασιν ἢ θερμότητος νοσηματικῆς
ὑπερβολῇ, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πυρετοῖς, πυκνὸν τὸ
πνεῦμα ποιοῦσι διὰ τὸ “μὴ δύνασθαι τὸν πνεύμονα
μακρὰν αἴρειν ἄνω καὶ συνίζειν. τέλος δ᾽, ὅταν
ηκέτι δύνωνται κινεῖν, τελευτῶσιν a ἀποπνεύσαντες.
XVIII. Péveous μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ πρώτη μέθεξις
80 ἐν τῷ θερμῷ τῆς θρεπτικῆς υχῆς, ζωὴ δ᾽ ἡ
μονὴ ταύτης. νεότης δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἡ τοῦ πρώτου κατα-
ψυκτικοῦ μορίου αὔξησις, γῆρας δ᾽ ἡ τούτου φθίσις,
ἀκμὴ δὲ τὸ τούτων μέσον. τελευτὴ δὲ καὶ φθορὰ
βίαιος μὲν 7, τοῦ θερμοῦ σβέσις καὶ μάρανσις"
4190 φθαρείη γὰρ ἂν δι᾿ ἀμφοτέρας ταύτας τὰς αἰτίας,
ἡ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν τοῦ αὐτοῦ τούτου μάρανοις διὰ
χρόνου μῆκος γινομένη καὶ τελειότητα. τοῖς μὲν
οὖν φυτοῖς αὔανσις, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ζῴοις καλεῖται
θάνατος. τούτου δ᾽ ὁ μὲν ἐν γήρᾳ θάνατος μάραν-
δ σις τοῦ μορίου δι᾽ ἀδυναμίαν τοῦ καταψύχειν ὑπὰ
γήρως. τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ ,γένεσις καὶ ζωὴ καὶ θάνα-
τος, καὶ διὰ τίνας αὐτίας ὑπάρχουσι τοῖς ζῴοις,
εἴρηται.
XIX. Δῆλον δ᾽ ἐκ τούτων καὶ διὰ τίν᾽ αἰτίαν
τοῖς μὲν ἀναπνέουσι τῶν ζῴων ἀποπνίγεσθαι
10 συμβαίνει ἐν τῷ ὑγρῷ, τοῖς δ᾽ ἰχθύσιν ἐν τῷ ἀέρι"
τοῖς μὲν γὰρ διὰ τοῦ ὕδατος ἧ κατάψυξις γίνεται,
τοῖς δὲ διὰ τοῦ ἀέρος, ὧν ἑκάτερα »στερίσκεται
μεταβάλλοντα τοὺς τόπους. a δ᾽ αἰτία τῆς κινή-
σεως τοῖς μὲν τῶν βραγχίων τοῖς δὲ τοῦ πνεύμονος,
ὧν αἰρομένων καὶ συνιζόντων τὰ μὲν ἐκπνέουσι
18 καὶ εἰσπνέουσι τὰ δὲ δέχονται πὸ ὑγρὸν καὶ
ἐξιᾶσιν, ἔ ἔτι δ᾽ ἡ σύστασις τοῦ ὀργάνου, τάνδ᾽ ἔχει
τὸν τρόπον.
XX. Τρία ἐστὶ τὰ συμβαίνοντα περὶ τὴν καρ-
472

ON RESPIRATION, χντι.--χχ,

tumours, or waste products, or by excess of heat due
to disease as for instance in fevers, cause rapid
breathing, because the lung cannot expand or con-
tract far. But at last when they can no longer move
the lung, they breathe their last and die.

XVII. Birth is the first sharing in warmth of the The P
meaning
of birth,

nutritive soul, and life is merely the perpetuation of
this. Youth is the growth of the first cooled part,
and old age is its destruction, the prime of life being
between the two, But violent destruction and death
is the extinction or waning of the heat ; for destruc-
tion may occur from either of these causes, but natural
death is the decay of the same part due to lapse of
time, and to its having reached its appointed end.
This phenomenon is called withering among plants,
and death among animals. Death in old age is the
withering of this part owing to its inability to grow
cool because of old age. So we have now defined
birth, and life and death, and explained why they
occur among living creatures.

XIX. From these facts it is clear why those animals Fh.

which breathe are suffocated in water, and fishes in
air ; for the latter achieve cooling through the water,
but the former through air, and when they change
their habitat each is deprived of one or other. The
reason for the movement in the one case of the gills,
and in the other of the lung, by the expansion and
contraction of which the former class exhale and
inhale and the latter admit and expel water, and also
the whole structure of the organ is to be explained as
follows,

XX. There are three movements which take place Action

473

of
rt,

479 b

480 o

ARISTOTLE

δίαν, ἃ δοκεῖ τὴν αὐτὴν φύσιν ἔχειν, ἔχει δ᾽
οὐ τὴν αὐτήν, πήδησις καὶ σφυγμὸς καὶ ἀνα-
πνοή.

"Πήδησις μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ σύνωσις τοῦ θερμοῦ τοῦ ἐν
αὐτῇ διὰ κατάψυξιν περιττωματικὴν ἢ συντηκτι-
κήν, οἷον ἐν TH νόσῳ τῇ καλουμένῃ παλμῷ, καὶ ἐν
ἄλλαις δὲ νόσοις, καὶ ἐν τοῖς φόβοις δέ καὶ γὰρ οἱ
φοβούμενοι καταψύχονται τὰ ἄνω, τὸ δὲ θερμὸν
ὑποφεῦγον καὶ συστελλόμενον ποιεῖ τὴν ,πήδησιν,
εἰς μικρὸν συνωθούμενον οὕτως ὥστ᾽ ἐνίοτ᾽ ἀπο-
σβέννυσθαι τὰ ζῷα καὶ ἀποθνήσκειν διὰ φόβον καὶ
διὰ πάθος νοσηματικόν.

Ἢ δὲ συμβαΐνουσα σφύξις τῆς καρδίας, ἣν ἀεὶ
φαίνεται. ποιουμένη συνεχῶς, ὁμοία φύμασίν ἐ ἐστιν,
ἣν ποιοῦνται κίνησιν μετ᾽ ἀλγηδόνος διὰ τὸ παρὰ
φύσιν εἶναι τῷ αἵματι τὴν μεταβολήν. γίνεται δὲ
μέχρι οὗ a ἂν πυωθῇ πεφθέν. ἔστι δ᾽ ὅμοιον ζέσει
τοῦτο τὸ πάθος" 7 yap ζέσις γίνεται πνευματου-
μένου τοῦ ὑγροῦ ὑπὸ τοῦ θερμοῦ" αἴρεται γὰρ διὰ
τὸ πλείω γίνεσθαι τὸν ὄγκον. παῦλα, δ᾽ ἐν μὲν τοῖς
φύμασιν, ἐὰν μὴ διαπνεύσῃ, παχυτέρου γινομένου
τοῦ ὑγροῦ, σῆψις, τῇ δὲ ζέσει ἡ n ἔκπτωσις διὰ τῶν
ὁριζόντων. ἐν δὲ τῇ καρδίᾳ ἡ τοῦ ἀεὶ προσιόντος
ἐκ τῆς τροφῆ ς ὑγροῦ διὰ τῆς θερμότητος 6 ὄγκωσις
ποιεῖ σφυγμόν, αἰρομένη πρὸς τὸν ἔσχατον χιτῶνα
τῆς καρδίας. καὶ τοῦτ᾽ ἀεὶ γίνεται, συνεχῶς:
ἐπιρρεῖ γὰρ ἀεὶ τὸ ὑγρὸν “συνεχῶς, ἐξ οὗ γίνεται ἡ
τοῦ αἵματος φύσις' πρῶτον γὰρ ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ
δημιουργεῖται. δῆλον δ᾽ ἐν τῇ γενέσει ἐξ ἀρχῆς:
οὔπω γὰρ διωρισμένων τῶν φλεβῶν φαίνεται
ἔχουσα αἷμα, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο σφύζει μᾶλλον τοῖς
νεωτέροις τῶν πρεσβυτέρων' γίνεται γὰρ ἡ ἀνα-
474

ON RESPIRATION, xx.

in the region of the heart, which seem to be of the
same character, but really are not: palpitation,
pulsation and breathing.

Palpitation is the forcing together of the heat in
the heart due to the cooling produced by waste pro-
ducts and decay, as occurs in the disease called heart
palpitation among others, and also in fear ; for those
who are afraid grow cold in their upper parts, and the
heat retreating and rallying again produces palpita-
tion, being forced into so small a space, so that some-
times animals suffer extinction and die through fear
or through disease.

The beating of the heart which occurs, and which it
seems to show continuously, is like the throbbing of
an abscess, but the latter is accompanied by pain,
because there is an unnatural change in the blood, and
this pain continues until the pus produced is dis-
charged, This latter affection is like boiling ; for
boiling takes place when liquid is aerated by heat :
it rises because the swelling becomes greater. In the
case of abscesses, if there is no escape, relief comes
in the form of suppuration, when the liguid grows
thicker, but in boiling it results in overflowing its
container. But in the heart swelling of the liquid
which continually comes to it through heat causes
pulsation, as it rises to the outermost part of the
heart wall, This is a continually repeated process ;
for the liquid is continually flowing in, from which the
nature of the blood results ; for in the heart it is first
manufactured, This is clear in birth from its be-
ginning ; for the heart can be seen to contain blood
before the veins are differentiated. For this reason |
there is more rapid pulsation in the young than in the
old; for more evaporation takes place in younger

ATS

ARISTOTLE

480 a
θυμίασις πλείων τοῖς νεωτέροις. καὶ σφύζουσιν αἱ

φλέβες πᾶσαι, καὶ ἅμα ἀλλήλαις, διὰ τὸ ἠρτῆσθαι
ἐκ τῆς καρδίας. κινεῖ δ᾽ ἀεί: ὥστε κἀκεῖναι αἰεί,
καὶ ἅμα ἀλλήλαις, ὅτε κινεῖ. ἀναπήδησις μὲν οὖν
ἐστὶν ἡ γινομένη ἄντωσις πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ψυχροῦ

τὸ σύνωσιν, σφύξις δ᾽ ἡ τοῦ ὑγροῦ θερμαινομένου
πνευμάτωσις.

ΧΧΙ. Ἢ δ᾽ ἀναπνοὴ γίνεται αὐξανομένου τοῦ
θερμοῦ, ἐν ᾧ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἡ θρεπτική. καθάπερ γὰρ καὶ
τἄλλα δεῖται τροφῆς, κἀκεῖνο, καὶ τῶν ἄλλων μᾶλλον'
καὶ γὰρ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐκεῖνο τῆς τροφῆς αἴτιόν ἐστιν.

20 ἀνάγκη δὴ πλέον γινόμενον αἴρειν τὸ ὄργανον. δεῖ
δ᾽ ὑπολαβεῖν τὴν σύστασιν τοῦ ὀργάνου παρα-
πλησίαν per εἶναι ταῖς φύσαις ταῖς ἐν τοῖς χαλκείοις"
οὐ πόρρω γὰρ οὔθ᾽ ὃ πνεύμων ot? ἡ καρδία πρὸς
τὸ δέξασθαι σχῆμα τοιοῦτον" διπλοῦν δ᾽ εἶναι τὸ
τοιοῦτον" δεῖ γὰρ ἐν τῷ μέσῳ τὸ θρεπτικὸν εἶναι
τῆς φυσικῆς δυνάμεως. αἴρεται μὲν οὖν πλεῖον
γενόμενον, αἰρομένου δ᾽ ἀναγκαῖον αἴρεσθαι καὶ τὸ
᾿περιέχον αὐτὸ “μόριον. ὅπερ φαίνονται ποιεῖν οἱ
ἀναπνέοντες" αἴρουσι γὰρ τὸν θώρακα διὰ τὸ τὴν
ἀρχὴν τὴν ἐνοῦσαν αὐτῷ τοῦ τοιούτου μορίου ταὐτὸ
τοῦτο ποιεῖν" αἰρομένου γάρ, καθάπερ εἰς τὰς
80 φύσας, ἀναγκαῖον εἰσφέρειν τὸν ἀέρα τὸν θύραθεν,
480 ὃ καὶ ψυχρὸν ὄντα καὶ καταψύχοντα σβεννύναι τὴν
ὑπεροχὴν τὴν τοῦ πυρός. ὥσπερ δ᾽ αὐξανομένου
ἤρετο τοῦτο τὸ μόριον, καὶ φθίνοντος ἀναγκαῖον
συνίζειν, καὶ συνίζοντος ἐξιέναι τὸν ἀέρα τὸν
εἰσελθόντα πάλιν, εἰσιόντα μὲν ψυχρὸν ἐξιόντα δὲ

5 θερμὸν διὰ τὴν ἁφὴν τοῦ θερμοῦ τοῦ ἐνόντος ἐν τῷ
μορίῳ τούτῳ, καὶ μάλιστα τοῖς τὸν πνεύμονα
ἔναιμον ἔχουσιν" εἰς eas yap οἷον αὐλῶνας τὰς

476

τῷ
a

ON RESPIRATION, χκχ.---χχι.

men. AIl the veins throb, and at the same time as
each other, because they are attached to the heart.
The heart is always moving ; therefore the veins are
also, and they move at the same time as each other,
when the heart moves, Palpitation, then, is the
reaction which the heart makes to the pressure of
the cold, but pulsation is the aeration of the heat
in liquid.

XXI. Breathing occurs when the heat increases on The
which the nutritive soul depends. For just as all the ae
other parts need food, so does it, and even to a greater
extent than the other parts ; for it is rather the cause
of food in the other parts. As it increases the organ
must rise. One may regard the structure of the
organ as very like the bellows in a forge ; for neither
heart nor lung is very far from adopting this shape.
An organ of this kind must be double ; for the nutri-
tive part must be in the middle of its vital force,
When it expands it rises, and when it rises that part
of the body which envelops it must also rise. This is
what men seem to do when they breathe ; for they
raise their chest, the source of this part residing
therein doing the same thing ; for when the chest
rises it must introduce the air from outside into it, as
it does into the bellows, and being cold and producing
coolness it quenches the excess of fire. Just as when
it increases in size this part rises, so it must subside
as it grows smaller, and, as it contracts, the air which
entered in passes out again; coming in cold and
going out hot, because of its contact with the heat
which resides in this part, especially in those whose
lung contains blood. Tor the tubes in the lung fall

4T7

480 b

ARISTOTLE

σύριγγας ἐμπίπτειν τὰς ἐν τῷ πνεύμονι, ὧν trap’
ἑκάστην παρατέτανται φλέβες, ὥστε δοκεῖν ὅλον
εἶναι τὸν πνεύμονα πλήρη αἵματος. καλεῖται δ᾽ ἡ
μὲν εἴσοδος τοῦ ἀέρος ἀναπνοή, ἡ δ᾽ ἔξοδος ἐ ἐκπνοή.
καὶ ἀεὶ δὴ τοῦτο γίνεται συνεχῶς, ἕως περ ἂν ζῇ
καὶ κινῇ τοῦτο τὸ μόριον συνεχῶς. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο
ἐν τῷ ἀναπνεῖν καὶ ἐκπνεῖν ἐστὶ τὸ ζῆν.

Τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τοῖς ἰχθύσιν ἡ κίνησις
γίνεται τῶν βραγχίων. αἰρομένου μὲν γὰρ τοῦ
θερμοῦ τοῦ ἐν τῷ αἵματι διὰ τῶν μορίων αἴρονται
καὶ τὰ βράγχια, καὶ διιᾶσι τὸ ὕδωρ' κατιόντος δὲ
πρὸς τὴν καρδίαν διὰ τῶν “πόρων καὶ καταψυχομένου
συνίζουσι, καὶ ἀφιᾶσι τὸ ὕδωρ. ἀεὶ δ᾽ αἰρομένου
τοῦ ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ, ἀεὶ δέχεται πάλιν καταψυχο-
μένου. διὸ κἀκείνοις τοῦ ζῆν καὶ μὴ ζῆν τὸ τέλος
ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ ἀναπνεῖν, καὶ τούτοις ἐν τῷ δέχεσθαι
τὸ ὑγρόν

Περὶ μὲν οὖν ζωῆς καὶ θανάτου καὶ τῶν συγ-
γενῶν ταύτης τῆς σκέψεως, σχεδὸν εἴρηται περὶ
πάντων. περὶ δὲ ὑγιείας καὶ νόσου οὐ μόνον ἐστὶν
ἰατροῦ ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ φυσικοῦ μέχρι του τὰς αἰτίας
εἰπεῖν. ἡ δὲ διαφέρουσι καὶ q διαφέροντα θεωροῦ-
σιν, οὐ δεῖ λανθάνειν, ἐ ἐπεὶ ὅτι γε σύνορος ἡ ,ἐπραγ-
ματεία μέχρι τινός ἐστι, μαρτυρεῖ τὸ γινόμενον"
τῶν τε γὰρ ἰατρῶν ὅσοι κομψοὶ ἣ ἣ περίεργοι, λέγουσί
τι περὶ φύσεως καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐκεῖθεν ἀξιοῦσι
λαμβάνειν, καὶ τῶν περὶ φύσεως πραγματευθέντων
οἱ χαριέστατοι σχεδὸν τελευτῶσιν εἰς τὰς ἀρχὰς
τὰς ἰατρικάς.

478

ON RESPIRATION, χχι.

into many channels so to speak, along each of which
the veins stretch, so that the whole lung seems to be
fullofblood. The entry of the air is called inhalation,
its exit exhalation. And this occurs continuously as
long as the creature lives, and continually moves this
part. This is why life depends upon inhalation and
exhalation.

In the same way movement of the gills takes place
among fishes. When the heat in the blood rises
through the parts of the body the gills also rise, and
the water passes through them ; but when it descends
towards the heart through the passages, and as it
grows cool, the gills contract and expel the water.
As the heat in the heart is continually rising, so as it
cools again it always returns. Just, then, as in land
animals the achievement of living ornot living depends
entirely on breathing, so in the water animals it
depends on admitting water.

e havenearly finished our entire inquiry into life,
death and kindred subjects. As for health and disease
it ig not merely the business of the physician but also
of the physical philosopher to discuss their causes up
to a point. But the way in which these two classes
of inquirers differ and consider different problems
must not escape us, since the facts prove that up to
a point the methods go hand in hand; for those
' physicians who have subtle and inquiring minds have
something to say about natural science, and claim
to derive their principles therefrom, and the most
polished of those who deal with natural science really
conclude with medical principles.

479

ON BREATH

INTRODUCTION

It is generally admitted that this is not the work of
Aristotle. It is in many respects unlike the other
treatises in this volume, and it. draws a distinction—
unknown to Aristotle—between “ veins” and “ ar-
teries,” though the latter term seems frequently to
mean not blood-vessels, but air-passages. The essay
belongs to the Peripatetic School, and for this reason
has a right to a place among the works of Aristotle.

The obscurity of its meaning is exaggerated by the
indifferent condition of the manuscripts, which in
some cases are evidently wrong and in some actually
defective.

483

ΠΕΡῚ ΠΝΕΎΜΑΤΟΣ

asia 1. Τίς ἡ τοῦ ἐμφύτου πνεύματος διαμονή, καὶ
τίς ἡ αὔξησις; ὁρῶμεν γὰρ ὅτι πλέον καὶ ἰσχυρό-
τερον γίνεται καὶ καθ᾽ ἡλικίας μεταβολὴν καὶ κατὰ
διάθεσιν σώματος, ἢ ὡς τἄλλα μέρη, προσγινο-

5 μένου τινός. προσγίνεται δὲ τροφὴ τοῖς ἐμψύχοις,
ὥστε ταύτην σκεπτέον ποία τε καὶ πόθεν. δύο δὴ
τρόποι δι’ ὧν γίνεται, ἢ διὰ τῆς ἀναπνοῆς, ἢ διὰ
τῆς κατὰ τὴν τῆς τροφῆς προσφορὰν πέψεως,
καθάπερ τοῖς ἄλλοις. τούτων ἴσως οὐχ ἧττον ἂν"
δόξειεν διὰ τῆς τροφῆς" σῶμα γὰρ ὑπὸ σώματος
τρέφεται, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα σῶμα. τίς οὖν ὁ τρόπος;
r ἢ δῆλον ὡς ἐκ τῆς ,φλεβὸς ὁλκῇ τινὶ καὶ πέψει.
τὸ γὰρ αἷμα ἡ ἐσχάτη τροφὴ καὶ ἡ αὐτὴ πᾶσιν.
ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ εἰς τὸ ἀγγεῖον αὐτοῦ καὶ εἰς τὸ
περιεχόμενον λαμβάνει τροφὴν εἰς τὸ θερμόν. ἄγει
δ᾽ ὃ ὁ ἀὴρ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ποιῶν, τήν τε πεπτικὴν
αὐτὸς αὑτῷ προστιθεὶς αὔξει καὶ τρέφει. οὐδὲν
δ᾽ ἴσως ἄτοπον αὐτό γε τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ γενέσθαι τὸ
πρῶτον ἐκ τῆς τροφῆς. καθαρώτερον γὰρ ὁ τῇ
ψυχῇ συμῴφυές, εἰ μὴ καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ὑ ὕστερον λέγοι
γίνεσθαι, διακρινομένων τῶν σπερμάτων καὶ εἰς

1 οὐχ οὕτω B.
484,

ON BREATH

I, What is the meaning of the permanence of the
breath implanted in the body, and how does its
growth take place? We see that it becomes more
and stronger, both according to change of age and the
disposition of the body, or as in the other parts of
the body by some addition. Living beings with souls
have their addition by food, so that we have to con-
sider the nature and source of these additions in the
ease of breath. There are two ways in which it
occurs, either by breathing, or by the process of
digestion due to the presentation of food, as in the
case of the rest of the body. Of these two one would
more naturally suppose it due to food ; for a body is
fed by a body, and breath is a body. What, then, is
its method? Clearly by drawing in and assimilating
breath from the veins. For the blood is the ultimate
food, and is the same for all. So then it takes food
into its warmth, just as into its container and en-
velope. The air, then, acts by producing activity and,
by joining the aid of digestion to itself, produces
growth and nourishment. Probably there is nothing
strange in this, but it would be more strange to sup-
pose it the result of food in the first instance. For
that which naturally belongs to the soul is purer,
unless one were to suppose that the soul is born after-
wards, by the seeds separating and coming into their

: 485

Tho
function
of breath.

ARISTOTLE

481 ἃ .
20 φύσιν ἰόντων, εἴ re’ περίττωμα πάσης τροφῆς ἐστί,

- \
ποίᾳ διαπέμπεται τοῦτο; κατὰ μὲν yap τὴν
2 4 kf "» 3 λ / ‘ 38 ΄
ἐκπνοὴν obi εὔλογον: ἀντιλαμβάνει γὰρ εὐθύς.
ὡς a Ὡς ,
λοιπὸν δὲ δῆλον ὅτι διὰ τῶν τῆς ἀρτηρίας πόρων.
τὸ δ᾽ ἐκκρινόμενον ἦτοι λεπτότερον ἢ παχύτερον.
ἀμφοτέρως δ᾽ ἄτοπον, εἰ τοῦτο πάντων ἔσται καθα-
a5 ρώτατον. εἰ δὲ παχύτερον, ἔσονταί τινες πόροι
f 2 Σ av * 4 2 4 ΄
μείζους. εἰ δ᾽ ἄρα κατὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς λαμβάνει
καὶ ἐκπέμπει, τοῦτ᾽ αὐτὸ παράλογον καὶ ἄτοπον.
A ~ a
ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐκ τῆς τροφῆς αὔξησις καὶ διαμονὴ
‘ ~
σχεδὸν ταῦτα.
Il ἭΑ δ᾽ 3 “- 3 - ῳ "A ,
II. ἐκ τῆς ἀναπνοῆς, ὥσπερ ᾿Αριστογένης
ve
οἴεται (τροφὴν γὰρ οἴεται καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα πεττό-
Fal , ~ 3
80 μενον, οὐ τοῦ ἀέρος ἐν τῷ πνεύματι" τοῦτο δ᾽ εἰς
481} \ 3 a ὃ δίδ θ, x ͵ in 2 / =
τὰ ἀγγεῖα διαδίδοσθαι, τὸ περίττωμα πάλιν ἐκπέμ,
a
mecbat) πλείους ἔχει τὰς ἀπορίας. ἥ τε yap πέψις
\ > /
ὑπὸ τίνος; εἰκὸς μὲν γὰρ ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ, καθάπερ
‘ ~ ” ἄς A - 3 uv >
καὶ τῶν ἄλλων. αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτ᾽ ἄτοπον, εἰ μὴ
διαφέρει τοῦ ἔξω ἀέρος" οὕτω δ᾽ ἡ θερμότης ἂν
δ πέττοι. καὶ μὴν καὶ παχύτερον αὐτὸν εὔλογον εἶναι
> €: / ~ 3 ‘ a 9 , cla "
μεθ᾽ ὑγρότητος τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν ἀγγείων ὄντα καὶ
“ ω Nv Ὁ > < , at > 4
τῶν ὅλων ὄγκων, ὥσθ᾽ ἡ πέψις ἂν εἰς TO σωμα-
τῶδες εἴη. τὸ δὲ περίττωμα, εἴπερ γίνεται λεπτό-
4 ¢ 4 ~
τερον, οὐ πιθανόν. ἄλογος δὲ Kal ἡ ταχυτὴς τῆς
πέψεως. εὐθὺς γὰρ μετὰ τὴν εἰσπνοὴν ἡ ἐκπνοή.
10 τί οὖν τὸ οὕτω ταχὺ μεταβάλλον καὶ ἀλλοιοῦν;
e é A uv i A / ay
ὑπολάβοι yap ἄν τις μάλιστα τὸ θερμόν, καὶ pap-
τυρεῖ οὕτως ἡ αἴσθησις" 6 yap ἐκπνεόμενος θερμός.

1 etre BL
486

ON BREATH, ι1.--τ.

own nature. If there is a waste product of all food,
how can it be expelled in the case of breath? It is
not reasonable to suppose that it is by exhalation ;
for that takes place immediately. There is left the
obvious conclusion that it. takes place by the channels
of the windpipe. For that which is secreted is either
lighter or denser. In either case it is absurd that it
should be the purest of all. If it is thicker, there will
necessarily be larger channels. But if it receives
and discharges by the same channels, this is also
improbable and strange. So the theory that the
growth and continuance of breath arises from food
presents these problems.

II. There is a theory that it arises from breathing, The
as Aristogenes supposes (for he thinks that the breath Ppysicleey
when digested is a form of food : not, that is, of the in the body.
air in the breath ; this he thinks is absorbed into the
receptacles, but the waste product is expelled again) ;
but this theory involves even more difficulties. What
is the aoe of this digestion? It would be natural
to suppose that it is due to the same thing as in other
animals. But this seems improbable unless it differs
from the outside air; for in this case its heat would
digest it. And again it would seem probable that it
should become thicker because of the liquid that
arises from the containers, and from the general in-
flation, so that digestion would be into something
corporeal. But that the waste product becomes
lighter cannot be believed. The swiftness of diges-
tion is unreasonable. For exhalation occurs im-
mediately after inhalation. What then can it be
which produces a change of state so rapidly? One
might suppose that it was heat, and the senses give
evidence of this, for the air breathed out is hot,

487

ARISTOTLE

481 b » 3 >? \ 3 , 4 “ > / \
ἔτι δ᾽ εἰ μὲν ἐν TH πνεύμονι καὶ TH ἀρτηρίᾳ τὸ

πεττόμενον, ἡ τοῦ θερμοῦ δύναμις ἐν τούτοις"
ὅπερ οὔ φασιν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τῇ κινήσει τῇ τοῦ πνεύματος
> Ψ x ra J 2 > δὶ ‘
15 ἐκθερμαίνεσθαι τὴν τροφήν. εἰ δ᾽ ἐξ ἑτέρου τινὸς
οἷον ἐπισπᾶται } καὶ κινοῦντος δέχεται, τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶ
θαυμασιώτερον. ἅμα δὲ καὶ οὐκ αὐτὸ τὸ πρῶτον
κινοῦν.
"Ere δ᾽ ἡ μὲν ἀναπνοὴ μέχρι τοῦ πνεύμονος,
ω ld > f 4 7 ~ 3 εὲ A
ὥσπερ λέγουσιν αὐτοί, τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα δι᾿ ὅλου τὸ
4 2 > > ‘ 4 ft \ A
20 σύμφυτον. εἰ δ᾽ ἀπὸ τούτου διαδίδοται Kal πρὸς
A , \ ‘ A » ~ € i 4
τὰ κάτω Kal πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα, πῶς ἡ πέψις οὕτω
eal a ~
ταχεῖα; θαυμασιώτερον yap τοῦτο καὶ petlov: οὐ
a \
γὰρ διαπέμπει τοῦτό γ᾽ εὐθὺς πεττόμενον τὸν ἀέρα
a“ , a
τοῖς κάτω. καίτοι τὸ μὲν δόξειεν ἂν ἀναγκαῖον
εἶναι τοῦτο τῆς πέψεως γινομένης ἐν τῷ πνεύμονι,
25 τῆς τ᾿ ἀναπνοῆς κοινωνούντων καὶ τῶν κάτω,
a 3
Μεῖζον δ᾽ οὕτως ἔτι καὶ παραδοξότερον τὸ συμ-
a“ \ af ‘ a A f ς
βαῖνον: οἷον γὰρ διόδῳ καὶ θίξει γίνεται μόνον ἡ
/ x” 4 \ 4 ‘ ; ?
πέψις. ἄλογον δὲ καὶ τουτὶ καὶ λογοδέστερον, «i
ὁ αὐτὸς πόρος τῆς τροφῆς καὶ τοῦ περιττώματος.
» \ > 4 \ ~ > 7: ¢ > \ / a
εἰ δὲ δι᾿ ἄλλου τινὸς τῶν ἐντός, οὗ αὐτοὶ λόγοι of
a0 καὶ πρότερον, εἰ μὴ τοῦτο λέγοι τις, ὡς οὐ πάσης
485. Τῆς τροφῆς οὐδὲ πᾶσι γίνεται περίττωμα, καθάπερ
οὐδὲ τοῖς φυτοῖς, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ τῶν τοῦ σώματος
e+ na» > ᾿ ? ”
μερῶν ἑκάστου λαβεῖν ἔστιν. εἰ δὲ μή, οὔτι γε
ra 2 3 ΕΝ ¢ 4 3 , " €
παντός. ἀλλ᾽ ἄρα ye ἡ μὲν ἀγγείων αὔξησις ἡ
αὐτὴ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων μορίων, εὐρυνομένων δὲ καὶ
δ διισταμένων τούτων πλείων 6 ἀὴρ ὁ εἰσρέων καὶ
3 3 - -
ἐκρέων. εἰ δέ τι ἀναγκαῖον ἐνυπάρχει, τοῦτο αὐτὸ

488

ON BREATH, u.

Moreover, if that which is digested is in the lung and
in the windpipe, the force of heat must lie in them
too; this they deny, saying that the food is warmed
in the movement of the breath. But it is still more
amazing to suppose that it is, so to speak, absorbed
from some outside source and receives it through the
agency of some other impulse. But it is certainly
not itself the prime cause of the movement.

Moreover the breathing only reaches as far as the
lung, as they themselves admit, but the breath which
is inherent in the creature goes all through it. Τῇ,
then, it is received in succession from this to the lower
parts and the rest, how is digestion so rapid? This
is more remarkable and a greater problem ; for it
does not distribute the air the moment it is digested
to the parts below ; and yet this would seem to be
essential if digestion takes place in the lung, and the
breathing communicates with the parts below.

But in this case what occurs is a greater and more
inexplicable mystery ; for in this case digestion seems
merely to be like a passage through and a contact.
But it is unreasonable, in ΕΝ more unreasonable, to
suppose that the same account applies both to food
and to waste product. But if it takes place through
any other of the internal organs, the same arguments
apply as before, unless one is prepared to say that
the waste product does not occur with all kinds of
food, nor with all creatures, as it does not for instance
with plants, since one cannot assume it of each of the
parts of the body. And if not, certainly not in every
case. But then the growth of the receptacles is the
same as that of the other parts, and, as they expand
and swell, the air flowing in and out becomes more.
But if this is necessarily so, the question we are ask-

489

482 ἃ

ARISTOTLE

a r ~ e
ζητεῖται, τίς 6 φυσικὸς καὶ πῶς οὗτος πλείων
ὑγιῶς, ἐκ τούτου φανερὸν ἂν εἶεν, τοῖς δὲ δὴ μὴ
3 a rs ¢ ἈΝ a ‘4 \ ,ὔ
ἀναπνευστικοῖς τίς ἡ τροφὴ τοῦ συμφύτου καὶ τίς
id uv > A Ψ , 5 7 a we
ἡ αὔξησις; οὐ γὰρ ἔτι τούτοις ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔξωθεν.
> 9. 595 A o~ > A " ~ a a wv
εἰ δ᾽ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐντὸς Kal τῆς κοινῆς τροφῆς, εὔλογον
, aA n
κἀκείνοις" ἀπὸ γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν τὰ ὅμοια, καὶ
ς a > \ La Ἂν rd 3 a ~ 2? a
ὡσαύτως. εἰ μὴ dpa καὶ τούτοις ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐκτός,
a ν ~ 3 n 5 , 3 > o ᾿
ὥσπερ καὶ τῶν ὀσμῶν αἰσθάνονται. ἀλλ᾽ οὕτω γ
᾿ 3 \ , e
οἷον ἀναπνοὴ γίνεται. περὶ οὗ κἂν ἀπορήσειέ τις,
? A fol
εἰ κατὰ ἀλήθειάν ἐστιν, αὐτό τε τοῦτο προφέρων
\ ‘ 3 , fal “-“ © \ ‘ g
καὶ τὴν ἐπίσπασιν τῆς τροφῆς (ὁλκὴ γὰρ dua
>
πνεύματος), ἔτι δ᾽ ὑπὲρ τῆς καταψύξεως ἀντι-
\
λέγων, ὡς κἀκείνων δεομένων. εἰ δὲ διὰ τοῦ
¢ pA 2 » is 4 a Lia A
ὑποζώματος αὐτοῖς γίνεται, ταύτῃ δῆλον ὅτι καὶ
ς ~ 3 ν ὃ Ρ oe θ᾽ a / ~ 3 inl
ἡ τοῦ ἀέρος εἴσοδος: ὥσθ᾽ ὅμοιόν τι τῇ ἀναπνοῇ.

πλὴν οὐκ ἀφορίζεται τίς ὁλκὴ καὶ ὑπὸ τίνος. ἢ

> Ne , a ¢ + > \ ἂν 7 ΄ὔ
20 εὖ μὴ ὁλκή, TUS 1 εἴσοδος; εἰ μὴ APA αὐτομάτως.

- ΕἾ > μὲ 4 Ἂν «ἢ; > e 4 F
τοῦτο μὲν οὖν ἔχει καὶ αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ σκέψιν.
“- A " , ~
Τοῖς δὲ δὴ ἐνύγροις τίς ἡ τροφὴ Kal αὔξησις τοῦ
4 4 A a εἶ 3 ΄- ἠδ᾽
συμφύτου; χωρὶς γὰρ τοῦ μὴ ἀναπνεῖν οὐ

n ~ sf A
ἐνυπάρχειν ὅλως ἐν TH ὑγρῷ φαμὲν ἀέρα. λοιπὸν

5 ἄρα διὰ τῆς τροφῆς, ὡς οὐχ ὁμοίως πᾶσιν, ἢ

κἀκεῖνα διὰ τῆς τροφῆς τὰ ἔνυγρα" τριῶν γὰρ
400

ON BREATH, 1.

ing—what is the natural breath and how does it
healthily increase in size—would be answered from
our previous statement. But in those creatures
which do not breathe, what is the food of their natural
breath, and what is its growth? In their case it
certainly could not come from the outside. But if it
comes from the parts inside, and from the general
store of food, it is reasonable that the same should
be true in the case of the others; for similar results
come from the same causes and in the same way.
Unless, of course, it is possible that in their case too
food comes from the outside, and that they apprehend
it like scents. But this is really a sort of breathing.
One might have considerable doubt as to whether
this is true, instancing both the fact itself and the
drawing in of the food (for a drawing in of the breath
oceurs at the same time), and also arguing against it
because of the cooling, on the assumption that they,
like other creatures, need it. If, then, this takes place
through the diaphragm, clearly the entry of the air
must also be by this way ; so that in a sense it would
be like breathing. But this does not define what this
drawing in is, nor by what agency it takes place. If
there. is no drawing in, how is there any entry? Un-
less it is an automatic action. This however requires
an inquiry all by itself.

But in the case of water animals what is the food,
and the growth of their natural breath? For apart
from the fact that they do not breathe, we do not
suppose that, generally speaking, there is any air in
water. So the only remaining supposition is that it
comes through food, in which case, either the process
is not the same as in all other creatures, or else the
water animals also receive it through food ; for one

491

482 ἃ

482 b

ARISTOTLE

a a 4 \
τούτων ἀναγκαῖον ἕν. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ὡς περὶ τὴν
αὔξησιν καὶ τροφὴν τοῦ πνεύματος.

III. Περὶ δὲ ἀναπνοῆς οἱ μὲν οὐ λέγουσι τίνος
4 > 4 ͵ a 4 i 4
χάριν, ἀλλὰ μόνον ὃν τρόπον γίνεται, καθάπερ
> a Α Δ , 4 > 3 i \ ?
Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ Δημόκριτος" οἱ δ᾽ οὐδὲ τὸν τρόπον
ὅλως λέγουσιν, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς φανερῷ χρῶνται. δεῖ δὲ
καὶ εἰ καταψύξεως χάριν, αὐτὸ τοῦτο διασαφῆσαι.
εἰ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἄνω τὸ θερμόν, οὐκ ἂν ἔτι δέουτο
,ὔ a 4 Va lol > @ 4 > A.
κάτω. τὸ δὲ σύμφυτον πνεῦμα δι᾽ ὅλου, καὶ ἀρχὴ
ἀπὸ τοῦ πνεύμονος. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ τῆς ἀναπνοῆς
εἰς πάντα διαδίδοσθαι κατὰ συνέχειαν, ὥστε τοῦτο
δεικτέον ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν. ἄτοπον δὲ εἰ μὴ δεῖταί
τινος κινήσεως καὶ οἷον τροφῆς. εἰ δὲ διαπνεῖ
πρὸς πᾶν, οὐκέτι καταψύξεως εἴη χάριν. ἀλλὰ
\ \ τ ὃ (ὃ LAA 3 > é θ \ \
μὴν Kat ἡ διάδοσις ἄλλως τ᾽ ἀναίσθητος, Kal τὸ
~ A , a
τάχος αὐτῆς. καὶ πάλιν τὸ τῆς παλιρροίας, εἴπερ
ἀπὸ πάντων, θαυμαστόν, πλὴν εἰ ἄλλον τρόπον
ἀπὸ τῶν ἐσχάτων. τὸ δὲ πρώτως καὶ κυρίως
> b ~ Α Ἂν f > a 3 [4
ἀπὸ τῶν περὶ τὴν καρδίαν. ἐν πολλοῖς δ᾽ οὕτω
τὸ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν καὶ τῶν δυνάμεων, ἄτοπον οὖν
ῳ ? \ 3 A > “- i " A 1
ὅμως εἰ Kal εἰς τὸ ὀστοῦν διαδίδοταν' καὶ yap δὴ
τοῦτό φασιν ἐξ ἀρτηριῶν. διό, καθάπερ εἴρηται,
σκεπτέον περὲ ἀναπνοῆς, καὶ τίνος ἕνεκα καὶ ποίοις
μέρεσι καὶ πῶς. ἔτι οὐδ᾽ ἐπιφορὰ τῆς τροφῆς
φαίνεται πᾶσι δι’ ἀρτηριῶν, οἷον αὐτοῖς τε τοῖς
3 ψ. ay 3, \ “- - fat A 4
ἀγγείοις Kal ἄλλοις τισὶ τῶν μερῶν: ζῇ δὲ τὰ
φυτὰ καὶ τρέφεται. ταῦτα μὲν οἰκειότερά πως
τοῖς περὶ τὰς τροφάς.
3 ᾿ A - & ta =~ 3 m~ > i
IV. ᾿Ἐπεὶ δὲ τρεῖς αἱ κινήσεις τοῦ ἐν τῇ ἀρτηρίᾳ

402

ON BREATH, π.---ν,

of these three things must be true. So much, then,
for the growth and increase of the breath.

ITI, On the question of breathing some authors,
such as Empedocles and Democritus, do not say why
it takes place, but only the method by which it
occurs ; others again do not even deal completely
with the method, but treat it as obvious. Now if its
purpose is to produce cooling, one must make this
point quite clear. For if the heat belongs to the
upper parts, cooling would not be needed below.
But the breath implanted within goes through the
whole, and its source is the lung. But the action of
breathing scems to be transmitted continually into
every part, so we should have to prove that this is
untrue. It is a strange thing, then, if the lower parts
do not need some movement and food as it were.
If, then, breath passes everywhere, there would be no
need for cooling. But the transmission is in other
a imperceptible and so is its speed. Again, its
reflux, if it comes from all parts, is astonishing, unless
it takes place from the extremities in some other way.
But its first and foremost reflux originates from the
region of the heart. But in many creatures the pro-
cess of energies and functions behaves in this way.
All the same it is remarkable if it is transmitted to the
bone ; for they say that this takes place from the air
passages. So, as has been said, we must consider
breathing, what it is for, in what parts it occurs, and
how. Nor does the addition of food come to all
organs through the air passages, for instance to the
vessels themselves, and other parts of the body ; for
plants live and are nourished. Perhaps these ques-
tions are more relevant to a discussion of food.

TV. But since there are three distinct movements

493

Breath
miust have
a definite
function.

How does
breath act?

482 b
1b

483 a

ARISTOTLE

πνεύματος, ἀναπνοή, σφυγμός, τρίτη δ᾽ ἡ τὴν
τροφὴν ἐπάγουσα καὶ κατεργαζομένη, λεκτέον ὑπὲρ
ἑκάστης καὶ ποῦ καὶ πῶς καὶ τίνος χάριν. τούτων
δ᾽ ἡ μὲν τοῦ σφυγμοῦ καὶ τῇ αἰσθήσει φανερὰ
καθ᾽ ὅτιοῦν μέρος ἁπτομένοις, ἡ δὲ τῆς ἀναπνοῆς
μέχρι μέν του φανερά, τὸ δὲ πλέον κατὰ λόγον,
ἡ δὲ τῆς τροφῆς ἅπασα κατὰ λόγον ὡς εἰπεῖν, ὡς
ἐκ τῶν συμβαινόντων δὲ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν. ἡ
μὲν οὖν ἀναπνοὴ δῆλον ὡς ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐντὸς ἔχει τὴν
3 v4 uv a 4 ” \ a /
ἀρχήν, εἴτε ψυχῆς δύναμιν εἴτε ψυχὴν δεῖ λέγειν
4 ᾽ν ἢ ὅλλ' \ ; / ΠῚ ὃ +)
ταύτην, εἴτε καὶ ἄλλην τινὰ σωμάτων μίξιν, ἣ δι
“ “- \
αὐτῶν ποιεῖ τὴν τοιαύτην ὅὁλκήν. ἡ δὲ Operrucn
δόξειεν ἂν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀναπνοῆς. αὕτη γὰρ ἀνταπο-
δίδοται, καὶ ὁμοία τῷ ἀληθεῖ, εἰ δὲ μή, πᾶν
a ᾿ \ ΙΝ \
ὁμαλίζει τοῖς χρόνοις τὸ σῶμα κατὰ τὴν τοιαύτην
:
κίνησιν. ἢ εἰ μηδὲν διαφέρει τὸ ἅμα, πάντα τὰ
μέρη σκεπτέον. 6 δὲ σφυγμὸς ἴδιός τις παρ᾽
αὐτάς, τῇ μὲν ἂν δοκῶν εἶναι κατὰ συμβεβηκός,
εἴπερ, ὅταν ἐν ὑγρῷ πλῆθος ἢ θερμότητος, ἀνάγκη
τὸ ἐκπνευματούμενον διὰ τὴν ἐναπόληψιν ποιεῖν
σφυγμόν, ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ δὲ καὶ πρῶτον, εἴπερ τοῖς
πρώτοις σύμφυτον" ἐν γὰρ τῇ καρδίᾳ μάλιστα καὶ
la’ 3 > \ a af , \ \ ‘
πρῶτον, ἀφ᾽ ἧς καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις, τάχα δὲ πρὸς τὴν
ὑποκειμένην οὐσίαν τοῦ ζῴου τὴν ἐκ τῆς ἐνεργείας
ἀνάγκη τοῦτο παρακολουθεῖν.
[2 > bd A εἴ > \ ς /
Ore δ᾽ οὐδὲν πρὸς τὴν ἀναπνοὴν 6 σφυγμός,
σημεῖον: ἐάν τε γὰρ πυκνὸν ἐάν τε ὁμαλὸν ἐάν τε
σφοδρὸν ἢ πρᾶον ἀναπνέῃ τις, ὅ ye σφυγμὸς
ὅμοιος καὶ ὁ αὐτός, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ ἀνωμαλία γίνεται καὶ

404

ON BREATH, ιν.

of the breath in the windpipe, breathing, pulsation
and the third which introduces and acts upon food,
we must explain in each case where, how and why it
takes place. Of these the movement of pulsation is
perceptible to those who touch any part; that of
respiration is perceptible up to a point, but most of it
is a question of theory, while the whole of the move-
ment as it affects food is so to speak theoretical, but,
in so fay as it can be determined from its results,
itis a matter of perception. It is clear that breathing
has its source from within, whether we are right to
describe it as a function of the soul, or the soul itself,
or some other mixture of bodies, which produces such
a drawing by means of bodies. But the nutritive
soul would seem to arise from breathing ; for breath-
ing corresponds to this, and is like itin truth. If this
is not so, every body is equated with time by such a
movement, Ifits simultaneous occurrence makes no
difference, then all parts must be examined. The
pulsation is a special feature beyond these, seeming
on the one hand to be only incidental, since, when
there is a quantity of heat in the liquid, that which is
breathed out must cause pulsation by its interruption,
but on the other it is to be regarded as an original
source and primary, since it exists by nature in
primary organs; for first and foremost it is in the
heart, from which it is communicated to the other
organs. But it must necessarily follow from the
underlying essence of the animal, which arises from
its activity.

But there is evidence that pulsation has no con-
nexion with breathing ; for whether a man breathes
rapidly or steadily, heavily or quietly, the beating
of the heart remains the same and unaltered, but

405

ARISTOTLE

488 ἃ
3 Ui a
ἐπίτασις ἔν τε σωματικοῖς τισὶ πάθεσι καὶ ἐν τοῖς

δ τῆς ψυχῆς φόβοις ἐλπίσιν ἀγωνίαις.

Hi δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἀρτηρίαις ὁ σφυγμός, καὶ ὁ
αὐτὸς ὧν ῥυθμῷ καὶ ὁμαλὸς ἢ, σκεπτέον" οὐκ ἔοικε
δέ γε τοῖς μακρὰν ἀπηρτημένοις. ἥκιστα δ᾽ ἕνεκά
του φαίνεται γίνεσθαι, καθάπερ εἴρηται. τὸ γὰρ
αὖ τῆς ἀναπνοῆς καὶ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς, εἴθ᾽ ὡς ἕτερα

/ > 4 "5 ε θ ca A θ 4

10 πάμπαν ἀλλήλων εἴθ᾽ ὡς θάτερον πρὸς, θάτερον,
ἕνεκά του φαίνεται καὶ ἔχει τινὰ λόγον. τριῶν
δ᾽ οὐσῶν πρότερον' εὔλογον εἶναι τήν γε σφυγμώδη
καὶ τὴν ἀναπνευστικήν; ἡ γὰρ τροφὴ προῦπάρ-
xovros. ἢ οὔ; τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀναπνεῖν, ὅταν ἀπολυθῇ
τῆς κυούσης, ἡ δ᾽ ἐπιφορὰ καὶ ἡ τροφὴ καὶ ξυν-

16 ισταμένου καὶ ξυνεστηκότος, 6 δὲ σφυγμὸς εὐθὺς
ἐν τῇ ἀρχῇ ξυνισταμένης τῆς καρδίας, καθάπερ ἐν
τοῖς φοῖς γίνεται φανερόν. ὥστε αὕτη πρώτη,
καὶ ἔοικεν ἐνεργείᾳ τινὶ καὶ ode ἐναπολήψει πνεύ-

2
ματος, εἰ μὴ ἄρα τοῦτο πρὸς τὴν ἐνέργειαν.
‘ ΕἾ “a ‘ > ~ > π᾿ 7

V. Τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα τὸ ἐκ τῆς ἀναπνοῆς φέρεσθαι

40 μὲν εἰς τὴν κοιλίαν, οὐ διὰ τοῦ στομάχου (τοῦτο

‘ ΑἹ 3 4 ἀλλὰ / ἣ A \
μὲν γὰρ ἀδύνατον), & πόρον εἶναι παρὰ τὴν
ὀσφύν, δι’ οὗ τὸ πνεῦμα τῇ ἀναπνοῇ φέρεσθαι ἐκ
τοῦ βραγχίου εἰς τὴν κοιλίαν καὶ πάλιν ἔξω" τοῦτο
δὲ τῇ αἰσθήσει φανερόν.

” > > , ‘ x ι 4 wv 2

Eye δ᾽ ἀπορίαν καὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν. εἰ

2 γὰρ ἡ ἀρτηρία μόνον αἰσθάνεται, πότερα τῷ πνεύ-
ματι τῷ δι’ αὐτῆς, ἢ τῷ ὄγκῳ, ἢ τῷ σώματι;
ἢ εἴπερ ὁ ἀὴρ πρῶτον ὑπὸ τὴν ψυχήν, τῷ κυριω-

1 πότερον B.

496

ON BREATH, τν.---ν.

unevenness and strain appear during some bodily
ailments and in conditions of fear, expectation and
conflict in the soul.

We must next consider whether the pulsation
occurring in the arteries maintains a steady and an
even rhythm ; it does not seem so in those which are
far apart. But, as has been said, this does not seem
to exist for any purpose. The action of breathing
and drawing in of food, whether each of them exists
entirely for each other, or one for one purpose and
one for another, seems to have an object and a
rational explanation. But of the three functions it
is reasonable to suppose that pulsation and breathing
are prior. For food of course assumes something pre-
vious. Or is this wrong? For breathing starts as
soon as the embryo is released from its mother, but
the growth and feeding belong to it while it is being
constructed, and after it has been constructed, but
pulsation begins at the very moment that the heart
is formed, as can be observed in eggs. So that pulsa-
tion is prior in origin, and seems to be an activity, and
not due to an interruption of the breath, except in so
far as this contributes to its activity.

V. The drawing of the breath into the stomach in Physiology
breathing does not take place through the throat sapcaerar tat
(this would be impossible), but there is a passage body.
along the loin, through which the breath is carried by
breathing from the windpipe into the stomach and
out again ; this is evidenced by the senses.

But these facts communicated by the senses pre-
sent difficulties. Tor, if the windpipe merely feels,
is it because of the breath passing through it, or by
its swelling or by its bodily nature? If the air is the
first factor in life after the soul, is it by means of the

2% 407

ARISTOTLE
483 ἃ
, wy ῃ | a ἄς ἢ , , ?
τέρῳ τε Kal προτέρῳ; τί οὖν ἡ ψυχή; δύναμίν
φασι τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς κινήσεως τῆς τοιαύτης. ἢ
δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐπιτιμήσεις τοῖς τὸ λογιστικὸν
80 καὶ θυμικόν: καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι ὡς δυνάμεις λέγουσιν.
Ἰλλ᾽ : ἢ ὃ Α ε x > fal 3.“ 4 + F
ἀλλ᾽ εἰ δὴ ἡ ψυχὴ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι τούτῳ, οὗτός ye
κοινὸς. ἢ πάσχων γέ τι καὶ ἀλλοιούμενος εὐλόγως
ἂν ἔμψυχον ἡ ψυχή, πρὸς τὸ συγγενὲς φέρεται, καὶ
Ὁ ¢ f 4 hid 37, Ai a 4 4 Ψ
τῷ ὁμοίῳ τὸ ὅμοιον αὔξεται. ἣ οὔ; τὸ γὰρ ὅλον
a a7 > \ ,ὔ / + 4 4
οὐκ ἀήρ, ἀλλὰ συμβαλλόμενόν τι πρὸς ταύτην τὴν
35 δύναμιν ὃ ἀήρ, ἢ οὐ τὸ ταύτην ποιοῦν, καὶ τὸ
ποιῆσαν τοῦτ᾽ ἀρχὴ καὶ ὑπόθεσις.
“ \ Α > ,ὔ uv > , n
488» Τοῖς δὲ μὴ ἀναπνέουσιν, ἵνα ἀνεπίμικτος τῷ
μὲ A a 3 \ > FAA 4 , ΗΣ
ἔξω. % οὔ, ἀλλὰ κατ᾽ ἄλλον τρόπον μιγνύμενος;
nr a i ‘ \
τίς οὖν ἡ διαφορὰ τοῦ ἐν τῇ aprypia πρὸς τὸν
vy Py ὃ / A a ‘ δὲ \ >
ἔξω; διαφέρειν γὰρ εὔλογον, τάχα δὲ καὶ avay-
al 4
sKatov, λεπτότητι: ἀλλ᾽ ἔτι δὲ καθ᾽ αὑτὸν θερμὸς
a” cy? £ / i \ im μὲ θ 7 ε
ἢ ὑφ᾽ ἑτέρου; φαίνεται γὰρ ὃ ἔσω καθάπερ ὁ
tal - ,
ἔξω" βοηθεῦται δὲ τῇ καταψύξει. πότερα δέ; ἔξω
μὲν γὰρ πραὖῦς, ἐμπεριληφθεὶς δὲ πνεῦμα, καθάπερ
πυκνωθεὶς καὶ διαδοθείς πως. ἢ μίξιν τινὰ ἀνάγκη
λαμβάνειν, ἐν ὑγρότητί τε καὶ σωματικοῖς ὄγκοις
10 ἀναστρεφόμενον; οὐκ ἄρα λεπτότατος, εἴπερ μέ-
- \
μικται. καὶ μὴν εὔλογόν ye τὸ πρῶτον δεκτικὸν
ψυχῆς, εἰ μὴ ἄρα καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ τοιοῦτον, καὶ οὐ
΄ ᾿ 3 i 2 > i? Ζ
καθαρόν τι καὶ ἀμιγές. τὴν δ᾽ ἀρτηρίαν μόνον
εἶναι δεκτιικκὴν πνεύματος, τὸ δὲ νεῦρον οὔ. δια-
φέρει δὲ καὶ ὅτι τὸ μὲν νεῦρον ἔχει τάσιν, ἡ δ᾽
32 ta A i < \ ε im
1 ἀρτηρία ταχὺ διαρρήγνυται, καθάπερ καὶ ἡ φλέψ.

408

ON BREATH, v.

controlling and prior part?) What then is the soul?
They say that the reason of movement of this kind is
its function. But it is clear that one is not right to
censure those who call it the seat of reasoning and
the passions; for these speak of them as functions.
But if the soul resides in the air, thisis common. But
if by some affection or change it becomes alive this
soul would naturally be attracted to what is related
to it, and like will increase by like. Or is this not
so? For, it may be said, the air is not the whole of
the soul, but the air contributes something to its
function, or else what creates or has created this is its
origin and basis.

But what about those creatures which do not
breathe, where there is no mixture with the air out-
side? Or is this not so, but is it mixed in some other
way ? What then is the difference between the air
in the air passage and the air outside? It is natural
and perhaps inevitable that it should differ in light-
ness, But again, is it hot in itself, or only heated by
something else? For the air inside seems to be
like the air outside; but it is assisted by cooling.
But which of the two is true? Outside the air is
mild, but when enclosed it is breath, and is in a sense
thickened and dissipated. Must it then receive
some mixing, by moving about in liquid and by bodily
swelling ? It is not, then, very fine, if it is mixed.
Now it is natural that the first receptacle of the soul
should be fine (unless the soul itself is of this character,
and is not pure and unmixed), and that the air passage
should be the first receptacle of the breath and the
nerve not. It makes a difference that the nerve can
stand tension, but that the air passage is quickly
broken through, just like a vein. But the skin is

499

488 b

85
484 a

σι

ARISTOTLE

τὸ δὲ δέρμα ἐκ φλεβὸς καὶ νεύρου καὶ ἀρτηρίας,
ἐκ φλεβὸς μὲν ὅτι Κεντηθὲν αἷμα ἀναδίδωσιν, ἐκ
νεύρου δὲ ὅτι τάσιν ἔχει, ἐξ a ἀρτηρίας δὲ ὅ ὅτι διαπνοὴν
ἔχει. μόνον γὰρ δεκτικὸν πνεύματος ἣ ἀρτηρία.
τὰς δὲ φλέβας ἔχειν πόρους, ἐν αἷς τὸ θερμὸν ὃν
ὥσπερ ἐν χαλκείῳ θερμαίνειν τὸ αἷμα" φύσει γὰρ
οὐκ εἶναι θερμόν, ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ τὰ τηκτὰ καταδια-
χεῖσθαι" διὸ καὶ “πήγνυσθαι τὴν ἀρτηρίαν, καὲ ἔχειν
ὑγρότητα καὶ ἐν αὑτῇ καὶ ἐν τοῖς χιτῶσι τοῖς
περιέχουσι τὸ κοίλωμα. φανερὸν δ᾽ ἔκ τε τῶν
ἀνατομῶν εἶναι, καὶ ὅτι εἰς τὸ ἔντερον καὶ εἰς τὴν
κοιλίαν ab τε φλέβες καὶ αἱ ἀρτηρίαι συνάπτουσιν,
ἃς εἰκὸς εἶναι τὴν τροφὴν ἕλκειν. ἐκ δὲ τῶν
φλεβῶν εἰς τὰς σάρκας διαδίδοσθαι τὴν τροφήν, οὐ
κατὰ τὰ πλάγια ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ στόμα, καθάπερ
σωλῆνας. ἀποτείνειν " γὰρ ἐκ τῶν πλαγίων φλεβῶν
φλέβια λεπτὰ ἐκ τῆς μεγάλης φλεβὸς καὶ τῆς
ἀρτηρίας παρ᾽ ἑκάστην. πλευράν, καὶ ἀρτηρίαν καὶ
φλάβα παρακεῖσθαι" καὶ τὰ ὀστέα δὲ καθάπτειν τὰ
νεῦρα καὶ τὰς φλέβας καὶ εἰς μέσα καὶ εἰς τὰς
συμβολὰς τῶν κεφαλῶν, δι᾿ ὧν τὴν τροφὴν δέχεσθαι
τοὺς ἰχθύας καὶ ἀναπνεῖν: εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀνέπνεον,
ἐξαιρεθέντας ἂν ἐκ τοῦ ὑγροῦ εὐθὺς θνήσκειν.

Τὰς δὲ φλέβας καὶ τὰς ἀρτηρίας συνάπτειν εἰς
ἀλλήλας καὶ τῇ αἰσθήσει φανερὸν εἶναι. τοῦτο δ᾽
avi ἂν συμβαίνειν, εἰ μὴ ἐδεῖτο καὶ τὸ ὑγρὸν
πνεύματος καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα ὑγροῦ, τῷ θερμὸν εἶναι
ἐν “νεύρῳ καὶ ἀρτηρίᾳ καὶ φλεβί, ϑερμότατον δὲ
καὶ οἷον φλεβωδέστατον τὸ ἐν τῷ νεύρῳ.

"Ατοπον οὖν τῇ τοῦ πνεύματος χώρᾳ τὸ θερμόν,
ἄλλως τε καὶ καταψύξεως χάριν. εἰ δὲ ποιεῖ καὶ
οἷον ἀναξζωπυρεῖ θερμῷ τὸ θερμόν, γίγνοιτ᾽ ἄν.
500

ON BREATH, ν.

made from veins, nerves and air passages ; from veins
because it emits blood when pricked, from nerves
because it admits tension, and from air passages be-
cause it allows the passage of air. For the air passage
alone is receptive of air. But the veins have pas-
sages, in which the heat, as though it were in a brazen
vessel, warms the blood ; for it is not naturally hot,
but the heat passes into it, just as soluble substances
do ; this is why the air passage is hard, and contains
moisture within it, and in the coverings which sur-
round the cavity. It becomes obvious from dissection
that both the veins and the air passages are con-
nected with the internal organs and with the stomach,
and that they naturally draw the food. But the
food passes through from the veins to the flesh, not
through the sides but through the mouth as through
channels. For from the veins stretching sideways
small light veins extend from the great vein and air
passage along each side, and air passage and vein lie
side by side. Both nerves and veins are attached to
bones, both in the middle parts and in the junctions
of the head, through which fishes admit food and
breathe + if they did not breathe, when taken out of
the water they would die at once.

But the veins and air passages are attached to each
other, as can be discovered by feeling them. This
would not be the case unless the liquid needed breath
and the breath liquid, because there is heatin thenerve,
in the air passage and in the vein, but the hottest
and, so to speak, the most venous, is that in the nerve.

Heat is not suitable to the place of the breath,
especially in view of the necessary cooling. But if it
is a fact that heat is generated, and in a sense re-
surrected by heat, then it might happen in this way.

501

484 ἃ

ARISTOTLE

ἔτι πάντων τῶν ἐχόντων θερμότητα σύμφυτόν πως
ἡ διαμονή, μηδενὸς ἀντικειμένου μηδὲ καταψύχον-
τος. ὅτι γὰρ πάντα δεῖται καταψύξεως, σχεδὸν
φανερὸν τῷ αἷμα κατέχειν ἐν τῇ φλεβὶ τὸ θερμὸν
οἷον ἀποστέγον' διὸ καὶ ὅταν ἐκρυῇ, μεθιέναι τε
καὶ ἀποθνήσκειν, τῷ τὸ ἧπαρ οὐκ ἔχειν οὐδεμίαν
ἀρτηρίαν.
VI. Πότερον δὲ τὸ σπέρμα διὰ τῆς ἀρτηρίας ὡς
καὶ συνθλιβόμενον, καὶ ἐν τῇ προέσει μόνον; ἐν
δ ΄, Ἧ, δι τὺν a \ ~ 4
ols δὴ φαίνεται καὶ ἡ ἐξ αἵματος μεταβολὴ τῷ τὰ
νεῦρα ἀπὸ τῶν ὀστῶν τρέφεσθαι" καθάπτει γὰρ
2 , a » a> 3 \ εἶ 2 ol f
αὐτά. ἢ οὔτε τοῦτ᾽ ἀληθές" καὶ yap ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ
νεῦρον, καὶ νεῦρα δὲ ἐκ τῶν ὀστῶν ἠρτημένα. οὐ
/ \ 3 | ee 4 > > > / 3 -
συνάπτει δὲ ἐν ἑτέρῳ, ἀλλ᾽ εἰς σάρκα ἀποτελευτᾷ.
AL mf 3 ᾿ , ᾿ A BLY θὲ 3 A fon
ἢ τοῦτό γ᾽ οὐθέν’ εἴη yap av οὐθὲν ἧττον ἀπὸ τοῦ
ὀστοῦ ἡ τροφή. αὐτοῖς δ᾽ ἀπὸ τοῦ νεύρου τοῖς
ὀστοῖς μᾶλλον τὴν τροφήν. ἄτοπον γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο.
ξηρὸν γὰρ φύσει καὶ οὐκ ἔχον πόρους ὑγρούς" ἡ
τροφὴ δ᾽ ὑγρόν, σκεπτέον δὲ πρότερον, εἴπερ
ἀπὸ τῶν ὀστῶν, τίς ἡ τοῦ ὀστοῦ τροφή, ἢ φέρουσι
πόροι καὶ ἐκ τῆς φλεβὸς καὶ ἐκ τῆς ἀρτηρίας εἰς
+ ae 2 y > a 4 5} / 2
αὐτόν. καὶ ἐν πολλοῖς μὲν εὔδηλοι, μάλιστα ὃ
εἰς τὴν ῥάχιν. τὰς δ᾽ ἀπὸ τῶν ὀστῶν γίνεσθαι
συνεχεῖς, ὥσπερ ταῖς πλευραῖς’ τούτους δ᾽ ἀπὸ
τῆς κοιλίας τίνα τρόπον, ἢ πῶς τῆς ὁλκῆς γινομέ-
ἊΝ Ἄν A a 7 ¢ ee? > >
νῆς; ἢ τὰ πολλὰ ἄχονδρα, καθάπερ ἡ ῥάχις" ἀλλ
οὔτι πρὸς τὴν κίνησιν, ἢ συνάψεως χάριν. δεῖ δέ,
καὶ εἰ ἀπὸ τοῦ νεύρου τὸ ὀστοῦν τρέφεται, τὴν
τοῦ νεύρου τροφὴν εἰδέναι. ἡμεῖς δέ φαμεν ἐκ τῆς
502

ON BREATH, v.—v1.

Again; the persistence of all things containing heat ts
in a sense a natural quality, provided that nothing
opposes nor causes a cooling. That everything
needs cooling is almost obvious from the fact that
the blood retains the heat in the veins as if it
occluded it. So when it flows out, the heat escapes
and the animal dies, because the liver has no air
passage.

VI. Does the semen pass through the air passage
by pressure, or does this only take place in emission ?
In such cases also the change from blood (into flesh)
is evidently due to the nerves being nourished from
the bones ; for they knit them together, Possibly
this is not true; for there is a nerve in the heart as
well as nerves attached to the bones. But the heart
nerve does not unite anything, but ends in flesh,
Possibly this is of no account ; for none the less the
nourishment of the nerve would come from the bone,
And yet the bones might more easily be supposed to
derive their nourishment from the nerves. But this
is curious, for the bone is naturally dry, and has no
passages for liquid. But food is wet. We must
consider first what the nourishment supplied by the
bone is, if it comes from the bones ; and whether the
passages both from vein and air passage carry it to
the bone itself. In many places these passages are
visible, especially those leading to the spine. But
those leading from the bones are often continuous ag
they are in the ribs ; but how could they come from
the stomach, and how would the food be drawn in ὃ
For most of them have no cartilage, like the spine ;
and are not therefore suited to movement, or for
knitting together. But if the bone is fed from the
nerve, one must inquire what feeds the nerve. We

503

Nerves.

484 ἃ

484 Ὁ

ARISTOTLE

= 4
ὑγρότητος γλίσχρας οὔσης τῆς περὶ τὸ αὐτό.
4 > i! ΧΑ \ ~ , A 2 ‘
πόθεν δ᾽ αὐτὴ καὶ πῶς, λεκτέον. τὸ ἐκ φλεβὸς
καὶ ἀρτηρίας τὴν σάρκα, ὅτι πανταχόθεν αἷμα τῇ

? A 2? nm Ψ , -»
κεντήσει, ψεῦδος ἐπί γε τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων, οἷον
> v4 ΝΜ 43 ΓΑ Noy ~ > ,
ὀρνίθων καὶ ὄφεων καὶ ἰχθύων ἢ ὅλως τῶν φοτόκων"
ἀλλὰ τῶν πολυάίμων τοῦτ᾽ ἴδιον, ἐπεὶ τῶν ὀρνιθίων
γε καὶ τεμνομένων τὸ στῆθος ἰχώρ, οὐχ αἷμα. Ἔμ-
πεδοκλῆς δὲ ἐκ νεύρου τὸν ὄνυχα τῇ πήξει. ἄρ᾽
οὖν οὕτω καὶ δέρμα πρὸς σάρκα; ἀλλὰ τοῖς doTpa-
κοδέρμοις καὶ μαλακοστράκοις πῶς ἀπὸ τῶν ἐκτὸς
¢ 4 3 7 A cal a > \ “
ἡ τροφή; τοὐναντίον yap δοκεῖ μᾶλλον ἀπὸ τῶν
? 1 ἢ - 3 / » δὲ Ps ' ὃ ‘ re ¢
ἐντὸς ἢ τῶν ἐκτός. ἔτι δὲ ποία καὶ διὰ τίνων ἡ
> a , f \ , ς ? E 2 ἊΣ
ἐκ τῆς κοιλίας δίοδος; καὶ πάλιν ἡ ἐκείνων ἀνα-
, >
στροφὴ πρὸς THY σάρκα, καίπερ ἄλογος οὖσα.
\ >
πολὺ γάρ τι θαυμαστὸν φαίνεται καὶ ἀδύνατον
ὅλως. «ἄρα γε ἄλλοις ἄλλη τροφή, καὶ οὐ πᾶσι
τροφὴ τὸ αἷμα" πλὴν ἐϊς τούτου τἄλλα.

VIL. Τὴν τῶν ὀστῶν φύσιν ἄρα σκεπτέον ἢ πρὸς
κίνησιν ἢ πρὸς ἔρειομα, καὶ πρὸς τὸ στέγειν καὶ
περιέχειν, ἔτι δ᾽ εἰ ὥσπερ ἀρχαὶ ἔνια, καθάπερ ὁ

7 f B 4 4 ͵ Ay a
πόλος. λέγω δὲ πρὸς μὲν κίνησιν, οἷον ποδὸς ἢ

a DS ~ 3
χειρὸς ἢ σκέλους ἢ ἀγκῶνος, ὁμοίως τήν τε καμ-
πτικὴν καὶ τὴν κατὰ τόπον’ οὐδὲ γὰρ τὴν τοπικὴν

/ ey 7 A \ ᾿ A > i
οἷόν τε ἄνευ κάμψεως. σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐρείο-
ματα ἐν τούτοις. τὴν δὲ τοῦ στέγειν καὶ περιέχειν,

Φ' AY 3 - ~ δ 3 7 , oe 1
οἷον τὰ ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ τὸν ἐγκέφαλον, καὶ ὅσοι δὴ

A ‘ ἢ ε 4 " ~
τὸν μυελὸν ἄρχειν, at δὲ πλευραὶ τοῦ συγκλείειν.

504

ON BREATH, vi.—vu.

ourselVes say it is from the liquid surrounding it
which is glutinous. Then it must be explained
whence this arises and how. The idea that flesh is
made from vein and air passage, because blood issues
from every point at which it is pricked, is false in the
ease of the other animals such as birds, snakes, and
fishes and generally of the oviparous animals. It is
really peculiar to the full-blooded animals, since,
when the breast of the small birds is cut, it is not
blood but ichor that flows out. Empedocles thinks
that nail is formed from nerve by a process of harden-
ing. Is the relation between skin and flesh the same ?
But how is it possible for either the hard or soft-
shelled creatures to get their food from the outside ?
They seem on the other hand to derive it rather from
inside than from outside. Again, of what nature and
by what means is the passage from the stomach?
And again its return as flesh, unreasonable though it
is? The whole thing is mysterious, and generally
speaking inexplicable. Perhaps other animals have
another source of food, and it is not blood in all cases ;
and yet the others are really formed from blood.
VII. Now we have to consider the nature of the
bones, whether they are designed for movement or
for support, and also as covering and envelope, and
whether some are the origin of movement, like the
axis of the universe. By “ for movement ” I mean
the movement of the foot, or hand, or Jeg, or elbow,
equally for bending and for movement from place to
place ; for this latter movement is impossible without
bending. Support seems to depend in man upon the
bones mentioned. As covering and envelope, [ mean
as the skull covers the brain, like those who regard
the marrow as the controlling agent. The ribs are

505

The
function of
the bones.

484 b

485 ἃ

ARISTOTLE

3 i 4 δ 4 4 ef 249 5» \ ς rr Η
ἀρχὴ δὲ καὶ μένον ἡ ῥάχις, ἀφ᾽ ἧς καὶ αἱ πλευραὶ
πρὸς τὴν σύγκλεισιν. ἀνάγκη γὰρ εἶναί τι τοιοῦ-
A ~
Tov’ ἅπαν yap TO κινούμενον ἐξ ἠρεμοῦντος.
Ψ N 4 ~ ῃ πω ἢ -
Apa δὲ καὶ δεῖ γε εἶναι τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα. ἐν ᾧ
A
δὴ Kal τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔνιοι, τόν τε βαχίτην καὶ τὸν
> ᾽ὔὕ uw A x - 5 “8 ~ \
ἐγκέφαλον. ἔτι δὲ παρὰ ταῦτ᾽ ἐπὶ συναφῆς καὶ
συγκλείσεως χάριν, οἷον ἡ κλείς" ὅθεν ἴσως καὶ
τοὔνομα. πρὸς δὲ τὴν χρείαν ἕκαστον καλῶς.
οὔτε γὰρ ἡ κάμψις, οὔτε τοῦ ὅλου οὔτε τῶν μερῶν,
εἰ μὴ τοιαῦτα, οἷον ῥάχις, πούς, ἀγκών. εἴσω
γὰρ δεῖ τὴν κάμψιν πρὸς τὴν χρείαν. ὁμοίως δὲ
καὶ τὴν τοῦ ποδὸς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τοιαύτην.
ἅπαντα δὲ ἕνεκά του, καὶ τὰ ἐν τούτοις ὀστᾶ,
Fal 5 Fal , a
οἷον ἡ ἐν τῷ ἀγκῶνι κερκὶς ἕνεκα τῆς στροφῆς
fol na ἃ, ~ Ν
τοῦ ἀγκῶνος καὶ τῆς χειρός. οὐ γὰρ ἐδυνάμεθα
πρηνῆ καὶ ὑπτίαν κινεῖν ἄνευ ταύτης, οὐδὲ τοὺς
> \ , ¢ 2 ~
πόδας ἐπαίρειν καὶ κάμπτειν, εἰ μὴ δύο αἱ ἐν τῇ
4
κινήσει KepKides. ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα σκε-
~ A
mréov, οἷον ἡ τοῦ τραχήλου κίνησις, εἰ ἕν τὸ ὁσ-
=. a A Ἂν. \ / a ΓΑ
τοῦν. δεῖ δὲ καὶ ὅσα πρὸς κατάληψιν ἢ σύνδεσμον,
ς 4 ee eo ~ Fé 3 \ \ LY t a
οἷον ἡ μύλη ἡ ἐπὶ τῷ γόνατι. ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τί τοῖς
ἄλλοις οὔ. ὅσα μὲν οὖν κινητικά, πάντα μὲν μετὰ
νεύρων, ἴσως δ᾽ ὅσα πρακτικῶς μάλιστα, οἷον τὰ
περὶ ἀγκῶνα καὶ σκέλη καὶ χεῖρας καὶ πόδας. τὰ
3 ἐᾷ ~
δ᾽ ἄλλα συνδέσμου χάριν, ὅσα δεῖται. ἐνίοις re
tows οὐδὲν ἢ ἐπ᾽ ὀλίγον, οἷον ἡ ῥάχις, ἀλλ᾽
κάμψις. καὶ γὰρ ἡ πρὸς ἄλληλα κόλλησις ἢ bile

1 ἡ Β,

9 i.e, radius in the arm and tibia in the leg.

506

ON BREATH, vm.

intended to enclose. The origin and fixed part of
the system is the spine, from which the ribs radiate
to enclose. ‘They must be of this character ; for all
movement depends on something stationary.

At the same time there must be a purpose for
which they exist. Some class as this both the spinal
marrow and the brain. Besides these there are
bones at the junctions for the purpose of interlocking,
such as the collar-bone; perhaps its name (the key-
bone) is derived from this. Each of these is admir-
ably suited to its object. If it were not for such
bones as the spine, the foot and the elbow, there
could be no bending either of the whole or of parts.
The bending of the elbow must take place inwards
to achieve its purpose ; and the same thing applies
to the foot und the other limbs. ΑἸ] things exist
for a purpose, as do the bones in these parts; for
instance the radius in the forearm for the purpose of
bending the elbow and the hand. For without it we
could not move either forward or upward, nor raise
and bend the feet, if there were not two radii ἃ em-
ployed in the movement. In the same way we must
consider other things, such as the movement of the
neck, whether there is one bone only concerned.
We have also to consider what belongs to seizing or
knitting together, like the patella over the knee;
and why no other bones have such an arrangement.
All the bones concerned in movement work with
sinews, and most of all those which are connected with
action, such as those about the elbow, legs, hands
and feet. All the others, which are needed, are for
the sake of knitting together. Some have little or
no function, except for bending ; such as the spine,
For what connects the bones to each other is ichor

507

485 8

ARISTOTLE

ἐστι καὶ ὑγρότης μυξώδης. τὰ δὲ καὶ ovbdetrar
νεύροις, οἷον τὰ περὶ τὰ ἄρθρα.
f
VII. Πάντων δ᾽ ἐστὶ λόγος ὁ βελτίων ὡς Kal
μὴ ayo ¢ , a ,
νῦν ζητεῖν" ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἐφ᾽ ἱκανόν, ὧν χάριν,
σκεπτέον. οὐκ ἂν δόξειε κινήσεως ἕνεκα τὰ ὀστᾶ,
ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὰ νεῦρα ἣ τὰ ἀνάλογον, ἐν ᾧ πρώτῳ
τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ κινητικόν, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡ κοιλία κινεῖται
" ‘4 ᾽ A wv ‘ 3 Ψ lod 3 3
καὶ ἡ καρδία νεῦρα ἔχει: τὰ δ᾽ οὐ πᾶσιν, ἀλλ
᾿ -
ἐνίοις, ἀνάγκη καὶ πρὸς τὴν τοιαύτην κίνησιν νεῦρα
ἔχειν, ἢ εἰς τὸ. . .. ὁ γὰρ πολύπους ἐπ᾽ ὀλίγον
~ ~ “a ~ [
καὶ κακῶς βαδίζει. δεῖ γὰρ τοῦτο λαβεῖν ὥσπερ
a \ ,ὔ *
ἀρχήν, ὅτι πᾶσιν, ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς χάριν: ἀλλὰ πρὸς
4 a a
τὴν κίνησιν τὴν οἰκείαν, οἷον τοῖς μὲν πεζοῖς πόδας,
a - A
καὶ τοῦτο τοῖς μὲν ὀρθοῖς δύο, τοῖς δὲ παντελῶς
“- ¢ ‘
ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς πλείους, ὅσοις ἡ ὕλη γεωδεστέρα, καὶ
, + δὲ \ M ὃ ὅλ .} . f
ψυχροτέρα. (τὰ δὲ καὶ ἄποδα ὅλως ἐγχωρεῖ" βίᾳ
γὰρ οὕτω κινεῖσθαι.) τοῖς δε πτηνοῖς πτέρυγας, καὶ
τούτων τὴν μορφὴν οἰκείαν τῇ φύσει. διάφορα δὲ
τοῖς πτητικωτέροις καὶ βραδυτέροις. πόδας δὲ
τροφῆς χάριν καὶ ἀναστάσεως, πλὴν τῆς νυκτερίδος"
διὸ καὶ τὴν τροφὴν ἐκ τοῦ ἀέρος. καὶ μὴ δεῖσθαι
διαναπαύσεως" οὐ δέονται γὰρ δι᾿ ἄλλων. τὰ δὲ
3 58 - > “ὃ ξ /, 5 ὃ A Ay é
ὀστρακόδερμα τῶν ἐνύδρων ὑπόποδα διὰ τὸ βάρος.
καὶ ταῦτα μὲν πρὸς τὴν κατὰ τόπον ἀλλαγήν' ὅσα
Ν ,ὔ Ul ~
δὲ πρὸς τὴν ἄλλην χρείαν, ὥσπερ ὑφηγεῖται καὶ
ὃ é ‘ 18 4 3 4 é « A
ἑκάστου τὰ ἴδια, καὶ εἴ τι μὴ προφανές, οἷον διὰ

α Five or six letters are missing in all Μ88.
508

ON BREATH, vit.—vir.

and mucous fluid. The rest are bound together by
sinews, such as those about the joints.

VIII. An investigation like this is the best for
discovering all things, but we must consider as fay as
is desirable what they are for. Bones would not
seem to exist for the sake of movement, but rather
the sinews, or what corresponds to them, in which
the organ of movemenlt essentially resides, since both
the stomach moves and the heart has sinews ; this is
not true in all cases but in some; they must then
have sinews with a view to movement of this kind
or for..... @, For the cuttlefish walks very little,
and that little indifferently. We must assume as a
starting-point that all have these organs for different
purposes, each being adapted to its own special form
of movement; for instance, feet for animals that
move on land, and of these two for those which stand
erect, more for those which are flat on the ground,
whose material essence is more earthy and colder.
(It is thus possible for some creatures to be entirely
footless: and such can only be moved by force.)
For the winged creatures thus have wings, and each
has a shape appropriate to its nature. There is a
difference between those whose flight is faster or
slower. They have feet for the purpose of getting
food and for standing upright ; except for the bat ;
because the bat gets its food from the air. Such
creatures do not need to alight for rest ; and they
need not do so for any other reason, The hard-
shelled water creatures have feet to support their
weight. And they use them for transport from place
to place ; all that serve any other need, are as the
special qualities of each dictate. This is true even if
the reason is not obvious, for instance why many-

509

Bones
(continned).

485 ἃ
25

485 b

ARISTOTLE

͵ x é
τί τὰ πολύποδα βραδύτατα, καίτοι τὰ τετράποδα
, A A
θάττω τῶν διπόδων' πότερον ὅτι ἐπὶ γῆς ὅλα τὰ
Ψ a ,
σώματα; ἢ ὅτι φύσει ψυχρὰ καὶ δυσκίνητα; ἢ
δι᾿ ἄλλην αἰτίαν;
IX, Οἱ ἀναιροῦντες ὡς οὐ τὸ θερμὸν τὸ ἐργαζό-
μένον ἐν τοῖς σώμασιν, ἢ ὅτι μία τις φορὰ καὶ
7 Ὁ A a ͵ al
δύναμις ἡ τμητικὴ τοῦ πυρός, οὐ καλῶς λέγουσιν.
ἡδὲ \ ὅλ a 3 YZ % 4 A a + ἣν
οὐδὲ γὰρ ὅλα τοῖς ἀψύχοις ταὐτὸ ποιεῖ πᾶσιν, ἀλλὰ
λ a mn
τὰ μὲν πυκνοῖ, τὰ δὲ μανοῖ Kal τήκει, τὰ δὲ πήγνυ-
3 A ~
ow, ἐν δὲ δὴ τοῖς ἐμψύχοις οὕτως ὑποληπτέον,
a ~ ~
ὥσπερ φύσεως πῦρ ζητοῦντα, καθάπερ τέχνης"
\ a “᾿
καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς τέχναις ἕτερον τὸ χρυσοχοϊκὸν καὶ
4 -
τὸ χαλκευτικὸν καὶ τὸ τεκτονικὸν πῦρ ἀποτελεῖ,
\ \ 3
καὶ τὸ μαγειρικόν. ἴσως δ᾽ ἀληθέστερον ὅτι αἱ
/ ~ /
τέχναι" χρῶνται yap ὥσπερ ὀργάνῳ μαλάττουσαι
‘
καὶ τήκουσαι καὶ ξηραίνουσαι, ἔνια δὲ καὶ ῥυθμί-
ζουσαι.
Τὸ αὐτὸ δὴ" τοῦτο καὶ αἱ φύσεις" ὅθεν δὴ καὶ πρὸς
ἄλληλα διαφοραί. διὸ γελοῖον πρὸς τὸ ἔξω κρίνειν'
" 4, a ” - "29 ¢ , >> 4
εἴτε γὰρ διακρῖνον etre λεπτῦνον εἴθ᾽ ὁτιδήποτ᾽ ἐστὶ
4 θ ? \ ~ 6 ὃ ‘ e 4
τὸ θερμαίνεσθαι Kai πυροῦσθαι, διαφορὰν ἔξει τὰ
~ 3
ἔργα τοῖς χρωμένοις. ἀλλ᾽ αἱ μὲν τέχναι ὡς
3 7 a c δὲ yA uv ‘ ες ON
ὀργάνῳ χρῶνται, ἡ δὲ φύσις ἅμα καὶ ὡς ὕλῃ.
Οὐ δὴ τοῦτο χαλεπόν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ τὴν φύσιν
~ a 3
αὐτὴν νοῆσαι τὴν χρωμένην, ἥτις ἅμα τοῖς αἰσθη-
τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ τὸν ῥυθμὸν drodwoe. τοῦτο γὰρ
οὐκέτι πυρὸς οὐδὲ πνεύματος. τούτοις δὴ κατα-
n 4 v
μεμῖχθαι τοιαύτην δύναμιν θαυμαστόν. ἔτι δὲ

1 δὲ Β,
510

ON BREATH, vir.—rx.

footed, creatures are the slowest movers, and yet
quadrupeds move faster than bipeds, Is it because
the whole body is on the ground (1.6. in the case of the
many-footed creatures)? Or because the others are
naturally cold and hard to move? Or again is it
for some other reason ἢ

IX. Those who maintain that heat is not the
operative principle in bodies, or that the destructive
function of fire is its one and only movement and
power, are inaccurate. For it does not produce
exactly the same effect in all soulless things, but some
it thickens and some it thins and melts, others again
it hardens. So in the case of all creatures possessing
soul we must assume that the results are the same,
seeking the effects of fire in nature, just as we should
of fire in a craft ; for in the crafts, the art of the gold-
smith and of the carpenter, fire produces different
results ; so it does in cooking. Perhaps more ac-
curately the crafts produce the different results ;
for they use the fire as an instrument for softening,
melting or drying, and in some cases for tempering.

In nature things achieve the same results ; whence
the differences they exhibit. To judge, then, from
the outside is absurd ; for whether we consider heat-
ing and firing as a separating, lightening or anything
else, the results will vary according to the user. But
the crafts use fire as an instrument, but nature uses
it in this way and as material.

This presents no difficulty, but rather the difficulty
lies in the fact that nature, the user, herself thinks,
seeing that she will assign the balance to perceived
effects. This is not due either to fire or breath.
And it is remarkable that such a function should be
mingled with these. But moreover the same re-

511

Feat in
the body.

ARISTOTLE

485 b
τοῦτο θαυμαστὸν ταὐτὸν Kat περὶ ψυχῆς" ἐν τούτοις

Ἂ € δ i4 2 ~ > ? / A
yap ὑπάρχει. διόπερ οὐ κακῶς els ταὐτόν, ἢ
ἁπλῶς ἢ μόριόν τι τὸ δημιουργοῦν, καὶ τὸ τὴν
κίνησιν ἀεὶ τὴν ὁμοίαν ὑπάρχειν ἐνέργειαν" καὶ γὰρ

τὸ ἡ φύσις, ἀφ᾽ ἧς καὶ ἡ γένεσις. ἀλλὰ δὴ τίς ἡ
διαφορὰ τοῦ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον θερμοῦ; εἴθ᾽ ὡς ὄργανον
ἴθ᾽ ς bn te ε » , \ ὃ \
εἴθ᾽ ὡς ὕλην εἴθ᾽ ὡς ἄμφω. πυρὸς γὰρ διαφοραὶ
κατὰ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον. τοῦτο δὲ σχεδὸν

@ > ,ὔ ἢ > ,ὔ A A Fs
ὥσπερ ev μίξει καὶ ἀμιξίᾳ: τὸ yap καθαρώτερον
μᾶλλον. ὃ αὐτὸς δὲ λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων

lot > 7 2 , A.

"0. ἁπλῶν. ἀνάγκη γάρ, ἐπείπερ ἕτερον ὀστοῦν καὶ
σάρξ ἡ ἵππου καὶ ἡ βοός, ἢ τῷ ἐξ ἑτέρων εἶναι ἢ

p& ἡ ἵππου καὶ ἡ βοός, ἢ τῷ τέρ ναι ἢ

x , , > Ἢ πιὰ ,
τῇ χρήσει διαφέρειν. εἰ μὲν οὖν ἕτερα, τίνες αἱ
διαφοραὶ ἑκάστου τῶν ἁπλῶν; καὶ τίς; ταύτας

ol 2 / ~ ,
γὰρ ζητοῦμεν. εἰ δὲ ταὐτά, τοῖς λόγοις ἂν δια-
4 a
φέροι. ἀνάγκη yap δυοῖν θάτερον, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς

Fy ” " 4 ‘ \ a “ "ἢ \ \

26 ἄλλοις" οἴνου μὲν γὰρ καὶ μέλιτος Kpaors* διὰ τὸ

" 3 ~ ey
ὑποκείμενον, οἴνου δ᾽ αὐτοῦ, εἴπερ ἕτερα, διὰ τὸν

, \ ay a yg κ᾿ ᾿ \ .
λόγον. διὸ καὶ ᾿Εμπεδοκλῆς μίαν" ἁπλῶς τὴν τοῦ
ὀστοῦ φύσιν, εἴπερ ἅπαντα τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον ἔχει

a , a
τῆς μίξεως, ἀδιάφορα ἐχρῆν ἵππου καὶ λέοντος καὶ
3 A ~ A 4 Lg
ἀνθρώπου εἶναι. νῦν δὲ διαφέρει σκληρότητι, μα-

80 λακότητι, πυκνότητι, τοῖς ἄλλοις. ὁμοίως καὶ
A ᾿ AY Ψ / lg δὲ δ 3 “ 3 σι
σὰρξ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα μόρια. ἔτι δὲ τὰ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ
τ 4 it \ -
ζῴῳ διαφέρουσι πυκνότητι καὶ μανότητι καὶ τοῖς
A >
ἄλλοις, ὥστ᾽ οὐχ ἡ αὐτὴ κρᾶσις. παχὺ μὲν yap
2 κρᾶσιν Β, 2. αἰτίαν Β,

512

ON BREATH, rx.

markakle feature occurs with the soul; for it exists
in them also. Therefore the fact that its motion
always exerts a similar activity may reasonably be
referred to the same source, either completely or to
some part which produces the result ; for the nature,
from which their birth arises, remains the same.
But what difference can there be between the forms
of heat occurring in each individual? Whether we
are considering the heat as an instrument, or as
matter, or as both. For the only differences that
heat can show must be in its greater or smaller
quantity. This is equivalent to finding it in a mix-
ture or unmixed ; for the purer is more. The same
argument applies to other simple substances. For it
is necessary, since the bone or flesh of the horse and
ox differ, that they must either be composed of
different substances, or be employed in different ways.
If they are actually different, what are the differences
between each of the simple things, and what is it ?
For this is what we are looking for. If they are the
same, then they can only differ in proportion. One
of these two things must be true, as in other cases ;
for a mixture of wine and honey differ because of
their material, but a mixture of wine differs, if it
differs at all, because of its proportion. Therefore
Empedocles described the nature of bone as only one,
supposing that all have the same proportion in the
mixture, so that there should be no difference be-
tween the bones of a horse, lion and man. But they
do differ in hardness, softness and in other qualities.
So also do flesh and other parts differ. They even
differ in hardness and softness, and in other qualities
in the same animal, so that the proportion of mixing
cannot be the same. For coarse and fine, great and

21, δ18

ARISTOTLE

485 b
καὶ λεπτὸν καὶ μέγα καὶ μικρὸν εἴη ἐν τῷ «ποσῷ,
Ὁ σκληρὸν δὲ καὶ πυκνὸν καὶ τὰ ἐναντία τούτοις ἐν
τῷ ποιῷ τῷ τῆς μίξεως. ἀναγκαῖον δὲ τοῖς οὕτω
λέγουσιν εἰδέναι πῶς τὸ δημιουργοῦν ἕτερον εἴη
4888 ἄν, καίτοι τοῦτο πλέον ἢ ἔλαττον εἶναι, καὶ τῷ
καθ᾽ αὑτὸ καὶ τῷ μεμιγμένῳ, ἢ ἐν ἄλλῳ πυροῦσθαι
καθάπερ τὰ ἑψόμενα καὶ ὀπτώμενα. ὅπερ ἴσως
ἀληθές: ἅμα γὰρ ἐγκαταμίγνυται καὶ ποιεῖ τὸ τῆς
486} φύσεως. dpa ὃ αὐτὸς καὶ περὶ σαριὸς λόγος" καὶ
γὰρ αἱ αὐταὶ διαφοραί. σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ περὶ φλεβὸς
καὶ ἀρτηρίας καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν, ὥστε δυοῖν θάτερον,
ἢ οὐχ εἷς ὁ λόγος τούτων κατὰ τὴν μίξιν, ἢ οὐ
σκληρότητι καὶ πυκνότητι καὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις τοὺς
λόγους ληπτέον.

δ14

ON BREATH, 1x.

small,* are quantitative differences, but hard and
thick and their opposites are differences in the quality
of the mixture. But those who argue in this way
must know how what creates them differs. And yet
this toa may be either greater or less, and may diifer
by existing alone or in a mixture, or by being heated
in something else like things which are boiled or
baked. Perhaps this is the true solution; for it is
in the mixing that it achieves its true nature. ‘Then
the same explanation may be given of flesh ; for the
differences in it are the same. And the accounts of
vein, air passage and the rest are approximately the
same. So of two things one is true; either the pro-
portions of the mixtures are not the same, or we
cannot give any true account in terms of hardness,
thickness or their opposites.

615

τ INDEX

Acholous, 420 b 12

Alemacan, 406 a 20

Anaxagoras, 404 2 25, 401 b1, 405
ἃ 18, 406 Ὁ 20, 430 ἃ 19, 429 b 24,
470 Ὁ 80, 470 b 88

Antipheron, 451 2 9

Aphrodite, 406 b 10, 464 b 8

Aristogenus, 481 a 28

Buryathenes, 462 b 25

Cloon, 425 a 25, 430 Ὁ ὅ
Ooriscus, 450 Ὁ 81, 461 b 24, 462 a 5
Critias, 405 b6

Dacdalus, 406 b 18

Demooritus, 408 b 81, 104 a 27,
40548, 406 b17, 406 b 20, 400 a
12, 409 a 82, 400 b 8, 419 α 15,
438 α δ, 442299, 442 b 10, 408
5, 470 b 28, 471 b 80, 482 a 80

Diares, 418 a 21

Diogenes, 405 ἃ 21, 470 Ὁ 81, 471 b
15

Empedocles, 404 b 11, 408 b 19,
410 a 8, 410 8 28, 410 Ὁ 4, 415 a 29,
418 b20, 497 8. 22, 490 Ὁ 20, 480 8

NOMINUM

28, 487 011, 487) 23, 141 a7,
441010, 440.0 26, 470 a 16,477 8 82,
47718, 478 ὁ Ὁ, 482 a 20, 484 a
88, 485 Ὁ 26

Euripides, 448 Ὁ 88

Hoctor, 404 a 80

Hephuestus, 410 Ὁ 6
Heracleitus, 406 a 25, 448 3
Horacles, Pillars of, 462 b 24
Hippon, 406 a 2

Homer, 104 a 20, 127 a 25

Leucippus, 404 ἃ 5

Orpheus, 410 b 28

Philacgidas, 404 b 2

Philip, 406 b 17

Plato, 404 Ὁ 16, 406 Ὁ 26

Pythagoreans, 404 0 17, 407 Ὁ 22,
439 a 31, 445 a 16

Strattis, 443 Ὁ 88

Thales, 405 8 19, 411. 8 8

Timaens, 404 b 16, 400 Ὁ 26, 487 b 18,
487 b15, 472 b6

517

Il. INDEX

Bones, function of, 484 4 9

Breath, function of, 481 8 1; phy-
slology of, 481 a 28

Breathing, animals and, 470 b 6;
Aristotle's views on, 474 a 25;
cooling and, 477 a 11; Empe-
docles’ account of, 473 a 15;
fishes and, 470 b 28; life and,
474 Ὁ 25; Plato's account of,
472 b 6; purpose of, 471 b 80

Colour, 28 an emanation, 440 a 16;
product of mixed, 439 b 22;
where it lies, 439 Ὁ 20

De natural and unnatural, 478

22
pons of the living body, 468 a
8
Dreams aud imagination, 460 a 8;
and opinion, 458 Ὁ 10; and per-
ception, 458 b 3; and true per-
caption in sleep, 462 86 15; and
residual images, 46248; dreamers
and, 462 a 31; distortion by, 463
a7; perception external to, 458 b
25; persistence of vision as ex-
lanation of, 460 8 82; sent from
od, 462 b 12; algnificant or
coincident, 462 Ὁ 26

Bcho, 419 Ὁ 25
Error, 428 Ὁ 10

Fish, physiology of, 471 8. 20
Food, nature of, 416 a 19

Grafting plants, 468 b 16

Hearing, process of, 420 a 8

518

RERUM

Heart, action of, 470 b 173 fune-
tions of, 409 Ὁ 6

Heat, destruction of, 400 Ὁ 21;
function of, 480 a 16

Imagination, 427 b 27

Light, 418 b 2

Longevity, health and, 464 b 19;
heat moisture and, 466 217; in
plants, 467 a6; sizeand, 4θ0 4 1

Lung and heart, 478 a 26; function
of, 478 8. 11

Medium, in sound and smell, 419 a
25; in touch, 4284 22; in vision,
410 16

Memory and imagination, 450 a1;
and recollection, 451 a 20; good
and bed, 408 a 84; in general,
449 b4

Movoment, causes of, 433 a 9

Potential and_uctual, 417 a 21

Recollection, bodily reaction of,
408 a 16; methods employed in,
461 Ὁ 12; not all living creatures
have, 414 a 20; time factor in,
452 Ὁ 8

Sensation and thinking, 427 a 19,
420 8 18; and time, 446 a 22; as
a harmony, 420 α 27; aa a mean,
424017; definition of, 424217;
in goneral, 416 Ὁ 82; its contri-
bution to life, 486 Ὁ 9; its con-
tribution to well-being, 4878 1;
life essential to, 467 b 10; pos-
sible divistbillty, 446b8; slmul-
taneous, 447 α 18

INDEX RERUM

Sense, cdmmon, 455 0 12

Senses, only five, 424 b 22; are all
derived from touch? 442 a $1;
counexion with elements, 437 4
19

Sensible objects, 418 2 6

Senstbles, common, 425 a 14

Sleep, action of food in production
of, 456 b 17; and wakefulness
complementary, 448 b 24; and
wakefulness polong both to soul
and body, 454 a7; cause of, 455 Ὁ
18; characteristic of all animals,
464.0 14; heatasa factor in, 457
a 838: Nature of, 455 b 28; and
wakefulness both transitory, 459
a 103 physical VA inhale of,
456 a 80; purpose of, 455 a 4

Smell, 4218. 7, 442 b 29; and breath-
ing, 444 b 2; and taste, 448 b 9;
in man, 444 a 84; supposed
nutritive function of, 445 1 17

Sout and body, 408 a 2; and imove-
ment, $65 b 31, 42a 16, 82h 83
and life, 434822; as compound
of elements, 469 Ὁ 235 a4 fom,
dlzb 10; as harmony, 407 b 273
as numbor, 408 Ὁ $2; nature of,
412a1; nutritive part of, 167 b
B43 parts of, 432219; theories
of befuru Aristotle, 403 Ὁ 20

Sound, conditions of, 410 Ὁ 4

Tarte, connexion with touch, 422
a 83 presence of liquid essential,
422 017; theories of, 411 αὶ 4

Touch, 422 b 17; first essential
sense, 418 b 7, 485. 11

Vision, aflects the Οὐ οὐ, seen, 459
Ὁ 28} process of, 4181 26, 437 b 14
Voice, 420 Ὁ 5

Whale'’s blow-hole, #76 Ὁ 18

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oe ana Tt, BE. Butler. 4 Vols. (Vol 1. Qned
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ST, AUGUSTIN, CONFESSIONS OI]. W. Watts
(163i). 2 Vols, (Vol. I. 4th Imp., Vol. ΤΠ. 87d Tiny.)

ST. AUGUSTINE, SELECT LETTERS. J. H. Baxter.

SALLUST. J. Rolfe. (θη Imp. revised.)

SCRIPTORES ITSTORIAK AUGUSTAE. D. Magie.
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SUETONIUS., J.C. Rolfe. 2 Vols. (4th Imp, revised.)

TACITUS: DIALOGUS. Sir Wm. Peterson; and AGRI-
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bere eae DE ARCHITECTURA. F. Granger.
2 Vols.

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ACHILLES TATIUS. 85. Gaselee.
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3

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ARATUS. Cf, CALLIMACHUS.,

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ARISTOTLE: METAPHYSICS. H. Tredennick, ὦ
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ham. (2nd Imp. revised.)

ARISTOTLE: OECONOMICA ἀν MAGNA MOR-
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ARISTOTLE: POLITICS. . Rackham.

ARRIAN: HISTORY OF ALEXANDER anv INDICA.
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CALLIMACHUS ann LYCOPHRON. A, W. Mair;
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CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA. Rev. G. W. Butter-
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COLLUTHUS. Cf OPPIAN,

DAPHNE ann CHLOE. Thornley’s ‘Translation revised
by J, M. Edmonds; ayp PARTHENIUS. S. Gaselee.
(3rd Imp.)

DEMOSTHENES: DE CORONA ayy DE FALSA
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ol. I,

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_ Imp., Vols. 1.-1V. 2nd Jmp.) :

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ols. I-III.

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QUINTUS SMYRNAEUS, A. S, Way. Verse trans,
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ST. JOHN DAMASCENE: BARLAAM AND IOA-
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SEXTUS EMPIRICUS. Ney. R. ὦ. Bury. In 3 Vols.

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SOPHOCLES. F. Storr, 2 Vols. (Vol. 1. 6¢h Imp., Vol.
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STRABO: GEOGRAPHY, Horace L. Jones. 8 Vols.
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THEOPHRASTUS: CHARACTERS, J. M. Edmonds;
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THEOPHRASTUS: ENQUIRY INTO PLANTS, Sir
Arthur Hort, Bart. ὦ Vols.

THUCYDIDES. C.F. Smith, 4 Vols. (Vol. 1. 3rd ding,
Vols, II., III. and ΤᾺ, Qnd Jmp. revised.)

TRYPHIODORUS. Cf. OPPIAN.

XENOPHON: CYROPAEDTA, Walter Miller. 2 Vols.
(πώ Imp.

XENOPHON: HELLENICA, ANABASIS, APOLOGY,
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8 Vols. (2nd Imp.)

Saad one MEMORABIL [A arp OECONOMICUS.

.C. Marchant
XENOPHON, SCRIPT A MINORA., EC, Marchant,

VOLUMES IN PREPARATION
GREEK AUTHORS

ARISTOTLE: ON HISTORY, MOTION AND PRO-
GRESSION OF ANIMALS. E. S, Forster and
A, Peck.

ARISTOTLE: ORGANON. 4H, P. Cooke and
H. Tredennick.

ARISTOTLE: RHETONICA AD ALEXANDRUM.
H. Rackham.

DEMOSTHENES: METIDIAS, ANDROTION, ARISTO-
CRATES, TIMOCRATES, ARISTOGEITON. J. H.

Vince,

DEMOSTHENES: PRIVATE ORATIONS. A. T.
Murray.

DIONYSIUS OF HALICARNASSUS: ROMAN ANTI-
QUITIES. Spelman’s translation revised by Εἰ. Cary,

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GREEK MATHEMATICAL WORKS. J. Thomas.
MINOR ATTIC ORATORS (ANTIPHON, ANDUCIDES
DEMADES, DINARCHUS, HYPEREIDES). K. Maid-

ment.
NONNUS. W.H.D. Rouse.

LATIN AUTHORS

AMMIANUS MARCELLINUS., J. C. Rolfe.

S. AUGUSTINE: CITY OF GOD, J. H. Baxter.

CELSUS. W G. Spencer.

CICERO: AD HERENNIUM. H. Caplan.

CICERO: IN CATILINAM PRO FLACCO, PRO
MURENA, PRO SULLA BLL. Ullman.

ea : DE ORATORE, Charles Stuttuford and W. E.

ution.

CICERO: ORATOR, BRUTUS. H. M. Hubbell.

CICERO: PRO SESTIO, IN VATINIUM, PRO
CAELIO, DE PROVINCHS CONSULARIBUS, PRO
BALBO. J. H. Freese,

COLUMELLA: DE RE RUSTICA. H. B. Ash.

ENNIUS, LUCILIUS and other specimens of Old Latin.
Ἐς H. Warmington.

PLINY: NATURAL HISTORY. W.H.S. Jones.

PRUDENTIUS. J. H. Baxter and C. J. Fordyce.

SIDONIUS: LETTERS & POEMS. E. V. Arnold and
W. B. Anderson.

VARRO: DE LINGUA LATINA. R. G. Kent.

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